Opinion
FSTCV186039009S
07-02-2019
PARISH OF ST. PAUL’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH et al. v. Right Rev. Ian DOUGLAS et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
KAVANEWSKY, J.
The plaintiffs, St. Paul’s Episcopal Church ("St. Paul’s" or simply "the parish") and twelve other named individuals, have commenced this action against the Right Rev. Ian Douglas, the Rev. Canon George I. Kovoor and Canon Robin Hammeal-Urban. The general nature of the plaintiffs’ action is one under Gen. Stat. § 47a-43(a)(1) through (4) commonly known as an action alleging the commission of a forcible entry and detainer. Before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss (no. 116). The motion is made on the grounds that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action and that, therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that at all pertinent times, two of these individuals were Wardens of the parish, the remaining ten were Vestry members, and all twelve were also parishioners of St. Paul’s.
Sec. 47a-43 states that:
The plaintiffs’ amended complaint, dated January 22, 2019, alleges in pertinent part the following. St. Paul’s is an ecclesiastical society under Connecticut law. The plaintiffs, acting in their official capacities as Wardens and Vestry members, were in sole possession and control of all property titled in the name of St. Paul’s. On October 26, 2018, the Diocese of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut enacted a resolution (hereinafter the "resolution") that, as applied, severed its relationship with St. Paul’s as a member parish. As a result, St. Paul’s had the status of a worshiping community, but not a parish. A worshiping community has no property and no governing body. As a consequence, the Wardens and Vestry members would no longer have had their status as such. The amended complaint further states that on October 28, 2018, the defendant Bishop Douglas and others seized control of St. Paul’s and all of its property, and thereby ousted the plaintiffs from sole possession and control of St. Paul’s. The plaintiffs claim that this violated the forcible entry and detainer statute, § 47a-43(a).
"The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544 (2003). "The proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party’s standing is a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 (2005). "If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802 (2007); In re Christina M., 280 Conn. 474, 480 (2006); Missionary Society of Connecticut v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 278 Conn. 197, 201 (2006). The burden is on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have legal standing. "The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodyear v. Discala, 269 Conn. 507, 511 (2004).
"Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved ... The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] ..." Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 277 Conn. 526, 538 (2006).
From a fair reading of the amended complaint, it is difficult to discern whether the plaintiffs’ claim involving standing is based upon statutory or classical aggrievement. The only statute that the plaintiffs have referenced relating to a possible basis for standing is Sec. 47a-43, the forcible entry and detainer statute itself. Regardless, the court addresses both statutory and classical aggrievement for purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss.
The court first considers whether the plaintiffs have shown that they are statutorily aggrieved for purposes of § 47-43. The plaintiffs must allege facts which show that they were in actual possession of the property at the time of the defendants’ entry. Berlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc., 203 Conn. 103, 108 (1987). "The inquiry is whether the individual has exercised the dominion and control that owners of like property usually exercise." Commuter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 394 (1985). Continuous presence is not required, but there must be evidence of "actual physical control, with the intent and apparent purpose of asserting dominion." Id. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated this. Rather, what they have shown was that prior to the resolution on October 26, 2018, they had a right of presence by virtue of their official capacities as Wardens or Vestry members of the parish. Subsequent thereto, and at the time of their claimed dispossession on October 28, 2018, the plaintiffs had the status of parishioners. Wardens or Vestry members may have had some degree of control greater than that of parishioners. However, this court cannot conclude that, at any time, the plaintiffs exercised a degree of control in the premises generally found to be of the kind commonly exercised by property owners.
The court next considers whether the plaintiffs have shown that they have demonstrated classical aggrievement. Paragraph two of the amended complaint states that "the individual Plaintiffs, acting in their official capacities as St. Paul’s Wardens and Vestry members were in sole possession and control of all real and personal property ... commonly known as St. Paul’s, Darien." Yet, paragraph six of the amended complaint, in its first sentence, states that "The individual Plaintiffs bring this action in both their official and individual capacities as Wardens and Vestry members and also as Parishioners, respectively. The Parish consists of over 200 members, including their immediate families who were in sole possession and control of Parish assets and used the Parish property as a place of worship." (Emphasis added.) Classical aggrievement requires that a plaintiff have a specific, personal and legal interest in the challenged action. The plaintiffs seek to interpret, or certainly seek to apply, the notion of classical aggrievement as it relates to the forcible entry and detainer statute, § 47a-43, far too broadly. Their interpretation would mean that a single parishioner, regardless of capacity and however defined, could assert a claim under the statute. The court suggests that this is not a sensible construction of classical aggrievement within the contours of this action.
