Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0921-13T1
06-23-2015
EVADELL PARKER-ROGERS, Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent.
Frank M. Crivelli argued the cause for appellant (Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman, attorneys; Mr. Crivelli and Donald C. Barbati, on the brief). Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Ms. Raksa, of counsel; Danielle P. Schimmel, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Lihotz, St. John, and Rothstadt. On appeal from the Department of the Treasury, Division of Pensions and Benefits, PFRS No. 3-10-44216. Frank M. Crivelli argued the cause for appellant (Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman, attorneys; Mr. Crivelli and Donald C. Barbati, on the brief). Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Ms. Raksa, of counsel; Danielle P. Schimmel, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Claimant Evadell Parker-Rogers appeals from a September 10, 2013 final decision of the Board of Trustees (the Board) of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) denying her application for accidental disability retirement benefits. The Board determined claimant's injuries, which she suffered during the course of her employment, resulted in permanent and total disability. However, it concluded the incident and injuries were not the result of a "traumatic event" as required for accidental disability retirement benefits. See N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 (setting forth the requirements for accidental disability retirement benefits). Following telephonic oral argument and review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
The facts are taken from the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) findings of fact, which were adopted by the Board, and the hearing before the ALJ. They are essentially undisputed.
Claimant was employed as a senior corrections officer with the New Jersey Department of Corrections. She was assigned to the Central Transportation Unit in 1990, where she was responsible for transporting inmates to and from court, correctional facilities, and other settings.
On November 10, 2009, claimant and another officer were assigned to transport inmates from Northern State Prison in Newark to Trenton State Prison using a handicapped van. The van was equipped with clamps designed to attach standard wheelchairs to the floor of the vehicle during transport. Upon arriving in Newark, claimant's partner escorted three or four prisoners onboard, when the officers were instructed to wait for a final inmate, who they learned was paralyzed and confined to his own oversized wheelchair. Claimant and her partner estimated the inmate weighed over 200 pounds and his wheelchair weighed approximately forty to fifty pounds.
Generally, inmates confined to oversized wheelchairs were transported by a staffed ambulance because the handicapped van's clamps were designed to accommodate standard wheelchairs. Claimant testified that, in her experience, when a prisoner in an oversized wheelchair was transported, her duties merely required her to follow the ambulance and assist upon arrival at the destination. She called her supervisor in the Central Transportation Unit Office to express concern for transporting the paralyzed inmate, because of the difficulty in fitting his oversized wheelchair through the van's doorway and because similar prisoners had been transported by ambulance. Claimant was told an ambulance had not been scheduled and was instructed she and her partner should do the best they could to transport the inmate in the van.
Claimant's partner testified regarding the day in question. He acknowledged transport officers sometimes transported prisoners in their own wheelchairs. He and another corrections department staff member successfully loaded the paralyzed inmate into the van, and clamped the wheelchair in place to prevent it from sliding around. Claimant drove the van, transporting the inmates to Trenton.
Upon arrival to Trenton, claimant's partner escorted the ambulatory inmates inside the facility. Claimant's partner stated it was normally the responsibility of the officer who did not drive to begin taking the inmates into the facility.
Claimant began unbuckling the paralyzed inmate. As she attempted to turn the wheelchair to move it to the van's side lift, she encountered difficulty because of the confined space. She attempted to straighten the wheels of the oversized wheelchair to face the van's exit to roll it from the landing to the lift, when one wheel became stuck against the wall and "went off the side of the lift." Because of his condition, the inmate could not assist in moving himself or the chair. Therefore, claimant attempted to raise the wheelchair to dislodge and straighten the wheel. Her partner returned and together the two lifted the chair.
As a result of attempting to lift the prisoner by herself while he sat in the oversized wheelchair, claimant suffered various injuries to her rotator cuff, shoulder, and back. The injuries required surgery and rehabilitation. Claimant was not able to resume employment.
