Opinion
Where the workmen's compensation commissioner stated to counsel for the state that there was no admission of liability in a stipulation for compensation and that it was incumbent on the state to prove that the employee had a compensable injury, counsel's reply, "That is my understanding," was an admission on which the commissioner was entitled to rely. An award was entered approving an agreement and stipulation executed by the plaintiff, his wife and the defendants for a lump sum payment of compensation. The stipulation stated that payment was in satisfaction of a disputed claim and was not an admission of liability by the defendants. The state was then furnishing hospital care to the plaintiff and continued to do so. It applied for a reopening of the award and an order directing the defendants to reimburse it for the hospital care. Held: 1. That the award did not establish the existence of a compensable claim. 2. That, if the award was the equivalent of a consent judgment, it was not an adjudication on the merits. 3. That the commissioner's finding that the state failed to sustain the burden of proof that the plaintiff had a compensable occupational disease could not be disturbed.
Argued June 8, 1950
Decided August 1, 1950
Appeal by the state of Connecticut from a ruling of the workmen's compensation commissioner for the first district denying an application by the state for an order requiring the defendants to pay the hospital expenses of the plaintiff at Cedarcrest Sanatorium, and appeal by the defendants from a ruling of the commissioner that the state had the right to become a party and present its claim, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Mellitz, J.; judgment dismissing the appeals and confirming the rulings of the commissioner, from which the state and the defendants appealed to this court. No For.
Raymond J. Cannon, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William L. Hadden, attorney general, for the appellant-appellee (state).
Edward S. Pomeranz, with whom was William P. Aspell, for the appellants-appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff claimed that he was disabled because of an occupational disease. On October 22, 1947, the commissioner entered an award approving an agreement and stipulation executed by the plaintiff, his wife and the defendants. It called for a lump sum payment by the defendants to the plaintiff of $3695 in lieu of all other compensation payments and all claims for medical, hospital, surgical and incidental expenses. This was paid. The stipulation contained a statement that the payment was in satisfaction of a disputed claim and was not an admission of any liability by either the employer or its insurers, who are the defendants. At the time, the state was furnishing hospital care to the plaintiff and it continued to do so. It applied to the commissioner for a reopening of his award of October 22, 1947, and for an order directing the defendants to reimburse it for the hospital care. The commissioner denied the application, and the appeal by the state was dismissed by the Superior Court. The state has appealed to this court and the defendants have also appealed.
At the hearing before the commissioner the state was represented by Assistant Attorney General Cannon and the following occurred: "Commissioner: Now, you understand, Mr. Cannon, there is no admission of liability in this stipulation so it is encumbent on the State of Connecticut to prove that this man has a disabling silicosis which is due to his employment at Russell and Erwin — unless they want to admit it. Mr. Cannon: That is my understanding." This was an admission on which the commissioner was entitled to rely. Kiss v. Kahm, 132 Conn. 593, 595, 46 A.2d 337; Abbott v. Lee, 86 Conn. 392, 401, 85 A. 526; see 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) 2588, 2597.
After hearing the evidence, the commissioner found that "the State failed to sustain the burden of proof that the claimant had sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment with the employer-respondent herein." The state has assigned error in this vital finding.
Its claim that the award on the stipulation for adjustment imports that a compensable claim existed is without merit. The stipulation contained no admission, nor the award any finding, to that effect. It is true that under Sugrue v. Champion, 128 Conn. 574, 578, 24 A.2d 890, and Wallace v. Lux Clock Co., 120 Conn. 280, 284, 180 A. 466, such an award is subject to modification in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes, 7434. These cases do not hold that the award establishes the existence of a compensable claim. If we assume, without deciding, that the award is equivalent to a consent judgment, as claimed by the state, the latter's position is not improved. A consent judgment is a contract between the parties approved by the court, and its terms may not be extended beyond the agreement entered into. Butler v. Denton, 57 F. Sup. 656, 660, aff'd, 150 F.2d 687. It is not an adjudication on the merits. New York Central H. R. R. Co. v. T. Stuart Son Co., 260 Mass. 242, 248, 157 N.E. 540; 49 C.J.S. 308. The stipulation in the case at bar contained a specific disclaimer of liability. Neither the award nor the evidence printed in support of this assignment of error requires the elimination of the finding under discussion.
The recovery of medical expenses in a workmen's compensation case must be based on a compensable injury. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. French, 212 Cal. 139, 141, 298 P. 23; Morey Mercantile Co. v. Flynt, 97 Colo. 163, 165, 47 P.2d 864; Merrimac Anthracite Coal Corporation v. Showalter, 158 Va. 227, 231, 163 S.E. 73; note, 143 A.L.R. 1264. The commissioner has found that no compensable injury was proven. The court was justified in dismissing the state's appeal.
The record presents other questions of law but as this conclusion is decisive of the state's appeal they are not discussed. The defendants appealed on the principal ground that the commissioner erred in considering the claim of the state in view of the terms of the stipulation. They do not insist on a consideration of their appeal if no error is found on the appeal of the state.