Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1848-G
November 7, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendants Fujitsu Technology Solutions, Inc. and Fujitsu IT Holdings, Inc. f/k/a Amdahl Corporation (collectively, "Fujitsu") to dismiss, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the claim of the plaintiff Howard Patton ("Patton") under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, Fujitsu's motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves allegations of employment discrimination by Patton against Fujitsu, his former employer. Fujitsu Technology Solutions, Inc. is a California corporation and Fujitsu IT Holdings, Inc. f/k/a Amdahl Corporation is a Delaware corporation. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("First Amended Complaint") ¶¶ 1.02-1.03. Both corporations are authorized to do business in the state of Texas. Id. Patton is an individual resident of Texas. Id. ¶ 1.01.
In November 1999, Patton — an African American male over the age of forty — was employed at Fujitsu as a senior sales executive. Id. ¶¶ 3.01, 3.04. Fujitsu terminated Patton's employment on June 18, 2001 and notified Patton of the termination the same day. Id. ¶ 3.26. On November 28, 2001, Patton filed his original charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Fujitsu had unlawfully discriminated against him in its decision to terminate his employment. Id. ¶ 4.08; see also Appendix Filed in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's ADEA Claim for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted ("Defendants' Appendix") at 3. Patton's original charge identified only racial discrimination as the basis for his complaint. See Defendants' Appendix at 3. On June 18, 2002, Patton amended his EEOC charge to include an allegation of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of His Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiff's Response") at 3; Defendants' Appendix at 4. Patton also attached to the amended charge a six-page affidavit amplifying his allegations of race and age discrimination against Fujitsu. See Defendants' Appendix at 5-10. The EEOC subsequently served Fujitsu with a copy of the amended charge and issued Patton a notice of right to sue. Plaintiff's Response at 3; Plaintiff's Appendix to Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiff's Appendix") at 3-4. Patton's right to sue notice, however, expressly authorized suit only for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). The relevant boxes authorizing legal action under the ADEA had not been checked. See Plaintiff's Appendix at 3.
The ADEA prohibits age discrimination by employers in both the public and private sectors against individuals who are at least forty years of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), et seq.; Williams v. General Motors Corporation, 656 F.2d 120, 126-127 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
Patton asserts that the failure to fill in the proper box authorizing suit under the ADEA was simply a clerical error on the part of the EEOC. Plaintiff's Response at 3. In support of this assertion, Patton has provided an affidavit of the EEOC representative responsible for filling out the form. See Plaintiff's Appendix at 1-2.
On August 28, 2002, Patton filed his original complaint in this court. The complaint contained two claims — one alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and the other alleging age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. See Plaintiff's Original Complaint ("Complaint") ¶¶ 4.02, 4.13. In addition, Patton's original complaint included a copy of his right to sue notification and the amended EEOC charge along with its supporting affidavit, which Patton collectively labeled as Exhibit A. See Exhibit A, attached to Complaint. On September 4, 2002, Patton filed his first amended complaint. See Docket Sheet. The amended complaint is virtually identical to the original complaint with the exception that Exhibit A to the amended complaint contains only a copy of the right to sue notification from the EEOC. See Exhibit A, attached to First Amended Complaint. Fujitsu responded to the amended complaint by filing the instant motion to dismiss.
At the outset, the court notes that Fujitsu's motion seeks dismissal only of Patton's ADEA claim, not his Title VII claim.
II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." There are two primary principles that guide the court's determination of whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted. First, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1357 at 598 (1969), for the proposition that "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). Second, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).These principles are, however, subject to important limitations. See Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1050. While the court must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint, the court need not accept as true "conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact." Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Company, 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (internal citation omitted); see also Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992); Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1050. Moreover, "a complaint that shows relief to be barred by an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action," pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1050; see also Kansa Reinsurance Company, Ltd. v. Congressional Mortgage Corporation of Texas, 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994); United Transportation Union v. Florida East Coast Railway Company, 586 F.2d 520, 527 (5th Cir. 1978); Mann v. Adams Realty Company, Inc., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977); J.M. Blythe Motor Lines Corporation v. Blalock, 310 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir. 1962); Herron v. Herron, 255 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1958). With these principles and their limitations in mind, the court now turns to Patton's ADEA claim.
