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finding a gap of one year between plaintiff's demotion and the discriminatory comments to be probative
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09 Civ. 9257 (NRB)
12-28-2011
KAREN MASCARELLA PAPALIA, Plaintiff, v. MILROSE CONSULTANTS, INC., Defendant.
Attorneys for Plaintiff: Christine A. Palmieri, Esq. Liddle & Robinson, LLP 800 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Attorneys for Defendant: Roger H. Briton, Esq. Jackson Lewis LLP 58 South Service Road, Suite 410 Melville, NY 11747
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Karen Mascarella Papalia ("Papalia") brings this action against her former employer, Milrose Consultants, Inc. ("Milrose"), claiming age and gender discrimination in connection with her demotion and alleged constructive discharge in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as amended (the "ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended ("Title VII"), as well as state and municipal laws. Papalia, who served on a grand jury for eighteen months during her employment with Milrose, also claims violation of the Jury Service Improvements Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1875, as amended (the "JSIA"). Defendant Milrose moves for summary judgment on all of these claims, asserting it had legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to demote Papalia. For the reasons stated below, Milrose's motion for summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part.
II. Background
The facts recited here are drawn from the following sources: (1) Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts Pursuant to Rule 56.1 ("Def.'s R. 56.1"); (2) exhibits attached to the Affirmation of Roger H. Briton in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Briton Affirm."); (3) the Affidavit of Louis Milo in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Milo Aff."); (4) the Affidavit of Dominick Chieco in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Chieco Aff."); (5) the Affidavit of Donna Jordan in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Jordan Aff."); (6) Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement ("Pl.'s R. 56.1"); (7) exhibits attached to the Affirmation of Christine A. Palmieri in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Palmieri Affirm."); and (8) the Affidavit of Karen Mascarella Papalia in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Papalia Aff.").
A. Papalia's Career with Milrose
In 1999, Papalia, who was born on April 21, 1955, joined Milrose as Assistant Controller, a position that she held for three years, initially earning an annual salary of $60,000. Def.'s R. 56.1 at ¶¶ 1, 10-17. Founded in 1988, Milrose is a construction consulting company that advises on building code compliance and permit facilitation. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. At all relevant times, Louis Milo ("Milo") and Dominick Chieco ("Chieco") were "partners" or members of the ownership and senior leadership at Milrose. Id. at ¶ 7. Milo, who was born on November 29, 1960, serves as president, and Chieco, who was born on December 5, 1966, serves as senior vice president. Id.
In 2002, Papalia was promoted to Director of Operations and Human Resources, a position that she held for over four years, earning an annual salary that increased pursuant to her successive requests from $75,000 to $125,000 and came to include a bonus equal to 0.25% of company sales. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17, 26, 28, 46-48. At the time she assumed this new role, Papalia oversaw a workforce of roughly forty-five employees and was responsible for managing the daily activities of the company's operational departments. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.
In September 2006, Papalia was again promoted to Executive Director of Operations, a position that she held until shortly before her departure from Milrose and in which her annual salary initially increased to $190,000 and continued to include a bonus equal to 0.25% of sales. Id. at ¶ 46. In December 2007, Papalia's annual salary was increased to $202,500, but her bonus was reduced to 0.125% of sales. Id. at ¶ 77. In February 2009, at the end of her tenure as Executive Director of Operations, Papalia supervised roughly eighty employees. Id. at ¶ 19.
Papalia states that in connection with this reduction, Milo told her, "I don't know why we're still giving you that." Briton Affirm. Ex. 1 Dep. Tr. 195:12-20. At some point prior or proximate to December 2007, Papalia also began to receive a $10,000 performance bonus and a $10,000 automatic bonus paid quarterly in installments of $2,500. See Id. at 205-208; Briton Affirm. Ex. 2 Dep. Ex. 44. Contrary to the parties' suggestions, see Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 77; Pl.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 77, whether the automatic bonus was directly introduced in partial lieu of Papalia's reduced sales bonus is insignificant.
B. Papalia's Jury Service
From March 2006 to September 2007, Papalia served on a grand jury convened in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for one day per week. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36; Compl. ¶ 14. During these eighteen months, Papalia allegedly experienced hostility from the partners relating to her jury service. Papalia asserts that she received "no support" from the partners who were "angry" that she was being paid for five days of work each week. Briton Affirm. Ex. 1 Dep. Tr. ("Papalia Tr.") 117:2-17. Milo admits telling Papalia that she was being paid for five but only working for four days. Palmieri Affirm. Ex. B Dep. Tr. ("Milo Tr.") 38:14-19. Papalia alleges that Milo also made flippant comments to her regarding, for instance, her availability to attend meetings (i.e. "if you can make it because you are on jury duty," Papalia Tr. 122:4-5) and company events (i.e. "oh, I'm glad you can make it . . . you are not on jury duty," id. at 122:8-15). Such comments led Papalia's subordinates to ask her why the partners were angry about her jury service. See id. at 123. Once, when Papalia explained that she was trying to make up for the lost workdays, Milo responded, "I don't like it, I don't have to like it and that's all there is to it." Papalia Tr. 118:19-21. While Papalia does not recall details, other partners joked about her jury service, making her uncomfortable. Def.'s R. 56.1 at ¶ 41.
