Summary
In Packard v. Packard, 33 Colo. App. 308, 519 P.2d 1221, 1222 (1974), the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that "where a statute is unambiguous, the court is not at liberty to carve out an exception to the act's coverage."
Summary of this case from In re Van WinkleOpinion
No. 73-181
Decided February 5, 1974.
His automobile having been seized in connection with enforcement of judgment for past due alimony and child support, defendant filed claim for exemption. From allowance of the claim for exemption, plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed
1. EXEMPTIONS — Judgment — Arrearages — Child Support and Alimony — Sheriff Seized Automobile — Statute Unambiguous — Entitled to Exemption. Where under writ of execution pursuant to a judgment for arrearages in child support and alimony, sheriff seized an automobile owned by defendant, and defendant filed a claim for exemption, the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly applies to all writs of execution, regardless of nature of the underlying claim; thus, defendant was entitled to his claimed exemption from levy under the statute.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of El Paso, Honorable William D. Rhodes, Judge.
William L. Carew, for plaintiff-appellant.
Nicholas J. Bourg, for defendant-appellee.
This appeal raises a single question for our determination:
Does the exemption from levy under writ of execution set forth in C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-2(1)(k), apply to a judgment for arrearages in child support and alimony?
Joyce Packard, plaintiff-appellant, was awarded a judgment of $4,100 against her former husband, defendant-appellee, for past due alimony and child support. Pursuant to a writ of execution, the sheriff of El Paso County seized a 1940 Dodge automobile owned by defendant. Defendant filed a claim for exemption, alleging that the automobile "is of a value less than $300 and is kept and used by the Defendant for the purpose of carrying on a gainful occupation . . . ." After hearing evidence on the value of the car, the trial court allowed the claim for exemption and plaintiff appealed. We affirm.
C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-2, provides:
"(1)(a) The following property shall be exempt from levy and sale under writ of attachment or writ of execution:
. . . .
(k) One or more motor vehicles kept and used by any debtor for the purpose of carrying on any gainful occupation in the aggregate value of three hundred dollars."
1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-6, states that the exemptions "shall extend and be applicable to writs of attachment, execution, and garnishment issued out of any court of record . . . ."
[1] On its face the statute clearly applies to all writs of execution, regardless of the nature of the underlying claim. The only exception is specified in a subsequent subsection, C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-3, which denies exemptions if the writ of execution issues on a judgment for the purchase price of the property exempted. Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, this court is not at liberty to carve out an exception to the act's coverage. See Estate of Bourquin, 84 Colo. 275, 269 P. 903.
Plaintiff argues that the purpose of the exemption laws is to "protect an unfortunate debtor and save to him a means of supporting his family," and therefore, as a matter of public policy, a debtor should not be allowed to utilize the statutory exemptions to deprive his former wife and children of the financial support these laws were designed to protect. Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff's public policy argument has merit, we may not write special limitations into the exemption statute. That is a function of the legislature and not the courts.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE PIERCE and JUDGE RULAND concur.