Opinion
No. 111,083.
2014-11-21
Jesseca PATTERSON, Appellant, v. Kayce CLOUD, Appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; James Charles Droege, Judge.Jeremiah Johnson, of the Law Office of Jeremiah Johnson, of Olathe, for appellant.Brette S. Hart, of Harris & Hart, L.L.C., of Leawood, for appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; James Charles Droege, Judge.
Jeremiah Johnson, of the Law Office of Jeremiah Johnson, of Olathe, for appellant. Brette S. Hart, of Harris & Hart, L.L.C., of Leawood, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and JAMES L. BURGESS, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This case demands that we consider how the parties to a personal injury action and the district court properly address a defendant's motion in limine aimed at precluding a plaintiff from testifying to the cause of his or her injuries and to the necessity of medical care. The Johnson County District Court granted such a motion by defendant Kayce Cloud in this motor vehicle collision case. Without receiving evidence and based solely on the lawyers' arguments, the district court then entered what it characterized as a judgment as a matter of law against plaintiff Jesseca Patterson when her counsel stated she would not offer expert medical testimony on causation at trial. The district court could not have granted a judgment as a matter of law premised on an order in limine. Furthermore, the district court should not have granted the motion in limine in the absence of supporting evidence, an adequate written stipulation, or similarly detailed proffers from the lawyers made for that purpose. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Factual and Procedural Background
Following a two-vehicle accident, Patterson filed a civil negligence suit against Cloud which alleged that Patterson had suffered permanent and painful injuries to her back, torso, neck, and head after Cloud's vehicle hit the rear of Patterson's vehicle. Patterson also alleged that she had lost wages as a result of the accident. Cloud admitted the accident was solely and proximately caused by her negligence.
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to the authenticity of Patterson's medical records and billings for the purpose of admission into evidence, but the parties reserved the right to raise proper objections to the contents of those documents.
Also prior to trial, Cloud filed a trial brief on the issue of the admissibility of medical records and bills. In her brief, Cloud argued that Patterson's medical records and billing statements would not be admissible in this case without supporting medical expert testimony. Cloud essentially argued that Patterson could not testify as to the reasonableness or necessity of medical treatment because she does not have the medical training necessary to render such an opinion. Further, allowing the medical bills and records into evidence without medical expert testimony would put hearsay evidence of causation in front of the jury without necessary medical expert testimony. Cloud asked the district court to issue an order precluding Patterson from testifying about the reasonableness or necessity of her medical treatment and the cause of her injuries, and asked to have the medical records and bills excluded from evidence at trial if there was no supporting medical expert testimony.
Cloud also filed a motion in limine asking the district court to preclude Patterson from testifying about the reasonableness or necessity of her medical treatment in addition to the cause of her injuries. The motion also requested that Patterson's medical bills and records not be admitted without supporting medical expert testimony. The arguments supporting the motion in limine were the same as those given in Cloud's trial brief.
At the hearing on the motion in limine, defense counsel explained that she believed Patterson was planning to present all medical evidence through her own testimony without calling any of her medical providers or other experts as witnesses. The defense argued that Patterson should be prohibited from presenting any such causation testimony for lack of foundation because such testimony was too complex to fit within the common knowledge exception. Defense counsel conceded that Patterson could testify about the reasonableness of her medical bills. However, counsel argued that the injuries alleged in this case were soft tissue injuries, there were large gaps in treatment, and causal testimony from someone other than Patterson was required. Patterson's counsel indicated that he was waiting for the district court's ruling on the motion in limine before Patterson would decide whether to depose or subpoena a witness on the issue of causation. Patterson asserted that, pursuant to caselaw, reasonableness and necessity are questions for the jury, and the necessity of the medical bills goes to causation. Patterson contends that a plaintiff can introduce evidence of his or her medical injuries through his or her own testimony.
