Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SC090708, Jacqueline Connor, Judge. Affirmed.
Girardi and Keese, Thomas V. Girardi, Christopher T. Aumais and Shahram A. Shayesteh for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Soltman, Levitt & Flaherty, John S. Levitt and Philip J. Bonoli for Defendant and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Belinda Padilla filed negligence and premises liability causes of action against defendant and respondent The Sports Club Company. Her complaint alleged that a pedal broke on a spin bicycle during a class, resulting in serious injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of The Sports Club based upon the waiver and release of liability agreed to by Padilla in her membership contract. Padilla timely appeals from the judgment entered in favor of The Sports Club.
The issues on appeal involve the validity of a waiver and release signed by Padilla in her membership contract with The Sports Club. Padilla argues the waiver and release were ambiguous and did not expressly exclude liability for injury due to malfunctioning equipment. She also argues there are triable issues of fact relating to assumption of the risk. We hold the waiver was not ambiguous, it eliminated any issue of implied assumption of the risk, and was in accord with a consistent line of cases upholding the summary judgment in favor of The Sports Club.
The Terms of the Contract
It is undisputed that Padilla signed a contract with The Sports Club containing the following provision.
“Release, Waiver of Liability and Indemnification Agreement. You . . . represent and agree as follows: (a) that you understand that the use of the Club’s facilities, equipment, services, programs and premises includes an inherent risk of injury to persons and property; . . . You understand that risk of injuries includes, but is not limited to, injuries arising from or relating to the use by you . . . of exercise equipment and machines . . .; injuries arising from or relating to participation by you or others in supervised and unsupervised activities or programs throughout the Club; injuries and medical disorders arising from or relating to the use of the Club’s facilities such as heart attack, stroke, death, heat stress, sprains, strains, broken bones, and torn muscles, tendons and ligaments among others; and accidental injuries occurring anywhere in the Club, including . . . exercise areas . . . . Accidental injuries include those caused by you, those caused by other persons and those of a slip and fall nature. . . . You hereby agree that all exercises and use of Club facilities, equipment and services, programs and premises are undertaken by you at your sole risk. By your execution hereof, you hereby waive all claims which you or any dependent may have hereafter against the Club, and do hereby release the Club on your behalf . . . and agree to hold the Club absolutely harmless from all claims, demands, injuries, damages, actions, suits, or causes of action to persons or property, arising out of or in anyway connected with you or your dependent’s use of the Club facilities, premises, equipment, services or programs, including those arising out of any such active or passive negligent act or omission of the Club, expect as to such which may arise from the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the Club. You do hereby further agree, on behalf of yourself and any dependents, to assume full responsibility for all risks of bodily injury, death or property damage due to the negligent act or omission of the Club. You acknowledge that you have carefully read this Waiver and Release and fully understand it is a release of liability. You are waiving any right that you may have to bring a legal action to assert a claim against us for our negligence.”
Standard of Review
“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has ‘shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established,’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
“Contract principles apply when interpreting a release, and ‘normally the meaning of contract language, including a release, is a legal question.’ [Citation.] ‘Where, as here, no conflicting parol evidence is introduced concerning the interpretation of the document, “construction of the instrument is a question of law, and the appellate court will independently construe the writing.”’ [Citation.]” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356 (Benedek).)
Discussion
Relying on Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281 (Zipusch), Padilla argues the release she signed was too ambiguous to insulate The Sports Club from liability. Padilla reasons that her claim arises from defective equipment maintained and controlled by The Sports Club. She maintains the agreement absolved The Sports Club of liability that was caused by other persons, but it did not cover injuries caused by equipment failures. Also, she argues that portion of the release relating to the risk of injury due to use of equipment and machines is not clear, as it is a catchall that protects The Sports Club from all liability and is so broadly written that it loses clarity. Finally, Padilla contends the waiver and release must be construed against The Sports Club because it was hidden in a lengthy paragraph in the middle of a four-page document in unduly small print with ambiguous and overly broad language.
Ambiguity
We first discuss Padilla’s contention that the agreement was ambiguous because her injury was caused by failed equipment, not another person. “Unsurprisingly, a line of California cases have upheld unambiguous release provisions involving health clubs. Some of these releases are broad with exculpation extending beyond injuries resulting from the inherent risk of exercising at a health club.” (Zipusch, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.)