In February 2007, Papalia documented her treatment in a memorandum that she arranged to have placed in her personnel file without disclosing its existence to the partners. Id. at ¶¶ 53-54. In the memorandum, Papalia stated, inter alia, that the partners "do not like the fact that I am out of the office one day a week and that they need someone there 'full time'" and that the "behavior and attitude of the partners took a significant downturn" when she informed them that she had discussed their treatment of her with grand jury personnel in an unsuccessful attempt to be excused. Briton Affirm. Ex. 2 Dep. Ex. ("Papalia Ex.") 30. She explained, "[u]nder the current working conditions, I feel it necessary to document my treatment and the negative effect it is having on my future." Id.
In September 2007, Milo wrote in Papalia's review that "I believe the jury duty assignment has greatly reduced her [e]ffectiveness" and that "[t]he four day a week work schedule has severely reduced her ability to manage, address QC issues and implement change." Papalia Ex. 36. However, Chieco wrote in the same review that "[e]ven though Karen has had to fulfill her civic duties, she has maintained her workload and didn't let her responsibilities at Milrose lapse. Outstanding." Id. Papalia's compensation was not reduced at any point during the eighteen months of her jury service. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 60.
Another of the partners at Milrose, William Rose, stated in the same review, "[a]lthough I find it admirable that Karen gets to so many tasks and completes as much as she does, I believe the amount of work she tries to tackle alone holds her back. Throw in the jury duty which she has no choice to attend and the quantity of work becomes crushing." Papalia Ex. 30.
In December 2008, the recently hired Director of Human Resources, Donna Jordan ("Jordan"), who was born on October 27, 1966, discovered the memorandum that Papalia had placed in her personnel file. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 99; Palmieri Affirm. Ex. C Dep. Tr. ("Jordan Tr.") 15:7-9. Jordan brought the memorandum to at least Chieco's attention, Jordan Tr. 15:20-24, 17:20-23; Jordan Aff. ¶ 11, and he in turn discussed it with all of his partners. Palmieri Affirm. Ex. A Dep. Tr. ("Chieco Tr.") 91:11-16.
C. Papalia's Goal of Hiring a No. 2 in Operations
In 2005, the partners called on Papalia, who was then Director of Operations and Human Resources, to hire a "No. 2" to assist her in operations due to the company's growth. See Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 29. In November 2005, a woman was hired to serve as Papalia's No. 2, but she resigned after less than one year. Id. at ¶ 30; Palmieri Affirm. Ex. H. Shortly thereafter, in October 2006, a man was hired to serve as Papalia's No. 2, but he too resigned after less than one year. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 31; Palmieri Affirm. Ex. I; Papalia Tr. 108. In August 2007, a second woman who was a family friend of Milo was hired to serve as Papalia's No. 2 with Milo's recommendation, but Papalia and Milo soon agreed that she would not be an effective No. 2 and that while she would be retained in a limited capacity the search for a No. 2 would continue. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶¶ 33-34.
In September 2007, Milo wrote in Papalia's review that "[t]he job requirement for ops has doubled over the years and the volume cannot be handled by one individual. [Papalia] was instructed to hire 'someone as good or better' to assist her in management. Did not follow direction." Papalia Ex. 30. In November 2007, Papalia received goals for 2008, the first of which was to hire a No. 2 by April 1, 2008. See Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 74; Papalia Tr. 184-87. In March 2008, this goal was repeated in an email to Papalia, who understood and agreed with it. See Papalia Tr. 213-16. Before August 2008, Papalia had interviewed one candidate who she deemed not viable. See id. at 230-32.
By August 2008, Papalia had interviewed and recommended a second candidate, but Chieco rejected him, prompting Papalia to write to Chieco that the soon-to-be-hired Director of Human Resources "'can resume the search.'" Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶¶ 86, 88. Chieco said that he interpreted this statement as Papalia "basically giving up, handing it over to someone else to do the search." Chieco Tr. 68:8-11, 69:18-21. Chieco and Milo also have said that they expected that the Director of Human Resources, who was hired in September 2008, would be involved in the search for a No. 2. Id. at 68-69; Milo Tr. 87. In fact, Jordan interviewed six to seven applicants, two of whom she deemed viable. Jordan Tr. 37:2-17. In November 2008, Papalia rejected one candidate lacking experience. Papalia Tr. 236-37; Papalia Ex. 53. Before February 2009, a No. 2 was not hired.
D. Papalia's Demotion and Departure
On February 5, 2009, Chieco and Papalia met for a scheduled review. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 106. After initial pleasantries, Chieco raised Papalia's failure to hire a No. 2, which was "a problem." Papalia Tr. 253:4-19. Papalia explained that she had hired No. 2s who "didn't work out," presented a candidate whom Chieco rejected, and eventually provided "the specs" to Jordan, to which Chieco asserted that Papalia "threw up [her] hands" when Jordan arrived. Id. at 253-54. Disputing Chieco's characterization, Papalia acknowledged, "we don't have a [No. 2] right, so, yes, you're right, we don't have a [No. 2]," which Chieco said "caused a big problem in the firm." Id. at 254.
Chieco then raised the recently found memorandum, stating, "we are very upset [that] you put this letter in your file." Id. at 255:19-20. Without denying the memorandum's allegations, Chieco explained that he questioned Papalia's decision to memorialize them, noting "we, my partners can't get past it, you are going to have to do something because my partners can't get past it." Id. at 255:23-256:14. At this point, both Papalia and Chieco were allegedly upset. Id. at 256.
