Opinion
No. 1:02-cv-116
December 15, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Carlton B. Parks ("Parks"), brings this action against the City of Chattanooga ("the City"), Tim Carroll, Steven Parks, and Steven Angel for claims asserting statutory violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3), 1986 and the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-701. The plaintiff also brings claims against the individual officers under Tennessee common law alleging abuse of process, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The case is before the Court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. [Court File No. 20]. The plaintiff has responded to this motion. [Court File No. 24]. For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment [Court File No. 20] will be GRANTED.
The style of the case reflects what appears to be the incorrect first name for defendant Carroll. The parties have referred to this defendant as Tim Carroll in their pleadings and he will be referred to as Tim Carroll in this memorandum.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
II. FACTS
On February 4, 1998, a state grand jury in Hamilton County, Tennessee, returned an indictment against Parks, a City of Chattanooga police officer, on counts of rape, sexual battery, and official oppression. [Court File No. 24, exh. 2]. Shortly after the indictments, the Chattanooga police department held a hearing and terminated Parks's employment. On September 8, 1998, the Hamilton County Assistant District Attorney Bates Bryan moved to dismiss without prejudice the criminal charges against Parks, and after an objection from Parks's attorney, the Criminal Court for Hamilton County dismissed the case with prejudice. [Court File No. 24, exh. 16]. For the purpose of clarity, the dismissal of the criminal case will be referred to as the termination of the "first prosecution."
A lawsuit based on Parks's termination was dismissed on the defendants' summary judgment motion by this Court. [Case No. 1-99-cv-090, Court File No. 58]. The case was appealed and recently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Parks v. City of Chattanooga, No. 01-6543 (6th Cir. July, 16, 2003).
Several days later, Hamilton County Assistant District Attorney David Denny met with Chief of Police J. L. Dotson, Captain Pat Rowe, Steven Parks, Steven Angel, and Tim Carroll to discuss the dismissal of the case against the plaintiff. [Court File No. 24, exh. 20]. On September 18, 2002, David Denny moved to have the case reinstated or the order amended to reflect dismissal without prejudice. [Court File No. 24, exh. 23 at 2]. This motion to amend the dismissal initiated what will be referred to as the "second prosecution" of Parks. In a hearing on November 2, 1998, the Tennessee Criminal Court chose to treat the motion to amend as a motion to reconsider, and the criminal case was reopened. [Court File No. 24, exh. 23]. Parks appealed.
Allowing an extraordinary appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court could not amend its dismissal of the criminal action more than thirty days after entry of the dismissal order and that the prosecution's motion had not acted to toll the running of the thirty days in which the trial court may act. State v. Parks, No. E2000-00145-CCA-R10-CD, 2001 WL 416738 (Term. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2001). The court explained that the September 8, 1998 order dismissing Parks's criminal case became final on October 8, 1998 and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the criminal case to the docket after that date. Id.
Parks filed the instant civil action against the City of Chattanooga, Tim Carroll, Steven Parks, and Steven Angel on April 22, 2002. The complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1986, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-701, and the state law claims of abuse of process, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Federal Claims 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Parks describes his assertion of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as arising from "[u]nreasonable search and seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, [and] violation of due process rights of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution." [Court File No. 1 paragraph 15]. The plaintiff's complaint explains that the claims against the individual defendants arises because the "second prosecution" was "not in good faith and was commenced or renewed without in (sic) scintilla of new evidence." [Court File No. 1 paragraph 15]. The claim against the City is described as arising from the allegation that "City's delinquent supervision and failure to train its employees was so severe as to amount to gross negligence or deliberate indifference to constitutional violations when it permitted the second criminal prosecution of the plaintiff." [Court File No. 1 paragraph 15].
