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holding that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) motion" when it was made, without any explanation, "almost nine months after th[e Second Circuit] denied [petitioner's motion] for rehearing of the order affirming the district court's judgment, and almost four years after the district court entered its judgment."
Summary of this case from Muller v. LeeOpinion
No. 08-1389-pr.
April 22, 2010.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the district court be AFFIRMED.
William Pabon, Stormville, N.Y., pro se.
David Lawrence III, Assistant Solicitor General, for Andrew M. Cuomo, New York, NY. Arjay G. Yao, Martin Clearwater Bell LLP, New York, N.Y., for Appellees.
PRESENT: WILFRED FEINBERG, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
William Pabon, pro se, appeals from the district court's order striking his Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion, seeking relief from the district court's judgment entered in March 2004, because the Rule 60(b) motion was not made within a reasonable time. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history.
As an initial matter, the district court's order striking Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion was not inconsistent with this Court's instructions in Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008). The district court essentially complied with this Court's instructions by filing the stricken document on the docket sheet and explicitly stating in its order that the motion was stricken because it was not filed within a reasonable time, as required by Rule 60(c)(1). We construe the order as a denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, however, because it was based upon the same reasoning typically used to deny, rather than strike, such motions. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
Upon review of the record and case law, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion. See Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1991) (this Court reviews the district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion). Pabon has not provided any reason why he did not file his Rule 60(b) motion until almost nine months after this Court denied his petition for rehearing of the order affirming the district court's judgment, and almost four years after the district court entered its judgment, where the argument he raised in his motion is the same argument he raised in his petition for rehearing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1); PRC Harris v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1983) (in order to determine whether a Rule 60(b)(6) motion was filed within a reasonable time, the court should "scrutinize the particular circumstances of the case, and balance the interest of finality with the reasons for delay"). Furthermore, Pabon has not demonstrated that "extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship" warrant relief from the district court's judgment based upon the same argument this Court previously rejected in denying his petition for rehearing. See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1979).