Opinion
Case No. 4:01-CV-11
January 31, 2003
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff and Defendants' Objections to Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody's Report and Recommendation ("Report").
I. Facts
Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently held at the Riverside Correctional Facility, filed claims against prison officials at Jackson Cooper Street Correctional Facility ("JCS") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants refused to allow him to participate in a Residential Substance Abuse Treatment program ("RSAT") at JCS, despite his alcoholism, because he is a diabetic. Plaintiff claims refusal to allow him to participate in RSAT amounted to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., ("ADA"). He further claims his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because he did not receive treatment for his alcoholism. Plaintiff asserts he would have been discharged on December 10, 2000, if he had been permitted to participate in RSAT. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 compensatory damages, discharge to seek professional alcoholism treatment, and telephonic communication with Defendants to discuss settlement of this action.
On November 13, 2001, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' original Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 14, 35). In that Opinion and Order, the Court dismissed Defendant Bill Martin and dismissed Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages under ADA. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint stating he has experienced physical injury as a result of Defendants' actions. He states he has physical symptoms of alcoholism and because he has received no treatment, he subsequently has relapsed.
Pending before the Court is a renewed Motion by Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"), Sherry L. Burt, and Mark Becker for Dismissal and Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 49). Also before the Court are three motions filed by Plaintiff: Motion for Trial (Dkt. No. 54); Motion for Injunctive Relief (Dkt. No. 56); and Motion for Entry of Default (Dkt. No. 57).
II. Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), a magistrate judge's report that is case-dispositive and/or concerns prisoner litigation shall be reviewed de novo by the district court, and the court may accept, reject, or modify the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b); L. Civ. R. 72.3(b).
Review of a motion for summary judgment requires the Court to determine if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is the function of the Court to decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The question is "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252. The facts are to be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and ". . . all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Schaffer v. A. O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 74 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (other citations omitted). The court must consider the record as a whole by reviewing all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file. Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Once the movant satisfies his/her burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp., 912 F.2d 151, 153-54 (6th Cir. 1990). The non-moving party may not rest on the mere allegations of the pleadings. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
III. Analysis
A. Plaintiff's First Objection
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that he has not stated an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff argues he was denied treatment for a substance abuse problem in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The standard to apply in evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim is what is socially acceptable punishment. According to Plaintiff, it is not socially acceptable today to deprive an addict of treatment since it is well recognized that treatment is necessary for recovery. Plaintiff contends the continuing lack of treatment caused him mental anguish and physical damage. Plaintiff argues MDOC is culpable because it knew of the violation of his rights.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits states from imposing "barbarous" punishment or punishment in contravention of society's "evolving standards of decency." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The Amendment prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or punishment that is disproportionate to the crime committed. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with "deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation" or "other conditions intolerable for prison confinement." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. Prisoners who allege a deprivation must demonstrate a deprivation that effects denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" in light of the contemporary standard of decency. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998).
That being said, denial of access to a treatment program does not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Purkey v. Simmons, No. 01-3269, 2002 WL 102655 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 2002) (finding "no authority establishing that a parolee has a federal constitutional right to drug or alcohol rehabilitation treatment"); Porter v. Potocki, 202 F.3d 269, *2, 1999 WL 1252905 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (finding plaintiff has no constitutional right to substance abuse treatment); Corn v. Morgan, 97 F.3d 1451, 1996 WL 549814 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (holding interference with access to rehabilitation program does not violate Eighth Amendment); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating "there is no constitutional right to rehabilitation"); McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding prison's failure to provide rehabilitation program is not unconstitutional).
While substance abuse treatment is socially acceptable, that does not translate into a burden on the state to provide substance abuse treatment as part of its punishment. A failure to provide substance abuse treatment clearly does not rise to the level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain nor does it constitute a deprivation of basic medical treatment. Plaintiff did not have access to alcohol while in custody and so was not placed in physical danger as a result of his alcoholism while in custody. Plaintiff does not allege any failure by MDOC to treat any physical problems he experienced. His relapse once he was released was not the responsibility of MDOC. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to sustain a triable Eighth Amendment claim.
B. Plaintiff's Second Objection
Plaintiff objects to dismissal of his monetary claims and argues monetary damages should be awarded for his retaliation claim and for continuing violation of ADA.
ADA provides "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A "public entity' under ADA includes any State or local government or any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998), states ADA applies to state prisons, but does not effectively abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of states. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (finding Congress did not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with passage of ADA); Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 813 (6th Cir. 2002).
