Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2016-0221
03-16-2017
PAULA C., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, G.B., J.V., AND B.M., Appellees.
COUNSEL Jacqueline Rohr, Tucson Counsel for Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Daniel R. Huff, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JD20150715
The Honorable Brenden J. Griffin, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Jacqueline Rohr, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Daniel R. Huff, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Howard authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Vásquez concurred. HOWARD, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Paula C. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her children, G. (born June 2009), J. (born June 2010), and B. (born May 2013), on time-in-care grounds pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). She argues on appeal there was insufficient evidence to support termination on that ground or the court's finding that termination was in the children's best interests. We affirm.
¶2 "[W]e view the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to sustaining the [juvenile] court's decision." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009). The Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed the children from Paula's care in October 2015, after receiving several reports of her substance abuse and neglect of the children. DCS filed a dependency petition, and the children were found dependent in December 2015. Paula was offered numerous services, including substance-abuse treatment, drug testing, parenting education, and visitation. Paula did not meaningfully participate in services, continued to use drugs and, in February 2016, was arrested for solicitation to possess methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. After her release from jail in March, she still did not engage in most services, including substance-abuse services, and again tested positive for methamphetamine and other drugs in April 2016; she was arrested for drug possession in May 2016. In July 2016, at the juvenile court's direction, DCS filed a motion to terminate Paula's parental rights on time-in-care grounds.
Paula's participation in services before her February arrest consisted of sporadic visitation, and submitting to a single drug test for DCS—which was positive for multiple drugs—before refusing to submit to additional tests. She failed to keep two substance-abuse intake appointments and did not attempt to engage in any other services.
¶3 Following her release in July 2016, Paula continued to fail to participate in most offered services. Although she attended visitation occasionally, during one visit, she kept falling asleep and was incoherent "for a good portion of the visit," causing the visit to be terminated. Paula was convicted of the various charged drug offenses and placed on probation, the terms of which included a 120-day jail term. She was incarcerated until September 9 and then placed in an inpatient treatment program, where she remained throughout the contested severance hearing in October and November.
¶4 The juvenile court terminated Paula's parental rights in November 2016. The court found Paula had willfully failed to comply with her case plan throughout her dependency and her recent compliance did not compel the court to find otherwise. It additionally found termination was in the children's best interests. Although the court acknowledged Paula had "ma[de] progress," it noted her "sobriety is nascent" and "[t]he children deserve permanency" and are currently in stable placements. It also observed that the children's behavior was "regressing" due to recent increased contact with Paula and found that "[f]orcing them to remain in a dependency to see if [Paula] can maintain her sobriety and otherwise become a minimally adequate parent will expose them to more inconsistency, uncertainty, and trauma." This appeal followed.
The juvenile court had previously terminated the parental rights of the children's fathers on, inter alia, abandonment grounds. They are not parties to this appeal.
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for severance and finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). "[W]e will affirm a termination order that is supported by reasonable evidence." Jordan C., 223 Ariz. 86, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d at 303. That is, we will not reverse a termination order for insufficient evidence unless, as a matter of law, no reasonable fact-finder could have found the evidence satisfied the applicable burden of proof. See Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, ¶ 10, 210 P.3d 1263, 1266 (App. 2009).
¶6 To terminate Paula's parental rights pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8)(a), DCS was required to show the children had "been in a [court-ordered,] out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of nine months or longer . . . and the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement." "[P]arents who make appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs outlined by [DCS] will not be found to have substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances that caused out-of-home placement, even if they cannot completely overcome their difficulties." In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994). "[T]he test focuses on the level of the parent's effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent's success in actually doing so." Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, ¶ 20, 152 P.3d 1209, 1212 (App. 2007). But when parents make only "sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy" the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement, a "court is well within its discretion in finding substantial neglect and terminating parental rights on that basis." Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 576, 869 P.2d at 1229. And "[t]ermination is not limited to those who have completely neglected or willfully refused to remedy" the circumstances that caused out-of-home placement. Id. (emphasis omitted).
¶7 Paula argues there was insufficient evidence to support termination under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) because she had made a good-faith effort to comply with her case plan. We find scant evidence of such effort. Paula's participation in services for the first ten months of the dependency consisted primarily of failed drug tests and sporadic visitation. She made no noticeable effort to enter substance-abuse treatment. Although she claims to have remained drug-free while in jail, she relapsed while on release pending sentencing. The juvenile court was free to conclude that Paula's recent sobriety, all while she was incarcerated or in residential treatment, was insufficient in light of her extended failure to take any steps to address her substance abuse despite having been given ample opportunity to have done so. A brief period of sobriety after a motion for severance has been filed does not prohibit severance pursuant to § 8-533(B). See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 577, 869 P.2d at 1230 (parent's successful efforts at rehabilitation during eight months prior to trial "'too little, too late'" in light of substantial neglect to remedy addiction for more than a year while child in out-of-home care).
To the extent Paula suggests there was insufficient evidence that the children were in a court-ordered placement for nine months or longer, she has made no cognizable argument and her claim is wholly unsupported by the record. Thus, we do not address it further. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Novak, 167 Ariz. 363, 370, 807 P.2d 531, 538 (App. 1990) (declining to consider issue unsupported by authority or argument). --------
¶8 Paula next argues that DCS failed to make "reasonable efforts to reunify the family." Pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8), DCS is required to make "a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services." But, at the termination hearing, Paula informed the juvenile court that she was "not disputing" that DCS had made such an effort. We therefore need not address Paula's argument on appeal. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, ¶ 16, 319 P.3d 236, 241 (App. 2014) (parent who does not object to adequacy of services waives issue on appeal).
¶9 Last, Paula contends the juvenile court erred in finding termination was in the children's best interests. She, however, identifies no legal error in the court's ruling and instead asks us to reweigh the evidence. We will not do so. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004).
¶10 We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Paula's parental rights to G., J., and B.