The district court noted that this issue would be simple if Patterson had gone straight to the hospital with injuries after the accident. In such case, the district court felt the jury could find any bills that resulted were reasonable, necessary, and caused by the accident without medical expert testimony. However, since there apparently was a break between the time of the accident and most of the treatment in this case, the district court felt the expert testimony of a medical professional was necessary to relate the treatment back to trauma caused by the accident. The district court sustained the motion in limine because it felt the Patterson, as a lay witness, was not qualified to introduce medical bills and medical records that were incurred or prepared 4 months after the accident to establish reasonableness, causation, and necessity of medical treatment. The district court then advised Patterson to obtain depositions on this issue if she planned to present them at trial.
Five days before the trial was scheduled to begin, the district court held another hearing on the issue of necessity and causation testimony. Defense counsel for Cloud informed the district court Patterson was planning to only call her physical therapist to testify at trial and reiterated that testimony of a medical provider or medical expert was required to prove causation. Cloud argued that Patterson also had preexisting complaints and treatment to the same areas of her body which she claimed were injured in the accident. These claims further necessitated medical or expert testimony linking the treatment sought after the accident to the injuries incurred in the accident. The defense noted that Patterson had previously been in a very serious car accident which resulted in serious injuries and complaints similar to those following the current accident. The district court reaffirmed its prior ruling that Patterson was required to present causation testimony due to the 4–month break between the accident and the time she sought treatment.
In response, Patterson's attorney generally outlined his client's anticipated testimony. Although Patterson would testify she did not have a preexisting injury that was aggravated by this accident, she would acknowledge the prior serious automobile accident. Patterson also would testify that she felt pain in her neck and back immediately following the accident; but she had gone home to care for her children before seeking treatment at the hospital; that all of her medical expenses were related to the accident; and that any breaks in treatment were either due to taking care of her children or a lack of insurance. Patterson's attorney noted that Patterson had also had a history of a couple of falls down some stairs and that she had continued taking prescription pain medication for these injuries until 4 months prior to the accident with Cloud. Finally, Patterson's counsel represented that Patterson, her friends, and her husband would testify that Patterson's previous pain complaints were minor aches and pains and the injuries at issue in this case were directly related to the accident, with no intervening causes.
Cloud's attorney then pointed out to the district court that Patterson had been referred to an orthopedic surgeon for neck, wrist, and shoulder complaints prior to the accident. Cloud's attorney also indicated Cloud would testify that the accident occurred at a very low speed, causing minimal damage to both vehicles. In response to Cloud's proffer, Patterson's attorney argued that Cloud would need to bring her own medical expert if she intended to argue Patterson's injuries were inconsistent with the nature of the accident.
Based on counsels' arguments, the district court found the history of preexisting injuries required Patterson to provide medical expert testimony to prove her injuries in this case were caused by the accident with Cloud. Because Patterson was not going to offer medical expert testimony at trial, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law for Cloud.
In its journal entry, the district court stated:
“8. For reasons stated in [Cloud]'s Second Motion in Limine and Trial Brief, and by the Court on the record at trial, the Court disagrees with [Patterson] and finds that [Patterson] is required to have medical expert testimony to prove the necessity and causation of [the] post-accident medical treatment received, especially given the fact that [Patterson] has suffered similar preexisting injuries from a previous accident. Specifically, [Patterson] is required to have such testimony to prove the nature and extent of her claimed injuries and causation of same. [Patterson] is required to have medical expert testimony to show that her post-accident medical treatment received was reasonable and necessary as a direct result of the September 10, 2010 auto accident; though, [Patterson] can testify that the cost of such post-accident treatment was reasonable in amount.
“9. Because [Patterson] failed to arrange the necessary expert testimony to prove her claimed injuries and damages, there is no reason to empanel a jury and hear evidence. The Court therefore renders judgment in favor of [Cloud] and against P[atterson] on all claims, at P[atterson]'s costs.”
Patterson filed a timely notice of appeal.
Analysis
Did the district court err by entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of Cloud?
