Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-3432
August 8, 2002
Frank G. DeSalvo, [COR LD NTC], Harry J. Boyer, Jr., [COR], Frank G. DeSalvo, A Professional Law Corp., New Orleans, LA for plaintiff.
Eve B. Masinter, [COR LD NTC], Christopher E. Moore, [COR], McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, New Orleans, LA for defendant.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendant Dillard University for summary judgment on plaintiff's Title IX action. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff matriculated at Dillard University in May 1999. In the fall of 2000, plaintiff enrolled in Dr. Charles Hollingsworth's drawing class. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Dr. Hollingsworth made inappropriate sexual comments to her. Dr. Hollingsworth allegedly continued his harassing conduct throughout the fall semester and on into the spring semester.
In her brief, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Hollingsworth asked for her phone number; left a sexually offensive messages on her answering machine; requested that plaintiff model nude for class; told her that she need to have sex; and asked her if she had ever had a one-night stand. See Pl.'s Brief at 2. She provides no affidavits or record support for her allegations.
On February 14, 2000, plaintiff complained to the Chair of the Art Department regarding Dr. Hollingsworth's conduct. That same day, the professor reported plaintiff's allegations to the University provost. The provost, along with an assistant vice president for human resources and the chief of staff, ordered an investigation into plaintiff's allegations. One week after the University learned of plaintiff's allegations, it informed plaintiff that it was investigating the matter, and it offered to transfer plaintiff out of Dr. Hollingsworth's class. As part of the investigation, the dean of the Division of Humanities interviewed plaintiff, Dr. Hollingsworth, plaintiff's father, and another professor in the Art Department. The assistant vice president for human resources and the chief of staff also conducted interviews of plaintiff and Dr. Hollingsworth. The University employed outside counsel to investigate Dr. Hollingsworth's employment history to determine whether there were similar allegations him in the past.
Based on its investigation, the University determined that Dr. Hollingsworth did not sexually harass plaintiff. Nevertheless, the University issued a formal reprimand to Dr. Hollingsworth for, "at a minimum," conduct "which has the appearance of impropriety." In addition, the University warned Dr. Hollingsworth that in the event that it received future complaints about his conduct, he will be subject to further disciplinary action, including termination.
See Def.'s Memo. in Supp. Mot. for Summ. J.; Ex. 1 to Dr. Smith Decl. (7/9/01 Letter).
Plaintiff sued Dr. Hollingsworth and Dillard in Louisiana state court. Defendants removed the case to this Court on the grounds that the state court petition alleged violations of federal law, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.. On February 8, 2002, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims against Dr. Hollingsworth. Dillard now moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's Title IX action because plaintiff cannot establish that it acted with deliberate indifference to her allegations of sexual harassment against Dr. Hollingsworth. Plaintiff has filed no affidavits in response to the motion, nor has she contested any of the facts recited by defendant. Further, plaintiff has failed to respond to defendant's argument that its conduct did not amount to deliberate indifference.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Title IX
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by educational organizations that receive federal funds. It provides that "[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a). The Supreme Court has held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of action. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1964 (1979) In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (1992), the Supreme Court held that sexual harassment of a student by a teacher constitutes actionable discrimination under Title IX. Id. at 75, 112 S.Ct. at 1037.
A school can be liable for damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student if it acts with deliberate indifference to the harassment or otherwise fails to remedy it. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 1999 (1998); see also Pederson v. Louisiana State University, 213 F.3d 858, 882 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1671 (1999)). In Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998), the Supreme Court set forth the deliberate indifference standard under Title IX for cases that do not involve official policy of the educational institution that receives federal funds. The Court held that
in cases like this one that do not involve official policy of the recipient entity, . . . a damages remedy [against the school] will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond.524 U.S. at 290, 118 S.Ct. at 1999; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 648, 119 S.Ct. at 1674 (defining deliberate indifference for purposes of finding school district liability under Title IX for student-to-student harassment as when the "response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances"). "The deliberate indifference standard is a high one." Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2000) (Doe II) (quoting Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) (Doe I)). The Fifth Circuit has stated that officials who respond reasonably to a risk of harm, "even if the harm ultimately was not averted," may avoid liability under a deliberate indifference standard. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1983 (1994)). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit noted that determining what constitutes appropriate remedial action for allegations of discrimination in Title IX cases is a fact-based inquiry. Id. (citing Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Here, defendant's uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that it took prompt and reasonable remedial action after an official in authority learned of plaintiff's allegations of harassment. Plaintiff complained about Dr. Hollingsworth's conduct to the Chair of the Art Department who reported the allegations to the University provost the same day. The provost, along with the chief of staff and an assistant vice president for human resources, immediately began an investigation into plaintiff's allegations. As part of the investigation, the dean of the Division of Humanities interviewed plaintiff, Dr. Hollingsworth, plaintiff's father, and another professor in the Art Department. The dean reported the results of the interviews to the provost and assistant vice president for human resources. In addition, the University hired outside counsel to investigate Dr. Hollingsworth's employment history in order to uncover any past documentation of sexual harassment complaints. One week after plaintiff reported her allegations, the University notified plaintiff and her father that an investigation had begun and it offered to move plaintiff out of Dr. Hollingsworth's class.
See Def.'s Memo. in Supp. Mot. for Summ. J.; Dr. Smith Decl. at ¶ 3.
See id.
See id.; Williams Decl. at ¶ 5; Ex. 3 to Williams Decl. (Summaries of Investigative Interviews).
See id.; Williams Decl. at ¶ 5, 7; Ex. 4 to Williams Decl. (Investigation Memorandum).
See id.; Ex. 2 to Williams Decl. (2/21/01 Letter).
As a result of its investigation, the University determined that Dr. Hollingsworth did not sexually harass plaintiff. Despite its finding, the University issued Dr. Hollingsworth a formal reprimand for, "at a minimum," conduct "which has the appearance of impropriety." It warned Dr. Hollingsworth that in the event that it received future complaints regarding his conduct, he will be subject to further disciplinary action, including termination. Since the University issued its reprimand, it has not received any complaints regarding Dr. Hollingsworth's conduct. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine fact issue as to whether defendant acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's allegations of sexual harassment. See Doe II, 220 F.3d at 387 (whether school official's response to actual knowledge of discrimination amounted to deliberate indifference may appropriately be determined on summary judgment) (citation omitted).
See id; Ex. 1 to Smith Decl. (7/9/01 Letter)
See id.
See id.; Williams Decl. at ¶ 12.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgement dismissing plaintiff's Title IX action.