When Papalia insisted that the review continue, Chieco told her that "we're splitting your job" and provided a description for the position of Director of Administration, in which Papalia would oversee one employee, earn $170,000 and a $10,000 performance bonus, and no longer have responsibilities in operations. Id. at 257-58; Papalia Ex. 58. Papalia was informed that another employee would serve as Director of Production. Papalia Tr. 261:13-20. When Papalia asked what happened to the plan of a No. 2, Chieco responded, "this is the job and this is the salary." Id. at 258:7-9. In response to Papalia's indication that she would review the job description for the position of Director of Administration, Chieco stated, "I hope you do, Karen, I hope you do." Papalia Tr. 259:15-16.
During the review, Papalia claims that Chieco said, "I thought you would jump at the chance to not work so hard, I thought--aren't you tired." Id. at 258:24-259:2. Papalia also claims that "[Chieco] told me a story about a seminar that he went to and they were all young, fresh professionals there and they handled the thing like clockwork and that's what we need here." Id. at 258:15-19. Chieco has testified that he told Papalia that he thought she would be happy about the opportunity to have less to handle, see Chieco Tr. 127:16-21, and that he recalls "commenting on the need for 'fresh ideas'" but otherwise denies the remarks. Chieco Aff. ¶ 11. Chieco and Milo claim joint responsibility for the decision to demote Papalia. Milo Aff. ¶ 11; Chieco Aff. ¶ 13.
Following the review, on February 10, 2009, Papalia met with Jordan, who told her that the position of Director of Administration was "'a real job'" and that Papalia would need to decide whether she would accept it, to which Papalia responded that she required more time. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 121. Thereafter, Papalia met twice with Milo, first meeting with him on February 13, 2009, by which date she had already sought legal counsel. Id. at ¶ 116. During these meetings, Papalia told Milo "this is an insult to my talents and my skills and my years of hard work and this is not splitting my job . . . you have taken my whole entire job and given me this" position. Papalia Tr. 271:22-271:2. Papalia also told Milo that she felt as though she was "being discriminated against because I'm an older woman." Id. at 274:2-4. In response, Milo allegedly made light of her accusation and told her to "'think this over [over] the weekend and [on] Monday we will talk again.'" Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 117. In addition, Milo conveyed to Papalia that the partners wanted her to remain with Milrose. Id. at ¶ 118. According to Papalia, Milo also told her that should she remain, "who knows, you may be the first to go," Papalia Tr. 287:8-12, and separately said to her during this time period, "you're not going to get emotional on me, are you?" Id. at 57:6-13.
Papalia states that Milo would tell other female employees, "stop getting emotional, stop getting hysterical." Papalia Tr. 47:5-12. In addition to herself, she recalls two other women he spoke to in this way. Id. at 57-58.
On February 17, 2009, Papalia emailed Milo, directing him to contact her present counsel, in response to which Milo came to her office, initially yelling, "this is what you do after ten years." Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶¶ 119-20; Papalia Tr. 277:20-21. On February 18, 2009, Papalia's present counsel responded to an inquiry from Milo by stating that Papalia "has retained me to address her demotion, which appears to be both discriminatory and retaliatory in nature." Papalia Ex. 63. Later that day, Milo emailed Papalia to re-emphasize the hope of the partners that Papalia would remain with Milrose, notwithstanding her prior rejections of the position of Director of Administration, and to offer "a final opportunity" for Papalia to reconsider. Papalia Ex. 64. Milo indicated that if Papalia did not accept the offer by February 20, 2009, "we will have no choice but to consider you to be resigning effective that day." Id. On February 20, 2009, Papalia emailed Milo and Chieco and stated, inter alia, that "[i]n addition to materially reducing my responsibilities, the new position pays substantially less than my former position," that "I have thus been constructively discharged," that "I have not resigned" but "[i]nstead . . . have been discriminated and retaliated against," and that "I have no choice to ask my attorney to proceed with whatever actions are necessary to protect my rights." Id.
In the alternative, Milo offered Papalia a consulting position, which Papalia states was intended to address the launch of a software program then scheduled for May 2009. Papalia Ex. 64; Papalia Aff. ¶ 5.
Immediately following Papalia's departure, during the week of February 23, 2011, Chieco and Jordan interviewed Kenneth Kochiss, and on February 26, 2011, he was offered the position of Director of Operations, which he accepted. See Palmieri Affirm. Exs. T, U; Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 133. Kochiss, who was born on June 28, 1964, Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 132, has testified that he learned about an opening for an operations-related position with Milrose two to three weeks earlier in a conversation with an acquaintance named Joseph Bastone, who was born on October 27, 1966, and was then Milrose's Controller. See Briton Affirm. Ex. 4 Dep. Tr. ("Kochiss Tr.") 10-13; Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 8. Kochiss does not recall whether he next provided his resume to Bastone or Jordan. Kochiss Tr. 12:15-20. While it appears from Kochiss's deposition testimony that he recalls first speaking with Jordan on the telephone on February 24, 2011, several days after Papalia's departure, he initially testified that during this conversation the following was discussed:
Kochiss initially understood from Jordan that he was interviewing for the position of Executive Director of Operations, which was Papalia's position prior to her demotion. See Palmieri Affirm. Ex. E. Dep. Tr. 14.