a. Officers Tim Carroll, Steven Parks, and Steven Angel
The Court will first address the § 1983 claims against the individual officers. The officers assert qualified immunity in response to the plaintiff's § 1983 claims and seek summary judgment on this claim. The Supreme Court has established a sequential method for analysis of qualified immunity. A court must ask first, whether the plaintiff has alleged that a constitutional violation occurred and second, whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the occurrence. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
The Court need only address the first element of this analysis because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the occurrence of a constitutional violation. Regarding his claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the plaintiff does not state in his affidavit [Court File No. 25], or provide other evidence, that any search or seizure occurred at the hands of the defendants in relation to the reopening of his criminal case in November 1998. Parks does not assert that he was arrested after his case was reopened, nor does he suggest that any search or seizure of his property occurred following the November 2, 1998 reinstatement of the criminal proceedings against him. As explained in this Court's October 29, 2002 memorandum and order [Court File No. 13], any events preceding the "second prosecution" clearly occurred outside the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action.
After the Supreme Court's holding in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), there has been a great deal of debate within the Sixth Circuit regarding the availability of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. If such a claim is contained in the plaintiff's complaint, it too fails to establish a constitutional violation.
A Sixth Circuit panel first addressed this issue in Spurlock v. Shatterfield, 167 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999). The Spurlock decision interpreted the Supreme Court holding in Albright and concluded that malicious prosecution claims brought under § 1983 must be analyzed as violations of the Fourth Amendment because Albright held that "there was no such substantive due process right." Id. at 1006 n. 19. A subsequent Sixth Circuit panel, discussing a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, included the following statement: "[i]n cases in which the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated, we believe Albright leaves open the question of whether substantive due process may be available to the plaintiff." Frantz v. Village of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2001). The Frantz court also appeared to wholly exclude the possibility of a malicious prosecution claim, under the Fourth Amendment, which is distinct from a plaintiff's claims based on unreasonable seizure, arrest without probable cause, and false imprisonment; an issue expressly not addressed in Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Albright. Id. at 875; see Albright, 510 U.S. at 275-276.
These two Sixth Circuit panel decisions interpreting Albright have created some confusion within the circuit. Each of the subsequent panels to address this question has adhered to the Spurlock approach noting that a "panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel" and that "[t]he prior decision remains controlling . . ." until an action is taken by the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Salmi v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1995) and 6th Cir.R. 206(c)) (the Darrah court did proceed to use both Frantz and Spurlock in its analysis); see also Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Ward, No. 00-6547, 2002 WL 1774215 (6th Cir. July 31, 2002). In Thacker, the most recent Sixth Circuit decision to address the conflict, the court explained "[w]e agree that we are obliged to follow Spurlock and recognize a separate constitutionally cognizable claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment." 328 F.3d at 259. Therefore, this Court will consider whether such a claim would survive summary judgment in this case.
The Thacker panel has explained that in order to maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, "it is clear that a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, `that there was no probable cause to justify [his] arrest and prosecution.'" Thacker, 328 F.3d at 259 (quoting Darrah, 255 F.3d at 310). In this case, the evidence presented by the parties, taken in the light most favorable to Parks, does not show the absence of probable cause to prosecute the defendant.
Prior to the plaintiff's arrest, on February 4, 1998, he was indicted by the grand jury on charges of rape, official oppression, and sexual battery. [Court File No. 24, exh. 2]. Indictment by a grand jury is synonymous with a finding of probable cause. State v. Hudson, 487 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Term. Crim. App. 1972). On September 8, 1998, prosecutor Bates Bryan, exercising his discretion, moved for dismissal of the charges upon learning that a DNA test of sperm found on the victim's underwear indicated two male donors, neither of whom were Parks. Prosecutor Bates Bryan, stated on the record that the presence of the DNA of two donors destroyed the credibility of the victim because it excluded the plaintiff as a donor and because the victim had told officers she had not had consensual sexual relations for some time prior to the alleged incident. [Court File No. 24, exh. 16 at 2-3].
The affidavits of officers Tim Carroll, Steven Parks, Steve Angel, and prosecutor David Denny, suggest that the DNA evidence was misinterpreted by prosecutor Bates Bryan. [Court File No. 20, exh, 2, 3, 4]. Each states that the DNA analysis of the plaintiff's fingernail clippings, which did not exclude the victim as a donor, was more important than other DNA evidence because the victim only alleged sexual assault by the plaintiff in the form of digital penetration. [Court File No. 20, exh, 2, 3, 4].
When the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed an extraordinary appeal of the reinstatement of the criminal case, it held that the order of dismissal became final on October 8, 1998. Parks, 2001 WL 416738 at *3. Thus, the court reasoned that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the appeal on November 2, 1998, some 25 days after the order was final. Id.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court acted too late, but left open the possibility that the trial court could have acted anytime between September 8, 1998 and October 8, 1998 to reinitiate the case against the plaintiff. The discretion exercised by prosecutor Bates Bryan, on September 8, 1998, does not alter the grand jury's initial finding of probable cause. The motion by prosecutor David Denny was timely made on September 18, 1998. While the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a timely motion did not toll the thirty days in which the trial court could act, any action by the officers in seeking such a motion to reinstate a case, within the time period that the judge was permitted to act, is not itself a constitutional violation.
The plaintiff also alleges 5th and 14th Amendment claims for violation of due process. As these claims appear to be indistinguishable from the claim for malicious prosecution asserted pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court has foreclosed the possibility of substantive due process as a grounds for a malicious prosecution claim, no further analysis is required. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 275; Darrah, 255 F.3d at 309; Thacker, 328 F.3d at 259; Johnson, 2002 WL 1774215 at **2-3; but see Frantz, 246 F.3d at 877. The plaintiff's § 1983 claims will therefore be dismissed.
b. The City of Chattanooga
The plaintiff's claims against the City of Chattanooga under § 1983 were able to survive the City's motion to dismiss because notice pleading is applicable to § 1983 actions to the same extent as other actions. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). However, this claim must now be dismissed at the summary judgment stage because the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence regarding the training, supervision, or policies of the City to support the allegations contained in the complaint.
The plaintiff's response to the defendants' summary judgment motions argues that "Defendant City of Chattanooga cannot say that it does not have a policy, custom or practice of allowing its officers to make arrests without probable cause or allow its officers to maliciously prosecute anyone because such a policy may be implied through the actions of natural person." [Court File No. 24 at 6, italics omitted]. Contrary to the assertion of the plaintiff, the City of Chattanooga may and does assert at this stage that it has no policy custom or practice which violates the constitution. [Court File No. 20, exh. 1]. Furthermore, the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to this Court that such a policy, custom or practice exists.
It is possible for the actions of a decision maker to effectively create a policy for a municipality. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). The plaintiff argues that the presence of Chief of Police J. L. Dotson in the meeting during which the prosecutor and police discussed seeking reinstatement of the case amounts to the creation of a policy in favor of malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As discussed above, however, a claim for malicious prosecution can only exist in the absence of probable cause. Thacker, 328 F.3d at 259. In this case, a grand jury made a determination of probable cause. [Court File No. 24, exh. 2]. This determination was not erased when prosecutor Bates Bryan exercised his discretion to dismiss the case.
As explained by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, it was only after October 8, 1998, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction reinstate the case. Parks, 2001 WL 416738 at *3. The affidavits submitted by the individual defendants explain that a meeting was held during which prosecutor David Denny, Chief of Police J. L. Dotson, Captain Pat Rowe, Steven Parks, Steve Angel, and Tim Carroll discussed the dismissal of the case and why they believed that Bates Bryan had misinterpreted the evidence. [Court File No. 24, exh. 20; Court File No. 20, exh. 2, 3, 4]. Prosecutor David Denny then acted within the thirty days, during which the trial court retained jurisdiction, to seek reinstatement. Although the criminal trial court acted outside of the thirty day window and the case was ultimately dismissed, the plaintiff has failed to show any unconstitutional policy.
Little discussion of the plaintiff's "delinquent supervision and failure to train" [Court File No. 1] claim appears in the motion for summary judgment and response. Because the plaintiff has failed to show that the actions taken by the individual defendant officers amount to a constitutional violation, no genuine issue of material fact remains regarding the training and supervision of the same officers by the City.
