Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-1283-D
July 12, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Background
Nature of the Case: Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division and formerly incarcerated in the Dallas County Jail filed the instant civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names J. Moreno and S. Meyers of the Garland Police Department as defendants in this action. No process has been issued in this case.
Statement of the Case: Plaintiff filed this complaint on July 3, 2001. The Court has granted his request to proceed in forma pauperis. He alleges that defendants engaged in police brutality, harassment, racial profiling, and obstruction of justice. (Compl. at 3.) He further alleges that they falsely arrested him and physically and verbally abused him. (Id.) He states:
I was arrested for burglary of habitation to my own apartment. The window screen was broken one week prior to my arrest in which I was arrested for public intoxication. Officer Moreno did not ask any questions. He arrested me not knowing that the person whom called 911 did not understand how to read English.
After being arrested I was taken to the Garland Police Dept., choked, maced, and beaten while still in handcuffs.
(Id. at 4.) As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages and all charges reviewed and dropped. (Id.)
In an effort to flesh out the claims in the complaint, the Court directed plaintiff to complete a Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire. He therein provided the following facts related to the claims against Officer Moreno:
Mr. Moreno didn't ask any questions, as to why the police was called. He didn't ask my name, why the window screen was broken, or if the misunderstanding between myself and La-Manykham, could be verbally resolved.
Mr. Moreno had pointed his gun directly into my face while several people watched. I did not resist or evade, so this was a threat to my life.
He had no reason to put his knee in my back, twisted my wrist and very aggressively placed handcuffs on my wrist much too tight.
Mr. Moreno informed La-Manykham that the paper she was signing was pertaining [to] me not coming back to the apartment, when indeed it was to press charges for attempted burglary and theft. La-Manykham did not read the charges.
(Answer to Question 1 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.) He also provided the following facts related to the claims against Officer Meyers:
Mr. Meyers helped Mr. Moreno and another number of officers pull me out of the squad car, mace me, and beat me. Mr. Meyers didn't know that I was an immediate threat when he grabbed me.
Mr. Meyers and the other officers was aggressively holding me and pulling me while Mr. Moreno elbowed me in my ribs and chest. The officers was laughing and saying: Spray him some more. Mr. Meyers did not try to stop until my leg was caught and my wrist was stuck inside the handcuffs.
Along with Mr. Moreno, Mr. Meyers proceeded the process of booking me knowing that I could not have assaulted anyone unable to see and in handcuffs.
(Answer to Question 2 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.) He contends the officers falsely arrested him because "Mr. Moreno didn't ask why was there any misunderstanding. He appeared angry and aggravated about a prior arrest or encounter." (Answer to Question 5 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.)
Plaintiff claims that he suffered contusions of his upper and lower extremities, as well as a chest contusion that took "a few months to heal." (Answer to Question 3 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.) He asserts that he did "nothing" to provoke the incident with Officers Moreno and Meyers. (Answer to Question 4 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.) When he answered the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire, charges of attempted burglary of habitation and two assaults on public servants were pending against plaintiff. (Answer to Question 6 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.)
II. Screening for Frivolity
The Court has permitted plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint is thus subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, plaintiffs complaint is also subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A regardless of whether he proceeds in forma pauperis. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua Sponte dismissal, if the Court finds the complaint "frivolous" or "malicious" or if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."
A claim is frivolous, when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law, furthermore, when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact, when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id. at 327-28. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, on the other hand, when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Smith v. Winter, 782 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1986); Henrise v. Horvath, 94 F. Supp.2d 768, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
III. Applicable Law
Plaintiff has filed his action on a standard form used in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id.
As part of the relief he seeks, plaintiff wants the charges dropped. Such relief, however, is an inappropriate remedy in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974). Accordingly, that claim for relief does not survive summary dismissal. To the extent the Court should reasonably construe the instant complaint as a petition seeking habeas relief, plaintiff has shown no exhaustion of his state remedies. To the extent the instant complaint is a habeas petition, the Court should thus dismiss it without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.
Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages for harassment, racial profiling, obstruction of justice, false arrest, police brutality, and physical and verbal abuse. To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff, however, must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999). With respect to his claims of harassment, racial profiling, obstruction of justice, and physical and verbal abuse other than that related to the claimed police brutality; plaintiff has alleged no facts which show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. These claims thus fail.
In this instance, the crux of plaintiff's complaint is that he was unlawfully arrested for attempted burglary of a habitation and suffered police brutality at the hands of the defendant officers. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), however, the Court must dismiss a complaint brought pursuant to § 1983, when the civil rights action, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff's conviction or sentence, unless plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 512 U.S. at 486-87. Heck, furthermore, bars "damage claims which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction on a pending criminal charge." Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 898 n. 8 (7th Cir. 2001); see also, Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Heck to prevent accrual of § 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of convictions on pending criminal charges).
When plaintiff answered the questions to the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire, charges of attempted burglary of a habitation and assault on public servants were pending. Plaintiff has provided nothing to indicate that they are not still pending or that they have not proceeded to a conviction. If the Court were to grant him damages for the alleged false arrest under the facts of this case, such ruling would necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction for attempted burglary of a habitation stemming from the alleged false arrest. See Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that Heck bars recovery under a false arrest theory, because a "conviction for aggravated assault necessarily implies that there was probable cause for his arrest at that point in time"); Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Heck bars recovery for false arrest, when there is probable cause for any of the charges made and plaintiff's "proof to establish his false arrest claim, i.e., that there was no probable cause to arrest . . . would demonstrate the invalidity of [plaintiff's] conviction). If the Court were to grant plaintiff damages for the alleged police brutality or excessive force claim, such ruling would likewise necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction for assault on a public servant. See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir.) (holding that excessive force claims under § 1983 are "barred as a matter of law if brought by an individual convicted of aggravated assault related to the same events"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 959 (2000); Sappington, 195 F.3d at 235 (same); Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Heck bars claims of excessive force when plaintiff has been convicted of "battery of an officer"); Singer v. Roberts, No. 3:99-CV-0296-G, 2000 WL233291, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2000) (holding that Heck bars claims of excessive force when plaintiff has been convicted of "assault on a public servant").
Accordingly, under Heck, plaintiff must demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or expunged prior to bringing the instant action. See Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 103. Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing. As stated in answer to the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire, the charges stemming from his arrest and alleged assaults on public servants remain pending. "[A] claim, that if successful would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, does not accrue so long as the potential for a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist." Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). Consequently, the claims of plaintiff for monetary damages for false arrest and excessive force are "legally frivolous" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 103. A "claim which falls under the rule in Heck is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question." Id. at 102.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS plaintiff's claims of false arrest and excessive force with prejudice as frivolous until such time as plaintiff satisfies the conditions set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). It is further recommended that the Court DISMISS plaintiff's other claims with prejudice as frivolous without regard to future satisfaction of the Heck conditions. To the extent the instant action is properly construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS it without prejudice for the failure to exhaust state remedies.