Opinion
No. 29073-5-III.
Filed: June 9, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Yakima County, No. 08-2-03154-2, David A. Elofson, J., entered May 6, 2010.
Reversed by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Sweeney and Siddoway, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Kelly J. Paullus, Trista S. Paullus, and Geoffrey M. Mitchell (collectively Mr. Mitchell) appeal the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of their negligence claim against Yakima County (County). The court found Mr. Mitchell failed to substantially comply with former RCW 4.96.020 (2006), the claim-filing statute. Mr. Mitchell contends issues of material fact exist regarding claim-filing compliance and the County waived the defense of noncompliance by proceeding with the claim. We conclude Mr. Mitchell substantially complied with claim-filing requirements, do not reach Mr. Mitchell's waiver contention, and reverse.
FACTS
On September 2, 2005, Jacob Depauw was driving a company van on Konnowac Pass Road in Yakima County. His passengers included Mr. Paullus and Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Depauw lost control of the van and struck the highway guardrail. It split, with a portion of the guardrail piercing the passenger compartment of the van, injuring Mr. Paullus and Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell decided to pursue a claim against the County for the guardrail splitting. Pursuant to former RCW 4.96.010 (2006), attorney Christopher Childers filed a statement of claim for each plaintiff with Yakima County on April 4, 2008. The notices of claim were on a form provided by Yakima County. The forms were filled out, including the date, time, and exact location of the accident, and provided the names of all persons involved in the accident. The form partly stated:
On September 2, 2005 at approximately 12:54 PM Jacob DePauw was driving a work van provided by his employer Michael Durnal with Durnal Construction traveling northbound on Konnowac Pass. DePauw lost control of the van hitting a 25' guardrail. The guardrail split in half and pierced through the van. Claimants Kelly J. Paullus and Geoffrey M. Mitchell were riding in the back of the van and suffered personal injury. Claimant, Trista Sofia Paullus, is Kelly Paullus' wife. Trista Sofia Paullus has assisted Kelly Paullus with his medical recovery.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 100. The claim omits mention of how the County was liable.
On May 29, 2008, in response to an inquiry from Mr. Mitchell's attorney, the county responded that it did not have the guardrail or photos of the accident scene. A county staff member then requested copies of all parties' treatment records. A second letter dated July 22 reiterated the County's request "to assist in our review of this claim." CP at 56. Plaintiffs' counsel did not respond to either request. And, the County took no action on the claim.
On August 12, 2008, Mr. Mitchell sued the County in superior court. Counsel for the county contacted Mr. Childers about his clients' theory of liability. Mr. Childers provided a general assertion that the guardrail had been improperly "designed, installed or maintained." CP at 25. No activity on the claim took place for over a year except for the December 10, 2009 appointment of a special deputy prosecutor to handle the case.
On February 8, 2010, the County requested summary judgment dismissal, asserting Mr. Mitchell failed to comply with the tort claims statute. The trial court granted the county's request, concluding Mr. Mitchell failed to substantially comply with the statute by failing to provide "some statement regarding the wrongful conduct of the defendant." Report of Proceedings at 19. Mr. Mitchell appealed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting the County's request for summary judgment dismissal of Mr. Mitchell's negligence claim. Mr. Mitchell contends he substantially complied with chapter 4.96 RCW before filing his negligence claim. Mr. Mitchell further contends the county waived the noncompliance defense by proceeding as though it would defend against the claim.
When reviewing a summary judgment order, we make the same inquiries as the trial court. Cowlitz Stud Co. v. Clevenger, 157 Wn.2d 569, 573, 141 P.3d 1 (2006). We consider all the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Mr. Mitchell. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party shows that he or she is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). "A genuine issue of material fact exists where reasonable minds could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation." Ranger Ins. Co., 164 Wn.2d at 552.
In 1967, Washington's legislature abolished sovereign immunity for the state's political subdivisions by enacting chapter 4.96 RCW. Sievers v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 97 Wn. App. 181, 183, 983 P.2d 1127 (1999). This chapter established the requirements for filing tort claims against local governmental entities. Id. A county is a local governmental entity. RCW 4.96.010(2).
"Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages." RCW 4.96.010(1). Additionally, "[a]ll claims for damages arising out of tortious conduct must locate and describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury or damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, and shall contain the amount of damages claimed." Former RCW 4.96.020(3) (2006). The claim is barred if the plaintiff fails to comply with this statute. Reyes v. City of Renton, 121 Wn. App. 498, 504, 86 P.3d 155 (2004).
The current statute requires all claims to be submitted on a standard tort claim form. RCW 4.96.020(3). The standard claim form requires, "A description of the conduct and the circumstances that brought about the injury or damage." RCW 4.96.020(3)(a)(ii). This is the same requirement that is in the former statute.
