Opinion
June 9, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Pooler, J.
Present — Denman, P.J., Pine, Wesley, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: In this action to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident, plaintiff appeals from an order that granted the motion of defendants Romano Toyota Limited, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., and Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota defendants) for partial summary judgment. In granting the motion, the court dismissed the complaint insofar as it alleged causes of action based on Toyota's failure to equip plaintiff's car with an airbag. The court held that the "no airbag" claims are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.).
Read together, the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as amended from time to time, embody Congress' clear intent to allow but not require the installation of airbags in passenger cars until 1996 at the earliest (see, 15 U.S.C. § 1391; § 1392 [a]; § 1410b [b] [2], [3]; Pub L 102-240, § 2508 [a], [b]; Pub L 103-272, § 1 [e]; 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.1.4.1). The Act's preemption clause provides that no "State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard" (15 U.S.C. § 1392 [d]). We thus conclude that plaintiff's attempt to impose liability on the Toyota defendants for their failure to equip plaintiff's vehicle with an airbag is expressly preempted by the Act. The State "standard" that plaintiff seeks to impose would not be "identical" to an existing Federal standard that does not require airbags (see, Estate of Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 856 F. Supp. 574, 577; Boyle v. Chrysler Corp., 177 Wis.2d 207, 213, 218-219, 501 N.W.2d 865, 867, 869-870, review denied 510 N.W.2d 137; Miranda v. Fridman, 276 N.J. Super. 20, 647 A.2d 167, certification denied 138 N.J. 271, 649 A.2d 1291).
Similarly, plaintiff's airbag claims are barred under the doctrine of implied preemption (see, Gills v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F. Supp. 894; Wilson v. Pleasant, 645 N.E.2d 638 [Ind App]; Boyle v. Chrysler Corp., 177 Wis.2d, supra, at 219-220, 501 N.W.2d, supra, at 870-871; Marrs v. Ford Motor Co., 852 S.W.2d 570 [Tex App]). The Federal regulatory scheme governing passenger restraints is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" (Rice v. Santa Fe El. Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230). Further, the matter is one in which the "federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject" (Rice v. Santa Fe El. Corp., supra, at 230). Finally, we conclude that a State standard imposing liability upon a manufacturer for not installing airbags would conflict with and frustrate the Federal policy of allowing manufacturers leeway in the decision whether to install airbags (see, CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-664; Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Commn., 461 U.S. 190, 204; see also, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79).
We have considered plaintiff's contentions concerning the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group ( 505 U.S. 504) and conclude that they are without merit (see, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 US ___, 115 S Ct 1483).