On September 14, 2011, claimant applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. The Board evaluated her claim and granted ordinary disability retirement benefits, determining as a direct result of an event that occurred on November 10, 2009, during the performance of claimant's regular and assigned job duties, she suffered injuries resulting in her total and permanent disability. However, the Board denied the claim for accidental disability benefits, concluding the facts did not demonstrate a traumatic event that was undesigned and unexpected, as required by statute for such an award.
Claimant filed a timely appeal. The matter was certified as a contested case and transferred to the Office of Administrative Law. Following an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ issued an initial decision. After setting forth her findings, the ALJ concluded claimant's application for accidental benefits should be approved because her injury occurred as a result of undesigned and unexpected events in transporting a paralyzed passenger confined to an oversized wheelchair, which she found was "an extraordinary circumstance, out of the realm of [claimant's] normal job duties." Specifically, the ALJ concluded claimant's "injury was not caused by her normal work effort, or normal work effort combined with a pre-existing condition. It was caused by a unique set of circumstances and led to an injury [that claimant] could not reasonably have anticipated or been prepared for. It was an accident pure and simple: undesigned and unexpected."
The Board reviewed the ALJ's initial decision and accepted the ALJ's findings of fact, but rejected the legal conclusion that claimant met the qualification for accidental disability retirement benefits as erroneous. Explaining why the ALJ's interpretation of the legal standard was inaccurate and contrary to legislative objectives embodied in the standard, the Board analyzed the facts and concluded claimant was injured performing a prisoner transport, which was not "out of the realm of her normal job duties." The transport of the prisoner in his oversized wheelchair was "a different transport" and the work effort required for its accomplishment was more strenuous; however, it remained within claimant's "assigned work activity" and was not undesigned or unexpected.
The Board noted claimant's unanticipated disabling injury resulted from strenuous work effort that was not unanticipated, extraordinary, or unusual. The injury was not the consequence of an accident, but of claimant's intentional decision to lift the prisoner. Because claimant was performing her usual work in the usual way, the incident was neither undesigned nor unexpected, and, therefore, was not a traumatic event. This appeal ensued.
Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is "severely limited." Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995). "Under that standard of review, an appellate court will not upset an agency's ultimate determination unless the agency's decision is shown to have been arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Barrick v. State, 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "That standard is applicable on appellate review of an administrative agency's actions regardless of whether that action followed a quasi-adjudicative hearing . . . ." Ibid.
Here, claimant seeks accidental disability retirement benefits rather than the ordinary disability retirement award she was granted. A member of the PFRS who seeks accidental disability benefits, as described in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7, must prove:
The amount of an accidental disability benefit is greater. Compare N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(2)(b) (accidental disability benefits), with N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(2)(b) (ordinary disability benefits). See also Kasper v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564, 573-74 (2000) (describing difference between ordinary and accidental disability).
1. that he [or she] is permanently and totally disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a. identifiable as to time and place,
b. undesigned and unexpected, and
c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);
See also N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).
3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence; and
5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
[Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 212-13 (2007).]
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1) provides in part:
[T]he member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence and that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty in the department which his [or her] employer is willing to assign to him.
This dispute centers on whether claimant's injury resulted from a traumatic event or merely strenuous work effort. In our review, "we are 'in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.'" Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
Interpreting the words of the statute, the Supreme Court has described "traumatic event" as "essentially the same as what we historically understood an accident to be — an unexpected external happening that directly causes injury and is not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with work effort." Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 212. When the "'normal stress and strain'" of a job alone or in combination with a pre-existing disease causes injury, "a traumatic event has not occurred." Id. at 213-14. Accordingly, the injury sustained must result from an external circumstance or event, not merely from the performance of strenuous work. See id. at 211 ("[W]ork effort itself . . . cannot be the traumatic event."); Cattani v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 69 N.J. 578, 586 (1976) (holding claimant did not experience a traumatic event where unusually strenuous work effort accelerated pre-existing medical condition, because injury was not caused by external event). "The polestar of the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of his [or her] job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with the work, has occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member." Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 214. In Richardson, the Court provided this example:
[A] police officer who has a heart attack while chasing a suspect has not experienced a traumatic event. In that case, the work effort, alone or in combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury. However, the same police officer, permanently and totally disabled during the chase because of a fall, has suffered a traumatic event.Despite the passage of time, the Legislature has not acted to refine this interpretation of its intent.