"To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of person of the equal protection of the laws and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or an deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." Sharp v. Rainey, 910 F. Supp. 394, 395 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (quoting Johnson v. Hills Dales General Hosp. 40 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir. 1994)). In order to satisfy the first element and "demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff must show more than `vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts'" Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of person of the equal protection of the laws. The lone event on which the plaintiff relies to support his allegation of an unlawful conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights is a meeting attended by Chief of Police J. L. Dotson, Captain Pat Rowe, Assistant District Attorney David Denny, Tim Carroll, Steven Parks, and Steven Angel. [Court File No. 24, exh 20]. It is undisputed that this meeting was held because prosecutor Bates Bryan had dismissed the criminal case against the plaintiff. [Court File No. 24, exh. 20; Court File No. 25 at 10]. The report of the meeting and affidavits of persons attending the meeting state that there was a general belief that prosecutor Bates Bryan had misunderstood the available evidence when he exercised his discretion to dismiss the case. [Court File No. 24, exh. 20; Court File No. 20, exh. 2, 3, 4, 5]. However, a meeting of members of the City's police force and an Assistant District Attorney, to discuss the exercise of prosecutorial discretion which resulted in the dismissal of a case that was brought with a grand jury indictment, simply does not constitute a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights.
The plaintiff presents no other evidence in support of his § 1985(3) claim. Because the plaintiff fails to establish a required element of a § 1985(3) claim, unlawful conspiracy, the claim will be dismissed.
A claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 may not be pursued where the plaintiff states no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1990). As discussed above, the plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the presence of elements necessary to his § 1985(3) claim. The plaintiff's § 1986 claim will therefore be dismissed.
B. Tennessee Human Rights Act Claim
The plaintiff asserts a claim against the defendants under TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-701. This provision of the Tennessee Human Rights Act creates a civil cause of action for malicious harassment. Addressing questions certified by the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has explained that "a claim of malicious harassment requires not only that a person acted maliciously, i.e., ill-will, hatred or spite, but also that a person unlawfully intimidated another from the free exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional right by injuring or threatening to injure or coercing another person or by damaging destroying or defacing any real or personal property of another person." Washington v. Robertson County, 29 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Tenn. 2000).
The plaintiff's complaint does state that he was the president of the Chattanooga Law Enforcement Officers Association which had "the purpose of advancing the equal treatment of minority policemen in Chattanooga." [Court File No. 1 at paragraph 13]. The complaint further states "the defendants used the prosecution against plaintiff in an attempt to quash his voice and to retaliate against him for his activism." [Court File No. 1 at paragraph 13]. However, no evidence in support of this allegation or discussion of this allegation is provided by the plaintiff in response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ see Court File Nos. 23, 24].
The entirety of the plaintiff response to the defendants' argument, that the plaintiff has failed to identify any constitutional right that he was deprived of by injury, threat of injury, coercion, or damage to property, is as follows:
All of the individually named Defendants' (sic) acted wantonly, maliciously, with ill-will, hatred or spite. Also such that each and all unlawfully intimated (sic) Plaintiff from the free exercise or enjoyment of his constitutional rights by re-instituting the criminal action against this Plaintiff and thereby subjecting him to the very real jeopardy of losing his liberty. The Defendants' actions were motivated by racial animus and discriminatory animus.
[Court File No. 24 at 12].
The summary judgment standard requires that in order to refute the defendants' showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. The plaintiff's mere repetition of the claim as stated in the complaint [Court File No. 1, at paragraph 18] does not constitute "significant, probative evidence" suggesting the presence of the necessary elements of a claim of malicious prosecution in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Id. The plaintiffs claim pursuant to TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-21-701 will be dismissed.
