Opinion
No. CV-08-5031152S
November 29, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (#109)
This case arises out of an intersection motor vehicle accident which occurred on February 23, 2008 when the plaintiff's vehicle was allegedly struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant. Originally, a one-count complaint alleging negligence was filed. On October 20, 2009, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging recklessness in the second count and seeking statutory damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. On November 24, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to strike the second count claiming the allegations were insufficient to state a cause of action for recklessness.
The cause of action of statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 is entirely distinct from a cause of action for negligence. See Bicio v. Brewer, 92 Conn.App. 158, 170, 884 A.2d 12 (2005). The factual findings a jury must make to award punitive damages are different from those upon which a compensatory damage award is based. See Harewood v. Carter, 63 Conn.App. 199, 206-07, 772 A.2d 764 (2001). In Hopwood v. Sciarretta, Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. 0075934 (July 9, 2002, Lager, J.) [ 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 474], this court noted the split in authority within the Superior Court with respect to the degree of specificity required to plead statutory recklessness under § 14-295, stating that "this split of authority rests on the assumption that the degree of specificity required to plead a statutory recklessness claim under § 14-295 has not been addressed by the appellate courts." However, in this court's opinion, there were a number Supreme Court decisions that had addressed the pleading and proof requirements of the predecessors to § 14-295 and left no doubt that "the complaint [must] clearly state such facts as will bring the case with the provisions of the statute . . . [and] that the claim for relief be specifically based upon the statutory remedy." Leone v. Knighton, 196 Conn. 494, 496, 493 A.2d 887 (1985).
This court discussed the following opinions: Hotchkiss v. Hoy, 41 Conn. 568 (1874); Broschart v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 1, 21 A. 925 (1890); Stevens v. Kelley, CT Page 23275 66 Conn. 570, 34 A. 502 (1895); Tillinghast v. Leppert, 93 Conn. 247, 105 A. 615 (1919); Leone v. Knighton, 196 Conn. 494, 493 A.2d 887 (1985); Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 618-19, 539 A.2d 108 (1988) (reviewing the historical antecedents of § 14-295 to conclude that all the facts underlying a multiple damages award under § 14-295 must be determined by a jury).
Accordingly, this court adopted the position that merely alleging a deliberate or reckless violation of one of the predicate statutes does not suffice to describe the conduct which would entitle a plaintiff to the extraordinary remedy available under § 14-295. To state a cause of action under § 14-295, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts establishing that the predicate statute was violated with the requisite mental state, that is, deliberately or with reckless disregard, and that such violation was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injury.
The court is required to examine the allegation of the amended complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See e.g., Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003). The amended complaint is spare. It alleges that on February 23, 2008, the plaintiff George L. Paris was operating his vehicle westbound on Goffe Street at its intersection with Sherman Avenue in New Haven, Connecticut and that he had a blinking yellow caution light in his direction of operation (First and Second Counts, ¶¶ 1, 3). The defendant, Cynthia M. Ziobron (Ziobron), is alleged to have been operating her vehicle northbound on Sherman Avenue with a blinking red light in her direction of operation (First and Second Counts, ¶¶ 2, 4). The complaint further alleges that Ziobron entered the intersection and "drove through the blinking red light and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle with such force as to spin the plaintiff's vehicle around and collide with the plaintiff's vehicle a second time," (First and Second Counts, ¶ 4). The Second Count alleges that the collision was caused due to Ziobron's "reckless disregard . . . for the safety of others" in operating her vehicle "recklessly in violation of § 14-222," "while under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol in violation of [§] 14-227a" and "at an unreasonable rate of speed having due regard to the traffic, weather, width and use of the highway and intersection of streets in violation of' Section 14-218(a) [sic]." (Second Count ¶ 5a-c.)
The factual allegations that Ziobron drove "through the blinking red light and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle with such force as to spin the plaintiff's vehicle around and collide with the plaintiff's vehicle a second time," as well as the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from these facts, minimally suffice to allege the requisite mental state for the imposition of statutory damages under § 14-295, at least with respect to a violation of either § 14-222 or § 14-218a. Accordingly, the motion to strike the second count of the amended complaint is denied.