Opinion
2:23-cv-00006-JPH-MG
04-29-2024
CLARENCE BURTON PARSLEY, III, Plaintiff, v. HOLCOMB Lt., et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION FOR ASSISTANCE WITH RECRUITING COUNSEL
James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge
Plaintiff, Clarence Parsley, III, has filed a motion for assistance recruiting counsel. Dkt. 43. Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory right to court-appointed counsel. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) gives courts the authority to "request" counsel. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). As a practical matter, there are not enough lawyers willing and qualified to accept a pro bono assignment in every pro se case. See Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that courts must be careful stewards of the limited resource of volunteer lawyers); Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Whether to recruit an attorney is a difficult decision: Almost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.").
"'When confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel, the district court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?'" Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)). These two questions "must guide" the Court's determination whether to attempt to recruit counsel. Id. These questions require an individualized assessment of the plaintiff, the claims, and the stage of litigation. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655-56.
The first question, whether litigants have made a reasonable attempt to secure private counsel on their own, "is a mandatory, threshold inquiry that must be determined before moving to the second inquiry." Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682; see also Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2019) (because plaintiff did not show that he tried to obtain counsel on his own or that he was precluded from doing so, the judge's denial of these requests was not an abuse of discretion). Plaintiff has attempted to contact multiple attorneys with requests for representation without success. The Court finds that he has made a reasonable effort to recruit counsel on his own before seeking the Court's assistance. He should continue his efforts to find counsel.
"The second inquiry requires consideration of both the factual and legal complexity of the plaintiff's claims and the competence of the plaintiff to litigate those claims himself." Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682 (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). "The court's competency evaluation should account for 'the plaintiff's literacy, communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience,' and, to the extent that such evidence is before the court, information 'bearing on the plaintiff's intellectual capacity and psychological history.'" Watts, 42 F.4th at 760 (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). "Specifically, courts should consider 'whether the difficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to coherently present it to the judge or jury himself.'" Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682 (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). "This assessment of the plaintiff's apparent competence extends beyond the trial stage of proceedings; it must include 'the tasks that normally attend litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other court filings, and trial.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).
Plaintiff's motion for counsel indicates that he has a GED, and does not indicate that he suffers from any physical or mental ailments that would impact his ability to litigate this case. Plaintiff's filings and communications with the Court thus far have indicated an ability to understand legal concepts and rules of procedure. Although he states that he sometimes does have difficulty understanding legal concepts and procedures or conducting legal research, that is a difficulty that many or most pro se litigants face and does not by itself warrant recruitment of counsel. The legal and factual issues in this case are not especially novel or complex, which weighs against recruitment of counsel at this time. See Watts, 42 F.4th at 766. Defendants have recently filed a motion for summary judgment that does not rely upon expert or complicated scientific evidence to resolve. Dkt. 51. Plaintiff will be granted ample opportunity to respond to that motion. But, ultimately, the decision to recruit counsel remains a practical one because "the decision whether to recruit a lawyer for a particular plaintiff is made against the twofold backdrop of a high volume of indigent, pro se litigants (particularly incarcerated litigants) and a small pool, by comparison, of attorneys willing and able to take those cases on pro bono." Id. at 763. Plaintiff notes that the Court previously recruited counsel on his behalf in another case, Parsley v. Roberts et al., No. 2:20-cv-00176-JRS-MJD (S.D. Ind.). However, the Court only did so in that instance after no dispositive motions were filed and the case needed to be resolved either by settlement or trial. This case has not yet reached that stage.
Plaintiff's motion for assistance recruiting counsel, dkt. [43], is denied without prejudice. The Court will remain alert to changes in circumstances that may warrant reconsideration of the motion, such as a settlement conference or trial.
SO ORDERED.