[Id. at 213.]
Here, claimant, in performing her job of transporting prisoners, was required to engage in a type of transport for which she had limited experience. Although this was not the ordinary type of transport, her partner confirmed it was within their regular duties. The record shows claimant did not observe how her partner, with the aid of another, loaded and secured the prisoner's wheelchair into the van's clamps or explore why she attempted to unsecure and move the prisoner's wheelchair toward the lift singlehandedly. No evidence depicts urgency in the need to perform the function. Nevertheless, she attempted to move the wheelchair and its wheels became lodged against the van's wall preventing it from getting rolled onto the lift. In an effort to straighten the wheels, claimant overexerted herself as she attempted to raise the wheelchair occupied by the prisoner. In doing so, she suffered her disabling injury.
The Board in reviewing the factual findings noted the ALJ's conclusion drawn from these facts was erroneous. The Board properly rejected the conclusion that because claimant's injury was caused by her performance of duties using extraordinary work effort, the event was undesigned and unexpected. The need to transport the prisoner in his oversized wheelchair did not directly cause claimant's injury; the lodged wheelchair did not fall on claimant or run over her foot. Further, nothing suggested safety concerns demanded the wheelchair's position immediately be moved. Claimant and her partner testified the two normally assisted each other. Therefore, she could have waited for his return to assist her in dislodging the wheelchair and removing the inmate from the van.
Claimant's injury resulted because of the strenuous effort in attempting to lift the heavy wheelchair by herself. Claimant knew her partner and another loaded the inmate; she was aware the circumstances of the transport were different because of the size of the chair and the overall weight. The work may have been unusual and, in fact, claimant's effort was excessive; however, the circumstances of her injury did not constituted a traumatic event. See Cattani, supra, 69 N.J. at 585.
We reject claimant's reliance on Brooks v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 425 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 2012). In Brooks, a custodian was confronted with a group of students attempting to carry a 300-pound weight bench into the school. Id. at 279. The claimant took charge of supervising this activity and made the students put the bench down. Id. at 279-80. Once he calculated how to maneuver the bench into the school, the claimant "asked two of the boys to help him tip the weight bench on its end and lift it onto [a] flatbed truck . . . ." Id. at 280.
However, when the bench was "halfway up," the boys . . . dropped their side of the bench. [Claimant] heard his shoulder 'snap' as the bench fell to the floor, which resulted in a total and permanent disability. [Claimant] said he did not drop his side of the bench when he saw the boys drop their side because one of his feet was directly underneath the bench.The court determined the custodian suffered a total and permanently disabling shoulder injury as a result of the traumatic event. Id. at 279.
[Ibid.]
Brooks was injured not from lifting the bench, but from the students dropping their end, forcing the entire weight upon his shoulders. In this matter, there was no similar accident or external event that caused claimant's injury. Rather, the wheelchair was stuck in a small space and claimant tore her rotator cuff and injured her back when she decided to lift it to straighten its wheels. See also Moran v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 438 N.J. Super. 346, 351, 354-55 (App. Div. 2014) (finding proof that claimant "encountered an unexpected life-and-death emergency for which he was carrying no tools" and was required to immediately act to break down a fortified door using his body presented an unexpected and undesigned event). In this matter, no evidence supports any type of unexpected event. Absent such an event, accidental disability retirement benefits may not be awarded.
In Richardson, the Court made clear: "work effort itself . . . cannot be the traumatic event." Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 211. Because claimant's disabling injuries stemmed from her decision to attempt to dislodge the oversized wheelchair rather than from an external event, her resultant disability cannot be found to be the direct result of a traumatic event.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
See also Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 18 (2011).