Opinion
No. CV02 0280285-S
July 8, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #111
I PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a summary judgment motion filed by the defendant. The dispositive issue presented is whether the plaintiff is a covered person under the terms of her parents' automobile liability insurance policy. The plaintiff, Alison Paquette, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), on March 27, 2002. Paquette seeks uninsured motorist benefits from GEICO as a result of being injured in a hit-and-run accident on June 12, 2001, while a pedestrian in the parking lot of the Meadowlands Sports Complex.
As alleged in the complaint, Donald K. Paquette and Joyce A. Paquette had a contract for automobile insurance with GEICO, and this policy included coverage for uninsured motorist benefits covering Alison Paquette. The complaint further alleges that the policy was in full effect on the date that Paquette was injured. Finally, the complaint alleges that GEICO agreed to pay all sums which Paquette is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner of an uninsured vehicle and that GEICO has breached the insurance agreement by falling to pay Paquette the damages that she is entitled to recover.
On October 30, 2002, GEICO filed this motion for summary judgment on the ground that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Paquette is not defined as an insured under the applicable insurance policy and therefore no coverage is provided for her claim. In support of its motion, GEICO submits a memorandum of law; a copy of Paquette's responses to GEICO's request for admissions, dated August 26, 2002; the affidavit of Kenneth Beyer, a GEICO claims examiner; and a verified copy of the "Family Automobile Insurance Policy" issued by GEICO to Donald K. Paquette and Joyce A. Paquette. A reply brief was also filed on February 11, 2003.
Paquette filed an objection to GEICO's motion for summary judgment on January 6, 2003. In support, Paquette submits a memorandum of law, the affidavit of Joyce A. Paquette, and a verified copy of the declarations page of the GEICO insurance policy at issue in this case. This motion appeared for argument on the March 17, 2003 short calendar.
II DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nomnoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 590, 840 A.2d 170 (2002). "[T]he `genuine issue' aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
GEICO argues that Paquette, who is not named in the policy, cannot be defined as an insured resident relative under the provisions of her parents' uninsured motorist coverage because she owned her own car as of the date of the accident. GEICO relies on Paquette's admission, in response to its request for admissions, that she owned a motor vehicle on the date of the accident. (GEICO's Memorandum of Law, dated October 29, 2002, Exhibit A.) GEICO also relies on the language in the policy that defines an insured as any relative who resides with the named insureds "and who does not own a motor vehicle that is required to be insured . . ." (GEICO's Memorandum of Law, dated October 29, 2002, Exhibit B: Family Automobile Insurance Policy, p. 10.) GEICO argues that this limitation of coverage is sanctioned by Middlesex Insurance Co. v. Quinn, 225 Conn. 257, 622 A.2d 572 (1993), as well as General Statutes § 38a-336 (d).
Paquette argues in response that Middlesex Insurance Co. v. Quinn, supra, 225 Conn. 257, is distinguishable from the present case and that amendments to § 38a-336 have changed the application of the holding in that case. Paquette also argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she was covered under the policy. For support of this argument, Paquette relies on the affidavit of her mother, Joyce A. Paquette, stating that she believed the premiums paid included coverage for the plaintiff, regardless of whether she owned her own car. (Joyce A. Paquette Affidavit, dated December 19, 2002, ¶¶ 4-5.) Finally, Paquette argues that the insurance policy at issue is ambiguous and violates public policy.
Section 38a-336 (a) (1) provides, in relevant part, that "[e]ach automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles . . . because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom." This statute is remedial in nature, and its purpose is "to protect and make whole a person injured at the hands of an uninsured/underinsured motorist." (Emphasis in original.) American Universal Insurance Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 197, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). See also Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Conn. 359, 373, 641 A.2d 783 (1994); Gohel v. Allstate Insurance Co., 61 Conn. App. 806, 815, 768 A.2d 950 (2001). Furthermore, there is a "strong public policy favoring uninsured motorist coverage . . ." Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 219 Conn. 371, 377, 593 A.2d 498 (1991). See also Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Insurance Co., 252 Conn. 79, 88 n. 5, 743 A.2d 156 (1999).
In Middlesex Insurance Co. v. Quinn, supra, 225 Conn. 259-60, the defendant was injured while driving a car he owned. The defendant lived with his father at the time of the accident and sought coverage from his father's automobile liability policy with the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied coverage on the ground that the defendant was not a covered person as defined in the policy. The policy language at issue in that case, which applied to both liability and underinsured motorist insurance, stated that "You, your, yourself . . . means a member of the family who is a resident of the household and who doesn't own a car . . ." Id., 261-62.
In deciding whether the defendant was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under his father's policy, the Quinn court reasoned that § 38a-336, unlike the automobile liability statutes, does not require that underinsured motorist benefits be extended to any particular class or group of insureds. Id., 264. "Rather, the statute requires that underinsured motorist coverage must be provided for the protection of persons insured thereunder . . . Thus, `persons insured' in this statute refers to persons specified as insureds in the liability portion of the policy." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court went on to reason that "[t]here would be no violation of public policy, therefore, unless the insurance policy specifically were to limit underinsured motorist coverage in such a way as to [preclude] persons who would otherwise quality as insureds for liability purposes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 264-65. Based on this reasoning, the court held that because the defendant was not a covered person under the liability section of the policy, the plaintiff insurer could properly exclude him from underinsured motorist coverage. Id., 267.
In the present case, the liability section of the policy describes persons insured as: "1. you and your relatives unless any such person is excluded by endorsement; 2. persons using the auto with your permission. The actual use must be within the scope of that permission; 3. any other person or organization for his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured under 1 or 2 above." (Family Automobile Insurance Policy, p. 4.) The liability portion of the policy contains no exclusion for a resident relative who owns his or her own car. Such an exclusion can only be found in the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage section.
Because Paquette, as a resident relative, is an insured under the liability portion of GEICO's policy, GEICO may not exclude her from uninsured motorist coverage. "The public policy behind uninsured motorist coverage . . . requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorist benefits to any insured under the automobile liability policy." Middlesex Insurance Co. v. Quinn, supra, 225 Conn. 267. Furthermore, a genuine issue of material fact is created by the affidavit of Joyce A. Paquette, wherein she states that she believed the premiums she paid included a charge for coverage of her daughter. The burden of proof is on the movant, and GEICO has failed to rebut this evidence. For the reasons stated, GEICO's summary judgment motion is denied.
III CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment is denied.
BY THE COURT
Peter Emmett Wiese, Judge