Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-009
11-19-2020
DARRYL PARKMAN, Plaintiff v. WILLIAM WOLFE, et al., Defendants
(MARIANI, D.J.) ()
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 2020, Darryl Parkman ("Plaintiff") initiated this pro se civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of what appear to be two separate incidents of allegedly discriminatory behavior. (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff names William Wolfe—a Carbondale Police Officer—and Chris Simpler—manager of the Anthracite Hotel—as Defendants.
On March 9, 2020, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5). On the same day, the Court issued an order screening Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). At the conclusion of that Order, Plaintiff was advised that he had failed to state a cognizable claim in his original complaint and was granted 30 days to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff was also advised that if he did not file an amended complaint on or before April 9, 2020, I would issue a Report recommending that his complaint be dismissed. Id. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within the time allowed.
On April 23, 2020, I issued a Report recommending that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because he did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted in his Complaint. (Doc. 7).
Plaintiff did not file any objections to my Report.
On October 6, 2020, United States District Judge Robert B. Mariani issued an Order adopting my Report, but modifying it so that Plaintiff could have one more opportunity to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 8). Judge Mariani ordered that Plaintiff was required to file his amended complaint on or before October 21, 2020. Id.
Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint.
Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without further leave to amend.II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEWING COMPLAINTS FILED BY PLAINTIFFS PROCEEDING IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that "pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Id. at 211. It also "has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and '"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are enough to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
Additionally, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains that, a Complaint must contain, "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Dismissal under Rule 8 is appropriate when a complaint leaves "the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action];" Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App'x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so "rambling and unclear" as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441 F. App'x 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, a dismissal is appropriate in "'those cases in which the complaint is confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'" Tillio v. Spiess, 441 F. App'x at 110 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)); Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App'x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). III. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The claims in Plaintiff's Complaint appear to arise out of two incidents: (1) an interaction with hotel manager Chris Simpler ("Defendant Simpler"); and (2) an interaction with police officer William Wolfe ("Defendant Wolfe"). It is not at all clear whether these two incidents are related. Plaintiff also appears to suggest that one or both of these incidents resulted in an April 8, 2019 arrest.
With respect to his interaction with Defendant Simpler, Plaintiff alleges:
The hotel manager called the police for something he charged me 2 days prior for. He told police he watch me go in and out the hotel during my stay and told police he think I'm selling drugs because I didn't stay in my room being the only African American in a sold out hotel. Defamation of Character and invasion of privacy.(Doc. 1, p. 4).
With respect to his interaction with Defendant Wolfe, Plaintiff alleges:
Carbondale police officer violated my rights and racial profiled me because he said he never seen me so he goes through my pockets and
luggage without my consent. This officer had malicious intentions because my skin color. He broke the law without proper training and knowledge of how to properly and respectfully enforce the law. I was jailed 6 months for this.Id.
Publicly available court records reveal that a traffic citation for driving while operating privileges were suspended or revoked was filed on April 8, 2019. Commonwealth v. Parkman, MJ-45303-TR-0000279-2019 (C.P., Lackawanna County). However, the same record lists the offense date as March 3, 2019. Id. There is no publicly available state court record of any other charges filed.
Plaintiff wrote his Complaint on a pre-printed fill-in-the-blank complaint form. In the section where Plaintiff was asked to identify the nature of his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff wrote:
| Fourth Amendment | deprivation of rights |
| Fourteenth Amendment | discrimination |
| Article 1, Section 8 | racial profiling |
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
As an American and tax paying citizen, I would like to be compensated for all emotional and mental damage caused by this incident. I want to be compensated for the 6 months I remained in prison due to my rights being violated, discrimination and false imprisonment due to this untrained officer with no regaurds [sic] to the constitution. I would also like to be compensated for the hotel breach of contract due to the violation of my privacy. I suffered cruel treatment while housed at Lackawanna state prison. I also would like to be compensated for the racial profile, discrimination and slander of my name and face I
encountered on April 8, 2019. I took medication due to permanent distress from the people that's suppose to protect my rights. Im [sic] seeking $101 million dollars for damages.(Doc. 1, p. 5).