C. Common Law Claims
The defendants assert that Parks's complaint is not clear regarding whether the officers are sued in their official capacities or in their individual capacities. [Court File No. 21 at 19]. It appears that the plaintiff's choice of a style in this case reflects the intent to sue the named officers only in their individual capacities. However, the Court will briefly address this issue. As discussed in the Court's October 29, 2002 memorandum and order, [Court File No. 13] the Tennessee Government Tort Claims Act provides that the City of Chattanooga has not waived immunity for claims of abuse of process, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2). When a suit is brought against a police officer in his official capacity, it is actually a suit against the government entity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25(1991). Thus, "the only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that the governmental entity possesses." Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985)). It follows that because the City of Chattanooga is immune from suit as to these common law claims, so too are the officers in their official capacities. See Baines v. Wilson County, 86 S.W.3d 575, 579-580 (Term. Ct. App. 2002). The Court will therefore discuss the common law claims only in reference to the individual capacities of the officers.
1. Abuse of Process
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has explained that "the gist of the tort [of abuse of process] is not commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish." Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 400 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 121, at 897 (5th ed. 1994)). The elements of the tort are "(1) the existence of an ulterior motive; and (2) an act in the use of the process other than such as would be proper in the regular prosecution of the charge." Id. (additional citations omitted).
Although, the plaintiff's complaint alleges that "the defendants used the prosecution against plaintiff in an attempt to quash his voice and to retaliate against him for his activism" he has failed to present any evidence to suggest such a motive. [Court File No. 1 at paragraph 13]. In fact, the plaintiff's response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment does not even address the defendants' arguments regarding the claim of abuse of process. [Court File No. 24]. In addition, the defendants have provided the affidavit of prosecutor David Denny which states that he filed the motion to reinstate the case against Parks "using . . .[his] discretion as a prosecutor and based on valid evidence which substantiated the position asserted by the victim, LaShundra Brown." [Court File No. 20, exh. 5 at paragraph 4]. This affidavit suggests that the defendant officers were not responsible for "an act in the use of process" which was taken by prosecutor David Denny. The plaintiff's claim for abuse of process will be dismissed.
2. False Imprisonment
Parks asserts a common law claim for false imprisonment against the defendant officers. "False imprisonment is the intentional restraint or detention of another without just cause." Newsome v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 901 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn.App. 1994) (citing Brown v. SCOA Indus., Inc., 741 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1987). The only evidence of such restraint in relation to Parks's "second prosecution" can be found the form of Parks's affidavit. [Court File No. 25]. Specifically, the affidavit states that after the reopening of the criminal prosecution and during a subsequent hearing, it was brought to the attention of the criminal court that Parks was not on bond because his bond had been canceled after the September 8, 1998 dismissal of the case. [Court File No. 25 at 13]. Parks states that "Judge Douglas Meyer then called up ABC Bonding Company threatening to put . . .[him] back in jail if ABC Bonding Company didn't re-bond . . .[him]." [Court File No. 25 at 13-14]. Parks's affidavit does not explain the resolution of this incident, however, it is apparent that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the involvement of officers Tim Carroll, Steven Parks, and Steven Angel, against whom the plaintiff asserts this claim. They simply had nothing to do with this. The plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment will therefore be dismissed.
3. Malicious Prosecution
The plaintiff asserts a claim of malicious prosecution against the defendant officers. In order to prove a malicious prosecution claim in the state of Tennessee, Parks must show that "(1) a prior suit or judicial proceeding was brought against the plaintiff without probable cause, (2) defendant brought such prior action with malice, and (3) the prior action was finally terminated in favor of the plaintiff." Christian v. Lapidus, 833 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tenn. 1992).
As discussed earlier in this memorandum, the indictment of the plaintiff by a grand jury demonstrates a finding of probable cause. The dismissal of the charges against the plaintiff through the discretionary actions of prosecutor Bates Bryan did not negate the initial finding of probable cause and the filing of a motion to alter or amend the court's order of dismissal did not create the need for an additional finding of probable cause. The plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment [Court File No. 20] will be GRANTED. The plaintiff's claims will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Costs will be awarded to the defendants.
A judgment will enter.
JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, the defendants' motion for summary judgment [Court File No. 20] is GRANTED. The plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3), 1986; the Tennessee Human Rights Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-701; and Tennessee common law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Costs are awarded to the defendants.
This is a Final Judgment. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.