Opinion
CASE NO: CV00-211-S-EJL
March 8, 2001
ORDER
On February 12, 2001, United States Magistrate Judge Mikel H. Williams issued his Order, Report and Recommendation in this matter. Docket No. 54. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), the parties had ten (10) days in which to file written objections to the proposed findings and report and recommendation. On February 20, 2001, Plaintiffs Detsel J. and Earlene Parkinson filed an objection, refutation, opposition, and motion to strike/quash and/or vacate order and report and recommendation of Mikel H. Williams, Magistrate (Docket No. 56). On February 26, 2001, Defendant Dale Thomson filed his response to Plaintiffs' objections (Docket No. 57), on February 28, 2001, the IRS Defendants filed their response (Docket No. 58), on March 2, 2001, Defendant Richardson filed her response (Docket No. 60), and on March 5, 2001, the Federal Court Defendants filed their response (Docket No. 61). On February 26, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a "Supplemental Memorandum Brief of Objections, Refutations, Opposition to, and Motion to Strike, Quash and Vacate Magistrate's Order and Report and Recommendation filed Feb. 12, 2001" (Docket No. 59). Plaintiffs requested a full hearing on the matter.
Judge Williams issued the following order: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify Winmill and Lodge, and to Consolidate Case with No. 98-340-E-BLW (Docket No. 14), filed August 25, 2000, is denied; (2) IRS Defendants' Motion for Protective Order re: Discovery (Docket No. 32), filed September 29, 2000, is deemed moot; (3) Plaintiffs Motion to Strike/Quash Motion for Protective Order (Docket No. 41), filed October 11, 2000, is deemed moot, (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants to comply with Plaintiffs' First Requests (Docket No. 42), filed October 11, 2000, is deemed moot; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant Winmill to Answer Interrogatories (Docket No. 44), filed October 23, 2000, is deemed moot; (6) Defendant Winmill's Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery (Docket No. 45), filed November 17, 2000, is deemed moot. Judge Williams also made the following recommendations: (1) grant Idaho Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 7), filed August 8, 2000; (2) grant IRS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 11), filed August 29, 2000; (3) grant Federal Court Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 21), filed September 18, 2000; (4) grant Defendant Betty Richardson's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 22), filed September 18, 2000; (5) grant Defendant Ray Rigby's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 24), filed September 18, 2000; and (6) grant Defendant Dale Thomson's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 26), filed September 19, 2000.
The IRS Defendants are identified individually as (1) the United States of America, (2) the Internal Revenue Service, (3) William T. Murphy, (4) James L. Mason, (5) Cindy L. Mason, (6) Al Seefried, (7) Cheryl Mosby, and (8) Kay Mosher.
The Federal Court Defendants are individually identified as Defendant U.S. District Judge B. Lynn Winmill, U.S. Magistrate Judge Larry M. Boyle, and Defendant Mark Echohawk are collectively referred to as "the Federal Court Defendants."
The Court cautions Plaintiffs that all briefing must comply with the local rules as set forth by this district. Plaintiffs' briefing greatly exceeds the page limits set forth by D. Id. L. R. 7.1(a)(2).
Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, this matter shall be decided on the record before this Court without oral argument.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), a district court judge may reconsider any pretrial matter where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Furthermore, a district court judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. The Court may accept, reject or modifY, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
Plaintiffs have not objected to Judge Williams' Order deeming moot the following motions: (1) IRS Defendants' Motion for Protective Order re: Discovery (Docket No. 32), filed September 29, 2000; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike/Quash Motion for Protective Order (Docket No. 41), filed October 11, 2000; (3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants to comply with Plaintiffs' First Requests (Docket No. 42). filed October 11, 2000; (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant Winmill to Answer Interrogatories (Docket No. 44), filed October 23, 2000; and (5) Defendant Winmill's Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery (Docket No. 45), filed November 17, 2000. Finding no clear error, this Court affirms Judge Williams' Order as to these matters.
A. General Objections
Plaintiffs first appear to argue that Magistrate Judge Williams had no jurisdiction to issue his report and recommendation. Docket No. 56 at 2. Section 636(b)(1)(A) of Title 28 of the United States Code permits a district judge to designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial mailer before the court. On September 20, 2000, this Court referred all pre-trial mailers in the instant case to United States Magistrate Mikel H. Williams. Docket No. 29. Accordingly, despite Plaintiffs' allegations to the contrary, Judge Williams had jurisdiction to her all pending motions in the instant case and was well within his authority in issuing his report and recommendation.
