Opinion
No. 46118-4-I.
Filed: December 26, 2000. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County, No. 98-2-23332-0, Hon. Richard Eadie, January 25, 2000, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), K. C. Webster, Phillips Webster P.L.L.C., 13303 N.E. 175th St, 18915 142nd Ave NE, Woodinville, WA 98072-8503.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Susan M. Weber, Russo Graham Ste 1510, 600 Stewart St, Seattle, WA 98101-1217.
Thomas P. Graham III, 1510 Plaza 600 Bldg., 600 Stewart St., Seattle, WA 98101.
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that Amber Lee was solely responsible for the car accident with Cheryl Parker. Lee admits that she hit Parker from behind, but does not understand why Parker, after stopping to check for traffic, proceeded to enter the clear street and stop again. Parker disputes that she stopped a second time. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Lee, there is an issue of material fact as to whether Lee acted unreasonably and whether Parker's second stop after proceeding to enter a clear street negligently contributed to the accident. Therefore, partial summary judgment in regard to liability was inappropriate.
FACTS
On the afternoon of November 27, 1997, Cheryl Parker was driving to her parents' house for Thanksgiving dinner. She came to a yield sign on East Titus Street and stopped. As she looked to merge onto East Smith Street, she was rear-ended by Amber Lee's car. Lee recounts the events differently. According to Lee, she came to a stop behind Parker, who was stopped at a yield sign on East Titus Street. Both she and Parker sought to merge onto East Smith Street and looked to their left accordingly. The street was clear to enter, and Parker proceeded to do so. Seeing Parker go, Lee checked again for cars and saw none so she proceeded forward, not knowing that Parker stopped a second time. This second stop by Parker caused Lee to tap Parker's car.
On December 8, 1999, the trial court granted Parker's motion for summary judgment in regard to liability. The ensuing jury trial was limited to damages. The jury returned a verdict segregated into four components:
past economic damages, future economic damages, past noneconomic damages, and future noneconomic damages. The portion of the award for past economic damages consisted of Parker's medical bills and wage-loss claim. Subsequently, upon Parker's motion for prejudgment interest on the medical bills and wage-loss claim, the court awarded an additional $3,116.73 in prejudgment interest.
Lee appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in regard to liability and the award for prejudgment interest.
DISCUSSION
Washington case law has long held that the primary duty of avoiding a collision with the preceding vehicle rests with the following driver. Rhodes v. DeRosier, 14 Wn. App. 946, 949-50, 546 P.2d 930 (1976). However, a following driver is not negligent as a matter of law simply because the preceding vehicle has been struck from behind. The preceding driver may not act in an unusual, unexpected manner that reasonably could not be anticipated. Rhodes, 14 Wn. App. at 949. It is for the jury to decide whether the circumstances were such that a sudden stop was to be anticipated. It is also for the jury to decide whether negligence on the part of the preceding driver proximately contributed to the injury. Rhodes, 14 Wn. App. at 950. Parker argues that even if she stopped a second time, it was not an unusual, unexpected event by someone trying to merge onto a busy street.
Therefore, the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in regard to liability. In a summary judgment proceeding, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Crowe v. Gaston, 134 Wn.2d 509, 514, 951 P.2d 1118 (1998). The evidence in the light most favorable to Lee shows that East Smith Street was not busy, but clear to enter and Parker proceeded to do so. Lee saw Parker go forward, so she double checked for traffic herself. With no cars in sight, Lee proceeded forward only to find that Parker stopped a second time for no apparent reason. Due to Parker's unexpected second stop, Lee was unable to avoid tapping her from behind.
Parker also argues that because Lee testified that she understood the law to be that a following driver is automatically at fault for hitting another car from behind, Lee admitted responsibility for the accident. Lee went on to testify, however, that she believed Parker was at fault for the accident. When taking Lee's testimony as a whole, Lee's statement about the law concerning rear-end accidents is not a factual admission of responsibility, but a statement of her subjective, and in fact erroneous, understanding of the law.
When the evidence is viewed in this light, it is not clear that the actions of Parker were such that reasonable minds would agree that only Lee failed to exercise the degree of care expected in that situation. Whether Lee was negligent in moving forward and whether Parker's unexpected second stop after proceeding to enter a clear street negligently contributed to the accident are questions for the jury.