. . . there was a person in the job of director of operations and Milrose had realized it was more work . . . than one person could--should handle--could handle, and they decided to split the position into two. And the person that was currently doing the operations director position was going to be taking the administrative position and I would be taking the--I was being offered the--I was there to discuss the operations position, executive director of operations.Palmieri Affirm. Ex. E. Dep. Tr. 16:5-16. Later in his deposition, however, Kochiss indicated that it was possible that Bastone, not Jordan, may have told him "that the person who had previously been director of operations or executive director of operations was going to be director of administration" and that he did not actually have a "firm recollection" regarding how he learned this information. Id. at 58:7-25.
On November 6, 2009, Papalia brought suit against Milrose, filing the complaint that underlies this action. In mid-2010, following a long search for a new job, Papalia finally accepted a position as a Director of Human Resources in which she earned roughly half the pay that Milrose offered to her as Director of Administration. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 141. In June 2010, Kochiss, whose performance was unsatisfactory, was offered in lieu of termination the position of Director of Administration, which had remained open since Papalia's departure. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶¶ 135-36. Kochiss accepted the position but was soon fired. Id. at ¶ 136. Bastone replaced Kochiss, assuming the position of Vice President of Operations. Chieco Tr. 152:20-153:10.
E. Facts Further Relating to Age and Gender Discrimination
The parties identify the following facts as further related to the allegations of age and gender discrimination. Papalia says that Milo once told her, "I want that old guy out of here, get him out of here, he's not doing us any good, he's useless," referring to "an older man" whom Milo later fired. Papalia Tr. 74:4-12. The record does not reflect the statement's timing.
In a document entitled, "Milrose 2005 Policy Paper," the statement, "[w]e need to hire a male within the age of 30 to 35 to assist us in client management and marketing," is ascribed to Milo. Palmieri Affirm. Ex. X. Milo has sworn in his affidavit that he made this comment to convey "the need to employ someone who would be able to establish relationships with newly hired, younger people employed by the [c]ompany's clients." Milo Aff. ¶ 10. Apparently in the context of the same comment, see Pl.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 161, Chieco has testified:
In an attempt to illustrate that Milo has given inconsistent testimony regarding his reason for making the comment, plaintiff's counsel somewhat mischaracterizes Milo's deposition testimony. See Pl.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 161. In response to the question, "[d]id you think it was important to have younger salespeople in order to capture a younger client base?" Milo responded, "I don't believe . . . that it was critical to the business, no." Milo Tr. 75:5-9. In response to the question, "[d]id you think it would be helpful?" Milo responded, "I don't think it would be harmful."
. . . as our clientele becomes older and grayer, newer people fill their slots and it makes sense to align them with people that they are comfortable with. I can sit across the table from somebody who is like-minded and like-experienced. I have trouble speaking to a very young person in th[at] spot because we don't have the same topics of discussion. It is just the way business is in terms of maintaining relationships. Those relationships stay with the company, but the people within that company, they cycle. You need to stay relevant and in tune with the pattern.Chieco Tr. 190:7-22.
In a wholly separate context, Papalia alleges that Andrew Presti, an external accountant for Milrose, told her that Milo had told him that when hiring controllers and assistant controllers "the profile had to be male, mid years, preferably Italian." Tr. 72:13-73:20. Contrary to the position of the parties, it is not apparent from Papalia's testimony when Presti allegedly made this representation, which he denies. See Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 158. According to Papalia, several years before her departure, Chieco told her in Milo's presence that "I'm glad we hired a woman [for a human resources position] because I always felt HR was a woman's job." Id. at ¶ 162; Papalia Tr. 67-68.
Though Papalia does not recall the time period, she alleges that on a few occasions and in the presence of other partners Milo would observe that "women my age . . . usually want a little job on Long Island. I'm odd because I wanted a career." Papalia Tr. 45:25-46:12, 48:6-50:20. In addition, Papalia claims that "[Milo] often said that men in the office had to be taken care of because they had families and that . . . he needed to take care of them first." Id. at 46:13-16. While Papalia later repeated that Milo often made this comment "when it came to dispersing the money amongst the staff," she could only recall one man who received such favorable consideration and did not remember Milo repeating the comment in the last few months before her departure. Id. at 50:21:-53:24. Papalia also alleges that several times Milo stated that he "want[ed] to have a legacy of white men in suits, no gray hairs" and that "if Abercrombie and Fitch could profile, so could he." Id. at 68:14-24. Though Papalia does not recall any persons Milo refused to hire on the basis of age, gender, or race, Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 157, she recalls in connection with her memory of these comments that Milo suggested photographing applicants so as to better screen them, a step that Papalia and Nicole Comeforo, another Milrose employee, recommended against and that was not implemented. Papalia Tr. 68:25-69:21.