Plaintiffs next argue that Judge Williams inaccurately concluded that Plaintiffs' Complaint is unclear as to the exact conduct underlying the broad allegations. Docket No. 59 at 2. Plaintiffs then proceed by reiterating portions of their Complaint. Id. at 2-14. After reviewing the record, the Court agrees with Judge Williams that Plaintiffs have failed to clarifY what exact conduct underlies their broad allegations. However, the Court will deal more specifically with this objection below as it determines whether Plaintiffs have stated claims upon which relief can be granted as to the individually named Defendants.
B. Magistrate Court's Orders
A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Oregon Med. Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 339, 72 S.Ct. 690, 698 (1952)quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542 (1948). See also In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1982); Thomas v. SS Santa Mercedes, 572 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1978).
1. Motion to Disqualify District Judge Lodge (Docket No. 14-1)
Plaintiffs first appear to object to Judge Williams' Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify District Judge Lodge, (Docket No. 14-1), filed August 25, 2000. Docket No. 59 at 26-27. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Judge Williams erred by failing to address the cases cited by Plaintiff which allegedly require the disqualification of Judge Lodge.
Plaintiffs' original motion also requested a disqualification of Judge Winmill and their objection is entitled "ALL U.S. DISTRICT JUDGES AND MAGISTRATE JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO ARE DISQUALIFIED AND RECUSED FROM HEARING OR PRESIDING OVER ANY MATTER HEREIN." Docket No. 59 at 26. However, Plaintiffs' objection does not otherwise refer to Judge Winmill and, having reviewed the portion of the record applicable to Judge Winmill, this Court is not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed; accordingly, the Court finds that Magistrate Williams' Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify District Judge Winmill is affirmed. On the other hand, Plaintiffs' objection does make specific reference to Judge Lodge; accordingly, this Court will review Judge Williams' denial as to Judge Lodge for clear error.
Without being specific, Plaintiffs argue that a thorough reading of all filings in this and other cases would reveal the reasons why Judge Lodge should recuse himself from this and any other related matters. Plaintiffs generally argue that Judge Lodge knows but overlooks egregious misstatements and abusive actions of Judge Williams and note that they intend for Judge Lodge to be either a defendant or witness in the instant action. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (1986), the Supreme Court noted that allegations of bias will rise to the level of a due process violation only in the most extreme instances. Id. at 821, 106 S.Ct. at 1585. Plaintiffs' arguments here fall well below that level. In Aetna, the record presented more than Plaintiffs' mere allegations of bias and prejudice. In Aetna, the Appellant was able to support claims that one of the Alabama Supreme Court Justices had a direct stake in the outcome of the case. That is certainly not the case here. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Judge Lodge has any personal animosity or bias against them. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Judge Lodge has failed to act impartially. No new law or evidence having been presented, and this Court having reviewed the record, this Court affirms Judge Williams' Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify District Judge Lodge.
2. Motion to Consolidate Case with No. 98-340-E-BLW (Docket No. 14-2)
Plaintiffs have also cited In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955), for the proposition that Judge Lodge needs to recuse himself, In Murchison the Supreme Court determined that a judge who effectively served as the complainant, prosecutor, and judge in a contempt proceeding was personally biased in favor of conviction. Id. at 137-39. Those facts are not present here and the Court finds Murchison distinguishable from the case at bar.
Next, Plaintiffs object to Judge Williams' Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate Case with No. 98-340-E-BLW, (Docket No. 14-2), filed August 25, 2000. Docket No. 59 at 28-29. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that this case and CV 98-340 have factual matters and causes of action in common and more than would meet the goals of judicial economy. Plaintiffs further indicate that their desire to consolidate the mailers was based, in part, on an effort to prevent Judge windmill from issuing an order resolving case CV 98-340.
After reviewing the record, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' general allegation that consolidation is appropriate. As noted by Judge Williams, case number CV 98-340-E-BLW is a civil action wherein these Plaintiffs were named as Defendants by the United States for the purpose of collecting taxes due and owing the government. The instant case alleges racketeering, civil conspiracies and due process violations by the Plaintiffs against various state and federal employees. Plaintiffs have failed to specify what causes of action the two cases have in common or indicate how consolidation would meet the goals of judicial economy. Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to state how Judge Williams' findings are clearly erroneous. No new law or evidence having been presented, and this Court having reviewed the record, this Court affirms Judge Williams' Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate.
III. Magistrate Court's Recommendations
Next, Plaintiffs object to Judge Williams' recommendation to grant the various Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docket Nos. 7, 11, 21, 22, 24, 26).
