Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1452.
July 23, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Kenneth Paramore seeks judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration that denied his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"). On April 28, 2004, Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell issued a Report and Recommendation ("RR") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) which recommends that the Court affirm the Commissioner's decision, deny the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and grant the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. In response, Plaintiff has filed Objections to Magistrate Judge Angell's findings, requiring the Court to conduct an independent, de novo review of the findings to which Plaintiff has objected.
Upon an independent and thorough consideration of the administrative record and all filings in this Court, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. II. Statement of the Case
On March 15, 2000, Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging that impairments in his right knee and left ankle have caused him to be disabled since June 4, 1999. (Stmt. of Undisputed Facts ¶ 2, 10-11, 21.) A hearing, on this claim, was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on March 20, 2001, at which Plaintiff testified and was represented by counsel. (Id. ¶ 3.) Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a ruling dated October 26, 2001, finding that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform light work and, thus, was not disabled. (Id. ¶ 4.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 19, 2002, following which Plaintiff filed his action in this Court. (Id. ¶ 5.)
The individual findings of the ALJ will be discussed as they relate to Plaintiff's claims and in greater detail below.
III. Standard of Review
The Court reviews de novo those portions of a Magistrate Judge's RR to which a plaintiff has objected. Beltran v. Barnhart, No. 01-4062, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23605, at * 5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)). The scope of this review, however, is limited to determining whether or not substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999)).
As such, "`[t]his Court is bound by the ALJ's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.'"Id. (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)). Where "an agency's factfinding is supported by substantial evidence, reviewing courts lack power to reverse . . . those findings.'" Id. (quoting Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1191 (3d Cir. 1986)). "`Substantial evidence does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. at *5-6 (quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).
IV. Discussion
To establish a disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate that there is some "medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any `substantial gainful activity' for a statutory twelve-month period." Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38-39 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). A claimant can establish such a disability in either of two ways: (1) by producing medical evidence that one is disabled per se as a result of meeting or equaling certain listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (2000), or (2) by demonstrating an impairment of such severity as to be unable to engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In deciding whether or not a claimant suffers from a disability, the ALJ must undertake a five step sequential process, which involves the following inquiries:
(1) Whether or not the claimant is working. If the claimant is working, he cannot be considered disabled regardless of the medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b);
(2) Whether or not the claimant suffers from a severe impairment. If the claimant does not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities he will not be found to be disabled. Id. § 404.1520(c);
(3) Whether or not a claimant's severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1. If so, the claimant will be deemed to be disabled. Id. § 404.1520(d);
(4) If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment, the claimant's residual functioning capacity will be examined by looking at whether or not the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, Id. § 404.1520(e)-(f);
(5) If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, it must be determined if claimant can perform other work in the national economy. If so, the claimant will be deemed to not be disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g).
In going through this analysis, the ALJ made the following findings for which Magistrate Judge Angell found there to be substantial evidence:
(1) Plaintiff had not been working for the statutory period of time. (Trans. at 13.)
(2) Plaintiff suffers from severe impairments (Trans. at 13-14), but
(3) Plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment in Appendix 1. (Trans. at 14.)
(4) Plaintiff possesses the residual functioning capacity to perform light level work or work that requires the maximum lifting of twenty pounds or the frequent lifting of ten pounds, and that Plaintiff's ability to perform this work is diminished by no more than occasional limitations related to the performance of postural activities, and by no more than occasional limitations related to sustaining concentration, maintaining attention and keeping pace. (Trans. at 15-18.)
(5) Plaintiff's residual functioning capacity prevents him from performing relevant past work (Trans. at 18), but
(6) Plaintiff's residual functioning capacity does not prevent him from performing other work in the national economy. Thus Plaintiff is not disabled. (Trans. at 18-19.)
Magistrate Judge Angell, in her RR, supports the ALJ's findings. However, Plaintiff has filed Objections, contesting the RR on the following grounds:
(1) Magistrate Judge Angell improperly adopted the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is capable of performing light work, because the ALJ's finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (Objections at 1.)
(2) Magistrate Judge Angell implicitly and erroneously rejected an argument raised by Plaintiff, in his Motion for Summary Judgment, that the ALJ did not follow the dictates of Social Security Ruling 00-4p, which "requires that the ALJ ask the vocational expert whether any possible conflict exists between the vocational expert's testimony and the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles] DOT, and that, if the testimony does appear to conflict with the DOT, to `elicit a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict.' The Ruling requires that the explanation be made on the record and that the ALJ explain in his decision how the conflict was resolved." Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2003). (Objections at 2-6.)
(3) Magistrate Judge Angell failed to address Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ had an obligation to recontact Dr. Irwin, one of Plaintiff's treating physicians, for clarification of Dr. Irwin's opinion. (Objections at 6.)
(4) Magistrate Judge Angell improperly adopted the ALJ's finding that the Plaintiff's testimony concerning his impairments was not totally credible, because the ALJ's finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (Objections at 9.)
(5) And, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence (Objections at 9.).
The DOT is "a publication of the United States Department of Labor that contains descriptions of the requirements for thousands of jobs that exist in the national economy" Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2002).
In reviewing de novo these portions of the ALJ's opinion, the Court holds that Magistrate Judge Angell properly concluded that the ALJ's opinion was based on substantial evidence. As such, the Report and Recommendation will be adopted, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
A. The ALJ's Finding That Plaintiff Possesses the Ability to Perform Light Work Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff's first objection maintains that Magistrate Judge Angell improperly adopted the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff possesses the ability to perform light work. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's findings in this regard are not supported by substantial evidence. In support, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's findings regarding his physical limitations are contradicted by medical reports submitted by his physicians. The Court disagrees.
"Light work" is defined as requiring the lifting of no more than twenty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds. 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1567; Social Security Ruling 83-10. "Frequent" is defined as occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the time. Social Security Ruling 83-10. Thus, "light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday." Id.
Plaintiff contends that the medical reports of his treating physicians, Dr. Irwin and Dr. Korevaar, demonstrate that he cannot perform light work as it is defined. The report of Dr. Irwin states that Plaintiff's "ability to carry out work duties, even the light duty he was previously assigned, has been greatly compromised" (Irwin Rept.), and Dr. Korevaar's report states that Plaintiff's permanent limitations include limited walking due to a calcified medial collateral ligament in his right knee. (Trans. at 68.)
While the reports of treating physicians must ordinarily receive great weight, they may be discounted where their opinions are "inconsistent with the other substantial evidence" in the record and not supported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory or diagnostic techniques. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(3). Here the record clearly indicates that the ALJ carefully considered all of the record evidence, finding that Dr. Korevaar's and Dr. Irwin's opinions were inconsistent with other record evidence (discussed below) and/or not supported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory or diagnostic techniques. Thus, substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff can perform light work.
In his opinion, the ALJ accepts that Plaintiff possesses a history of left ankle and right knee impairments. However, based on inconsistencies in the evidence of record, the ALJ questions the severity of those impairments. (Trans. at 15-16.) For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff:
(1) Testified that he is independent in matters of self care;
(2) Does not experience any upper extremity difficulties or limitations;
(3) Manages his pain through the use of over the counter Motrin;
(4) Testified that he uses a prescribed cane, but previously stated, in the consultative examination report of June 7, 2000, that he does not utilize any ambulatory assistive aids, and that although Plaintiff carried a cane into the hearing room, Plaintiff did not rely on the cane to walk;
(5) Was diagnosed by Dr. Liederman, in the consultative examination report of June 7, 2000, as displaying right knee pain, but having normal ranges of motion, only mildly decreased left ankle strength and intact lower extremity reflex and sensation.
(Trans. at 16.)
The ALJ further noted that all the medical evidence Plaintiff offered into the record, which includes the report of Dr. Korevaar dated July 7, 1992, but not the report of Dr. Irwin dated June 13, 2000, predates Plaintiff's alleged date of disability onset when Plaintiff allegedly stopped working. (Trans. at 16.) Consequently, because Plaintiff was working during this time period the ALJ could reasonably conclude that the limitations noted in these records do not indicate limitations that constitute a disability. The ALJ further noted that although Plaintiff's condition may have deteriorated over time, the record does not show that Plaintiff required any emergency room treatments, hospitalizations, critical active treatment or significant office care, nor have there been any significant increases or changes in prescribed medications reflective of an uncontrolled condition. (Trans. at 16.) These findings are all supported by the record and substantially support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff can perform light work.