According to Papalia, Milo "didn't want women in certain positions. He said it wasn't for them, we have enough women in key positions, we don't need more women in key positions." Papalia Tr. 47:13-16. Papalia recalls hearing this statement more than once, probably for the last time in 2008, and that it was repeated on a separate occasion to Jaclyn DiRenzo ("DiRenzo"), another Milrose employee. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 147. The occasion to which Papalia refers appears to have been an episode that DiRenzo documented at Papalia's request. Briton Affirm. Ex. 6 Dep. Tr. 44:19-45:19. According to DiRenzo's closely contemporaneous account, on February 13, 2008, Milo told DiRenzo over the telephone with regard to a recently hired female employee, inter alia, that "he thought he told Karen that he 'didn't want to hire anymore women in this slot'" and that "he is 'not hiring anymore women in these key positions,' [h]e 'needs men in these slots' and he 'thought he made that clear.'" Papalia Ex. 46. Milo allegedly continued, "'[i]f we want to hire women, I have plenty of other places in the office for women but these key positions are not open.' He stated that he has enough women in key positions." Id. DiRenzo subsequently told Papalia that she did not wish to further pursue the incident, and she has testified that she has not heard Milo make any other gender-based comments and is not aware of any gender-based hiring decisions. Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶¶ 150-52. Papalia has separately testified that on another occasion whose timing she does not recall DiRenzo complained to her of being denied a promotion on the basis of her gender and that when Papalia raised this concern with Milo he said "'she's just unhappy because she doesn't have a man in her life and she wants a man and wants to have babies.'" Id. at 153.
Both Milo and Chieco "deny making any discriminatory comments relating in any way to age or gender." Milo Aff. ¶ 9; Chieco Aff. ¶ 12.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment is appropriately granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In this context, "[a] fact is 'material' when it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law," and "[a]n issue of fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "In assessing the record to determine whether there is [such] a genuine issue [of material fact] to be tried, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). On a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 'the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" F.D.I.C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Where that burden is carried, the non-moving party "must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . and may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Brown v. Eli Lilly and Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Second Circuit has "repeatedly emphasized 'the need for caution about granting summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case where, as here, the merits turn on a dispute as to the employer's intent.'" Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 101 (quoting Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008)). "Where an employer has acted with discriminatory intent, direct evidence of that intent will only rarely be available, so that 'affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.'" Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 137 (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)). With that said, it is well established that "summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases." Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001).
B. Age and Gender Discrimination Claims
Papalia's claims of age discrimination under the ADEA and gender discrimination under Title VII are analyzed through the three-step evidentiary burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 105-106 (ADEA); Leibowitz v. Cornell University, 584 F.3d 487, 498-99 (2d Cir. 2009) (ADEA and Title VII). First, the employee bears the burden of producing evidence to support a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case of age and gender discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII, respectively, the employee must show that "(1) she was within the protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Leibowitz, 584 F.3d at 498. The employee's burden is light, Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 107, and "[o]ne might characterize it as minimal." Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
Papalia brings her claims of age and gender discrimination under not only the ADEA and Title VII but also the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (the "NYSHRL") and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. (the "NYCHRL"). See Compl. ¶¶ 39-49, 56-62. Traditionally, "[a]ge discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL [have been] analyzed under the ADEA framework . . . just as gender discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL [have been] analyzed under the Title VII framework." Leibowitz, 584 F.3d at 498 n. 1. However, cases decided in the past couple of years have begun to acknowledge that claims brought under the NYCHRL "must be reviewed independently from and 'more liberally' than their federal and state counterparts" in light of The Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005, N.Y.C. Local Law No. 85 (2005). Loeffler v. Staten Island University Hosp., 582 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D. 3d 62, 66-69, 872 N.Y.S. 2d 27, 31 (1st Dep't 2009)). Because we find that Papalia succeeds in defeating Milrose's motion for summary judgment pursuant to the stricter standards of the ADEA and Title VII, we do not separately consider her claims under the NYCHRL, which necessarily withstand summary judgment as well.
Second, if the employee establishes a prima facie case, then the evidentiary burden shifts to "the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In particular, the employer "'must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.'" Hongyan Lu v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 412 Fed. Appx. 413, 415 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (emphasis in original)).
Third, if the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, then the employee who "carries the ultimate burden of persuasion . . . must produce evidence such that a rational finder of fact could conclude that the adverse action taken against her was more likely than not a product of discriminatory animus." Leibowitz, 584 F.3d at 504. That is, the employee must demonstrate that "the legitimate reasons offered by the [employer] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, to prevail in her claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, an employee must have "raised sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that her age was a 'but for' cause" of the adverse employment action. Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 107. See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-51 (2009) (holding "but for" cause is required under the ADEA). That is, the employee must raise facts from which rational jurors could decide that the employee was subjected to the adverse employment action "'because of such individual's age.'" Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)) (emphasis in original). In contrast, under Title VII, an employee need only show that gender was a "'motivating factor'" alongside possibly other motivating factors. Id. at 2350 n. 3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
In moving for summary judgment on the age and gender claims, Milrose argues that Papalia fails to establish a prima facie case of age and gender discrimination and that furthermore Papalia also fails to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason that Milrose articulates for her demotion is pretextual.
1. Prima Facie Case
Milrose concedes that Papalia satisfies the first three elements of a prima facie case for discrimination. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 6-7. We pause to note that with regard to the third element, an adverse employment action, Milrose acknowledges that Papalia was demoted but asserts that "whether there was a constructive discharge is a question of fact." Id. at 7 n. 3. We are unclear why Milrose would concede that whether Papalia was constructively discharged is a question of fact. Given the repeated statements to Papalia that Milo and Chieco wished her to stay and the relatively modest reduction in her salary, we are not necessarily inclined to agree that a rational juror could find that Papalia was constructively discharged. "To establish constructive discharge, a[n employee] 'must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response.'" Holowecki v. Federal Exp. Corp., 382 Fed. Appx. 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004)). The fact that she may have suffered economic hardship as a result of her decision to depart does not of course in and of itself mean that Milrose is liable for her lost earnings, all of which came after she left Milrose. See Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶ 114. In any event, the pending motion for summary judgment does not require us to answer this question of constructive discharge.