Based on the Plaintiffs' objections, this Court must conduct a de novo review of the record. It is a statutory and constitutional obligation of the district court "to arrive at its own independent conclusion about those portions of the magistrate's report to which objections are made."United States v. Ramsing, 874 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1989).
A. Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiffs object to Judge Williams' recommendations to grant each of the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. For clarity, the Court will look at each Defendants' motion in turn.
1. The Idaho Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Defendants the Idaho Tax Commission, the Idaho Attorney General's Office, and employees Daryl Jones and Larry Wasden are collectively referred to as "the Idaho Defendants."
In granting the Idaho Defendants' motion to dismiss, Judge Williams found that the Plaintiffs' Complaint was barred under the Eleventh Amendment and/or the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Plaintiffs general allege that "[t]he case authorities do in fact establish that there are no immunities nor Eleventh Amendment protections to any of said defendants." Docket No. 59 at 21.
The local rules of this district require that any party "objecting to the recommended disposition of the matter shall serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." D. Id. L. Civ. R. 72.1(b)(2). Plaintiffs' general statement regarding the alleged holdings of unidentified case authorities does not sufficiently specify the objections being made. Accordingly, no new law, evidence or argument being presented, this Court finds that the recommendations of Judge Williams are well reasoned and well founded in law and hereby accepts and adopts as its own the findings of Judge Williams as to the Idaho Defendants.
2. The IRS Defendants
In granting the IRS Defendants' motion to dismiss, Judge Williams found that individual IRS employees cannot be sued in their official capacities and, in dismissing the individual employees, noted that the proper party defendant to address the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint is the United States. Judge Williams then found that Plaintiffs' claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and/or are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as to the IRS Defendants. Plaintiffs assert that the alleged facts and causes of action in their present Complaint were not alleged in an earlier case because they had not yet occurred and the fact that some of the federal defendants were named in an earlier case is not sufficient to bar the present claims. Docket No. 59 at 23. Plaintiffs further assert that "[n]o one presented a request for judicial notice of plaintiffs' opening brief and closing briefs in said appeal on CV 98-383-E-EJG." Id. at 24.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (a) and 26 U.S.C. § 7432 (a), 7433 (precluding the suing of named individual IRS employees in their official capacities), See also Thompson v. Walbran, 990 F.2d 403, 405 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that suits under FOIA may not be maintained against individual IRS employees).
To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that a lack of judicial notice has precluded the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the Court notes that Fed.R.Evid. 201(c) permits a court to take judicial notice, whether requested or not. Furthermore, while Plaintiffs specifically challenge Judge Williams' findings of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel Plaintiffs fail to address his finding that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Failure to state a claim is fatal to Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs' general averments of some type of grand "Mormon" conspiracy, various constitutional and statutory violations, and fraud are vague and conclusory. Plaintiffs' laundry list of alleged criminal conduct fail to allege any specific facts or tie the IRS defendants to the alleged conduct. Such failures are fatal to Plaintiffs' claims against the IRS Defendants. Accordingly, even if this Court agreed that the present issues have not been barred by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel Plaintiffs' claims would not be saved as to the IRS Defendants. Accordingly, no new law, evidence or argument being presented, this Court finds that the recommendations of Judge Williams are well reasoned and well founded in law and hereby accepts and adopts as its own the findings of Judge Williams as to the IRS Defendants.
3. The Federal Court Defendants
In granting the Federal Court Defendants' motion to dismiss, Judge Williams found that Judge Boyle and Mark Echohawk were not timely served. Judge Williams additionally found that Judge Winmill and Judge Boyle were previously named as Defendants in Morgan, et al. v. Mason. et al., Case No. 98-383-E-BLW, which Plaintiffs were also involved in. Docket No. 54 at 8. Judge Williams additionally found Judge Winmill was entitled to judicial immunity for all actions taken within his authority as a federal judge. Id. Finally, Judge Williams found, as to each of the Federal Court Defendants, that Plaintiffs' Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 9.
a. Defendant Mark Echohawk
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to relief of any alleged failure to serve within 120 days per Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Docket No. 59 at 16-20. While Judge Williams' recommendation to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint as to Defendant Mark Echohawk was based, in part, on Plaintiffs' failure to comply with timely perfection of service of process as required by Fed.R.Civ.P.4, Judge Williams also found that the instant Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to this Defendant.