B. Patton's ADEA Claim
In this motion, Fujitsu asserts that Patton failed to exhaust the administrative remedies required under the ADEA and, therefore, failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Defendants' Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim of Age Discrimination Under the ADEA For Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted ("Defendants' Motion") ¶ 2. Specifically, Fujitsu argues that the age discrimination claim in Patton's amended EEOC charge is untimely because it was not filed until more than three hundred days after his termination date. See id. ¶¶ 4, 20. Fujitsu also argues that Patton's ADEA claim is not sufficiently "like or reasonably related to" the race discrimination claim in his original EEOC charge so as to permit its maintenance despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See id. ¶¶ 4, 33. For the reasons discussed below, the court agrees with these assertions.
1. Rule 12(b)(6) is a Proper Mechanism to Challenge Patton's ADEA Claim as Untimely
As an initial matter, this court will address Patton's argument that a motion to dismiss, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "may not be a proper mechanism" to address a failure to timely file an ADEA claim with the EEOC. Plaintiff's Response at 5. According to the Fifth Circuit, the EEOC filing requirement in an ADEA claim "functions as a statute of limitations" and is a necessary "pre-condition to filing suit in [the] district court." Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Division, 927 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir.) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991). Moreover, as discussed above, it has long been the rule in this circuit that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is an appropriate vehicle to dispose of a claim where that claim is, on its face, barred by a statute of limitations. Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1050. In the present case, Fujitsu challenges Patton's ADEA claim as time-barred for failure to file an EEOC charge within three hundred days. See Defendants' Motion ¶¶ 4, 20. Consequently, Fujitsu's motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is a proper vehicle for raising Patton's alleged failure to timely file an administrative charge under the ADEA.
2. Patton Failed to Exhaust the Administrative Remedies Requited Under the ADEA
A plaintiff asserting age discrimination must file a timely administrative charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to bringing suit under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Conaway v. Control Data Corporation, 955 F.2d 358, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 864 (1992); Rhodes, 927 F.2d at 878. Generally, the EEOC charge must be filed within one hundred and eighty days of the allegedly unlawful action. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). However, in a deferral state such as Texas, the limitations period for filing a timely EEOC charge is three hundred days from the date of the allegedly unlawful employment practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Mooney v. Aramco Services Company, 54 F.3d 1207, 1223 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Anson v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 962 F.2d 539, 540 (5th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that "one cannot take legal action in ADEA cases unless one has filed an administrative charge, in cases arising in Texas, within 300 days of the last act of discrimination"). Consequently, "a Texas employee's ADEA claims are normally time-barred if the employee fails to file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC within [three hundred] days." Tyler v. Union Oil Company of Calfornia, 304 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2002).
A "deferral state" is a state with a law prohibiting age discrimination in employment and authorizing a state authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practices. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) and 633(b); see also Conaway, 955 F.2d at 362 and n. 3.
Patton submitted his original EEOC charge on November 28, 2001, alleging only racial discrimination as the basis for his termination. See Defendants' Appendix at 3. It was not until June 19, 2002 that Patton amended the EEOC charge to add a claim for age discrimination and provided the commission with a six-page affidavit explaining the basis for his age discrimination allegations. See Plaintiff's Response at 3; Defendants' Appendix at 4, 5-10. The amended charge was the first document submitted to the EEOC alleging any discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Thus, Patton did not make his charge of age discrimination until more than a year after his termination by Fujitsu, i.e., more than three hundred days following his termination. Patton, therefore, has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which must be done before a legal action under the ADEA may be brought. See Tyler, 304 F.3d at 384.
Patton makes two arguments in response. First, he argues that the court must accept as true all material allegations in his complaint, including the allegation that he has properly exhausted his remedies with the EEOC and timely asserted his age discrimination claim under the ADEA. Plaintiff's Response at 3-4. Second, he argues that, even if untimely, his age discrimination claim arises out of the same facts as his racial discrimination claim and, therefore, is sufficiently "like or related to" his original EEOC charge to permit its maintenance in this case despite any failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 6. Patton's arguments are wide of the mark.
