Opinion
April 13, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ramirez, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration or a limitation by express agreement, employment by a private employer is presumed to be at will, and terminable by either party at any time (see, Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333; Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304-305). Courts will not infer a contractual limitation on the employer's right to terminate at-will employment absent an express agreement to that effect which is relied upon by the employee (Diskin v Consolidated Edison Co., 135 A.D.2d 775, 777; see, Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc., supra). In the instant case, the complaint failed to allege circumstances establishing anything other than an at-will employment relationship. Neither oral assurances made to the plaintiff nor a general provision in an employee manual were sufficient to limit the defendants' right to discharge the plaintiff at any time, for any reason (see, Diskin v Consolidated Edison Co., supra; see also, Sabetay v Sterling Drug, supra; Marvin v Kent Nursing Home, 153 A.D.2d 553; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., supra; Dickstein v Del Labs., 145 A.D.2d 408).
Moreover, although the employer was subject to State and local regulation and funding, its action in discharging the plaintiff did not constitute the requisite "State action" necessary to invoke due process protections (see, Gould v Community Health Plan, 99 A.D.2d 479; Matter of Smallwood v Warren, 50 A.D.2d 598; see generally, Blum v Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991; Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152; Fried v Straussman, 41 N.Y.2d 376). Thus, the plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed in its entirety. Bracken, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and O'Brien, JJ., concur.