In addition to noting the above inconsistencies in the record, the ALJ also dealt with specific deficiencies in the report of Dr. Irwin. In particular, the ALJ found that Dr. Irwin's opinion was not supported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory or diagnostic techniques. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(3). On this point, the ALJ noted that "Dr. Irwin's report appears to be based primarily, if not solely, upon the claimant's assertions and complaints," that Dr. Irwin "provided no objective clinical, diagnostic or laboratory findings to support the degree of limitation assessed," and that Dr. Irwin "failed to offer any indication or description of the precise medical observations utilized to form the basis of his opinion" among other criticisms. (Trans. at 17.) Additionally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Irwin's report opined only about Plaintiff's ability to perform his past work duties. It offered no opinion as to Plaintiff's ability to perform other gainful activity. (Trans. at 17.) All of these findings are supported by the record. Hence, the ALJ possessed ample justification to discredit the report of Dr. Irwin and substantial evidence in the record to support his finding that Plaintiff can perform light work.
Plaintiff's additional objection, that the ALJ should have recalled Dr. Irwin, also lacks merit. An ALJ must recontact a physician when the evidence received from that physician is inadequate to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e). This will be done when:
the report from your medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not contain all the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.Id. § 404.1512(e)(1). However, the ALJ need not recontact a physician when he "knows from past experience that the source either cannot or will not provide the necessary findings." Id. § 404.1512(e)(2).
Here, the ALJ could have reasonably concluded from past experience that Plaintiff could produce no other pertinent, reliable information from Dr. Irwin. At the hearing, Plaintiff requested leave to submit "additional records" from Dr. Irwin, which the ALJ granted. (Trans. at 200.) Plaintiff did not even submit Dr. Irwin's report until after the administrative hearing. (Trans. at 200-204.) At this point in the proceedings, one would expect that Plaintiff's attorney would have sent the ALJ all of the pertinent and reliable records Dr. Irwin possessed regarding Plaintiff's impairments. Instead, Plaintiff sent only a one-page, handwritten note by Dr. Irwin that included no treatment notes, medical records or other information. Consequently, due to the paucity of Plaintiff's post-hearing filings the ALJ could have found, from past experience, that recontacting Dr. Irwin would not have provided the ALJ with the necessary information, as Plaintiff twice failed to provide that information — both pre- and post-hearing. Thus, on this ground, fault lies with Plaintiff's counsel and not the ALJ. See Colavito v. Apfel, 75 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (denying plaintiff's claim that the ALJ failed to recontact a treating physician on the basis that "it is plain that the ALJ did all that she could to have the record completed and that it was Plaintiff who failed to furnish the necessary information. The opportunity that the ALJ furnished Plaintiff's counsel to strengthen the credibility of Plaintiff's case was not a failure of the tribunal to complete the record."). Thus, remand would not be appropriate on this ground.
B. Credibility
____ The inconsistencies discussed above, regarding Plaintiff's complaints of pain, also contribute to and substantially support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the severity of his impairments lacks credibility. Thus, Plaintiff's objection on this basis also does not justify remand.
As the RR points out, it is the ALJ's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine credibility and the relative weights to be given to the evidence. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999); Mason v. Shalala, 99 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993). The ALJ's conclusions must be accepted unless they are without basis in the record. Torres v. Harris, 494 F. Supp. 297, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Hence, where credibility is at stake, courts should be reluctant to overturn an ALJ's determination, especially given that only the ALJ had the opportunity to hear live testimony. See Wilson v. Apfel, No. 98-6511, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16712, at * 9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999) ("In Social Security cases in general, the credibility determinations of the ALJ are to be given great deference.")