Patton's first argument — that the court must accept as true his allegations of timely filing and exhaustion of administrative remedies under the ADEA — completely ignores the limitations on the general rule that a court must accept all material allegations in a complaint as true. As discussed above, the court need not accept as true any conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact in a plaintiff's complaint. Associated Builders, 505 F.2d at 100. Further, while the court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings in entertaining a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "documents that a defendant attaches to a [12(b)(6) motion] are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [his] claim." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting the holding in Venture Associates Corporation v. Zenith Data Systems Transportation, 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)). By providing such documents, "the defendant merely assists the plaintiff in establishing the basis of the suit, and the court in making the elementary determination of whether a claim has been stated." Id. at 499. Thus, the court need not accept as true any allegations in a plaintiffs complaint if contradicted by documents provided by the defendant. See Franks v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 164 F. Supp.2d 865, 871-72 (W.D. Tex. 2001); see also Sheppard v. Texas Department of Transportation, 158 F.R.D. 592, 595 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (citing Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1327 at 762-63 (1990), for the proposition that "when a plaintiff does not attach a pertinent document to the complaint, a `defendant may introduce the exhibit as part of his motion attacking the pleading.'").
Here, Fujitsu has provided the court with copies of Patton's original and amended EEOC charges, including the affidavit Patton attached to the amended charge. See Defendant's Appendix at 3-10. Patton refers to each of these documents — either directly or by implication — throughout his amended complaint and pleadings. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 4.08, 4.19; Plaintiff's Response at 1, 3, 5-6. Both administrative charges are central to Patton's ADEA claim because they show just when Patton presented his age discrimination claim to the EEOC and the extent of his allegations. Thus, Fujitsu has assisted the court in making the "elementary determination" of whether Patton has properly stated a cause of action by supplying the missing the EEOC charges — documents which Patton conveniently omitted from his amended complaint. See Collins, 244 F.3d at 499. A review of these documents reveals Patton's failure to timely allege a claim of age discrimination and, consequently, his failure to exhaust the required administrative remedies. The court, therefore, will not accept as true Patton's merely conclusory allegations that he has timely alleged his age discrimination claim and properly exhausted his remedies with the EEOC.
Patton cites Alfred v. Centex Corporation, 2001 WL 1041787 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2001) (Fish, J.), for the proposition that, under the deferential standard of Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true his assertions of timely filing and administrative exhaustion because he has supplied an affidavit indicating an EEOC clerical error. See Plaintiff's Response at 3; Plaintiff's Appendix at 1-2. Patton misconstrues the holding in Alfred. In Alfred, this court denied a motion to dismiss where the plaintiffs' affidavit supported their allegations of administrative exhaustion. See Alfred, 2001 WL 1041787 at *3. The defendants in Alfred presented no evidence to contradict the validity of the plaintiffs' affidavit. In this case, the plaintiff's complaint and the affidavit itself are contradicted by the EEOC documents submitted by Fujitsu.
Finally, Patton's second argument — that his ADEA claim is sufficiently "like or related to" his timely filed racial discrimination claim — is equally unavailing. As discussed, a plaintiff seeking relief under the ADEA must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to obtaining judicial redress. The logical corollary of this rule is that a district court considering a discrimination claim under the ADEA is limited to the scope of claims timely presented to the EEOC. However, where a plaintiffs unexhausted claims are sufficiently "like or related to" allegations in a timely filed charge such that the unexhausted claims would likely be within "the `scope' of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charge of discrimination," a district court may consider the untimely claims despite a failure to exhaust. Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also Thomas v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000); Fine v. GAF Chemical Corporation, 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993); Fellows v. Universal Restaurants, Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983).
Patton's original charge of discrimination, as presented to the EEOC on November 28, 2001, alleged race as the only basis of discrimination. The original charge made no mention of age-based discrimination, nor did it provide any factual allegations that would reasonably lead the EEOC to investigate a claim of age discrimination. Patton's ADEA claim, therefore, could not "reasonably be expected to grow out of" the race discrimination claim alleged in his original charge. See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 395. Rather, it is simply a "separate and distinct" basis of recovery. See Randel v. United States Department of the Navy, 157 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998). Consequently, Patton's allegations of age discrimination in his amended EEOC charge are not sufficiently "like or related to" the timely filed racial discrimination claim and Patton must, therefore, independently exhaust his administrative remedies on that claim prior to pursuing it in this court. See Fine, 995 F.2d at 578.
Patton's "discrimination statement" in the original charge states:
I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Defendants' Appendix at 3.
Because Patton's age discrimination claim in his amended EEOC charge was untimely and not "like or related to" the original EEOC charge, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the ADEA. Accordingly, this court must dismiss Patton's ADEA claim, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Randel, 157 F.3d at 395.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Fujitsu's motion to dismiss Patton's ADEA claim is GRANTED.