Opinion
Case No. 4:01-CV-11
November 9, 2001
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Objections to the Magistrate's July 17, 2001 Report and Recommendation. The Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Objections and will adopt in part and reject in part the Report and Recommendation (Report) of Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody. As a result, Defendants' Rule 12(b) Motion for Dismissal or Rule 56(b) Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), a magistrate judge's report that is case-dispositive and/or concerns prisoner litigation shall be reviewed de novo by the district court, and the court may accept, reject, or modify the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); L. Civ.R. 72.3(b).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The allegations of the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The rules generally require only a "short and plain statement of the claim" and not detailed allegations. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,168 (1993). The complaint, however, "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Review of a motion for summary judgment requires the Court to determine if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is the function of the Court to decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The question is "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252. The facts are to be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and ". . . all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Schaffer v. A. O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 74 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (other citations omitted).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) system, has filed this action alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that because he is a diabetic, Defendants have refused to allow Plaintiff to participate in a Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program for his alcoholism. Further, Plaintiff asserts that he would have been discharged on December 10, 2000 if he had been permitted to participate in the program. Plaintiff requests money damages, discharge to seek professional alcoholism treatment, and telephonic communication with Defendants to discuss settlement of this action.
Defendants made a Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment, which Magistrate Judge Carmody recommended be denied. The Court has reviewed all pertinent pleadings in this matter, including Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' Objections (Dkt. No. 32). As of when the Report was submitted, Defendants had not filed an Answer to the complaint and discovery was outstanding, and this appears to still be true. The Court will address each of Defendants' three objections in turn.
A. Objection I
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants' conduct has caused him physical injury, and thus he cannot sustain his claims because of a prohibition put in place by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), found in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). This section provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2001).
This section on its face requires a prior showing of physical injury to bring claims of mental or emotional injury, but it does not require specific allegations of physical injury in order to bring any claim at all. At most, this argument would bar monetary relief for mental or emotional injury claims if Plaintiff in fact did not make claims of physical injury. Since Plaintiff does not appear to make any specific claims for mental or emotional injury, Defendants' argument is wholly inapplicable to this case.
Moreover, Plaintiff has made serious, non-frivolous claims for relief, and presumably Plaintiff could plead physical injury in a legally sufficient manner if given leave to amend his Complaint. The Court takes judicial notice that alcoholism is a disease that, left untreated, can create serious physical injury, particularly when present in combination with diabetes.
B. Objection II
Defendants further argue that the Complaint should be dismissed as to Defendant Bill Martin because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to this Defendant. Prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies as to each defendant in order to put the prison on notice of prisoners' alleged problems specific to each defendant. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2001). It appears that Defendant Martin was not named on Plaintiff's administrative grievances, and thus he must be dismissed from this action.
C. Objection III
Finally, Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's finding that they are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to Plaintiff's ADA claim, and they make new legal arguments, which the Court will address below. Plaintiff sues under Title II of the ADA, the public services title, which prohibits discrimination against the disabled in their participation in or benefit from services, programs, or activities of public entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12165 (2001).
It is true that the United States Supreme Court recently held that Congress may not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to make Title I of the ADA applicable to states. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 967-68 (2001). Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination as to the disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117 (2001). The Court, however, did not consider whether Congress may validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under Title II of the ADA. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 960 n. 1.
It is also true that in its previous term, the Supreme Court held that Title II of the ADA applies on its face to state prisons, but the Court did not address whether Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998).
It is with this background that this Court must decide whether these Defendants are entitled to state sovereign immunity to Plaintiff's ADA Title II claim for monetary damages. In Garrett, the Supreme Court held that Congress, in enacting Title I of the ADA, had not met the Court's requirements for demonstrating a valid exercise of power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 968. To do so, Congress must demonstrate there is a "pattern of discrimination" showing that states are violating the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be "congruent and proportional" to the targeted violations. Id. at 967-68.
The Court, speaking for a 5-4 majority, found that the record of legislative findings was too sparse on the issue of state hiring and employment discrimination against the disabled to constitute a "pattern of discrimination," and in fact noted that employment discrimination was not mentioned in the Congressional findings but only in anecdotal examples compiled by the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. Id. at 965-66. Moreover, the Court felt that the "reasonable accommodation" required by Title I of the ADA was not a proportional response, since the Court felt that the accommodation duty might exceed what the Fourteenth Amendment requires. Id. at 966-67. See also id. at 964 (continuing to hold that discrimination on the basis of disability is subject only to rational basis review).
Given that the examples in the Garrett record were considered sparse and encompassed state discrimination of all kinds, and combined with the fact that the Supreme Court was not convinced that Congressional findings regarding discrimination against the disabled were accurate, it is likely that higher courts, including the Supreme Court, will find that Congress may not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under any portion of the ADA. The Sixth Circuit was headed in this direction before Garrett, holding in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 227 F.3d 627, 629 (6th Cir. 2000) that states have a state sovereign immunity defense to Title II of the ADA because Congress could not validly abrogate immunity. However, this decision was vacated on December 12, 2000 for rehearing en banc, and no new decision has been issued as of the writing of this opinion.
Of the circuit courts holding prior to Garrett that Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity under at least some portion or all of the ADA, they have split as to whether Garrett compels the same result for Title II claims as well as Title I claims. The Second Circuit, in discussing a Title II claim, found that its previous position that states were not immune from ADA claims was "implicitly abrogated" by Garrett. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 1159970, at *10 n. 3 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2001). In an unpublished decision, the Tenth Circuit went in the same direction, calling their previous position "overruled," but without distinguishing between Title I and Title II claims. Ferguson v. Oklahoma Secy. of State, 2001 WL 321357, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2001).