Here, the record indicates that the ALJ properly weighed Plaintiff's testimony in reaching the conclusion that it was not fully credible. In particular, the ALJ took note that Plaintiff testified that he is independent in matters of self care, does not experience any upper extremity difficulties or limitations, manages his pain through the use of an over the counter drug called Motrin, did not use his cane during the hearing, and was diagnosed by Dr. Liederman, as displaying right knee pain, but having normal ranges of motion, only mildly decreased left ankle strength and intact lower extremity reflex and sensation. (Trans. at 16.) Moreover, the ALJ noted that the medical evidence submitted by Plaintiff predated the alleged onset date of his disability, and that the one report, by Dr. Irwin, that did not predate the alleged onset date was medically unreliable and focused only on Plaintiff's ability to perform past work and not future gainful activity. Thus, the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's complaints of pain are not fully credible. See Wilson, supra at *9-18 (upholding the ALJ's denial of benefits where the ALJ examined plaintiff's complaints of pain in light of the daily activities of living conducted by plaintiff along with various medical opinions). As such, "it is not for this Court, upon review, to decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment to decide whether a claimant is or is not disabled." Wilson, supra at * 18-19. The ALJ's credibility determination must be left undisturbed.
C. The ALJ Properly Relied on the Vocational Expert's Testimony
Plaintiff also objects on the basis that the ALJ erred at the fifth step of the aforementioned sequential evaluation process. At this step, "the ALJ often seeks advisory testimony from a vocational expert. In addition, the ALJ will generally consult the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") . . . in order to determine whether any jobs exist that a claimant can perform."Burns v. Barnhart, supra fn. 1 at 119. Plaintiff objects on the basis that the vocational expert opined that Plaintiff could perform jobs, which according to the definitions provided by the DOT exceed Plaintiff's physical limitations and skill level. As such, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ possessed an obligation to address these conflicts pursuant to Social Security Ruling 00-4p, which requires that:
the ALJ ask the vocational expert whether any possible conflict exists between the vocational expert's testimony and the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles] DOT, and that, if the testimony does appear to conflict with the DOT, to `elicit a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict.' The Ruling requires that the explanation be made on the record and that the ALJ explain in his decision how the conflict was resolved.Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir., 2003) (construing Social Security Ruling 00-4p).
On review with this Court, Plaintiff is able to delineate several inconsistencies between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT. The vocational expert's testimony was based on her opinion that Plaintiff's past work experience qualified him to perform "unskilled labor." (Trans. at 220.) In addition, the ALJ requested the vocational expert to assume that Plaintiff could perform only "light" or "sedentary" labor. (Trans. at 221.) Based, on these factors, the vocational expert suggested that Plaintiff could perform the following jobs, which existed at the local and national level:
(1) Security guard,
(2) Kitchen worker,
(3) Cashier,
(4) Assembler,
(5) Gate Attendant,
(6) Dispatcher,
(7) Receptionist, and
(8) Appointment clerk.
(Trans. at 221-223.)
Based on the description of these jobs in the DOT, Plaintiff argues that the vocational expert incorrectly opined that Plaintiff possessed the ability to perform them. In support, Plaintiff shows that several jobs involve at least semi-skilled labor and require more than light work. For example:
(1) The job of Security Guard is listed in the DOT at section 372.667-034 and is listed as involving light labor, but having a Specific Vocational Preparation ("SVP") of 3, making it a semi-skilled job. See Boone v. Barnhart, supra, at 206-207 ("Occupations with an SVP of 3 or 4 are semi-skilled."). Thus, Plaintiff's past experience as an unskilled laborer may preclude him from performing this job.
(2) The job of Kitchen Worker encompasses many different jobs some of which involve semi-skilled labor and others which involve unskilled labor. Additionally, the jobs require various levels of exertion from light to medium (for example, Kitchen helper, defined at section 318.687-010, requires unskilled labor (SVP of 2) but medium exertion, Kitchen Clerk, defined at section 222.587-022, requires semi-skilled labor (SVP of 4) and medium exertion, and Kitchen Steward requires medium exertion and has an SVP of 6, placing it at a level higher than semi-skilled labor). Thus, inconsistencies exist due to the skill and exertion levels of these jobs.
Despite these conflicts, Plaintiff's argument does not require remand. The Third Circuit has not yet expressly ruled on how to handle issues involving Social Security Ruling 00-4p. However, the case of Boone v. Barnhart, supra, sheds some light on the issue. In Boone, the Third Circuit, in addressing a conflict between a vocational expert's testimony and the DOT, noted the existence of Social Security Ruling 00-4p, but held that the ruling did not apply because the ALJ's opinion was issued prior to the ruling's effective date. 353 F.3d at 206 n. 6.
