Opinion
Submitted March 14, 2000.
May 3, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant James V. Dodds appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bruno, J.), dated August 14, 1998, which granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate his default in appearing for oral argument on the motion of the defendant James V. Dodds for summary judgment, and denied that motion.
Friedberg Raven, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Steven G. Friedberg of counsel), for appellant.
Proner Proner, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Tobi R. Salottolo of counsel), for respondent.
LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., DAVID S. RITTER, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
It is well settled that a plaintiff seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious claim (see, CPLR 5015[a][1]; Piacentini v. Mineola Union Free School District, 267 A.D.2d 290 [2d Dept., Dec. 13, 1999]; Kolajo v. City of New York, 248 A.D.2d 512). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see, Bardales v. Blades, 191 A.D.2d 667), and in exercising that discretion the trial court may accept law-office failure as an excuse (see, CPLR 2005). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting the plaintiff's explanation of law office failure for his failure to appear in court for argument on the summary judgment motion (see, Rock v. Schwartz, 244 A.D.2d 542; Robinson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 203 A.D.2d 351). Further, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff presented a meritorious claim by submitting evidence that his injuries may have occurred as the result of the acts of the appellant James V. Dodds (see, Piacentini v. Mineola Union Free School District, supra; see generally, Ferrar v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly vacated the plaintiff's default.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Supreme Court also correctly denied his motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff established the existence of triable issues of fact with regard to the alleged negligence of the appellant in continuing to drive his vehicle for approximately 200 feet after the plaintiff had become pinned under it (see, Rivera v. New York City Tr. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 322; Lopez v. City of New York, 4 A.D.2d 48; see generally, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557).
BRACKEN, J.P., RITTER, KRAUSMAN and SMITH, JJ., concur.