Notwithstanding Padilla’s contrary contention, the agreement expressly excluded liability for injury during use of The Sports Club’s equipment. It also waived any right she had to bring an action against The Sports Club for negligence. The agreement contains language reflecting Padilla’s understanding that there was a risk of injury relating to use of exercise equipment and machines. By signing the contract, Padilla agreed to hold The Sports Club absolutely harmless from all claims and injuries in connection with her use of the premises, equipment, services or programs. There is nothing ambiguous about this provision—it constitutes a release of liability for any claim arising out of injury from use of The Sports Club’s equipment.
For similar reasons, we reject Padilla’s argument that the portion of the release relating to the risk of injury relating to use of equipment and machines is an invalid catchall provision that protects The Sports Club from all liability and is so broadly written that is loses clarity. The breadth of the section does not render it unclear, particularly as to the injury suffered in this case. As set forth above, liability for injuries due to malfunctioning equipment are specifically released by signing the contract.
“We find that the release and assumption of risk provision is clear, explicit, and comprehensible in itself and when considered and read in whole with the entire agreement. (See Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 748, 755.) Therefore, plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the terms of the agreement.” (Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 62, 69.)
Padilla’s reliance on Zipusch is unavailing. In Zipusch, a health club’s waiver and release provision expressly referred to two categories of injuries—injuries caused by others to a club member and injuries to others caused by the member. The agreement did not expressly exculpate the health club for injuries due to its negligence. (Zipusch, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) Because the health club’s negligence was not excluded by contract, it was not entitled to summary judgment when the member alleged injury to the club’s negligent maintenance of its equipment. In contrast, Padilla expressly agreed to hold The Sports Club harmless if she suffered injury resulting from her use of equipment. She expressly waived the right to bring a negligence action against The Sports Club. Because of the readily apparent difference in contract provisions, Zipusch provides no support to Padilla.
Enforceability of the Release
Padilla argues the waiver and release must be construed against The Sports Club because it is hidden in a lengthy paragraph in the middle of a four-page document in unduly small print with ambiguous and overly broad language.
The membership agreement is a two-page contract. In the middle of the second page is a paragraph entitled, “Release, Waiver of Liability & Indemnification Agreement.” The heading is in bold print. The font size of the release and waiver is no different than the remainder of the second page, except for a warning on the use of steroids.
Padilla admitted that the membership agreement was genuine in response to a request for admissions. The agreement bears Padilla’s signature, indicating she acknowledged that she read, understood, and received a complete copy of the agreement and bylaws of The Sports Club. The title of the waiver and release paragraph was sufficiently highlighted to stand out from the balance of the text of the contract. (See Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162-165.) Despite Padilla’s protest that she did not intend to waive her right to seek compensation for injuries or release The Sports Club from liability, the fact is the contract, which Padilla signed after indicating she read and understood it, did just that. She is bound by the contract. (Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 65-66.)
Assumption of the Risk
Padilla argues that under Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 (Knight), there were triable issues of fact regarding assumption of the risk. The argument is misplaced, as the issue in Knight was implied assumption of the risk, rather than, as in this case, express contractual allocation of the risk.
Padilla agreed, by contract, that she would assume the risk of all injury, including from equipment malfunctions. “Knight v. Jewett, supra, was entirely concerned with implied assumption of the risk and never had occasion to discuss, let alone make a binding ruling on, express releases. ‘It is fundamental that cases are not authority for propositions which are not considered.’ (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 473-474.) Thus, nothing in Knight affects the law regarding the validity of contractual agreements to allocate risks differently from the manner in which they would otherwise be allocated.” (Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1374.)
Padilla’s contract with The Sports Club specifically allocated the risk as follows: “You hereby agree that all exercises and use of Club facilities, equipment and services, programs and premises are undertaken by you at your sole risk.” There is no public policy bar to this type of contract allocation of risk. “Exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy. (Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733, 739; Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc.[, supra,] 51 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1373.)” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1356-1358.) “It is obvious that patrons of health clubs sign release and assumption of risk provisions in contemplation of injuries that occur in the course of using the facilities for the primary purpose of exercising and using exercise equipment. Therefore, the injury suffered by plaintiff in the present matter is one reasonably within the contemplation of the parties.” (Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Sports Club is awarded costs on appeal.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., ARMSTRONG, J.