On March 9, 2020, I issued an Order (Doc. 6) explaining why Plaintiff's original complaint was not sufficient and provided him with an opportunity to make a curative amendment. Plaintiff was directed to amend his complaint on or before April 9, 2020. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint.
On April 23, 2020, I issued a Report (Doc. 7) recommending that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because he did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted in his Complaint.
Plaintiff did not file any objections to my Report.
On October 6, 2020, United States District Judge Robert B. Mariani issued an Order adopting my Report, but modifying it so that Plaintiff could have one more opportunity to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 8). Judge Mariani ordered that Plaintiff was required to file his amended complaint on or before October 21, 2020. Id.
To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint. IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Simpler and Wolfe are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). "It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely 'provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
A. PLAINTIFF'S § 1983 CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT SIMPLER SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT SIMPLER IS NOT A STATE ACTOR
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Simpler is a hotel manager. In his capacity as a hotel manager, Defendant Simpler is a private, not state, actor. "Only persons acting under the color of state law [ ] can be held liable for constitutional violations under § 1983." Hynoski v. Columbia County Redevelopment Authority, 941 F.Supp.2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
For a private actor, like Defendant Simpler to "come within the purview of § 1983 liability, plaintiff must show that [the stated] defendants acted under color of state law by pointing to some action, undertaken by them, that is 'fairly attributable' to the state." Id. at 562 (citations omitted). To accomplish this, a plaintiff "must show (1) that the defendants' acts were 'the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible' and (2) that the defendants may fairly be said to be state actors." Id. For example, "[a] private party who willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right acts 'under color of state law' for purposes of § 1983." Id. Nothing in Plaintiff's Complaint suggests that any action undertaken by Defendant Simpler could be attributable to the state. Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant Simpler should be dismissed.
B. PLAINTIFF'S § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT WOLFE
Although Plaintiff alleges a violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and a violation of his rights under the necessary and proper clause of Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution, based on the facts alleged it appears that Plaintiff's claims relate to malicious prosecution and false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
To successfully plead a malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff must allege that:
(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318
F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003); Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009); Piazza v. Lakkis, 2012 WL 2007112, *7 (M.D. Pa. June 5, 2012); Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2016). "[A] claim for malicious prosecution 'permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.'" Piazza, 2012 WL 2007112, *8 (citations omitted). Further, "a claim for malicious prosecution seeks to remedy 'the deprivation of liberty accompanying prosecution, not prosecution itself.'" Id. (citations omitted).Wiggins v. McAndrew, No. 3:17-cv-1410, 2018 WL 3727389 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2018).
As explained by the Court in Kokinda v. Brenier:
A claim under § 1983 for false arrest/false imprisonment is grounded in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures. Garcia v. County of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995) ). To maintain his false arrest claims , "a plaintiff must show that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest." Id. "Probable cause exists when the totality of facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent officer to believe that the party charged has committed an offense." (emphasis added) Id.557 F.Supp.2d 581, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
"[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest." Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). However, unlike a malicious prosecution claim, for which each criminal charge is analyzed independently, a false arrest claim will fail if there was probable cause to arrest for at least one of the offenses involved . Johnson, 477 F.3d at 75; see also Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that for an arrest to be justified, "[p]robable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be charged under the circumstances")(emphasis added).
For Plaintiff to prevail on his Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution and false imprisonment claims under § 1983, the allegations in his Complaint need to satisfy the elements listed above. Unfortunately, he has not done so.
With respect to the malicious prosecution claim, it is not clear whether Plaintiff was charged with a crime on April 8, 2019. Although Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and imprisoned, he does not state whether any criminal proceeding was initiated. When the Court, on its own, attempted to locate any criminal proceeding initiated on or around April 8, 2019, all that was found was a traffic citation. Therefore, Plaintiff has not satisfied the first element of his malicious prosecution claim.
With respect to the false arrest claim, Plaintiff has alleged that he was arrested and imprisoned. However, he does not allege that the arrest was made without probable cause.
C. LEAVE TO AMEND
If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff has already been given two opportunities to amend his complaint and has chosen not to do so. Therefore, dismissal without further leave to amend is appropriate. V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED without further leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).Date: November 19, 2020
(2) The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.Date: November 19, 2020
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge