Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:99CV073-D-A.
April 2, 2001.
OPINION
This cause is before the court on Defendant, Magnolia Regional Health Center's (Magnolia) motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration of the motion, the court finds that it should be granted in part and denied in part.
Factual Background
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the court must take as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). The court's factual summary is so drafted.
The Plaintiff, Sonya Patterson (Patterson), is a former collection department employee of Magnolia's in Alcorn County, Mississippi. She was fired after approximately 8 weeks of work for allegedly poor job performance. Patterson contends that she was fired due to her race, which is African-American. Her immediate supervisor, Janet McCann (McCann), often made comments like, "that's mighty white of you"; "it is harder for them to learn" speaking of blacks; and she was "not having trouble out of the white girls." Patterson complained about these remarks and about how she often felt she was being treated differently because of her race to her supervisor, McCann, and Martha Olds, the business office director. However, it appears that Magnolia did nothing to investigate or discipline McCann for her racial remarks. Patterson was replaced by a white woman whose performance was approximately the same as her own.
Summary Judgment Standard
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing'. . .that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by. . .affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).
Discussion
Patterson asserts claims under Title VII for what she believes is her wrongful discharge, based on her race. These claims include, racial discrimination, retaliatory discharge, and disparate impact. Disparate Impact 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) sets forth the standards which plaintiffs must meet in order to sustain a claim for disparate impact. It provides in relevant part:
The Defendant also believed the Plaintiff's claims to include intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiff, however, maintains in her reply that no such claim has been pled.
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if —
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decision-making process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
The Supreme Court first announced the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). The Supreme Court held in Griggs that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case establishes that an employer maintains a racially neutral employment practice which adversely affects black employees at a substantially higher rate than whites similarly situated, the burden then shifts to the employer to justify the practice as being "related to job performance."Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853. "To succeed on a disparate impact theory of liability, a plaintiff must show that a policy or practice that appears neutral on its face, in fact, has a disparate impact or effect on a protected class." Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-55 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). "If the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove a substantial legitimate justification for the practice." Young v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 922 F. Supp. 544, 549 (M.D.Ala. 1996) (citation omitted). "Should the defendant prove a valid justification, the plaintiff may still prevail by proffering an equally effective alternative practice which results in less [racial or gender] disproportionately or by presenting evidence that the legitimate practice is a pretext for discrimination." Id.
Magnolia is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of disparate impact as a matter of law. Patterson has failed to set forth any specific policy or practice that has had a disparate impact or effect on a protected class. Patterson has neglected to identify any other individuals who were discriminated against due to their race. She alludes to the fact that some "Hillburton" applications for free hospital care for blacks were denied due to race. However, she fails to mention the names of those who were refused free treatment, or how many applications were turned down based on the person's race. She also suggests that one black person was not promoted from the kitchen to the office. Patterson, however, has failed to show any analysis of how these few incidents impacted blacks at a substantially higher rate than they did whites.
In Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit stated that a plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact on the basis of race, absent a systematic analysis of the racial effects of all promotional criteria for each rank. Id. In the case at hand, Patterson has made no such analysis. She simply states that a disparate impact can be inferred from the treatment that she received while working at Magnolia, and from what others have told her. The court is of the opinion that this is simply not enough to support a claim for disparate impact.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed a lower courts decision that vague assertions that: a former employer did not promote minorities; that a less qualified white man was hired instead of a black former employee; that employer did not hire minorities; that when a black former employee was employed with the employer, he was not promoted because he was black; and that a former employer violated its internal procedures in not hiring a black employees, did not support a cause of action for disparate impact. The former employee did not identify any facially neutral standards which resulted in discriminatory hiring practices, and he did not claim that anyone else suffered disparate impact except for himself.Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D.Va. 1996), affirmed, 103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.(Va.) Dec 18, 1996). Again, in the case at hand, Patterson has not disclosed evidence to overcome a summary judgment motion on the issue of disparate impact.
For the above mentioned reasons, the court is of the opinion that the Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment on the claim of disparate impact.
All remaining claims.
As to all remaining claims, the court finds that Magnolia's motion for summary judgment is not well taken and should be denied.
Magnolia has failed to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In any event, the court has the discretion, which it exercises here, to allow the Plaintiff's claims to proceed to trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("Neither do we suggest . . . that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.").
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART AND DENYING IT IN PART
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
• the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry # 50) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
• the Plaintiff's claims as to disparate impact are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and,
• the remainder of Plaintiff's claims will be allowed to proceed to trial.
SO ORDERED.