Opinion
CV-23-00141-TUC-JAS (BGM)
11-30-2023
William Pait, Petitioner, v. Mark Gutierrez, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HONORABLE BRUCE G. MACDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On March 23, 2023, Petitioner William Pait, who is currently incarcerated with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) and housed at the United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona (USP-Tucson), filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody. (Doc. 1.) Pait raises one ground for relief in his petition, requesting that the Bureau's policy on the collection of court-ordered fines be amended to treat fine collection like the collection of restitution under Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2012). (Id. at 5.) The petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 5 at 3.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the petition and dismiss with prejudice this case.
Pait includes an incognizable exhaustion argument under Ground One of his habeas petition. (See Doc. 1 at 4); Garcia-Cortez v. Sanders, No. SACV 11-1554-CJC MAN, 2013 WL 2417973, at *13 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2013) (ruling that the petitioner's contention that he was prevented from filing a timely administrative appeal was relevant to whether he exhausted administrative remedies, but that it did not constitute an independent basis for federal habeas relief). As such, the Court interprets Pait's Ground One as an argument toward administrative exhaustion and not an independent basis for habeas relief.
BACKGROUND
On September 3, 2013, after pleading guilty to one count of production of child pornography, William Pait was sentenced by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to fifty years' incarceration (600 months), lifelong supervised release, a $100 assessment and a $5,000 fine. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Pait, No. 5:12-cr-187-FL-1 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 3, 2013), ECF No. 54. The court declined to order restitution and instructed that payment of the fine and special assessment were to be “due in full immediately.” Id. at 6-7.
On March 11, 2014, Pait began making $25 quarterly payments toward his $100 assessment, which he completed approximately nine months later. (Doc. 9-1 at 35.) On December 10, 2019, Pait began making $25 quarterly payments toward his $5,000 fine. (Id. at 36.) However, Pait's two most recent quarterly payments were $163.30 and $27.25, respectively, which were calculated by the Bureau based partially upon the last six months of deposits into Pait's inmate's account. (Id. ¶ 11 at 4; see also id. at 25.) At the time of the Government's response, the balance of Pait's fine was $4,009.45. (Id. ¶ 10.)
On March 23, 2023, Pait filed the petition at hand. (Doc. 1.) On September 5, 2023, the Government filed its return and answer. (Doc. 9.) Pait failed to file an optional reply. This Report and Recommendation follows.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner is in custody in “violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence are filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution are brought under § 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and courts within its jurisdiction, have repeatedly maintained subject matter jurisdiction over § 2241 petitions concerning the Bureau's collection of restitution or fines. See, e.g., Ward, 678 F.3d at 1050 (reversing district court's denial of inmate's § 2241 petition and ruling that the sentencing court's restitution order was unlawful because it ordered immediate payment of restitution but failed to include a restitution payment schedule); United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing in part the district court's denial of inmate's § 2241 petition and ruling that where the sentencing court properly sets a restitution payment schedule, the Bureau has the authority to encourage voluntary payments in excess of that schedule); Fultz v. Martinez, No. CV-14-02293-TUC-CKJ (BGM), 2017 WL 2579055, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-14-02293-TUC-CKJ, 2017 WL 2573178 (D. Ariz. June 14, 2017) (denying inmate's § 2241 petition and ruling that the Bureau had the authority to request restitution payments in excess of the sentencing court's payment schedule). A § 2241 habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to federal law, and he must satisfy his burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
Pait files the petition at hand challenging the Bureau's policy on the collection of court-ordered fines. (See Doc. 1.) Pait specifically argues that the Bureau's policy, via its policy statement, should treat the collection of court-ordered fines like the collection of court-ordered restitution under Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045-50, and sections 3664 and 3613 of the federal criminal code. (Id. at 5.) The Government argues that the petition should be denied because the Bureau is entitled to set a payment schedule for court-ordered fines and Pait failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. (Doc. 9 at 4-8.) While futility may shield Pait from the prudential exhaustion requirement, his petition fails on the merits since controlling caselaw holds that Ward only applies to court-ordered restitution and more than a handful of courts within the Ninth Circuit have considered, and rejected, arguments similar to Pait's. The Court begins its analysis with the exhaustion requirement and then addresses the merits of Pait's petition.
Presumably, if the Bureau complied with Pait's request, it would amend its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) and Pait would no longer owe $4009.45 in fines because the federal sentencing court failed to include a payment schedule for fines in its restitution order. (See Doc. 9-1 at 19-38 (outlining IFRP)).
I. Administrative Exhaustion Doctrine
Before a court considers the merits of a § 2241 habeas petition, it must address administrative exhaustion. Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045. Under the administrative exhaustion doctrine, the petitioner must exhaust all available judicial and administrative remedies, unless waived by the court. Id. For § 2241 habeas claims, the exhaustion requirement is prudential, not jurisdictional. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). As such, courts may waive the exhaustion requirement if “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Where a petitioner's claim is denied based on official Bureau policy, exhaustion of administrative remedies is futile. Ward, 678 at 1046; Fraley, 1 F.3d at 925; Sours v. Chavez, No. CV08-1903-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 2714028, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2009); see also Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2004) (reiterating that exhaustion is futile when the agency's position on the issue appears “already set” and is unlikely to change).
