Opinion
No. C 01-0825 MMC (PR)
July 9, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 25)
Plaintiff Freddy L. Paramo was a California prisoner when he filed a verified pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Morgan Hill, California ("Morgan Hill"); Morgan Hill police officers Gary Smith ("Smith"), Rick Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") and A.J. Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") (collectively "officers" or "police officer defendants"); Morgan Hill Police Chief Steve Schwab ("Police Chief"); and the County of Santa Clara ("County"). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the police officers violated his constitutional rights when they used excessive force in obtaining a blood sample from him. He further alleged that these actions were taken pursuant to policies of Morgan Hill and the County.
Morgan Hill, its police chief and the police officer defendants are described collectively infra as "Morgan Hill defendants."
After an initial review of the complaint, the Court ordered the United States Marshal to serve it on all defendants and ordered defendants to file a dispositive motion, or indicate why such a motion was inappropriate. The Morgan Hill defendants jointly filed a motion for summary judgment, and the County filed a separate motion for summary judgment. In an order extending the deadlines for filing the dispositive motion, the Court informed plaintiff that he was allowed, though not required, to file an opposition, and that any opposition would be due on or before October 10, 2001. Plaintiff did not file an opposition or a request that the deadline be extended. Instead, on November 27, 2001, plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery. Thereafter, the Morgan Hill defendants and the County filed respective motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
On January 25, 2002, the Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, denied defendants' motions to dismiss, and denied plaintiff's motion to compel. The Court also ordered the Morgan Hill defendants to file supplemental briefing on their motion for summary judgment, and granted plaintiff permission to file a response to the supplemental briefing. Thereafter, the Morgan Hill defendants filed a supplemental memorandum and declaration in support of their motion for summary judgment, in which they addressed the outstanding issues identified by the Court. Plaintiff subsequently filed a document entitled "Objection of Dismissal," to which defendants filed a reply.
The Court addresses the Morgan Hills defendants' motion for summary judgment below.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.
The court will grant summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding that a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, and that a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted).
At summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; if direct evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with direct evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
B. Plaintiff's Papers
Prior to addressing the merits of the Morgan Hill defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court notes that the motion is essentially unopposed. Plaintiff did not initially file an opposition to the motion. He did file a document entitled "Mental Findings of Client for Civil Action. Motion to Compel Discovery," in which he states he is "objecting to" Smith's declaration filed in support of the motion. (See Mot. to Compel at 6.) The Court, however, will not construe this document as an opposition. First, plaintiff was explicitly informed, in the Court's July 9, 2001 order extending the deadline for filing plaintiff's opposition, that any opposition had to be filed on or before October 10, 2001. Plaintiff never requested or established good cause for an extension of that deadline, and filed the "motion to compel" more than six weeks thereafter. Second, plaintiff was released from custody more than two months prior to the date his Opposition was due. As a result, the usual impediments to timely filings experienced by incarcerated litigants were not present, and any consideration ordinarily afforded an incarcerated litigant would not apply. Finally, defendants have been deprived of an opportunity to respond to the assertions made in the motion to compel as plaintiff did not serve that filing on defendants, in violation of the Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's explicit instructions in the Order of Service. After the Morgan Hills defendants filed their supplemental briefing, however, plaintiff did file and serve on defendants a three-page document entitled "Objection of Dismissal," which the Court construes as an opposition to the matters raised in that filing.
Even if the Court were to consider that motion as an opposition, the Court's conclusions as expressed infra would remain unchanged. Both the "Motion to Compel" and the "Opposition to Dismissal" are largely devoted to a description of plaintiff's current symptoms and the treatments he received. In neither filing does plaintiff offer evidence that their were caused by any of the defendants. The only reference to defendants or summary judgment motion is plaintiff's statement that he "objects" to defendant Smith's declaration. The specific nature of the objection is not clear, however, nor does plaintiff indicate any objection to the declaration of Montes, which is similar in content.
C. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff claims that the police officers used excessive force while obtaining a blood sample from him at the Morgan Hill Police Department in the course of investigating him for driving under the influence of a controlled substance. The use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer in effectuating an arrest states a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986). Excessive force claims which arise in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). The reasonableness inquiry in excessive force cases is an objective one, the question being whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to the officers' underlying intent or motivation, and without the "20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396-97. Because the reasonableness test is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. at 396.
According to defendants' evidence, at approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 4, 1999, Officer Smith saw plaintiff's car weave through traffic lanes, evade three police cars, and ultimately spin out of control. After coming to a stop, plaintiff tried to restart his car, but the police cars were positioned to prevent him from moving his car any further. Smith then ordered plaintiff to get out of his car. In doing so, plaintiff stumbled backwards. Once out of the vehicle, plaintiff was slow to react to commands, could not walk steadily, and was mumbling and slurring his speech. Plaintiff was unable to complete field sobriety tests and thereafter was taken to the Morgan Hill Police Department, where a breath test revealed he had a blood alcohol content of .12%, a level not ordinarily associated with the degree of impairment demonstrated by plaintiff The officers then requested that plaintiff provide a blood sample to determine if he was under the influence of a controlled substance. When plaintiff refused to comply with their request that he submit to a blood test, the officers put plaintiff in a "restraining hold" and "placed" him on the ground on his stomach. While the officers secured plaintiff" a nurse, Susan Montes ("Montes"), lay down next to plaintiff and extracted a blood sample from him. The sample tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine and PCP.
1. Blood Test
In its initial review of the complaint, the Court found that plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim for a Fourth Amendment violation in connection with the nonconsensual taking of a blood sample. Thus, at the outset, the Court must address whether the defendant officers had probable cause to conduct the blood test in question. The Fourth Amendment permits the nonconsensual seizure of blood for purposes of testing for alcohol content only in certain circumstances. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966). First, an officer ordering that a blood sample be taken must reasonably believe he is "confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threaten[s] `the destruction of evidence.'" Id. at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). Second, the officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect has been driving under the influence of alcohol. See id. Third, the procedures used to extract the blood must be reasonable; that is, the sample must be taken by trained medical personnel in accordance with accepted practices. See id. at 771; United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Nothing in Schmerber suggests that the analysis at this step would differ where the suspect is believed to have been driving under the influence of a controlled substance rather than alcohol.
Based on defendants' account of the events at issue, there was probable cause to believe that plaintiff had been driving under the influence of alcohol because plaintiff had a blood alcohol level of .12% shortly after the car chase. Defendants also had a reason to believe that plaintiff was under the influence of a controlled substance because, in Officer Smith's experience, the behavior demonstrated by plaintiff is inconsistent with a blood alcohol level of less than .20%, unless the person is under the influence of another substance as well. As the blood test was needed to ascertain the presence of other substances in plaintiff's system, the officers had probable cause to take a blood sample. Cf. Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1200-05, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no probable cause for blood test simply for the purpose of further testing for alcohol). Moreover, a warrant likely could not have been obtained for some considerable period of time, as the events occurred in the very early morning hours on a Sunday. It was reasonable for defendants to believe that such a delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would have resulted in the loss of critical evidence by dissipation over time. Finally, defendants have also shown that the blood sample was taken by trained medical personnel. Plaintiff presents no facts in his "objection of dismissal" which dispute defendants' account. Plaintiff merely asserts that there was no probable cause. Given the circumstances leading up to plaintiff's arrest and the results of the breath test, the Court disagrees. Consequently, the police officers are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that the nonconsensual blood test violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
2. Excessive Force
According to Montes, defendants used the same restraining technique that she had observed them use on at least twelve prior occasions; on none of these occasions had she observed the restraint to cause injury to the suspect. After the blood sample here at issue was taken, Smith took plaintiff to the Santa Clara County Jail ("County Jail"), located approximately forty-five minutes away, where plaintiff was admitted without the need for a medical clearance. Both Smith and Montes declare that throughout the events in question, plaintiff had no discernible injuries and that plaintiff did not complain of any injury.
