Opinion
Civil No. 02-3766 (JRT/FLN)
September 2, 2003
Alan Merrill Patnoe, Oakdale, MN, pro se
Toni A. Beitz, OFFICE OF THE HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY, Minneapolis, MN for defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Alan Patnoe ("Patnoe") has filed suit under several federal statutes against defendant Hennepin County, Minnesota (the "County"). Patnoe's claims stem from his guilty plea to a charge of soliciting a minor to engage in sexual conduct and his attendant duty to register as a predatory offender pursuant to Minnesota law. This matter is now before the Court on the County's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the County's motion.
BACKGROUND
On May 20, 1998, Patnoe pleaded guilty in Hennepin County District Court to one count of soliciting a minor to engage in sexual conduct. Patnoe's plea was pursuant to a plea agreement, which provided in part that Patnoe would be placed on probation for ten years, and would be required to register as a predatory offender pursuant to Minnesota's registration statute. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166.Patnoe later learned that the ten-year probation requirement exceeded the statutory maximum for his offense. Patnoe requested and received a hearing, which was held on December 19, 2000. The prosecutor, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney David Brown ("Brown"), conceded at the hearing that the ten-year term was improper and that Patnoe should be resentenced. On January 9, 2001, the Hennepin County court modified Patnoe's sentence, changing the term of probation to three years. Patnoe was discharged from probation on March 20, 2001, slightly less than three years after being sentenced.
On January 29, 2002, Patnoe petitioned the state court to have his conviction expunged. On May 17, 2002, Hennepin County District Judge Allan Oleisky held a hearing at which Patnoe argued in favor of expungement. Patnoe also argued that he should not have been required to register as a predatory offender. The Hennepin County court allowed Patnoe to submit additional briefing on the registration issue, and Patnoe did so. In the County's response to this additional briefing, the county attorney incorrectly stated that Patnoe was not registered as required by law. In fact, Patnoe was properly registered. A second hearing had been scheduled on this matter, but the Hennepin County court determined that further oral argument was not necessary, and cancelled the hearing. In an order dated July 25, 2002, Judge Oleisky denied Patnoe's motion for expungement and held that he was required to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166. Patnoe never appealed this ruling to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
Patnoe filed his complaint in this case on October 1, 2002. He alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(2), 1986, and state common law, contending that his rights were violated by the Minnesota registration requirement, the initial probation term of ten years, Judge Oleisky's refusal to expunge his conviction, the cancellation of the July 1, 2002 hearing, and the County's failure to intervene on his behalf.
ANALYSIS
The County argues that Patnoe's complaint does not state any claims upon which relief can be granted because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Court from considering this case. Alternatively, the County contends that Patnoe's claims cannot succeed because the County and its employees are immune from suit.
The Court notes at the outset that both parties have submitted materials outside the pleadings for this 12(b) (6) motion. In this circuit, such submissions do not require conversion of a 12(b) (6) motion to one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the materials submitted in this case are part of the public record and do not contradict the complaint, the Court will not convert the County's motion into one for summary judgment. See State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999).
I. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal district courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions. Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000). See District of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Only the United States Supreme Court has the authority to review most decisions of state courts. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Besides foreclosing straightforward attempts to review state court decisions, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also prevents indirect attempts to undermine state court decisions, such as when a plaintiff's general constitutional claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the claims asserted in state court. Lemonds, 322 F.3d at 492-93. A claim is inextricably intertwined if the federal claim succeeds "only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995); Lemonds, 322 F.3d at 493. Essentially, Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal action if the relief requested in federal court would "effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling." Charchenko, 47 F.3d at 983.
The gravamen of Patnoe's complaint is that he was improperly compelled to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166. The County argues that such a claim is barred because Judge Oleisky's July 25, 2002 order held that Patnoe is required to register. Patnoe disagrees, claiming that he is not challenging Judge Oleisky's order. Patnoe claims that his registration requirement was imposed by Assistant County Attorney Brown on May 20, 1998. ( See Pl. Br. at 11) ("Brown falsely required Plaintiff to register. . . .") This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, Patnoe is mistaken in arguing that the County Attorney required him to register. Patnoe's plea agreement clearly indicated that he would be required to register as a predatory offender, and this requirement was formally imposed by the Hennepin County court when it sentenced Patnoe on May 20, 1998. Thus, the registration requirement was not imposed by the County, but rather by the court.
Second, Patnoe's claims clearly do challenge the state court ruling, and therefore invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Deciding whether Rooker-Feldman applies "requires determining exactly what the state court held to ascertain whether granting the requested federal relief would either void the state court's judgment or effectively amount to a reversal of its holding." Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 493 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In his July 25, 2002 order, Judge Oleisky unequivocally held that "Patnoe . . . is lawfully required to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166." State v. Patnoe, No. 97101748, slip op. at 6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. July 25, 2002) ("Oleisky Order").
