Opinion
No. 5-982 / 04-1631
Filed April 12, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchison, Judge.
Robert Parks appeals from the dismissal of his petition for judicial review. AFFIRMED.
Lisa R. Perdue and Mark W. Thomas of Grefe Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Gordon E. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek and Jeffrey Peterzalek, Assistant Attorneys General, and for appellee-State.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Robert Parks appeals from the dismissal of his petition for judicial review. Because we conclude Parks failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, we affirm the dismissal.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Parks was a State Trooper employed under a contract with the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS). His position was covered by a collective bargaining agreement which, among other things, provided a grievance procedure, including the possibility of arbitration between Parks's bargaining unit and DPS.
Parks was a member of a collective bargaining unit known as the State Police Officers Council.
In September of 2002, DPS terminated Parks's employment after allegations of bribery and other impropriety were received. On March 31, 2004, a non-evidentiary grievance hearing was held. On April 30, 2004, DPS affirmed the decision to terminate Parks. Parks subsequently requested his union to pursue arbitration challenging his dismissal. On June 7, 2004, the union informed Parks by letter that it had voted unanimously against taking the matter to arbitration. Parks thereafter filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, requesting a "de novo review of [the decision to terminate] and . . . an actual evidentiary hearing on his claim . . . in accordance with [Iowa Code] section 17A.19." Parks named the Iowa State Patrol, DPS, and the State of Iowa as defendants in the action.
The defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss the petition. Following a hearing on the motion, the district court first concluded Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003) did not authorize it to grant Parks's request for an evidentiary hearing. The court further concluded that because Parks had failed to challenge before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) the bargaining unit's refusal to pursue arbitration, administrative remedies had not been exhausted, and therefore judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A was improper. Parks appeals.
Scope and Standards of Review.
We review the district court's granting of a motion to dismiss for errors of law. Iowa Tel. Ass'n v. City of Hawarden, 589 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1999). The ruling must rest on legal grounds. Id. Motion to Dismiss.
The primary question on appeal is whether Parks was required to seek administrative relief from the PERB under Iowa Code sections 20.10 and 20.11 prior to seeking judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A. Parks maintains he is allowed to seek judicial review of his termination, regardless of whether he has made a PERB claim against his union. The defendants, however, counter that after the union declined to pursue arbitration on his behalf, Parks should have made a fair representation claim against his union before the PERB to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.
We note that a state employee may sue to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. See O'Hara v. State, 642 N.W.2d 303, 314 (Iowa 2002) (interpreting Iowa Code section 20.17(5) as allowing a district court action to enforce a collective bargaining agreement).
When an administrative remedy has been established by statute, our courts are generally not immediately available to litigants to grant relief. See IES Utils. Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue Fin., 545 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1996). Instead, litigants affected by the actions of state agencies must exhaust all prescribed administrative remedies before obtaining proper access to the district court. Id.; Iowa Code § 17A.19(1). The failure to exhaust all required administrative remedies deprives the court of its authority and requires dismissal when properly raised. Aschan v. State, 446 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Iowa 1989). The exhaustion requirement honors agency expertise, handles matters to the extent possible within an agency rather than in the courts, and preserves judicial resources. IES Utils., 545 N.W.2d at 538. The exhaustion requirement allows agencies to develop the factual background upon which the decisions are based, gives agencies an opportunity to exercise discretion and apply their expertise, and may obviate the need for judicial intervention. See Riley v. Boxa, 542 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Iowa 1996).
Two conditions must exist before the exhaustion requirement arises. North River Ins. Co. v. Iowa Div. of Ins., 501 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1993). First, an administrative remedy must exist for the claimed wrong. Id. Second, a statute must expressly or implicitly require that remedy to be exhausted before resort to the courts. Id.
The union had a duty to represent Parks, a public employee, fairly. See Iowa Code § 20.17(1). "To sustain a claim that a certified employee organization has committed a prohibited practice by breaching its duty of fair representation, a public employee must establish by a preponderance of the evidence action or inaction by the organization which was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id.
We conclude an administrative remedy exists that would address Parks's alleged wrong — his termination. As noted, Iowa Code chapter 20 allows an aggrieved employee to file a proceeding with the PERB asserting his union breached its duty of fair representation. O'Hara v. State, 642 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Iowa 2002) ("The PERB has exclusive original jurisdiction over a public employee's claim for breach of fair representation against the union."). Reinstatement with or without back pay and benefits is among the statutory remedies available to the agency in such cases. Iowa Code § 20.1(3). If he had joined both the union and the DPS in a proceeding before the PERB and persuaded the agency both that he was discharged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and the union breached its duty to represent him, Parks might have had no need to invoke the court's authority to exercise judicial review under chapter 17A. Parks did not avail himself of the administrative agency remedies before invoking judicial review.
The O'Hara court suggests that these remedies could be available if the aggrieved employee joins the employer and the union in the PERB action. O'Hara, 642 N.W.2d at 313.
When Parks filed this action seeking judicial review under chapter 17A, only a non-evidentiary grievance hearing had been conducted by the DPS. Consequently, the record available for judicial review of the legality of Parks's termination was scant at best. An administrative record sufficient for meaningful judicial review of Parks's claims could have been developed in a proceeding before the PERB, the agency expressly authorized to resolve grievances of the sort advanced by Parks. See Iowa Code § 20.1 (declaring the public policy of the PERB to adjudicate and conciliate employment-related cases involving the State, its employees, and their employee organizations).
However, Parks urges that pursuant to this court's holding in Steele v. State of Iowa Dep't of Corrs., 462 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990), he need not have proceeded through arbitration before seeking judicial review in this case. There, we held that an employee who appealed her termination through a grievance procedure established in a collective bargaining agreement, but declined to participate in binding arbitration, had exhausted her administrative remedies. See Steele, 462 N.W.2d at 300; Iowa Code § 20.18. We believe the circumstances in the case before this court are clearly distinguishable from those presented in Steele. The plaintiff in Steele did not assert a claim for judicial review of agency action under Iowa Code chapter 17A. She instead brought an action under Iowa Code section 20.17(5), which provides that the terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be enforced by a civil action in the district court. In sharp contrast, Parks seeks judicial review of agency action under chapter 17A, and makes no claim under section 20.17(5).
We conclude the district court correctly determined Parks failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he failed to file an action with the PERB under sections 20.10 and 20.11. Accordingly, the dismissal of Parks's petition for judicial review is affirmed.