We must determine if Mr. Mitchell substantially complied with the claim-filing statute, former RCW 4.96.020(3), when he described the accident but did not specify his liability theory. "We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo." Renner v. City of Marysville, 168 Wn.2d 540, 545, 230 P.3d 569 (2010). We first look to the plain language of the statute. Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 372-73, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). We look to the statute itself, its context, its related provisions, and the entire statutory scheme. Id. at 373. We construe statutes "`so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.'" State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 624, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)). If a plain meaning analysis fails to resolve the issue, we look to legislative history and relevant case law to discern legislative intent. Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 373.
Our Supreme Court has interpreted "substantial compliance" to require "that the claimant make a `bona fide attempt to comply with the law' and that the notice filed `must actually accomplish its purpose.'" Renner, 168 Wn.2d at 545 (quoting Brigham v. City of Seattle, 34 Wn.2d 786, 789, 210 P.2d 144 (1949)). "Even when the notice is defective in some respects, we have held it is sufficient if it advances the purpose of the statute." Id. at 546.
The purpose of the claim-filing statute is "to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim." Id. "The legislature illustrated the general nature of this purpose, stating that `[t]he laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.'" Id. (quoting RCW 4.96.010(1)). Accordingly, "exact specificity is not required; the claimant simply must provide enough information to put the government on notice of the claim and its contents." Id.
Here, the relevant statute requires Mr. Mitchell to "locate and describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage." Former RCW 4.96.020(3). The submitted claim states, "DePauw lost control of the van hitting a 25' guardrail. The guardrail split in half and pierced through the van. Claimants Kelly J. Paullus and Geoffrey M. Mitchell were riding in the back of the van and suffered personal injury." Relying on Caron v. Grays Harbor County, 18 Wn.2d 397, 403, 139 P.2d 626 (1943), the County argues this is insufficient because the liability theory is unstated.
In Caron, a county employee filed a claim with the county based upon a prior claim-filing statute after falling off a ladder. The claim stated, "Blanche Caron hereby presents a claim to said county for damages to the person of said Blanche Caron, caused from a fall while carrying on her general duty as an abstractor. . . . Blanche Caron was on a ladder extracting a file case when the case failed to hold causing the ladder to slip and the said Blanche Caron to fall and injure her back." Caron, 18 Wn.2d at 403-04. The court held this did not substantially comply with the claim-filing statute because it did not describe why the ladder slipped. Id. at 410.
Caron is distinguishable from this case. The predecessor to RCW 4.96.020 required "`[a]ll such claims for damages must locate and describe the defect which caused the injury.'" Caron, 18 Wn.2d at 403 (quoting Rem. Rev. Stat. § 4077, P.C. § 1664a). Clearly, Ms. Caron did not locate and describe the defect which caused her injury. Here, however, the plain language of the current statute solely requires the claimant to "locate and describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage." Mr. Mitchell exactly specified the injury location and the conduct and circumstances bringing about the injuries: Mr. DePauw lost control of the van, hit a guardrail, the guardrail split in half, pierced through the van, and injured the passengers.
The purpose of the claim-filing statute is "to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim." Renner, 168 Wn.2d at 546. The legislature recognized this purpose in stating, "The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory." RCW 4.96.010(1).
In Renner, the Supreme Court held that a former employee substantially complied with the statutory requirement of stating "amount of damages" in the claim filed with the city by describing the damages the former employee would request instead of including a numerical amount; and the former employee complied with requirements for a statement of residence. Based on the purpose of the claim-filing statute, the court held, "Under this directive, exact specificity is not required; the claimant simply must provide enough information to put the government on notice of the claim and its contents." Renner, 168 Wn.2d at 546.
Under these circumstances, we conclude Mr. Mitchell substantially complied with the applicable statutory requirements to "locate and describe the conduct and circumstances" of the parties' injuries and satisfied the conditions precedent to bringing suit against the County. See former RCW 4.96.020(3). Mr. Mitchell provided enough information "to put [the County] on notice of the claim and its contents." Renner, 168 Wn.2d at 546.
In sum, the trial court erred in deciding claim-filing deficiencies and granting summary dismissal of Mr. Mitchell's case. Having so ruled, we acknowledge but do not consider Mr. Mitchell's additional contention that the county waived its noncompliance defense. See Christiano v. Spokane County Health Dist., 93 Wn. App. 90, 94, 969 P.2d 1078 (1998) ("principles of judicial restraint dictate that when one issue is dispositive, we should refrain from reaching other issues that might be presented.").
Reversed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SIDDOWAY, J. and SWEENEY, J., concur