Patnoe maintains that he does not have to register because the offense to which he pleaded guilty was not one for which registration was required at the time of his sentencing. Judge Oleisky recognized that this argument might have been "a compelling argument before the 1998 amendment" adding Patnoe's offense to the crimes requiring registration, but held that Patnoe's argument "is without merit in view of the amendment". Oleisky Order at 5.
Patnoe argues that Judge Oleisky agreed with his interpretation of the statute. This statement is inaccurate. Judge Oleisky recognized that Patnoe "correctly interprets" the Minnesota statute "as requiring an offender to be convicted of an enumerated offense before registration can be mandated." Oleisky Order at 5. As noted above, however, Oleisky's agreement was limited to this basic statement of law. Judge Oleisky's order clearly shows that he did not agree with Patnoe's legal argument. See id. at 5-6.
Judge Oleisky further noted that the 1998 amendment was made retroactively applicable to persons who were under supervision as of July 1, 1998. Because Patnoe was under court supervision on that date, the amendment required that he register as a predatory offender. Patnoe argues that the amendment was not retroactive because the statute does not contain the word "retroactive." (Pl. Br. at 13.) The statute, however, need not contain such "magic words," and it is clear from Minnesota law that the 1998 amendment was made retroactive to persons, like Patnoe, who were under supervision as of July 19, 1998. See Minn. Laws 1998, ch. 367, art. 3, §§ 1, 16; Minn. Stat. § 243.166. See also Oleisky Order at 5. Therefore, Patnoe's retroactivity argument fails.
Judge Oleisky held that Patnoe must register under Minnesota law, but Patnoe claims that he need not. It is thus clear that despite his protestations to the contrary, Patnoe does challenge the state court's ruling. If this Court adopted Patnoe's contentions and granted him relief, it would "effectively amount to a reversal" of Judge Oleisky's holding. Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 493. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine addresses this precise situation. See id.; Charchenko, 47 F.3d at 983. Patnoe's claims are inextricably linked with the Hennepin County court's rulings, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine thus divests the Court of jurisdiction over Patnoe's complaint.
Patnoe also argues that "the validity of [Judge Oleisky's] order is considerably in question" because it relied upon the County Attorney's representation — which was later found to be wrong — that Patnoe had not complied with the order to register as a predatory offender. Although Judge Oleisky did erroneously state that Patnoe had not registered, his ruling that Patnoe was obligated to register in no way relied on that statement. Therefore, Patnoe's contentions on this matter are irrelevant to this motion.
II. Immunity
The County argues that even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, Patnoe's motion would still fail because the County and the prosecutors are immune from suit. Most of Patnoe's allegations revolve around the actions of Assistant County Attorneys David Brown and William Richardson ("Richardson").
The County also discusses Judge Oleisky's immunity. Patnoe, however, has stated that he does not base his lawsuit upon any actions by the judge. ( See Pl. Br. at 17.) The Court therefore will not address this question.
The Court first addresses the question of vicarious liability. Count I of Patnoe's complaint alleges that the County is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees. This argument directly contradicts established law, which provides that a municipality "cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis original). See Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 328 F.3d 427, 440 (8th Cir. 2003). Patnoe's complaint alleges actions by individual County employees, but it does not allege that any of these actions were done pursuant to any governmental policy or custom, as it must to state a claim under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Therefore, Patnoe's allegations of vicarious liability fail.
The County also argues that Patnoe does not state a claim against the individual prosecutors because they enjoy absolute immunity. Patnoe argues that the County's actions were motivated by malice, and that this strips away any immunity. Patnoe's argument is inapposite because it relies upon the Minnesota common law doctrine of "official immunity." See, e.g, Davis v. Hennepin County, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122-24 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997). State-law official immunity does not protect officials who commit a malicious or willful wrong, but that doctrine does not apply here. Id. at 122. This case involves the absolute immunity that a prosecutor enjoys when acting within the scope of prosecutorial duties. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976). Under this doctrine, "a prosecutor does not, in a civil rights action for damages, have to defend prosecutorial mistakes if those mistakes occurred in the performance of a function recognized as inherent in the prosecutor's role as an advocate." Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). This immunity is vast; it protects prosecutors from liability for actions borne out of malice, and even from allegations of abusive, illegal, or unethical conduct. See id. The cloak of absolute immunity drops only for acts that are not "encompassed in the initiation or conduct of adversarial proceedings." Id. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.
In this case, Patnoe seeks redress for the prosecutors' role in negotiating an erroneous ten-year probationary term (which was later changed), for implementing the legal requirement that Patnoe register as a predatory offender, and for other actions taken in the course of prosecuting Patnoe and negotiating a plea agreement. These acts are clearly inherent within the scope of Brown's and Richardson's job of conducting the prosecution, and Patnoe presents no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, even if the prosecutors' actions were motivated by malice, they would still be protected by absolute immunity. The Court therefore concludes that Patnoe has not stated a claim against Brown, Richardson, or any employee of Hennepin County. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Patnoe's complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court will grant the County's motion to dismiss.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 4] is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.