Opinion
7:02-CV-047-R
June 23, 2003
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This is an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate currently confined in the Coffield Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") in Tennessee Colony, Texas. Plaintiff claims that, while he was incarcerated in the James V. Allied Unit, Defendants denied him proper medical care, retaliated against him and caused him to suffer cruel and unusual punishment. Complaint ¶ V. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was denied medication for hypertension, hypoglycemia and asthma, forced to have his stomach pumped and placed in a filthy freezing cold cell with no clothing, linens or blankets. Id. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.
In order to state a colorable claim for the denial of medical care under the Eighth Amendment, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct 285, 292 (197 ¶, "Deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment occurs only where a prison official subjectively knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 550 (5th Cir. 1996). However, it is well established that negligent or erroneous medical treatment or judgment does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). As long as jail medical personnel exercise professional medical judgment, their behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461-62 (1982). A disagreement over the appropriate medical treatment constitutes, at most, a possible claim of medical malpractice appropriately addressed under state law. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08, 97 S.Ct. at 293; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).
First, Pate seeks to hold David Schmidley liable on his denial-of-medical-care claim. Schmiddley is Director of the Texas Tech Health Science Center and he supervises TDCJ medical care personnel. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 4. Pate claims that Schmidley was responsible for the training of employees, that he had access to Plaintiff's medical files and that he failed to properly train and supervise his employees. Id.
Pate has failed to state a claim against Schmidley under the Civil Rights Act. He cannot recover under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. A Defendant cannot be held responsible for the alleged acts or omissions of his subordinates under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 US. 658, 98 S.Ct 2018 (1978); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987). To state a valid claim, a civil rights plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the acts or omissions of a defendant and the resulting constitutional deprivation. Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981). Pate has alleged no facts to show either active participation by Schmidley in the actions causing the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights or affirmative adoption by this Defendant of policies which were wrongful or illegal and which caused the constitutional deprivation See Wanger v. Banner, 621 F.2d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to "establish a causal connection between an act of the supervisory official and the alleged constitutional violation."). Instead, Plaintiff seeks to establish liability simply by claiming that Schmidley was in charge. Careful review of Plaintiffs answers to the Court's questions reflects that he presents nothing more than conclusory allegations regarding the involvement of David Schmidley. He has failed to articulate facts which, if taken as true, would demonstrate that Schmidley was deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care or that Schmidley was even negligent. See Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 4-6. Therefore, Schmidley shall be dismissed as a party to this action.
Next, Plaintiff seeks redress against David Flack, M.D. a physician at Electra Memorial Hospital where Plaintiff was taken for treatment by prison officials after a suspected drug overdose. Complaint ¶ V. To the extent that this Defendant can be considered a state actor, i.e., acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, Plaintiff has foiled to state a cognizable claim, Pate claims that Flack abused his authority by discontinuing his medications, by discharging him from the hospital with elevated blood pressure and by referring him for psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 18. A review of Plaintiff's answers to the Court's questions reveals nothing more than conclusory allegations regarding the alleged deliberate indifference of Dr. Flack. Pate has failed to articulate facts which, if taken as true, would demonstrate that Flack was deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care. See Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 18. His allegations reflect nothing more than a disagreement with the nature of the medical care provided rather than any lack thereof. Disagreements such as this do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Flack shall be dismissed.
Plaintiff states that the remaining Defendants unlawfully retaliated against him for filing grievances and complaints against them. Complaint ¶ V. Prison officials may not retaliate against an in ¶ nate for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084, 116 S.Ct. 800 (1996); Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117, 106 S.Ct 1975 (1986). In order to show retaliation an inmate "must establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation." McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998). Causation requires a showing that "but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred" Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir.) (quoting Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 995, 118 S.Ct. 559 (1997), This places a significant burden on the inmate, Mere ¶ conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166; Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1988). The inmate must produce direct evidence of motivation or "allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred." Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff has failed to articulate facts which could demonstrate that any of the Defendants retaliated against him. He has not provided the Court with any information which could demonstrate that, but for a retaliatory motive, the Defendants would not have discontinued medication, pumped his stomach or placed him in a barren cell in the psychiatric area of the prison. See Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 23. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, without more, are insufficient to state a cognizable claim of retaliation.
Finally, Pate claims that Defendants Eastxidge, Luna, Munoz and Brackeen denied him treatment for hypertension, hypoglycemia and asthma, that they forced him to have his stomach pumped and that they placed in a filthy freezing cold cell with no clothing, linens or blankets.
Review of Plaintiff's answers to the Court's questions reveals that Pate presents nothing more than a disagreement with the events surrounding his medical condition and the efforts of Defendants to treat him. See Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 7-15 22. Pate concedes that his stomach was pumped and that his medications were discontinued because Defendants believed that he had taken an overdose. According to Pate's interpretation of the results of medical testing, he did not overdose and he argues that Defendants should have known that The Court notes that prison medical personnel had Pate transferred to the Electra Memorial Hospital for immediate treatment and later placed him in a psychiatric cell for observation. Such action on the part of prison medical personnel does not even suggest deliberate indifference. Clearly, this is nothing more than a disagreement over the emergency medical treatment afforded Pate by Defendants. As such, he cannot prevail on these claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
This action came on for consideration by the Court, and the issues having been duly considered and a decision duly rendered,IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's civil rights claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous.
The Clerk of Court shall transmit a true copy of this Judgment to Plaintiff.