Two circuit courts have held firm with their position that states are not immune from claims falling under Title 11 of the ADA. The Ninth Circuit originally took this position before Garrett in Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1187 (2001). In the unpublished Wroncy v. Oregon Dept. of Transportation, 2001 WL 474550, at *1 (9th Cir. May 4, 2001), the Ninth Circuit maintained its position in Dare, even after Garrett. The Fifth Circuit originally held that immunity was validly abrogated as to Title II claims in Coolbaugh v. State of Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998). In a case brought after Garrett, the Fifth Circuit remanded the issue to the district court for briefing, finding that immunity as to Title II claims was not "facially compelled" by Garrett Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 737 (5th Cir. 2001). No further opinions in this case by either the district court or the Fifth Circuit have yet been issued as of the writing of this opinion. However, the Fifth Circuit was divided on the issue generally prior to Garrett. Compare Coolbaugh with Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 280 n. 29, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (questioning Coolbaugh and finding a regulation promulgated under Title II an unconstitutional abrogation).
The Eleventh Circuit, from which Garrett originated, 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1999), held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in the ADA, but was reversed by Supreme Court as to Title I of the ADA. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 967-68. The Eleventh Circuit has yet to take up the issue of whether states are immune from Title II claims as well.
The Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits held the ADA's abrogation of sovereign immunity invalid prior to Garrett. See Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 206 (3d Cir. 2000); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2000) (Title I); Stevens v. Ill. Dept of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2000) (ADA generally); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (Title I); DeBose v. Nebraska, 207 F.3d 1020, 1021 (8th Cir. 1999) (Title I); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Title II), cert. granted in part, 528 U.S. 1146 (2000), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001. There was division in the Fourth Circuit. Compare Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Pub. Safety Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1999) (Amos II) (finding Title II a constitutionally valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity as applied to state prisoners), vacated and appeal dismissed after settlement of parties, 205 F.3d 687, 688 (4th Cir. 2000), with Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that regulation promulgated under Title II is unconstitutional abrogation).
This Court's research located only one decision from a court within the Sixth Circuit since the Popovich ruling was vacated that addresses whether states have immunity from Title II claims, Key v. Grayson, 163 F. Supp.2d 697 (E.D.Mich. 2001) (Gadola, J.).
In that opinion, Judge Paul V. Gadola adopted the analysis of Magistrate Judge Donald A. Scheer, who found that while Congress made findings that the disabled suffer discrimination in the provision of public services, Title II of the ADA would still fail the "congruence and proportionality" portion of the test for valid abrogation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 714. This is because Magistrate Judge Scheer found that the discrimination prohibited by Title II would not be limited to unconstitutional discrimination, since the Supreme Court continued to hold in Garrett that a rational basis test was appropriate with respect to discrimination involving the disabled, and Title II "does not differentiate, in any manner, whether the discrimination was rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective." Id.
Thus, Magistrate Judge Scheer decided, states are immune to monetary claims made under Title II. This analysis was thoughtful and extensive, and this Court believes that it reflects the course of action likely to be taken by the Sixth Circuit when it addresses this issue, given the findings of the Supreme Court in Garrett. Therefore, this Court will also find that, given the analysis in Garrett, this Court is bound to hold that states are immune from monetary claims under Title II of the ADA. However, if during the pendency of this action the Sixth Circuit decides differently when it issues a new opinion in Popovich, this Court will entertain motions for reconsideration on this issue.
In addition, even though Plaintiff may not maintain his monetary claims under the ADA against these Defendants in light of the foregoing, Plaintiff may still maintain claims for injunctive relief under the ADA. Cf. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 968 n. 9 (noting that plaintiffs seeking vindication of ADA Title I claims still have Ex Parte Young injunctive remedy available, which is available generally even when monetary relief is barred by state sovereign immunity, and may have remedies under applicable state laws). See also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief that are premised on the ADA survive Defendants' dismissal and summary judgment motion.
III. Conclusion
Therefore, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Objections. The Court will adopt in part and reject in part the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody. Defendants' Rule 12(b) Motion for Dismissal or Rule 56(b) Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to Defendant Bill Martin and as to Plaintiff's ADA claims for monetary relief. Plaintiff's remaining claims survive, including his claim for injunctive relief under the ADA.
Upon review of the file, it appears that Plaintiff requested leave to amend his complaint in a previous response pleading. (See Dkt. No. 18.) The Court will grant that request pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) and require Plaintiff to file his Amended Complaint, consistent with this opinion, within 20 days of receipt of this opinion and order.
In addition, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Defendants are ordered to file an Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint within 20 days of receipt of the Amended Complaint. An order will be entered consistent with this opinion.
ORDER AND PARTIAL DISMISSAL
In accordance with an Opinion filed this day,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Objections to the Magistrate's July 17, 2001 Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 30) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody (Dkt. No. 24) is ADOPTED in part and REJECTED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Rule 12(b) Motion for Dismissal or Rule 56(b) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14) is GRANTED as to Defendant Bill Martin and as to Plaintiff's monetary claims under the ADA. The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff file his amended Complaint, consistent with this order and its accompanying opinion, within 20 days of receipt of the order and opinion.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining Defendants file an Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint within 20 days of receipt of the Amended Complaint.