On this point, it is noteworthy that paragraph eight of the amended complaint alleges that "On Sunday, October 28, 2018, [the named defendants] assembled at the church building for a regular Sunday service ... An estimated 10 to 12 persons, reputed to be guests of the defendant Kovoor and three to four members of the Parish attended that Sunday service. St. Paul’s people typically met on Saturday night at St. Paul’s Church or chose to go elsewhere for Sunday service because, with the exception of three to four Parishioners, the remaining parishioners unanimously refused to attend any services conducted by Defendant Kovoor." The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this allegation is that St. Paul’s Parishioners retained the choice to participate in parish services, but not that they were prevented or dispossessed of their right to do so.
Finally, the plaintiffs cannot assert as a possible basis for standing in this action that, regardless of any implications of the resolution, the plaintiffs’ claim of standing is rescued by St. Paul’s continued existence as an ecclesiastical society under Connecticut law. See, Gen. Stat. § § 33-265, 266. That is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, in Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Connecticut v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2773 (2012), our own Supreme Court held that trial courts should apply neutral principles of Connecticut law in resolving church property disputes. In the present case this court cannot find a meaningful distinction between an ownership dispute to property and a possessory one. Nor have the plaintiffs identified anything within these statutes that would bear upon the court’s consideration of standing in this action.
Gen. Stat. sec. 33-265 states: "All ecclesiastical societies in this state, in communion with the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, shall be known in the law as parishes as well as ecclesiastical societies, and shall have power to receive and hold by gift, grant or purchase all property, real or personal, that has been or may be conveyed to them for maintaining religious worship according to the doctrine, discipline and worship of said church, and for the support of the educational and charitable institutions of the same, and shall have and exercise all the ordinary powers of bodies corporate." Gen. Stat. sec. 33-266 states: "The manner of conducting the parish, the qualifications for membership of the parish and the manner of acquiring and terminating such membership, the number of the officers of the parish, their powers and duties and the manner of their appointment, the time of holding the annual meeting of the parish and the manner of notification thereof and the manner of calling special meetings of the parish shall be such as are provided and prescribed by the constitution, canons and regulations of said Protestant Episcopal Church in this state."
The plaintiffs maintain that in an action, as here, for unlawful entry and detainer, standing is satisfied by demonstrating the right of possession, and not ownership. This argument ignores the criteria to use in determining a possessory right. Commuter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 394 (1985).
Second, the circumstance that a parish may also be an ecclesiastical society and that its members enjoy standing as such, is not well taken. A decision by a sister court in Massachusetts rejecting that argument is especially persuasive. In Parish of The Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts et al., 426 Mass. 268, 286-89, 688 N.E.2d 923 (1997), a majority of the members of the local parish had passed a vote of no-confidence in the parish rector. A suit ensued between, on the one hand, those same parish members and, on the other hand, the remaining parish members, the parish Vestry, the diocesan Bishop, and the Protestant Episcopal diocese of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, and concluded that it did not. The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that, as a separately incorporated religious corporation, it and it alone had the right to determine matters of local parish affairs. It remarked that "A claim that a religious corporation established under State statute (as the Parish is) may not, as matter of State law, subject itself to a higher ecclesiastical authority would be a fundamental intrusion into church operations, and turn well-settled religious freedom jurisprudence on its head." Id., 286. This court agrees with that reasoning.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court had first concluded that the Protestant Episcopal Church has a hierarchical structure. Id., 281. While that alone was not dispositive, it determined that because the trial court would have had to decide "doctrinal matters" would deprive the court of jurisdiction. Id., 283-86.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
(a) When any person (1) makes forcible entry into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and with a strong hand detains the same, or (2) having made a peaceable entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, holds and detains the same with force and strong hand, or (3) enters into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and causes damage to the premises or damage to or removal of or detention of the personal property of the possessor, or (4) when the party put out of possession would be required to cause damage to the premises or commit a breach of the peace in order to regain possession, the party thus ejected, held out of possession, or suffering damage may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court.