Though Milrose concedes the first three elements of a prima facie case, it argues that Papalia has failed to establish that the facts give rise to an inference of age or gender discrimination. We examine these contentions seriatim.
a. Inference of Age Discrimination
In general, "a plaintiff's replacement by a significantly younger person is evidence of age discrimination." Carlton, 202 F.3d at 135. While replacement analysis is typically undertaken where the employee bringing suit was terminated and replaced, this approach is no less applicable where the employee was demoted and replaced. See, e.g., Martinez v. RZB Finance LLC, No. 10 Civ. 4214 (SAS), 2010 WL 4449031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2010) (citing Carlton and finding prima facie case established where plaintiff in her later forties was demoted and replaced by employee in his early twenties).
The facts here present something of a novel situation because Papalia was demoted, then departed, then was replaced by Kochiss. There is evidence, however, from which a rational juror could find that Milrose was already considering Kochiss as a replacement for Papalia prior to her departure, namely Kochiss's recollection that he was told that the current holder of the operations position (i.e. Papalia) was being moved to the administrative position and that he would assume the operations position. See Palmieri Affirm. Ex. E. Dep. Tr. 16:5-16. In any event, Kochiss can certainly be viewed as Papalia's replacement, and when he was hired, he was forty-four years old and Papalia was fifty-three years old, an age difference of nine years.
In many prima facie cases under the ADEA, the age differential between plaintiffs and the employees who replaced them is much larger than nine years. See, e.g., Carlton, 202 F.3d at 135 (plaintiff replaced by employees eighteen to twenty-five years younger); Hird-Moorhouse v. Belgian Mission to United Nations, No. 03 Civ. 9688 (RWS), 2010 WL 3910742, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2010) (fifty-four year old plaintiff replaced by sixteen year old employee). However, since Carlton was decided, the Second Circuit has found that an age differential of as little as eight years is alone sufficient to support an inference of age discrimination. See D'Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd Corp., 479 F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (reversing grant of summary judgment and noting "[t]his difference in age [of eight years]--though not large--is significant enough to support an inference in [plaintiff's] favor"). Under the existing case law, the age differential is sufficient to meet the required inference.
b. Inference of Gender Discrimination
"[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class will suffice for the required inference of discrimination at the prima facie stage of the Title VII analysis." Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001) (gender discrimination). See also Giannone v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 576, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discharged woman whose employer initially sought to replace her with a man but was ultimately replaced by two women established prima facie case of gender discrimination). Here, Kochiss, a man, replaced Papalia, a woman, and Papalia thus establishes a prima facie case.
The cases that Milrose cites in arguing that Papalia's replacement by a younger man is insufficient to raise an inference of age and gender discrimination do not address whether plaintiffs have established a prima facie case but rather whether they have carried their burden at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which is a different inquiry. See Def.'s Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 3-4.
2. Nondiscriminatory Reason
We now consider whether Milrose has provided a nondiscriminatory reason to rebut the prima facie case of age and gender discrimination that Papalia has established. Since 2005, the partners have clearly conveyed to Papalia their wish that she hire a No. 2 to assist her in operations due to the company's expansion. While three candidates were hired to fill the position between 2005 and 2007, none proved a long-term solution. For 2008, Papalia was expressly assigned the goal of hiring a No. 2 but at the time of her demotion had not succeeded in identifying a candidate that was acceptable to Milrose. At the review on February 5, 2009, Chieco identified the "problem" that this failure presented for Milrose. Relying on this general set of facts to explain its decision to demote Papalia, Milrose articulates a nondiscriminatory reason sufficient to meet its evidentiary burden. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (the employer's "burden is one of production, not persuasion").
3. Pretext
We thus consider whether Papalia has produced evidence from which a rational juror could find that Milrose more probably than not demoted Papalia not because of her failure to hire a No. 2 but due to age and gender discrimination. "[A]n employee may satisfy the ultimate burden of proving pretext 'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Dister v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). Here, the combination of indirect and direct evidence persuades us that Papalia has carried her burden at this stage on her claims of age and gender discrimination.
a. Indirect Evidence
Milrose's contention that Papalia was demoted because she failed to retain a No. 2 partially rests on its argument that in August 2008 Papalia effectively abandoned pursuit of this goal by inappropriately delegating the task to the soon-to-be-hired Director of Human Resources. A rational juror could find evidence of pretext in this explanation, however, because both Milo and Chieco have said that they expected that Jordan, who was shortly thereafter hired, would be significantly involved in assisting Papalia with the search for a candidate. Moreover, Chieco, who took issue with Papalia's delegation email in August 2008 does not appear to have at the time raised any concerns with her. Papalia also remained involved in the search process, interviewing (and rejecting) a candidate identified by Jordan.