The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Cloud in this case prior to the start of trial. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–250(a)(l) states that the district court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law once a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue. Procedurally, it is clear that the district court used an improper method to dispose of this case. K.S .A.2013 Supp. 60–250(a)(1) deals solely with judgments entered during a jury trial. In this case, there was no jury and no trial. This statute is not a mechanism for entering judgment at pretrial.
It is clear from the record on appeal the parties and the district court considered the court's ruling to be a directed verdict. However, the only matter pending at the time the district court made its ruling was a motion in limine. There is no Kansas statute that would permit the district court to jump from ruling on a motion in limine to ordering a directed verdict. Although there are other mechanisms a party can utilize before trial to request the court render a judgment as a matter of law in its favor ( e.g., a motion for summary judgment), no such procedure was utilized in this case. We find a directed verdict in this case was premature.
There is no Kansas case directly on point. However, the Michigan case of Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich. 53, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001), dealt with the pretrial dismissal of a medical malpractice case. Michigan Court Rule 2.516 dealing with directed verdicts is nearly identical to K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–250. In Wickens, the appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court to dismiss a very specific allegation made by the plaintiff. But the appellate court construed the motion for directed verdict to be one for summary judgment since a motion for directed verdict could not be entered prior to the close of plaintiffs evidence. This issue concerned a very specific aspect of Michigan malpractice law, and extensive evidence was presented on this issue. While it was found the ruling on this specific issue was proper, it was also found that the trial court's dismissal of the remaining claims by the plaintiff was improper. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that it was an error by the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's entire cause of action without affording the plaintiffs the opportunity to present their case at trial. 465 Mich. at 61–62.
We necessarily conclude in this case that the district court erred by directing a verdict in favor of Cloud prior to trial. But even if there had been a legal basis for granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Cloud prior to trial, the record before this court does not support entering judgment for Cloud. The record is essentially arguments of both counsels. There were general statements about a prior car accident, a “couple [ot] slip and falls,” and prior treatments to the same areas of the body that Patterson claims were injured in the current accident. There is nothing detailing when the prior accidents occurred, the nature of the injuries, what the prescribed treatment was for those injuries, the results from the prior treatment, and many other details that would be pertinent to support dismissal as a matter of law.
A sufficient basis for granting the motion in limine may have existed for purposes of precluding Patterson from giving an opinion on causation for some and perhaps all of her claimed injuries and treatment-particularly the treatment that was remote in time. But that would not preclude Patterson from giving factual evidence that would circumstantially support causation.
In Yount v. Deibert, 282 Kan. 619, 147 P.3d 1065 (2006), the Kansas Supreme Court specifically found that circumstantial evidence can create a question of fact. In Yount, a wrongful death action where the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the burden of proof the plaintiff had to meet in order to show causation for the house fire that caused the wrongful death. The fire marshal in that case could not determine the cause of the fire, but there was evidence that the defendants had engaged in pyromaniacal activities in the living room of the house before the fire broke out, and the fire marshal believed the fire's point of origin was in the living room. The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that, although it could not be said with mathematical certainty that the defendants' activities caused the house fire, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a question of fact concerning causation. 282 Kan. at 631.
In the Yount decision our Supreme Court quoted from American Family Mutual Ins. Co., v. Grim, 201 Kan. 340, 343, 440 P.2d 621 (1968):
“ ‘The fallacy of defendant's argument is that in order for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to sustain a finding in a civil case, such evidence need not rise to that degree of certainty which will exclude any and every other reasonable conclusion. [Citations omitted.] It suffices that such evidence affords a basis for a reasonable inference by the court or jury of the occurrence of the fact in issue, although some other inference equally reasonable might be drawn therefrom.’ “ Yount, 282 Kan. at 630.
Because the district court's decision to grant judgment has no basis in law or in the factual record, we reverse and remand for further proceedings including, in the district court's discretion, a pretrial conference at which the district court and the parties may reassess how best to navigate the remaining pretrial issues and a jury trial.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.