We next consider whether the trial court erred in granting prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest is properly awarded when claims are `liquidated.' Kiewit-Grice v. State, 77 Wn. App. 867, 872, 895 P.2d 6 (1995). A claim is `liquidated' when the evidence makes it possible to exactly compute the amount owed for damages without reliance upon opinion or discretion. Kiewit-Grice, 77 Wn. App. at 872. Conversely, a claim is `unliquidated' where the exact amount owed cannot be definitely fixed, but depends upon the opinion or discretion of the judge or jury. Kiewit-Grice, 77 Wn. App. at 872. This analysis has long been the law in Washington to ensure that full compensation is given for the use value of money representing liquidated or determinable damages. Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wn.2d 468, 473-74, 730 P.2d 662 (1986).
Due to its compensatory nature, prejudgment interest has been found to apply regardless of whether it arises in a negligence action or contract action. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 475. It also applies regardless of the fact that a dispute exists over all or part of a claim. Dautel v. Heritage Home Ctr., Inc., 89 Wn. App. 148, 154, 948 P.2d 397 (1997). But it does not apply where a defendant is unable to ascertain the amount owed for damages; otherwise, prejudgment interest would exceed its compensatory purpose and exact a penalty. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d 468 at 474-75. Parker contends that prejudgment interest was properly awarded because all of the treating physicians testified that the medical bills were reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident and her work supervisor testified to her pay per hour and the number of hours missed from work.
Thus, the medical bills and wage loss were ascertainable without reliance upon opinion or discretion of the judge or jury. Parker argues further the fact that Lee did not challenge the medical bills and wage loss also made the amounts owed for past economic damages ascertainable without reliance upon opinion or discretion. Lee argues that whether the reasonableness of the medical bills and wage loss were challenged is not the issue. The issue is whether the jury exercised discretion in determining the amount owed for damages. Our Supreme Court has held that it is not enough that medical bills be paid — the amounts must be reasonable and because reliance upon opinion or discretion is necessary in determining whether the amounts were reasonable, medical expenses are unliquidated. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 477. Here, the jury was properly instructed to assess the reasonableness of Parker's medical bills. This called for the exercise of discretion by the jury to make the medical bills portion of the award unliquidated.
The jury was asked to determine whether Lee was responsible for the medical bills and wage loss suffered by Parker when she was rear-ended by Lee. Lee argues that because Parker suffered injuries in the accident similar to injuries sustained prior to the accident, the jury had to decide which damages were accident related and this was a discretionary act. The jury's determination that Lee was responsible for Parker's damages suffered in the accident with Lee went to causation and does not control the liquidated damages analysis.
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that an agreement to the reasonableness of a settlement does not render the amount liquidated because to hold otherwise would discourage settlements, contrary to policy favoring settlements. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 477-78. Although we are not dealing with an agreement to the reasonableness of a settlement, the same principle guides our decision here. The essence of Parker's argument is that Lee's failure to contest the reasonableness of the medical bills is tantamount to a stipulation to the reasonableness of the amount; therefore, the medical bills are liquidated. However, to rule that a stipulation to the reasonableness of medical bills makes them liquidated would lead to the result rejected by the Supreme Court. Parties would be discouraged from settling or stipulating to the reasonableness of medical bills and encouraged to always contest their reasonableness in fear of paying prejudgment interest. Because such a result is contrary to policy favoring settlements and stipulations, we find Parker's argument unpersuasive.
We are faced with an entirely different situation regarding Parker's wage-loss claim. Because Parker's supervisor testified to the number of hours Parker missed from work and her pay per hour, no opinion or discretion by the judge or jury was required to calculate the amount owed for wage loss.
The evidence, if believed, clearly provided data from which the wage loss could be calculated without resort to opinion or discretion. Cf. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 478 (stating that a seaman's unearned wages claim might be liquidated if once the facts are decided, the amount is readily ascertainable). Thus, the wage loss portion of the award was properly deemed a liquidated sum. For the stated reasons, we reverse partial summary judgment in regard to liability and remand for trial. In the event that the jury finds for Parker, prejudgment interest is not allowed for medical bills, but is allowed for wage loss.
We concur:
SUSAN R. AGID
WILLIAM W. BAKER