Further, the central thrust of Milrose's rationale for demoting Papalia is that her failure to hire a No. 2 had adversely impacted the performance of the business over a prolonged period. See Milo Aff. ¶ 3 (in late 2007 "I was concerned about growing operational problems and client complaints and attributed the deterioration in the quality of Milrose's service to Papalia being stretched too thin in a rapidly growing business"). In proposing the split of Papalia's former position, Milrose states that it elected to pursue a different approach to addressing the acknowledged issue that the workload had expanded beyond the capacity of a single individual. A rational juror could question this explanation based on the evidence that during Kochiss's tenure as Director of Operations Milrose purportedly (i) intended to hire a Director of Administration and (ii) intended to hire a No. 2 for Kochiss. See Jordan Aff. ¶ 18; Chieco Tr. 178:13-17. These simultaneous aims confirm that Milrose believed that its leader of operations, whether styled as an Executive Director or Director, required management assistance but undermine Milrose's position in this litigation that "[it] decided that rather than continuing to search for a [No. 2] to work under Papalia, [it] would split [her] responsibilities" in order to solve the problem of her former position's excessive workload. Milo Aff. ¶ 7; Chieco ¶ 8. A rational juror could conclude that Milrose never wavered in its intention to engage a No. 2 in operations but simply preferred that Papalia not serve as the No. 1 (or for that matter the No. 2) and so articulated the splitting rationale as a pretext and sloughed her off to the position of Director of Administration, which it has never filled except briefly in connection with demoting Kochiss.
b. Direct Evidence
i. Age Discrimination
In addition to this indirect evidence that tends to impeach Milrose's nondiscriminatory reason, there is direct evidence, which if believed, would allow a rational juror to conclude that Papalia's age was a "but for" cause for her demotion. This direct evidence consists of comments that Milo and Chieco allegedly made during the period of Papalia's employment and that Milrose challenges to one degree or another as constituting nothing more than stray remarks. In deciding whether a remark is probative of discriminatory animus in connection with an adverse employment action, we consider four factors: "(1) who made the remark (i.e., a decision-maker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker); (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark (i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory); and (4) the context in which the remark was made (i.e., whether it was related to the decision-making process)." Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). While useful for assessing the sufficiency of an employee's evidence, the identification of a remark as "stray" does not mean that it should be wholly disregarded. See Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2007). "Although evidence of one stray comment by itself is usually not sufficient proof to show age discrimination, that stray comment may 'bear a more ominous significance' when considered within the totality of all the evidence." Carlton, 202 F.3d at 136 (quoting Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Papalia attributes several comments to Chieco. Papalia claims that at her review on February 5, 2009 Chieco told her that Milrose needed young and fresh professionals, a comment that he denies. In addition, Papalia has testified that Chieco expressed his surprise that she would not welcome reduced responsibilities and conveyed his understanding that she was tired. Milrose argues that these alleged comments "do not reflect discriminatory animus or are, at worst, ambiguous as to their discriminatory meaning." Def.'s Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 4 n. 5. The context of these comments is significant. Chieco, together with Milo, made the decision to demote Papalia and his alleged comments were made during Papalia's reassignment. Further, a rational juror who credited Papalia's testimony could find that the comments reflected an age animus. See Tomassi, 478 F.3d at 113 (reversing grant of summary judgment where sixty-three year old employee testified that her employer had said when discharging her that "I figure[d] . . . you probably didn't want to work long hours any more and you would be happier doing something part-time").
These alleged comments at the time of Papalia's demotion must also be considered in the context of additional testimony from Milo and Chieco that reflects a philosophy of aligning the personnel of Milrose on an ongoing basis with younger generations of employees at its clients for the purpose of more naturally developing business relationships. Their testimony regarding this philosophy was elicited in connection with the statement that Milo made in 2005 regarding the "need to hire a male within the age of 30 to 35 to assist us in client management and marketing." Palmieri Affirm Ex. X. While this stray remark is itself of little relevance to this case, Chieco's statement in explanation of Milo's remark appears to indicate his current sentiment and willingness to make employment decisions based on age. While Papalia does not appear to have regularly interacted directly with clients, Chieco's perspective is still probative of whether he made the comments that Papalia alleges and also whether he did so with discriminatory animus.
In sum, the alleged comments and explanatory statements, together with other stray remarks, see, e.g., Papalia Tr. 46:9-12 ("[Milo] often said in front of others, women my age . . . usually want a little job in Long Island"), and the fact that Kochiss was younger than Papalia could in their totality support a finding that age was the "but for" cause of Papalia's demotion. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied on the claim of age discrimination. Though we find that Papalia succeeds in defeating Milrose's summary judgment motion, the parties should not interpret this finding as in any way reflecting an appraisal of her claim on the merits.
ii. Gender Discrimination
Moving to the claim of gender discrimination, there were no comments made in the immediate context of Papalia's demotion that suggest gender as opposed to age animus. However, one year prior to Papalia's demotion, DiRenzo documented an episode in which Milo revealed active hostility toward women serving in key positions, which a rational juror could find encompassed the position of Executive Director of Operations to whom dozens of employees reported. Though uttered over twelve months prior to the demotion, Milo's statements evidence sexism in the context of employment decisions relating to positions of importance and are therefore probative of the argument that Papalia's replacement by a man was not coincidental but rather motivated by discriminatory intent. The number of other gender-related comments that Papalia attributes to Milo all exist somewhere further along the spectrum toward stray remarks but are in many cases tied to the employment context and thus contribute to the totality of the evidence. While Milo denies making all but one of these comments, which exception is documented in a writing attributable to him, his denials simply demonstrate that a dispute as to material facts exists.
While the evidence of gender discrimination is more remote from the decision to demote Papalia than that relating to age discrimination, the evidentiary burden is also proportionately reduced. A rational juror could conclude that gender was a motivating factor in Papalia's demotion. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied on the claim of gender discrimination. Though we find that Papalia succeeds in defeating Milrose's summary judgment motion, we emphasize again that the parties should not interpret this finding as in any way reflecting an appraisal of her claim on the merits.
C. Jury Service Claim
In addition to alleging age and gender discrimination, Papalia also claims violation of the JSIA, which provides in relevant part: "[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee by reason of such employee's jury service." 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a). Though there is little case law interpreting the JSIA, as Judge Cote recently observed, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), the Supreme Court "considered a similarly worded provision of the [ADEA]." Arnold v. Beth Abraham Health Servs., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 7932 (DLC), 2011 WL 2416877, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2011). Finding that the term "because of" in the relevant provision of the ADEA means "by reason of" or "on account of," the Supreme Court held that employees suing under the ADEA must establish that their age was the "but for" cause of the adverse employment action. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350-51. We agree with the reasoning in Arnold that in light of Gross the term "by reason of" in the JSIA should be interpreted to require "but for" cause. See also Williams v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding JSIA requires "but for" cause per Gross).
Papalia asserts that on two instances Milrose retaliated against her for her jury service: (i) when her sales bonus was reduced in December 2007 and (ii) when she was demoted in February 2009. See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Opp'n") 21-23. We again agree with the approach in Arnold of analyzing employment discrimination claims under the JSIA through the framework of McDonnell Douglas. See 2011 WL 2416877, at 3-4. Given the post hoc nature of Papalia's jury service claim, we further find it useful to analogize to retaliation claims under the ADEA and Title VII, which require that "[t]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she participated in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between her protected activity and her adverse employment action." Dixon v. Int'l Fed'n of Accountants, 416 Fed. Appx. 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 110). We note that the JSIA, unlike the ADEA and Title VII, however, does not reach adverse employment action in general, instead only prohibiting employers from "discharge[ing], threaten[ing] to discharge, intimidat[ing], or coerc[ing]" employees because of their jury service. 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a). Papalia fails to establish a prima facie case on either of the two bases that she offers in support of her jury service claim.
As to the reduction of her sales bonus, Papalia raises no fact aside from temporal proximity to link Milrose's compensation decision to her jury service and the hostility that she faced from the partners. It appears that Papalia's jury service ended on or about September 26, 2007 and that her sales bonus was reduced on or about December 12, 2007. See Papalia Exs. 35, 44. Again, in the parallel context of retaliation claims under the ADEA and Title VII, "[t]o the extent [an employee] relies on the temporal proximity [of four months] between . . . two events as circumstantial evidence of causation, that, standing alone, is insufficient" to establish a prima facie case. Dixon, 416 Fed. Appx. at 110. Even assuming that the slightly less than three months that elapsed in this case is short enough to sustain a causal nexus inference, Papalia still fails to make out a prima facie case because the reduction in sales bonus when placed in context does not raise an inference of intimidation or coercion. The reduction of Papalia's sales bonus was accompanied by an increase in her base salary yielding an overall increase in her compensation of over $10,000 in 2008 as against 2007. See Def.'s R. 56.1 ¶¶ 77, 79, 81. In addition, in September 2006, amidst her jury service, Papalia received a promotion and a significant pay increase. See id. at ¶ 46. This perspective on Milrose's relevant compensation decisions convinces us that the reduction in sales bonus cannot be reasonably viewed as an intimidating or coercive measure. Cf. United States v. Adamita, 701 F. Supp. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding the "infliction of economic hardship upon a juror after she has been selected and in deviation from her employer's previously established policy has a tendency to coerce and intimidate the juror" under the JSIA).
As to her demotion, Papalia argues that we should not attempt to trace a causal connection from her jury service itself, which concluded over sixteen months before she was demoted, but rather consider the closely proximate discovery of the memorandum in her personnel file as the "but for" cause for Milrose's retaliation. Papalia advances an argument of statutory interpretation, insisting that the JSIA should be read to protect an employee for "having documented a complaint concerning harassment during jury service--harassment that [she alleges] itself violated the JSIA." Opp'n 23. The text of the JSIA, which addresses retaliation "by reason of [an] employee's jury service," simply does not support this argument. Considering the issue through again the lens of retaliation claims under the ADEA and Title VII, Papalia cannot establish a prima facie case because she claims that the alleged retaliation responded to activity that is not statutorily protected.
Papalia is unable to establish even a prima facie case that the JSIA was violated. Accordingly, Milrose's motion for summary judgment is granted on the jury service claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Milrose's motion for summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part. The parties themselves and their counsel are directed to appear for a conference on January 23, 2012 at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom 21A. Dated: New York, New York
December 28, 2011
/s/_________
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Copies of the foregoing Memorandum and Order have been mailed on this date to the following: Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Christine A. Palmieri, Esq.
Liddle & Robinson, LLP
800 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022 Attorneys for Defendant:
Roger H. Briton, Esq.
Jackson Lewis LLP
58 South Service Road, Suite 410
Melville, NY 11747