Summary
In Owens v. State, 243 Md. 719, 222 A.2d 838 (1966), the Court said that it was the duty of the trial judge to ascertain that the guilty-pleading defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of a guilty plea.
Summary of this case from State v. PrietOpinion
[No. 235, September Term, 1965.]
Decided October 11, 1966.
CRIMINAL LAW — Guilty Plea — Failure Of Trial Judge To Advise Accused Of Consequences Of, Held Not To Be Erroneous Nor Prejudicial, Where Accused Was Made Aware Of His Rights Through His Own Lawyer. It is a fundamental basic right that an accused be advised of the nature of the charges against him and of the consequences of a guilty plea, and this is implicit in a knowing acceptance by the court of such a plea. It is not, however, mandatory that the trial judge ritualistically and personally advise the accused of these matters, it being quite sufficient that the accused be in fact made aware of the consequences of his guilty plea, regardless of the source from which the information comes. In the present case, while it might have been the better practice for the trial judge officially to put the accused on notice of his rights in open court, it was sufficient under the circumstances of the case, as detailed in the opinion, for the accused to have been made aware of those rights through his own lawyer. Therefore, the Court found that no prejudice was shown and no error demonstrated. pp. 720-721
Decided October 11, 1966.
Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore (FOSTER, J.).
Irvin N. Owens pleaded guilty to attempted larceny, and from the judgment entered thereon, he appeals.
Affirmed.
The cause was argued before HAMMOND, C.J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, BARNES and McWILLIAMS, JJ.
Milton B. Allen, with whom were George L. Russell, Jr., Richard K. Jacobsen and Brown, Allen Russell on the brief, for the appellant.
David T. Mason, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, and Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Attorney for Baltimore City, on the brief, for the appellee.
The appellant, Irvin N. Owens, pleaded guilty to the second count of a two count indictment charging him with attempted larceny. He was sentenced to one year in the Maryland House of Correction by Judge Dulany Foster in the Criminal Court of Baltimore.
On April 26, 1965, at his arraignment appellant pleaded not guilty. At the trial on June 2, 1965, his counsel, who had previously advised him of what he was being charged in the first and second counts of the indictment and of what the penalties were for each of those offenses, asked appellant if he wished to plead guilty to the second count. Owens nodded affirmatively. When counsel questioned him concerning the absence of promises made to him in order to induce a plea of guilty to the second count he answered that no promises had been made and that he still wished to plead guilty to the second count. After this questioning the trial judge accepted the plea, heard evidence presented by the State's Attorney, and then imposed sentence.
His sole contention on appeal is that because the trial judge did not ask any questions of him concerning his plea of guilty in order to determine if he knowingly and intelligently waived certain constitutional rights, the trial judge failed to satisfy himself of the voluntariness of the plea and of the fact that appellant understood the nature and effect of the plea.
Appellant was no stranger to criminal proceedings. He had an extensive record of convictions dating back at least to 1956. Owens made no claim at the trial and makes no claim now of prejudice nor of any misunderstanding of the consequences of his plea in the court below. In fact he was advised of the nature of the plea and of his rights by his counsel in open court.
It is fundamentally a basic right that an accused be advised of the nature of the charges against him and of the consequences of a plea of guilty, Adams v. State, 224 Md. 141, 167 A.2d 94; Jones v. State, 221 Md. 141, 156 A.2d 421; and this is implicit in a knowing acceptance by the court of a guilty plea. It is not, however, mandatory that the judge ritualistically and personally advise the accused of these matters. It is quite sufficient that the accused be in fact made aware of the consequences of his guilty plea regardless of the source whence the information comes. That the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and of the consequences of a guilty plea is the duty of the court to ascertain, but the court need not follow any ritualistic formula in reaching its determination. While it might have been the better practice for the trial judge to put the accused on notice of his rights officially, in open court, it was sufficient under the circumstances of this case for the accused to be made aware of those rights through his own lawyer. Miller v. Crouse, 346 F.2d 301 (10th Cir., 1965); James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 219 A.2d 17; Cooper v. State, 231 Md. 248, 189 A.2d 620; Cf. Lifshutz v. State, 236 Md. 428, 433-435, 204 A.2d 541; cert. den., 380 U.S. 953. No prejudice was shown and we find no error.
Judgment affirmed.