Opinion
Civil Action No. DKC 99-1877
August 31, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending before the court in this case alleging excessive force by police officers are two motions: a motion for summary judgment brought by the Defendants Prince George's County, Officers L. Craven, C. Harris, and C. Copeland and a motion to compel discovery brought by the Plaintiffs, Stephon Paige, et. al. The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the court shall GRANT the motion for summary judgment as to the federal claims and remand the state claims to state court.
The Motion to Compel Discovery shall be denied because Plaintiffs failed to comply with the discovery deadline. The discovery deadline in this case was October 29, 1999, and the plaintiffs served their request on October 20, 1999. Defendants have 30 days to produce documents after a request is made according to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the request was not made sufficiently early to allow Defendants adequate time to respond in compliance with the discovery deadline. Local Rule 104.2.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 31, 1998, at about 11:30p.m., Stephon Paige, who lives at 8910 Branchview Drive, prepared to walk his dog by opening the front door. The dog bounded through the front door and glass screen door onto the lawn. Mr. Paige stayed in the house to turn off the light, intending to follow his dog outside. Meanwhile, Officers L. Craven and C. Harris of the Prince George's County Police Department were in the street, after answering a domestic call at 8911 Branchview Drive.
According to Defendants, the Paige's dog, a 110-pound Rottweiler, charged them, left the family yard and entered the street near them. (Deposition of L. Craven at 12). By contrast, Plaintiffs maintain that the officers mistakenly believed the dog to be charging. Plaintiffs admit that the dog burst out of the house, but contend that the dog remained on the family compound during the entire incident. (Deposition of Stephon Paige at 52).
Officers Craven and Harris yelled for Mr. Paige to call his dog back, and then they opened fire, shooting several rounds from their service weapons. Mr. Paige attempted to call his dog back while ducking behind the screen door to avoid the bullets.
The officers contend that the dog was deterred from his charge by the initial bullets. Plaintiffs disagree, stating that the dog never went into the street because the dog was trained not to leave the family property. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that the dog would have stayed on the family property without the firing of the bullets.
Several of the rounds fired by the officers struck the Plaintiffs' home. One shattered the lower part of the glass screen door, and Stephon Paige sustained bleeding cuts to his legs from the shattered glass pieces. Bullet holes were found in the back bedroom, in the siding, and in the foyer of the Paige's house.
After the shooting, the officers approached Plaintiffs' home. Mr. Paige contends that Officer Craven accused him of letting the dog out on the officers. (Interrogatories of Stephon Paige, 2). Officer Craven maintains he questioned Mr. Paige as to why he let the dog out on the officers. Mrs. Paige responded to Officer Craven statement by calling him a "liar." She went on to tell the officers that they were "incompetent mother fuckers," and they could have killed her husband. (Interrogatories of Sandra Paige, 2).
Next, several other officers, including Officer Copeland, arrived to investigate the incident. Officer Copeland, a trainee, gave Mr. Paige a summons in lieu of an arrest for failure to restrain a dangerous dog.
On November 18, 1998, almost eight months after the incident and at the request of the assistant state's attorney, Officer Copeland swore out an application for statement of charges for Mr. Paige's failure to confine and restrain his dog. Mr. Paige received the court-issued arrest warrant and, as ordered, reported to be processed to the Sheriff's Office. Mr. Paige, then, went to trial in the District Court of Maryland on the charges of failure to restrain his dog and failure to confine his dog and was acquitted of both charges.
On March 24, 1999, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, alleging assault, battery, and reckless endangerment. The County and the officers filed motions to dismiss in the Circuit Court on April 20, 1999 and May 18, 1999. On June 11, 1999, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging five counts. Count I contains a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Paige family's federal constitutional rights. Count II alleges violations of Articles 19, 24, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Counts III, IV, and V allege supplemental state law claims: false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution. The case was thereafter removed to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Pulliam Inv. Co., Inc. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pulliam, 810 F.2d at 1286 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1998). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, on those issues on which the non moving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In Celotex, the Supreme Court stated:
In cases like the instant one, where the non moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be "made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the non moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. However, "`a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue.'" Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967)). There must be "sufficient evidence favoring the non moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. § 1983 Claims
1. Qualified Immunity
Defendants claim right to summary judgment by invoking the doctrine of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, public officials such as law enforcement officials, are not liable under federal law for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not contravene "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).A finding of qualified immunity depends on a "two-step analytical process." Doe v. Broderick, ___ F.3d ___, 99-1893 (4th Cir. 2000). First, a court must determine whether the plaintiff "has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right in the first place." Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Second, the court determines the defendant's "entitlement to qualified immunity or whether, because he ran afoul of clearly established constitutional rights, he is to be held personally accountable for his unlawful conduct." Id. The court only undertakes the analysis in step two if the plaintiffs have successfully established step one, the constitutional or statutory deprivation.
Plaintiffs maintain that their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to the police officers' use of force. Plaintiffs allege that Stephon Paige's subsequent arrest and answering of state charges served to constitute a seizure, making the force used at the outset an excessive force violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the police officers used the force to ward off the Plaintiffs' dog not to effect Plaintiffs' arrest. In order to allege a Fourth Amendment violation, Plaintiffs must establish that the police effected an unlawful "seizure" upon the plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that the police officers' actions "shock the conscience," thus, violating the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights.
It does not appear from the Amended Complaint and Plaintiff's Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment that Mr. Paige is asserting a separate Fourth Amendment violation based on the later arrest. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996). Rather, any such claim is made under Maryland common law, which will be remanded to state court.
a. FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment provides individuals the "right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. An individual is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an "officer uses physical force or a show of authority" to interfere with an individual's liberty interest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968).
"Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control." Brower v. Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). "The Fourth Amendment addresses `misuse of power' . . . not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct." Id. (quoting Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927). Thus, a Fourth Amendment violation does not occur simply when there is a governmentally caused interference with an individual's freedom of movement, but only where government termination of freedom of movement occurs "through means intentionally applied." Id. at 597.
In order to proceed, then, Plaintiffs must prove that the police intentionally fired at them in order to be able to show that they were "seized" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. In Rucker v. Harford County, Maryland, 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit denied a bystander, killed by police officers attempting to apprehend a fleeing criminal, Fourth Amendment protection because he was not the intended object of the police officer's act of physical restraint.
The key question in this case is whether the police officers were intentionally firing at Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that the fact that the officers' bullets hit their home proves that the officers were aiming at Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the police officers shot at Stephon Paige while he was standing at the glass screen door, and he was injured by the debris from the glass.
However, even in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs' own statements contradict the notion that the police officers were intentionally firing at them. Stephon Paige in his deposition stated that the officers were firing at the dog and he was in the background (Deposition of Stephon Paige at 26). Additionally, he criticized the officers for putting human lives at risk in order to shoot at a dog. ( Id. at 23-24). He also did not shut the door and go into the house to avoid the gunfire. ( Id. at 14). At no point did he openly accuse the police officers of aiming the bullets at him, nor did he profess a fear that the police officers were trying to kill him. It is not even clear that Mr. Paige saw the officers while they were shooting.
Sandra Paige, Stephon Paige's wife, also admitted that the officers were shooting at the dog. (Deposition of Sandra Paige at 8). She stated that she made no attempt to dodge bullets nor did she feel apprehension that she might be a target. ( Id. at 20). In addition, she did not even realize that some of the bullets had struck her house until she saw the evidence. ( Id. at 20).
Stephany Paige, Stephon and Sandra Paige's daughter, stated in her deposition that the she did not see any of the events of the night, and her knowledge is derived solely from her parents' accounts. (Deposition of Stephany Paige at 16). Thus, she does not provide any testimony supporting the idea that the police officers intentionally tried to shoot a member of the Paige family.
Based on the deposition testimony of the Paige family, which on this point is consistent with the officers, the police officers intended to shoot the Paige family dog and not the human members of the Paige family. Thus, no member of the Paige family has a viable Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force.
b. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Although "the Fourth Amendment's specific protections against unreasonable search and seizure of the person does not by definition extend to unintentionally injured bystanders," the substantive protections of the due process clause may apply in particular situations. Rucker, 946 F.2d at 281. A § 1983 claim alleging a violation of substantive due process can be made out only when the conduct alleged "shock[s] the judicial conscience." Temkin v. Frederick County Commissioners, 945 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth Circuit has further stated that "the state actor's conduct must amount to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience." Rucker, 946 F.2d at 281 (quoting Temkin v. Frederick County Commissioners, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991)).
The threshold to meet this test is very high. In Temkin, 945 F.2d at 718, a police officer in pursuit of a fleeing felon broadsided an innocent person's vehicle, severely and permanently injuring the driver. Key factors in Temkin included 1) the chase continued for a significant period of time over 10 miles; 2) the chase continued at a high rate of speed; 3) the chase was due to a minor violation; 4) the police already had a partial identification of the license plate; and 5) the chase violated the sheriff department's order because the officer failed to maintain radio contact throughout the chase. Id. The court stated that even though the "police officer's conduct may have been disturbing or even lacking in judgment, it did not meet the shocks the conscience standard." Id at 723.
In this case, the police officers together shot seven times at a 110 pound Rottweiler they perceived to be charging them. (One officer shot four times; the other, three.) The officers may have been mistaken or even held an unreasonable belief as to the intentions of the dog, but that does not transform the officers' response into a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power. Additionally, the police officers may have engaged in reckless behavior in attempting to shoot at the dog with Stephon Paige in the background. However, the police conduct still does not rise to the offensive and abusive level required to establish a substantive due process violation.
In order to defeat the police officers' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs must produce evidence of a specific constitutional right violated by Defendants' actions. Plaintiffs have not alleged viable Fourth Amendment or Substantive Due Process Claims. Thus, Defendants, Officer Craven, Officer Harris, and Officer Copeland, are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.
2. Prince George's County Police Department
Prince George's County is not liable under a § 1983 analysis because the police officers, the municipality's employees, did not violate a constitutional right of any plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not offer either evidence or arguments of Prince George's County liability pursuant to the § 1983 claims.
B. State Law Claims
Because summary judgment is being granted on the federal claims, the only remaining claims are state law claims. Remand of removed cases under such circumstances is the general rule. See Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). "[T]rial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished." Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1999). Moreover, "[t]here are no situations wherein a federal court must retain jurisdiction over a state law claim, which would not by itself support jurisdiction." Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the court shall GRANT the motion for summary judgment as to Count I, and will remand Counts II, III, IV, and V to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland.
A separate Order will be entered.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS this __ day of August, 2000, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED;
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED with respect to Count I and DENIED on the remaining counts;
3. JUDGMENT BE, and the same hereby IS, ENTERED in favor of Defendants, L. Craven, C. Harris, C. Copeland, and Prince George's County, and against plaintiffs, Stephon, Sandra, and Stephany Paige with respect to Count I;
4. This matter BE, and the same hereby IS, REMANDED to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County with respect to Counts II, III, IV, and V;
5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the Clerk will mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County; and
6. The clerk is directed to transmit a copy of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion to counsel for the parties and CLOSE this case.