Failure to state a claim is fatal to Plaintiffs' claims. As previously noted, Plaintiffs' general averments of some type of grand "Mormon" conspiracy and various constitutional and statutory violations are vague and conclusory. Furthermore, this Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has identified law clerks as "probably the one participant in the judicial process whose duties and responsibilities are most intimately connected with the judge's own exercise of the judicial function" and found that law clerks are covered by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Defendant Echohawk, to the extent that he was assisting Judge Winmill in carrying out judicial functions, is covered by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Plaintiffs have neither articulated the conduct which ties Defendant Echohawk to the "laundry list" of alleged criminal activities nor have they stated that such conduct was outside the scope of his duties as a law clerk. Such failures are fatal to Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Echohawk. Accordingly, granting Plaintiffs relief from the requirements of Rule 4 would not save Plaintiffs' claims as to this Defendant.
b. Judge Boyle
As with Defendant Echohawk, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to relief of any alleged failure to serve Judge Boyle within 120 days per Fed.R.Civ.P.4(m). Docket No. 59 at 16-20. In addition to the Rule 4 violation, Judge Williams' recommendation to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint as to Defendant Boyle was based on principles of res judicata and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Res judicata and failure to state a claim are both fatal to Plaintiffs' claims. The Court can discern no attempt by Plaintiffs to argue that the claims against Judge Boyle are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Furthermore, as with Defendant Echohawk, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any specific fact associating Judge Boyle with the alleged criminal conduct. Such failures are fatal to Plaintiffs' claims against Judge Boyle. Accordingly, granting Plaintiffs relief from the requirements of Rule 4 would not save Plaintiffs' claims as to this Defendant.
c. Judge Winmill
Plaintiffs have not specifically objected to Judge Williams' recommendation to dismiss Judge Winmill based on judicial immunity. Furthermore, they have failed to articulate why Judge Winmill would not be entitled to such immunity for all actions taken within his authority as a federal judge. Accordingly, no new law, evidence or argument being presented, this Court finds that the recommendations of Judge Williams are well reasoned and well founded in law and hereby accepts and adopts as its own the findings of Judge Williams as to Judge Winmill and the other Federal Court Defendants.
4. Defendant Richardson
Judge Williams granted Defendant Richardson's motion to dismiss for the following reasons: (1) the proper defendant is the United States; (2) Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Richardson are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; (3) Plaintiffs' Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations against Defendant Richardson and therefore fails to meet the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8; and (4) Defendant Richardson, in her official capacity as the United States Attorney for the District of Idaho, is entitled to avail herself of the doctrine of absolute immunity for all conduct engaged in while performing her functions as prosecutor.
While Plaintiffs generally objected to Judge Williams' granting of Defendant Richardson's motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs did not specifically address Judge Williams' reasoning. Plaintiffs have failed to address why Ms. Richardson, and not the United States, is the proper defendant in the instant action. Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to allege that Ms. Richardson engaged in conduct outside of her official capacity. No new law, evidence or argument being presented, this Court finds that the recommendations of Judge Williams are well reasoned and well founded in law and hereby accepts and adopts as its own the findings of Judge Williams as to Defendant Richardson.
5. Defendants Rigby and Thomson
Judge Williams granted Defendant Rigby's motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Rigby are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; and (2) Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Judge Williams granted Defendant Thomson's motion to dismiss based on violations of Rules 4 and 8.
While Plaintiffs have generally objected to Judge Williams' recommendation to grant Defendant Rigby's and Defendant Thomson's motions to dismiss, as previously noted, the local rules of this district requires objecting parties to file specific, written objections.
Plaintiffs' general notice of opposition does not sufficiently specify the objections being made. Accordingly, no new law, evidence or argument being presented, this Court finds that the recommendations of Judge Williams are well reasoned and well founded in law and hereby accepts and adopts as its own the findings of Judge Williams as to Defendant Rigby and Thomson.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because the Court finds the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Williams to be well reasoned and well founded in law, the Court hereby accepts and adopts as its own, the findings made by Judge Williams. Acting in part on the recommendations of Judge Williams, and this Court being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judge Williams' Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify Winmill and Lodge, and to Consolidate Case with No. 98-340-E-BLW (Docket No. 14), filed August 25, 2000, is AFFIRMED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Idaho Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 7), filed August 8, 2000, is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that IRS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 11), filed August 29, 2000, is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Federal Court Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 21), filed September 18, 2000, is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Betty Richardson's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 22), filed September 18, 2000, is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ray Rigby's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 24), filed September 18, 2000, is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Dale Thomson's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 26), filed September 19, 2000, is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike, Quash and/or Vacate Judge Williams' Report and Recommendation (Docket Nos. 56, 59), filed February 20, 2001, and February 26, 2001, are DENIED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Requests for Hearing (Docket Nos. 56, 59), filed February 20, 2001, and February 26, 2001, are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is hereby dismissed in its entirety. The parties to bear own costs and fees.