Opinion
105784/2006.
June 19, 2009.
Defendants New York City Transit Authority, Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Authority, and Michael Deas (collectively, "movants") move for summary judgment dismissing the claim against them, on the grounds that any alleged negligence on the part of defendants was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs oppose the motion; co-defendants have not submitted opposition. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion is denied.
On September 29, 2005, plaintiffs were passengers at the rear portion of movants' bus, driven by Deas. The bus proceeded along 125th Street, a two-way street separated by double yellow lines, each side consisting of two traveling lanes and a bus stop lane closest to the sidewalk. Deas sought to discharge passengers at the designated bus stop, but was unable to do so because of a second bus parked in that stop. Instead, he pulled behind a third bus parked in the center traveling lane, parked in that lane, and stopped the bus. The parties' testimony varies, but at the very least, the rear portion of movants' bus was jutting out at least part of the way into the far left lane closest to the double yellow line.
While the bus was parked, an emergency fire truck came around the corner with its lights flashing and sirens on. Deas testified that he did not hear the sirens. The fire truck collided into the rear portion of movants' bus, causing plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Deas alleges that at the time of impact, he was discharging passengers. Plaintiffs testified that the doors were closed at the time of impact, and therefore they claim that Deas could not have been discharging passengers. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the bus was parked at the moment it was hit.
Defendants argue that any alleged injuries were not proximately caused by Deas's negligence, and allege that these injuries were caused solely by the co-defendants.
At this juncture, the court takes no position on co-defendants' negligence, or lack thereof.
New York City Traffic Regulations require that a bus must only pick up or discharge passengers at designated bus stops, and it is undisputed that Deas stopped to discharge passengers in a traveling lanc that was not so designated. Nevertheless, violation of this regulation does not automatically expose defendants to liability where a parked bus is hit from behind. In Sheehan v. City of N.Y., 40 N.Y.2d 496, 500, 354 N.E.2d 832 (1976), the defendant's bus was slowing down to make a stop, allegedly unable to pull into the parking lane because of parked cars. A city garbage truck crashed into the rear of the parking bus, injuring the bus's passenger. Id. at 499. The garbage truck's driver, who saw the bus before he crashed, conceded negligence. Id. at 503. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant bus, holding that any alleged negligence on the part of the bus was not the proximate cause of the collision. Id. Rather, presence of the bus in the traveling lane merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event rather than its causes." Id. The court noted that it was no different than if the bus had continued to drive down the traveling lane without stopping, or if it properly drove into the parking lane, and then back into the traveling lane. Id. Therefore, the bus was merely in one place it had a right to be, as opposed to another place it had a right to be. Id. See also Haylett v. New York City Tram. Auth., 251 A.D.2d 373, 674 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d Dept 1998) (granting summary judgment to defendant truck, where transit bus was unable to park in the bus lane because truck was negligently parked in that location). Compare Dowling v. Consolidated Carriers Corp., 103 A.D.2d 675, 478 N Y.S.2d 883 (1st Dept 1984) (denying summary judgment to defendant buses, distinguishing Sheehan on the basis that buses were illegally parked on the shoulder of state highway, which is unacceptable except during an emergency).
More recently, in White v. Diaz, 49 A.D.3d 134, 135, 854 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (1st Dept 2008), the First Department denied a motion for summary judgment where defendant's Access-A-Ride van was double-parked, with his hazard lights on, while waiting to pick up a passenger. The driver testified that he could find an available parking spot on the street, and he did not see the apartment's parking lot. Id. The Access-A-Ridc ran was rear-ended by another van while plaintiff was boarding the Access-A-Ride. Id. The driver of the second van was falling asleep behind the wheel. Id. The First Department, taking Sheehan into consideration, denied summary judgment and held that a "reasonable jury could find that a rear-end collision is a reasonably forsccablc consequence of double parking for five minutes on a busy Manhattan street." Id. at 139, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 110. See also Walters v. City of New York, 23 Misc.3d 1127(A) (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Co. 2009). It reasoned that a jury could find that if the van had pulled over to the curb or in the nearby parking lot, it would not have been in the path and plaintiff would not have been injured. White, 49 A.D.3d at 139, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
With these precedents to guide the court, plaintiffs argue that there are two material issues of fact that preclude this court from ruling in defendants' favor. First, plaintiffs suggest an issue of fact as to whether Deas should have heard the siren prior to discharging passengers, such that his stopping the bus close to the intersection in the traveling lane of travel was reckless or negligent. Second, there is an issue of fact as to whether Deas was discharging passengers at the time, which allegedly precluded him from driving away immediately after he heard or should have heard the siren.
Although the court recognizes that both of the above-mentioned factual issues are in dispute, it disagrees that either are material issues on this motion. The obligation of a vehicle, upon awareness of an emergency vehicle seeking to pass, is to pull over and let the emergency pass. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1 144. The court declines to create a duty for an already parked vehicle to continue driving where an emergency vehicle needs to pass.
Nevertheless, there is an issue of fact as to movants' negligence and as to whether such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Defendant does not dispute that at least the rear portion of the bus extended into the traveling lane closest to the yellow line, and other testimony suggests that the entire bus may have been in that lane. If the former is true, a rear-end collision is foreseeable; if the latter is true, such a result is almost inevitable. Therefore, unlike in Sheehan, the bus was not "in a place where it had a right to be." Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury may find that the bus was capable of completely parking into the middle lane without occupying the far left lane, and that a rear-end collision was a foreseeable result of utilizing both lanes while discharging passengers. See White, 49 A.D. 139, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 110; Walters, 23 Misc.3d 1127 (A).
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.