A. Exhaustion Futile
Pait argues that under Ward and Carr v. Saul, 141 S.Ct. 1352 (2021), it would be futile to attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies because his petition challenges an official Bureau policy. (See Doc. 1 at 3-6.) To support his argument, Pait attaches a copy of his March 13, 2023 request to staff in which he argues that the Bureau lacks the authority to collect payment on his court-ordered fine because the sentencing court failed to include an enforceable schedule of payments. (See Doc. 1-1 at 1.) The staff member's response states that “Ward v. Chavez qualifies for only restitution,” and that the request is denied. (Id.) This justification is similar to the Bureau's response in a Declaration attached to the Government's answer. (See Doc. 9-1, ¶ 14 at 4.) In the declaration, case manager Diaz states that Pait was not ordered to pay restitution, that he was instead ordered to pay a $100 assessment and a $5,000 fine, and that his obligations have not been reviewed pursuant to Ward. (Id. ¶ 14.)
While the Government's argument that Pait failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit is well taken, the Ninth Circuit has not required exhaustion under nearly identical circumstances. See, e.g., Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045-46 (reversing the district court on exhaustion and ruling that the court “erred in not waiving the exhaustion requirement, as [the petitioner's] exhaustion of his administrative remedies would have been futile”); Fraley, 1 F.3d at 925 (affirming district court order finding exhaustion of administrative remedies futile where federal inmate filed only a “Request for Administrative Remedy” prior to filing his § 2241 petition). Even if Pait went through the Bureau's administrative review process, the agency's position on the issue appears unlikely to change from the consistent denials provided here. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Pait's exhaustion requirement be waived as futile and that the Government's request that his petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be denied.
The Government argues that exhaustion would not be futile because the “Bureau's approach to restitution orders in the Ninth Circuit is a case-by-case evaluation based on individualized review, rather than strict reliance on Bureau policy,” but this assertion is belied by the Bureau's contrary responses to Pait's inquiries at his facility and to this Court. (See Docs. 1-1 at 1; 9-1, ¶¶ 12-14.)
II. Caselaw and Statute Misinterpretation
While the Court recommends that Pait's exhaustion requirement be waived, it concludes that Pait fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas relief. Pait misinterprets Ward by applying it to court-ordered fines, and the statutes he cites fail to support his request that the Bureau amend its policy to preclude fine collection when the sentencing court orders immediate payment but omits a payment schedule for fines.
In Ward, the Ninth Circuit held that “that where the sentencing court has failed to consider whether the defendant has the financial resources to pay restitution immediately, ordering immediate payment impermissibly delegates to the BOP the court's obligation to set a payment schedule.” 678 F.3d at 1044 (emphasis added). The court went on to describe the parameters of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664, and reiterate that it is the sentencing court's responsibility to set the restitution payment schedule, which is a “non-delegable” task. Id. at 1046.
While the MVRA mandates that the sentencing court specify the “the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid,” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (emphasis added), the Act does not apply to the imposition of court-ordered fines. See United States v. Gunning, 401 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) (Gunning II) (ruling that § 3664(f)(2) “does not speak to fines at all”). Rather, it is 18 U.S.C. § 3572 that regulates how a sentencing court imposes a fine. See United States v. Eureka Lab'ys, Inc., 103 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A sentencing court is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3572 to consider several factors when deciding whether to impose a fine and in what amount.”). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. 3613, one of two statues that Pait references in his request to amend Bureau policy, (see Doc. 1 at 5), broadens the government's ability to enforce criminal monetary judgments as opposed to curtailing it. In re Partida, 862 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2017). Finally, a number of courts within this circuit have ruled that Ward does not preclude the Bureau from collecting or setting a payment schedule for court-ordered fines. As such, Pait fails to demonstrate a viable avenue for habeas relief, and the Court recommends that his petition be denied and this case dismissed.
In fact, Ward had nothing to do with fines. See 678 F.3d at 1044. Ward addressed an inmate's objection to the Bureau's collection of restitution where the sentencing court's restitution order mandated immediate payment but failed to include a restitution payment schedule as mandated by the MVRA. Id. at 1046. Ward's restitution order was limited to monetary penalties of a $1,000 assessment and $27,885 in restitution. Id. at 1044.
See, e.g., Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying § 2241 petition and ruling that Bureau may partially divert inmate's wages to pay court-ordered fine); Fitch v. Johnson, No. EDCV 16-700-DOC (KS), 2017 WL 1485525, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. EDCV 16700DOCKS, 2017 WL 1479409 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2017), affd, No. 17-55629, 2017 WL 9251834 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2017) (denying § 2241 petition and ruling that Ward concerned restitution, not fines, and hinged on the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) rather than 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)); Vondette v. Ives, No. CV 13-07351-DSF VBK, 2014 WL 657877, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014), affd sub nom. Vondette v. Fox, 615 F. App' x 445 (9th Cir. 2015) (denying § 2241 petition and ruling that “there is no legal bar to a sentencing court allowing the B[ureau] to determine a schedule for the collection of a fine”).
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court issue an order DENYING the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1) and DISMISSING with prejudice this case.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, and a party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted by the District Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-23-141-TUC-JAS.
Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of de novo review. The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties.