Opinion
H050546
01-19-2024
BRANDON PAIGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HARVEST BLOOM, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV345680)
Greenwood, P. J.
Appellant Brandon Paige prevailed against respondents Harvest Bloom, Inc. and Alexander Gillis (collectively Harvest) in his appeal in the trial court from a Labor Commissioner award of unpaid wages. The trial court thereafter awarded attorney fees and costs to Paige in an amount lower than he requested. On appeal, Paige contends the trial court abused its discretion by reducing the number of attorney and paralegal hours that were compensable to Paige, and erred in denying his request for a 1.2 lodestar multiplier. Finding no error on appeal, we affirm the trial court's order.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Paige worked for Harvest, a mobile cannabis dispensary, as an on-site farm manager for seven months. Claiming that Harvest failed to pay overtime or agreed-upon additional compensation, Paige filed a claim with the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) for unpaid wages. In two separate orders-one against Harvest Bloom, Inc., the other against Gillis, Harvest Bloom's CEO-the Labor Commissioner awarded Paige a total of $11,775.78 in overtime wages, sick leave, and waiting time penalties.
Gillis appeared in propria persona at the attorney fees hearing in the trial court. Harvest Bloom, Inc.'s corporate status was suspended by the Franchise Tax Board before the de novo trial commenced in the trial court. This court notified Harvest Bloom, Inc., that it would not be permitted to appear without an attorney in this appeal. (See CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145.) Neither Harvest Bloom, Inc. nor Gillis filed respondent's briefs in this matter.
Paige appealed the DLSE order in the trial court. Following a de novo trial, the trial court awarded Paige $17,341.33 in "Labor Code section 1192 penalties[,]" "Unpaid Harvest Bonus[,]" "Interest on Unpaid Bonus[,]" "Labor Code section 203 Penalties on Bonus[,]" and "additional penalties under Labor Code section 226[.]"
In the request for attorney fees at issue in this appeal, Paige intimated that the trial resulted in a cumulative award of over $33,000. However, Harvest Bloom, Inc. and Gillis were jointly and severally liable for the bulk of the award, with the Labor Code section 226 penalties awarded against Harvest Bloom, Inc. alone. The trial court found Paige's suggestion that the award was cumulative to be "an improper characterization of the Court's prior findings and an attempt to mislead."
Paige thereafter sought $65,390.40 in attorney fees and $5,101.84 in costs pursuant to Labor Code sections 98.2, 1194, 1194.2, and 218.5. In support of the request, Paige contended that there were several delays in holding the de novo trial. He further contended that his attorney, Drew Lewis, litigated the case efficiently, serving one set of discovery and taking one deposition. Lewis filed one motion to compel further discovery responses, which the parties resolved before additional work was required. Lewis attempted to negotiate a settlement with Harvest's counsel, who indicated that Harvest was not "willing to" nor could discuss settlement at the time. In addition to Lewis, who charged $500 per hour, an "experienced law clerk" and a paralegal worked on Paige's case, at a rate of $225 per hour and $190 per hour, respectively. A second attorney, Jessica Hart, attended the trial with Lewis, at a rate of $395 per hour. The parties disclosed four witnesses and prepared a combined 35 exhibits. The trial lasted six hours over the course of two days. In total, Paige claimed Lewis and his staff spent 115.8 hours through the end of trial, and 142.1 hours in total, including post-judgment activity and the motion for attorney fees.
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise specified. Section 98.2 authorizes the appeal of the Labor Commissioner's award to the trial court, and provides that a party who unsuccessfully appeals such an award shall be charged the other party's attorney fees as a cost. (§ 98.2, subd. (c).) Sections 218.5 and 1194 authorize an award of attorney fees to a prevailing employee in actions for nonpayment of wages and overtime. Section 1194.2 governs recovery of liquidated damages.
Citing Serrano v. Priest (1978) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III), Paige argued that the requested attorney fees were reasonable under the lodestar-adjustment method. He contended that the hours expended by Lewis and his staff were reasonable, noting that Lewis's decision to use staff at a reduced rate reflected the efficiency of the litigation. Paige provided declarations from two Bay Area employment lawyers to support his claim that the hourly rate Lewis charged was within the market rate for comparably experienced attorneys. Finally, Paige argued that the trial court should apply a multiplier to the lodestar in recognition of the "exceptionally high" contingent risk in the case.
Paige supported this argument with a declaration indicating that he contacted between 12 and 18 attorneys to assist him with his DLSE claim. Only four or five were willing to speak with him. They told him they would not take his case on a contingency basis, and they were uncomfortable taking cases involving work in the cannabis industry. In his declaration, Lewis contended there were three risk factors that made the multiplier appropriate: the case was unappealing to a majority of attorneys because of the low" 'sticker value,'" there was a lack of documentary evidence supporting Paige's contentions regarding the hours he worked, and there was a risk any attorney fees would not be paid because of Harvest Bloom, Inc.'s, corporate status and "apparent solvency issues."
Harvest did not oppose the attorney fees motion. The trial court issued a tentative ruling, and Paige requested a hearing to contest the tentative ruling and to ask that the court address the request for a multiplier. Gillis represented himself at the hearing on the motion, which was held remotely by videoconferencing. The trial court granted the motion, but awarded only $13,137 in attorney fees and $4,384.38 in costs. While the court found Lewis's hourly rate to be reasonable for an attorney of his experience, it did not find that "the level of experience described by Mr. Lewis, or the participation of multiple professionals, was needed for the handling of this matter[,]" as it was a case involving one person working less than one "growing season . . . as the sole on-site employee of a cannabis farm." Based on Lewis's described experience, the court "expected that there would have been far less time (if any) need for trial preparation. Having considered the time and labor such an experienced attorney should have required, the lack of novelty of the questions involved, the customary charges of the bar for similar services [fn. omitted], the modest amount involved in the controversy, and the certainty of collecting an award (given that this was the Plaintiff's appeal of a Labor Commissioner Award in his favor)," the court awarded Paige 21.6 hours of attorney time at a rate of $500 per hour (6 hours for discovery, 6.3 hours for trial preparation, 6.3 hours for trial, and 3 hours for the attorney fees motion), and 12.3 hours of paralegal time at a rate of $190 per hour (3 hours to assist with discovery, 6.3 hours to assist with trial preparation, and 3 hours to assist with the attorney fees motion). In doing so, the court found "unpersuasive" the declarations Paige provided from other attorneys, as one attorney did not practice employment litigation, the other did not practice in Santa Clara County, and neither declaration lent "credible authority for the need for an attorney of Mr. Lewis' experience to pursue an appeal of a Labor Commissioner's award for unpaid overtime wages, sick leave (which was not disputed) and waiting time penalties."
The court reporter experienced "audio/technical" problems at the outset of the hearing. Thus, it is not clear from the transcript whether Gillis attempted to appear on behalf of Harvest Bloom, Inc., or otherwise addressed Harvest Bloom, Inc.'s status at the hearing.
Regarding the hours claimed by Paige, the court determined that the hours allegedly incurred were "inflated." While Paige sought 16.7 hours in total attorney time for the trial, the court determined that the trial was only 6.3 hours, "there was no substantive contribution at trial by more than one attorney per side," and the billing records included "inter-office conferences between billing professionals, recovery of which is not allowed." The court further found that Paige sought "recovery of fees in pursuit of needless and futile endeavors, such as a discovery motion that was filed, but not heard and was resolved by stipulation." It also found that Paige "spent considerable time and effort to advance claims that the Court found without merit, and which needlessly burdened the Court," noting that the court rejected his claims as to the amount of his annual salary, the contentions that he worked 24 hours per day, and his "attempt to avoid the applicability of the Agricultural Wage Order." The trial court had to perform its own calculations of the hours Paige worked and the amounts he was due because it "rejected entirely" Paige's proposed calculations. The court also rejected Paige's proposed judgment, drafting its own judgment instead.
The court found that a lodestar multiplier was not warranted under the circumstances of the case, which did not require the advancement of "novel or complex" legal theories. "[Paige's] recovery occurred despite the Court's rejection of the factual and legal bases of the claim. His claim does not aid the public generally or any person other than himself, as he is an individual Plaintiff and the only employee similarly-situated of a corporate employer that is no longer in operation." The court further found that "[t]here was no real risk of no recovery-as Plaintiff was appealing an award in his favor and achieved a result that was higher, primarily because the Court made an award for the unpaid portion of a bonus plus the interest thereon, which is an individual contract matter."
The trial court entered an amended judgment including its award of attorney fees and costs. Paige timely appealed from the attorney fees order and amended judgment.
II. Discussion
" '[T]he determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court ....[Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096 (PLCM Group).) Because an experienced trial judge is in the best position to determine the value of professional services rendered in the judge's court, we will not disturb the trial court's exercise of discretion unless we are" 'convinced [the award is] clearly wrong.' [Citation.]" (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) We will presume the order is correct, indulging all inferences and presumptions in support of the order. (Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Watkins (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1097 (Cavalry).)
However, "discretion must not be exercised whimsically, and reversal is appropriate where there is no reasonable basis for the ruling or the trial court has applied 'the wrong test' or standard in reaching its result. [Citation.]" (Nichols v. Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1239.) If there is a reasonable basis for the order, we will uphold the ruling even if" 'a contrary ruling would also be sustainable. We cannot substitute our own judgment.' [Citations.]" (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 428 (Harman).)
"[A] court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the 'careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.' (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 48.)" (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-1132 (Ketchum).) The court may then adjust the lodestar up or down based on a multiplier determined by consideration of a variety of factors. (See Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) Paige contends that the trial court erred in both its determination of the reasonable amount of time involved in the presentation of the case and its determination that a lodestar multiplier was not warranted in the matter.
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the hours reasonably spent on the matter.
Once the trial court determines the reasonable hourly rate of compensation, it calculates the lodestar by multiplying that rate by "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation...." (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1136.) There is no dispute that, "absent circumstances rendering the award unjust," Paige should be compensated for "all hours reasonably spent" by his attorneys in this action. (See Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.) The trial court has discretion to determine" 'which of the hours expended by the attorneys were "reasonably spent" on the litigation. . .' [Citation.]" (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 (Mikhaeilpoor).) The court must first "determine the actual time expended and then 'ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.' [Citation.] Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) The party seeking fees bears the burden of demonstrating that the fees were"' "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation," ....' [Citations.] It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, 'then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 248.)
1. The trial court considered proper factors in reducing the hours.
The trial court found that the hourly rate charged by Lewis was reasonable. The issue on appeal concerns the number of hours for which the court awarded compensation. Paige relies on Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677 (Hadley), to argue that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing the amount of time it considered reasonable in this matter. In Hadley, the trial court ordered a significantly reduced amount of contractual attorney fees and costs to the prevailing defendant upon hearing the plaintiff's motion to tax costs; it reduced the fees even lower than the plaintiff requested in the motion. (Id. at p. 681.) On appeal, the appellate court divided its review into two phases. First, it considered whether the plaintiff's motion to tax costs sufficiently rebutted the presumption that "the items on a verified cost bill are prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, and when they are properly challenged the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming them as costs." (Id. at p. 682.) This phase is not relevant to the instant appeal. In the second phase, the appellate court recognized that "[a] trial judge 'is entitled to take all of the circumstances [of the case] into account and is not bound by the itemization claimed in the attorney's affidavit.' [Citation.] Thus, in accordance with the principle an appellate court may exercise its independent judgment in determining whether there was an abuse of discretion [citation], we also apply [stated factors] to determine if there was any basis for the court's award." (Id. at p. 683.)
Ultimately, the Hadley court determined that the trial court failed to consider "essential factors" when it reduced the attorney fees award to the prevailing party to an amount that "[bore] no rational relationship to the amount of fees incurred ...." (Hadley, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 686.) The appellate court considered the nature and complexity of the litigation, the skill required and employed by the attorney, the success of the attorney's efforts, "the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed.' [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 682, 686.) After doing so, the court found, "The only explanation we can divine for the meager award is the trial judge's unrealistic view of what constitutes a reasonable value for legal services. An award of attorney fees and costs must be measured by the economics of the times. Currently, lawyers' minimum hourly rates far exceed their predecessors'. In days past the [amount awarded] may have been sufficient to defend a lawsuit of this nature; today it is not." (Id. at pp. 686-687.)
Here, we need not "divine" an explanation for the trial court's reduction in fees awarded to Paige. The court explained the factors it considered in determining the hours reasonably spent on the matter. It determined that the litigation was not complex or novel, and, given Lewis's level of experience, did not require the amount of preparation he claimed in his supporting declaration. Regarding the amount of attorney time claimed for the actual trial (16.7 hours between two attorneys, Lewis and Hart), the trial court found that only Lewis represented Paige at trial, and that there was "no substantive contribution at trial by more than one attorney per side." The trial court considered the success of the attorney's efforts, noting that Paige "spent considerable time and effort to advance claims that the Court found without merit, and which needlessly burdened the Court." Given the nature of the action, it found the complexity of Paige's attorney fees motion unnecessary. The motion "included references to fees charged for services in non-analogous circumstances (e.g. anti-Slapp motions), in cases involving multiple parties and institutional clients, in larger urban courts" and was supported by "unpersuasive" declarations from other attorneys that did not "lend any credible authority for the need for an attorney of Mr. Lewis'[s] experience to pursue" the appeal.
Paige argues that the trial court's "wholesale fee reduction shocks the conscience and demands the conclusion" that the trial court abused its discretion. The record does not include any evidence supporting a determination that this case required more than 6 hours of attorney time for discovery, 6.3 hours for trial preparation, and 6.3 hours for trial time. Paige did not designate for inclusion in the record any of the pleadings filed related to discovery or pre-trial preparation (such as trial briefs, motions in limine, etc.). He did not include in the record reporter's transcripts, settled statements, or minute orders reflecting the work performed in the trial, including any requests by the trial court for additional briefs or exhibits. Absent such evidence, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court-particularly when the judge who heard the attorney fees motion also heard the underlying trial-and must presume that the order is correct, as the trial court has set forth a reasonable basis for the order. (See Cavalry, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097; Harman, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 428; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447-448 (Vo).)
2. The trial court considered relevant public policy.
Nor has Paige demonstrated that the trial court "ignored California's strong public policy of compensating attorneys fully for representing plaintiffs in employment actions." "[T]he aim of fee-shifting statutes [like sections 218.5 and 1194] is 'to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific . . . laws. Hence, if plaintiffs . . . find it possible to engage a lawyer based on the statutory assurance that he will be paid a "reasonable fee," the purpose behind the fee-shifting statute has been satisfied.' (Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council (1986) 478 U.S. 546, 565 [106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439] [discussing federal Clean Air Act].)" (Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 583 (Flannery) [recognizing the "fundamental public policies embodied in" the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act].)
The trial court recognized the policy underlying the fee-shifting statutes at issue, albeit in its discussion of Paige's request for a multiplier (see § II.B., post), wherein it confirmed its consideration that parties like Paige might otherwise go unrepresented if attorneys did not take the case on a contingent basis pending an attorney fees award. Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court "ignored" the policy. Moreover, Paige misstates the discussion in Flannery. The policy behind fee-shifting statutes does not require "full" compensation to attorneys. Rather, it requires some assurance that attorneys taking such cases will be paid a "reasonable fee." (Flannery, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 583.) While the goal of the policy is undoubtedly that "full" compensation and "reasonable" compensation will be one and the same, these statutes do not require the trial court to order "full" compensation if it is not also "reasonable." Paige has not demonstrated, based on the record before this court, that the trial court erred in reducing the award to what it considered to be a reasonable amount.
Paige contends that the trial court's apparent reduction in the award based on its determination that some of the attorney's arguments proved meritless does demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Paige correctly states that a minimal or modest recovery on a plaintiff's wage claims does not preclude an award of attorney fees and that the trial court should not "strictly limit" compensation to only those efforts by counsel that are "demonstrably productive." (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 839.) However, the authority cited by Paige does not require us to find that the trial court abused its discretion to the extent it did preclude recovery of certain fees incurred for unsuccessful arguments. The trial court was allowed to consider the success of Lewis's efforts as one of several factors in determining how much time was reasonable in this matter. (Hadley, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d p. 682.) Based on the record before this court, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in considering potentially unsuccessful claims in making its evaluation, particularly without any evidence concerning the nature of those claims or the trial court's rulings thereon. (See Vo, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 447-448.)
3. The trial court did not err in its characterization of Paige's litigation activity.
Paige's failure to designate a sufficient record also precludes us from determining that the trial court erred in characterizing Lewis's efforts concerning pre-trial discovery and the post-trial attorney fees motion to be excessive. The record is devoid of information about the nature of the discovery disputes at issue in the matter. Thus, we must presume the trial court's determination that nine hours of combined attorney and paralegal time was reasonable to resolve the disputes. (See Vo, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 447-448.) Paige does not cite any legal or factual authority for his contention that the trial court erred in its determination of the reasonable time for the attorney fees motion.
4. Paige has not shown judicial bias or prejudice.
Paige argues that the trial court demonstrated bias and prejudice through several comments included in its order granting the attorney fees motion. He contends that the trial court's determination that Lewis's "significant level of expertise," as described in his declaration, led to an expectation that "there would have been far less time (if any) needed for trial preparation," "evince[d] an apparent, if not actual, bias against [Lewis]." Paige also claims that the trial court engaged in misconduct when it stated in the attorney fees order that Lewis's description of Paige's recovery in the action was an "improper characterization of the Court's prior findings and an attempt to mislead."
Paige relies on Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 994 (Haluck) in which the appellate court determined that the trial court engaged in numerous instances of misconduct that were "sufficiently egregious and pervasive that a reasonable person could doubt whether the trial was fair and impartial...." (Id. at p. 997.) But Haluck addresses the danger of a judge's unfavorable comments regarding counsel and the credibility of witnesses interfering with the jury's independent role as factfinder. Here, the trial court was the factfinder in both the underlying trial and the attorney fees motion.
Further, nothing in the trial court's comment here about Lewis's level of experience and the court's expectations "shocks the judicial instinct." The court's statement does not express bias or prejudice. Nor has Paige demonstrated that an average person would" 'entertain doubt whether the trial judge was impartial'" based on the statement. (Haluck, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009.) The court properly considered Lewis's experience relative to the nature of the case in determining what was a reasonable amount of time to allow. The judge's determination that Lewis mischaracterized the prior findings did not constitute misconduct under the circumstances.
B. Declining to Apply the 1.2 Lodestar Multiplier was not an Abuse of Discretion
Having discerned no error in the trial court's computation of the lodestar figure, we turn to the trial court's decision to deny Paige's request for a lodestar multiplier. The lodestar figure is the starting point of the attorney fees analysis, and the trial court may adjust it based on the following factors: "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award...." (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) "The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for a particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services." (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
"The economic rationale for fee enhancement in contingency cases has been explained as follows: 'A contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is higher because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of conventional loans.' [Citation.] 'A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.' [Citations.]" (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133.)
However, "the trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains the discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof. In each case, the trial court should consider . . . the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors under Serrano III. We emphasize that when determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar." (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138, italics in original.) Thus, a contingency adjustment "may be made at the lodestar phase of the court's calculation or by applying a multiplier to the noncontingency lodestar calculation (but not both). ([Ketchum,] at pp. 1133-1134.)" (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395 (Horsford).) We reiterate for purposes of this analysis that "[t]he' "experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [their] court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong."' [Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.]" (Ketchum, at p. 1132.)
Here the trial court denied Paige's request for a 1.2 lodestar multiplier, finding that he did not advance any novel or complex legal theories, he obtained recovery despite the court rejecting the legal and factual bases for his claims, his claims did not aid the public or anyone other than himself, and "[t]here was no real risk of no recovery...." Each of these determinations clearly relied on the pleadings and evidence presented before and during the trial of the matter-pleadings and evidence that are not part of the record on appeal. Where the trial court bases its determination of the application of a multiplier on the entire course of the litigation, it is implicit in the determination "that the trial judge considered the pleadings, theories of recovery under the complaint, and evidence as presented by counsel ....The record on appeal does not contain a copy of the pleadings, nor does it contain a trial transcript. The experienced and highly regarded judge who presided over this case was the best judge of what occurred in [the] courtroom." (Vo, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) The absence of the record precludes us from determining that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to apply a lodestar multiplier. (Id. at p. 448.)
Appellant argues that the trial court's order reflects "erroneous reasoning." "No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.... 'To justify a reversal, it is incumbent upon the appellant to show an erroneous ruling, and not merely bad reasoning or mistaken views of the law.' [Citations.] In other words, it is judicial action, and not judicial reasoning or argument, which is the subject of review; and, if the former be correct, we are not concerned with the faults of the latter." (Davey v. Southern Pac. Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329-330; accord People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18.) By failing to designate a sufficient record, Paige has not demonstrated an erroneous ruling. Thus, we cannot justify reversing the trial court's order.
III. Disposition
The September 1, 2022 attorney fees order and amended judgment are affirmed. In the interests of justice, no costs are awarded on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, J. Wilson, J.