Under the circumstances described by defendants, the use of force was reasonable. The evidence is undisputed that, from the outset, plaintiff did not cooperate with the police, initially fleeing and later refusing to allow a blood test. It is also undisputed that plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol. It was reasonable for the officers to believe that an uncooperative suspect in custody and under the influence of alcohol could pose a threat to the safety of medical personnel. As a consequence, it was reasonable for the police to use physical force to restrain plaintiff, and to do so on the floor where such restraint would be easier to accomplish.
The only specific factual dispute that can be gleaned from plaintiff's complaint is as to whether defendants "threw," rather than "placed," plaintiff on the floor. The Court assumes for the purposes of this motion that plaintiff was in fact thrown to the floor. Police officers, however, are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible; they are required only to act within a reasonable range of conduct. See Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1994). There is no evidence that plaintiff was thrown to the floor with a great amount of force or in a dangerous manner. Defendants present undisputed evidence from Montes that the police officer defendants used the same technique they had employed with at least twelve other suspects and that no suspect had been injured on any of those occasions. Plaintiff presents no evidence that by reason of his physical condition, or any other circumstance, the technique in question posed an unreasonable risk of harm to him.
Nor does plaintiff present evidence as to the extent of any injuries he sustained as a result of the challenged actions. The extent of any injury to plaintiff, caused by a police officer's use of force, while not a necessary element of an excessive force claim, is nevertheless relevant to show the extent of the force that was used. See Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 2001), judgment vacated and remanded on other grounds, 01 C.D.O.S. 8542 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2001) (holding that whether the use of force poses a risk of permanent or significant injury is a factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the force used in a particular case, but is not dispositive); cf. Warren v. Westchester County Jail, 106 F. Supp.2d 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that de minimis injury strongly suggests a de minimis use of force, not actionable under the Eighth Amendment). Defendants present the declarations of two witnesses, stating that plaintiff had no visible injuries or complaints of injuries. Although plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges that he has a host of injuries, including brain damage, broken knees and torn ligaments, plaintiff presents no medical evidence, confirming his self-diagnosis, let alone any medical evidence that any such injury was the result of defendants' actions. Plaintiff's allegation in the complaint that defendants "caused" his injuries is conclusory in nature and insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Cf. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff's claim that injury was caused by defendant's handcuffing was conclusory and, without any supporting facts or medical records, insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation).
Although the inquiry in an excessive force claim is fact intensive, defendants may still prevail on summary judgment if the district court concludes, after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, that the officers' use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, as discussed above, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the police officers did anything more than force him to the ground on a single occasion. Without more, this maneuver does not constitute an unreasonable application of force when used to restrain an uncooperative suspect who is under the influence. See e.g. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806-07 (finding use of pain compliance techniques on passively-resisting abortion protesters, resulting in bruises, pinched nerve and broken wrist, was objectively reasonable). Consequently, resolving all disputed facts and drawing all inferences in plaintiff's favor, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the police officers used an unreasonable amount force under the circumstances of this case. The police officer defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff'[s excessive force claim.
3. Supervisor and Municipal Defendants
Plaintiff's claims against the Police Chief and Morgan Hill require that plaintiff establish a violation of his constitutional rights. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding that a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only upon a showing of personal involvement in, or causal connection between, the supervisor's conduct and a constitutional violation); Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding local government is liable under § 1983 where official policy or custom causes constitutional violation). Plaintiff has offered no evidence of conduct by the Police Chief causing the alleged constitutional violations or the existence of any policy, pattern or practice of constitutional violations by Morgan Hill. In any event, as plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he suffered a constitutional violation in the first instance, the supervisor and municipal defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
This order terminates Docket No. 25 and any other pending motions.
The Clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED defedants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.