Opinion
2014-11-19
Frank PALLADINO, appellant, v. Debra McCORMICK, respondent.
Brodsky & Peck, Harrison, N.Y. (Robert A. Brodsky of counsel), for appellant. Aldo V. Vitagliano, P.C., Rye, N.Y. (Phillip A. Grimaldi, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.
Brodsky & Peck, Harrison, N.Y. (Robert A. Brodsky of counsel), for appellant. Aldo V. Vitagliano, P.C., Rye, N.Y. (Phillip A. Grimaldi, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to set aside a deed conveying real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Smith, J.), dated January 2, 2013, which granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the plaintiff's case at a nonjury trial, for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a new trial before a different Justice.
“ ‘A trial court's grant of a CPLR 4401 motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where the trial court finds that, upon the evidence presented, there is no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party’ ” (Clarke v. Phillips, 112 A.D.3d 872, 874, 978 N.Y.S.2d 281, quoting Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346; see Sargiss v. Magarelli, 115 A.D.3d 842, 982 N.Y.S.2d 362). “ ‘In considering the motion, the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may be properly drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant’ ” (Clarke v. Phillips, 112 A.D.3d at 874, 978 N.Y.S.2d 281, quoting Miller v. Bah, 74 A.D.3d 761, 763, 902 N.Y.S.2d 174; see Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d at 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346; see Sargiss v. Magarelli, 115 A.D.3d at 842, 982 N.Y.S.2d 362).
The burden of proving undue influence generally rests with the party asserting its existence ( see Matter of Walther, 6 N.Y.2d 49, 53–54, 188 N.Y.S.2d 168, 159 N.E.2d 665; Matter of DelGatto, 98 A.D.3d 975, 977, 950 N.Y.S.2d 738; Matter of Caruso, 70 A.D.3d 937, 938, 895 N.Y.S.2d 481). “However, where there is a confidential relationship between the beneficiary and the grantor, ‘[a]n inference of undue influence’ arises which requires the beneficiary to come forward with an explanation of the circumstances of the transaction” (Matter of DelGatto, 98 A.D.3d at 978, 950 N.Y.S.2d 738, quoting Matter of Neenan, 35 A.D.3d 475, 476, 827 N.Y.S.2d 164; see Matter of Bach, 133 A.D.2d 455, 456, 519 N.Y.S.2d 670; Matter of Collins, 124 A.D.2d 48, 54, 510 N.Y.S.2d 940; see also Matter of Henderson, 80 N.Y.2d 388, 391, 590 N.Y.S.2d 836, 605 N.E.2d 323). “In the absence of an explanation, the beneficiary has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair and free from undue influence” (Matter of DelGatto, 98 A.D.3d at 978, 950 N.Y.S.2d 738; see Matter of Gordon v. Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 N.Y.2d 692, 698, 412 N.Y.S.2d 593, 385 N.E.2d 285; Hearst v. Hearst, 50 A.D.3d 959, 962, 857 N.Y.S.2d 596; Sepulveda v. Aviles, 308 A.D.2d 1, 11, 762 N.Y.S.2d 358; Matter of Connelly, 193 A.D.2d 602, 603, 597 N.Y.S.2d 427).
Here, in granting the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, the Supreme Court improperly resolved issues of the credibility of the witnesses against the plaintiff ( see Crowley v. Brown, 91 A.D.2d 601, 601, 456 N.Y.S.2d 432). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolving all issues of credibility in the plaintiff's favor, we find that the plaintiff established, prima facie, that a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the defendant, requiring the defendant to come forth with an explanation of the circumstances of the transaction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the plaintiff's case, for judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we reverse the order appealed from, deny the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a new trial before a different Justice ( see e.g. Pipelias v. City of New York, 99 A.D.3d 685, 685–686, 952 N.Y.S.2d 87).