Plaintiff contends that the Third Circuit, in Burns v. Barnhart, supra, held that remand is appropriate where an ALJ fails to follow the requirements of Social Security Ruling 00-4p. However, a careful reading of Burns shows that the Third Circuit remanded on other grounds and specifically noted that it was not bound by Social Security Ruling 00-4p because the ALJ's decision was rendered prior to its effective date.
Social Security Ruling 00-4p became effective in December of 2000. Money v. Barnhart, No. 03-2553, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3654, at *8 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2004).
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit, in Boone, cited Social Security Ruling 00-4p with approval, noting that it represents the most reasoned approach to dealing with inconsistencies between a vocational expert's testimony and the DOT. 353 F.3d at 209 ("Social Security Ruling SSR 00-4p squarely addresses how this situation should be handled."). The Court noted that this approach allows the ALJ to rely on the vocational expert's testimony where it conflicts with the DOT so long as the ALJ "explain[s] away any decision to prefer the testimony of a vocational expert over the DOT." Id. at 208-209.
Building on this foundation, precedent from this District interpreting Ruling 00-4p clearly shows that an ALJ need not "explain away" inconsistencies in every instance. Precedent dictates that:
such a duty arises only where a conflict has been identified, or where there is an apparent unresolved conflict between [vocational expert] . . . evidence and the DOT. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, the ruling requires an explanation only if the discrepancy was identified — that is, if the claimant (or the ALJ on his behalf) noticed the conflict and asked for substantiation.Scandone v. Barnhart, No. 02-2892, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21068, at * 11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2003) (quoting Thompson v. Barnhart, 281 F. Supp. 2d 770 (E.D. Pa. 2003)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The court's holding in Scandone articulates what is also evident in Boone — that Ruling 00-4p does not impose upon the ALJ an affirmative duty to question the vocational expert about potential inconsistencies in her testimony. As stated above, the Third Circuit, in Boone, while not bound by Ruling 00-4p, expressed a preference for Ruling 00-4p's approach to resolving conflicts between a vocational expert's testimony and the DOT. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit expressly declined to "adopt a general rule that an unexplained conflict between a [vocational expert's] testimony and the DOT necessarily requires reversal."Boone, 353 F.3d at 206. As the Court in Scandone explains, there must be a triggering event — the discrepancy must first be identified. Scandone, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21068, at * 11.
In this case, the ALJ's duty to "explain away" inconsistencies was not triggered. Although Plaintiff, in his filings with the Court, has pointed to numerous inconsistencies between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT, Plaintiff's counsel failed to bring these inconsistencies to light at the administrative level. When questioning the vocational expert, Plaintiff's attorney asked:
Q: Now . . . you described a number of different jobs. Are these jobs all classified as unskilled jobs?
A: Yes. Unskilled entry level.
Q: Okay. That's everything you described from the first hypothetical with the medium exertional level down to the last one?
A: Yeah. Every job that I cited today would be considered unskilled entry level with an SVP of one or two.
(Trans. at 224-225.) Plaintiff's attorney did not probe any deeper. The record does not show that Plaintiff's attorney reviewed the DOT himself, nor did he ask the vocational expert to read each job's SVP level from the DOT. The record also does not show that Plaintiff's attorney ever attempted to supplement the administrative record in order to bring these inconsistencies to the ALJ's attention. As such, no discrepancy was ever identified at the administrative level. Therefore, pursuant to the precedent announced in Scandone, supra, and Thompson, supra, the ALJ possessed no obligation to "explain away any decision to prefer the testimony of a vocational expert over the DOT."Scandone, supra at * 11; see also Boone, 353 F.3d at 206.
V. Conclusion
Plaintiff's final objection to the ALJ's findings is that the ALJ lacked substantial evidence to find him not to be disabled. This is a catchall objection, encompassing all of the above objections. Of course, if the ALJ erred on any of the grounds discussed above, his holding would not be based on substantial evidence. However, the Court finds that the ALJ possessed substantial evidence to find Plaintiff disabled, did not ere by not recalling Dr. Irwin, possessed substantial evidence to find Plaintiff's testimony to not be fully credible and properly relied on the testimony of the vocational expert. As such, Magistrate Judge Angell's Report and Recommendation will be adopted, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW THIS 23rd day of July, 2004, it is hereby ORDERED that:1. The Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED;
2. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and
3. The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED;