Opinion
Case No. 2:99-CV-00147PGC.
September 22, 2004
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION ON THE 1ST, 2ND, AND 3RD CLAIMS FOR RELIEF.
The court DENIES plaintiff's motion for class certification (#277-1). Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), classes are to be certified "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action. . . ." While this rule is a limitation on the court, "the policy of Rule 23(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [is] that the status of class actions should be determined quickly." Thus, in McCarthy v. Kleindienst, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely on untimeliness as a reason for rejecting a motion for class certification. The district court had found that certifying a class at the late stage of the litigation would require further delay and additional discovery. The D.C. Circuit reasoned:
Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding district court denial of motion for class certification as untimely) vacated mem. 458 U.S. 1118 (U.S. 1982); see also, Coffin v. Sec. of Health, Ed., and Welfare, 400 F.Supp. 953, 956-57 (D.C.D.C. 1975) (denying motion for class certification as untimely).
741 F.2d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In our view, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1) . . . rest[s] upon at least two fundamental policies. The first is that defendants are entitled to ascertain at the earliest practicable moment whether they will be facing a limited number of known, identifiable plaintiffs or whether they will instead be facing a much larger mass of generally unknown plaintiffs. Fundamental fairness, as well as the orderly administration of justice requires that defendants haled into court not remain indefinitely uncertain as to the bedrock litigation fact of the number of individuals or parties to whom they may ultimately be held liable for money damages . . . Second, these rules foster the interests of judicial efficiency, as well as the interests of the parties, by encouraging courts to proceed to the merits of a controversy as soon as practicable. That, at bottom, is a matter of simple justice. As previously described, plaintiffs' three-year delay in moving for class certification indisputably thwarted these policies.
Id. at 1412.
It is true that in McCarthy the court was dealing with a local rule governing the timeliness of motions for class certification. However, the absence of a local rule in this case does not change the policy of Rule 23(c)(1).
In Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., a case out of the Southern District of New York, the court rejected a motion for class certification as untimely where it was filed nine months after the second amended complaint. The court noted that the purpose of 23(c)(1) was "to ensure that `the parties may take the existence of class claims into account as they conduct the litigation.'" "`[F]undamental fairness requires that a defendant named in a suit be told promptly the number of parties to whom it may ultimately be liable.'" The Second Circuit remanded the case on other grounds but "agree[d] with the district court that the motion was untimely. . . ."
1998 WL 812045 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. ( quoting Owens v. Morgan Stanley Co., Inc., 1997 WL 793004 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1997)).
Cruz, 1998 WL 812045 ( quoting Siskind v. Sperry Retirement Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Complaint in this case was filed on March 8, 1999 — more than five years ago. Discovery cutoff passed on July 30, 2004. The motions cutoff deadline passed the day the motion for class certification was filed. A two-week jury trial is scheduled to begin on November 29, 2004. In other words, after more than five years of litigation and with trial a little more than two months away, the plaintiffs now seek class certification. The motion is untimely. Certifying a class at this point would require reopening discovery and resetting the motions cutoff date so that defendants could depose class members and potentially challenge inclusion of parties in the class. Class certification would also require putting off a two-week trial while the court attempted to locate and give notice to class members. Perhaps most importantly, the failure to move for class certification early in the case "bears strongly on the adequacy of the representation that those class members might expect to receive."
East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).
"[A] party's failure to move for class certification until a late date is a valid reason for denial of such a motion." The court therefore DENIES the motion for class certification (#277-1).
Sterling v. Environmental Control Bd. of City of New York, 793 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1986) ( citing Green v. Philbrook, 576 F.2d 440, 446 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding denial of motion for certification as untimely)).