This Court, in its November 13, 2001 Opinion and Order of partial dismissal (Dkt. Nos. 34, 35), dismissed Plaintiff's monetary damages claim under the ADA against both the individual Defendants and MDOC on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity. "[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief under ADA to be assigned to the RSAT program. Regardless of the relief sought, the states and their departments are immune from suit in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984). As a result, MDOC is not subject to suit and Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief against MDOC will be dismissed. Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief against the individual Defendants is discussed below.
C. Plaintiff's Third Objection
Plaintiff claims he is a member of a class that suffers from an uncontrollable disease and so his Equal Protection claim should not be dismissed. His diabetes is not curable and without insulin he could die. He is being discriminated against by being refused treatment on account of his disability, his diabetic condition.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Trial in which he also sought leave to amend his Complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 permits amendment of complaints. When deciding whether to grant a Rule 15 motion to amend, the court should consider whether amending the complaint would cause undue delay, is the product of bad faith, is the result of repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previously allowed amendments, would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party, or is futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). If a claim would properly be dismissed, amendment to add the claim would be futile. Thiokol Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs proposed amendment is an Equal Protection claim that is properly denied because the amendment is futile. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment essentially provides that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike under law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Because a fundamental right is not implicated in this case and Plaintiff does not allege he is a member of a suspect class, he is not entitled to strict scrutiny. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-47 (finding disability is not a suspect class); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (stating "equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class"). Plaintiff, therefore, must show "intentional and arbitrary discrimination" by the state. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). MDOC had a reason for denying Plaintiff admittance to RSAT. The facility did not have the necessary accommodations to meet Plaintiff's medical needs. Plaintiff does not contend this was not the reason for his refusal or that the rule was irrational. Even if a different rule was possible, its existence does not state an equal protection claim. Plaintiffs motion for trial, to the extent it seeks to amend the complaint, should be denied.
D. Defendants' First Objection
Defendants Burt and Becker object to the Magistrate Judge's finding that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is not moot because Plaintiff has re-offended and is again in MDOC's custody. Defendants argue that a prisoner's transfer to another facility moots his claim for injunctive relief. The Court believes the rule is more precisely stated as a request for injunctive relief is moot when a prisoner is released from prison, but is not necessarily moot because of a transfer. Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996). Defendants cite Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975), which held a prisoner's claim for declaratory relief moot upon his tranfer because there was no reasonable expectation the wrong would be repeated. Prison officials' subsequent conduct demonstrated any subjective fear plaintiff had of a retaliatory transfer or of suffering adverse consequences because of an earlier transfer was "indeed remote and speculative" and therefore rendered his claim moot. The court in Holland v. Purdy, 457 F.2d 802, 803 (5th Cir. 1972), determined that if a prisoner has been transferred and is no longer subject to the conditions giving rise to the request for injunctive relief, the request is moot. That is not the case here, as in his renewed motion, Plaintiff states he requested admittance to the treatment program upon re-incarceration and was again refused because of his diabetic condition.
Defendants argue a request for release from confinement must be brought as a request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which this was not. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Plaintiff, however, seeks release to a treatment program, not release from prison.
Ordinarily, a suit against an individual in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity, such as MDOC. Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). An official capacity action seeking injunctive relief constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Therefore, Plaintiff's ADA claim against Defendants Burt and Becker is cognizable.
E. Defendants' Second Objection
Defendants Burt and Becker claim they are entitled to judgment on the merits on Plaintiff's ADA claim. Defendants argue Plaintiff was not denied participation in RSAT. The fact was that the facility could not meet Plaintiff's medical needs and he was not medically cleared for transfer. Defendants argue regulatory provisions for ADA state entry criteria can lawfully have the effect of screening individuals with disabilities if the criteria are necessary to provision of the program. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(8); Pottgen v. Missouri St. High Sch. Activities Assn., 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) Defendants state the entry criteria for RSAT are permissible because the facility did not have nursing staff on at the times Plaintiff required insulin and so would not be able to meet his medical needs.
Defendants raise this argument for the first time in their objections to Magistrate Judge Carmody's Report. As a result, Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to fully respond to this argument. The Court will not dismiss the claim on the merits without full briefing by both parties.
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff's and Defendants' Objections. The Court will adopt Magistrate Judge Carmody's Report.
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion issued this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objections (Dkt. No. 68) are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Burt and Becker's Objections (Dkt. No. 63) are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody's Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 61) is ADOPTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections, Sherry L. Burt, and Mark Becker's Motion by for Dismissal and Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 49) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed. Michigan Department of Corrections is dismissed on all claims as a party Defendant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Trial (Dkt. No. 54) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief (Dkt. No. 56) is. DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default (Dkt. No. 57) is DENIED.