Opinion
No. 00-CV-10440-BC.
February 2, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted, and that the plaintiffs complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The motion to dismiss was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder for Report and Recommendation. Although the plaintiff appears to have a worthy case on the merits, the Court agrees with the finding of the Magistrate Judge that the plaintiff has once again failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that this case must be dismissed without prejudice.
I.
This case arises from events that took place beginning in 1997 at the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility ("SMF"), operated by the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"). The plaintiff is still incarcerated in the MDOC prison system, although he has since been transferred to the Muskegon Correctional Facility in Muskegon, Michigan.
The plaintiff has filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from the alleged inclusion of false information in his prison file. Before entering the MT)OC prison system in 1997, the plaintiff was briefly incarcerated at the Monroe County Jail. Upon arrival at the State Prison of Southern Michigan in Jackson, Michigan, the plaintiff was asked by defendant John Walker if he knew anything about an escape attempt at the Monroe facility. The plaintiff stated that he did not, and was then charged with misconduct for lying to a prison employee. The plaintiff was convicted at the misconduct hearing (based on "staff observation") and sentenced to seven days' loss of privileges. Pl.'s Compl. Ex. D. The plaintiffs request to see documentation of his alleged escape attempt was allegedly ignored.
Following the hearing, the plaintiff embarked on a quest to determine why he had been accused of attempting to escape from the Monroe County Jail. As a result of the escape charge, the plaintiff's security classification was Level V; otherwise, the plaintiff would have been classified as a Level II prisoner. The plaintiff was transferred to SMF in 1997, and pleaded with his case manager. defendant Wendi Reetz, for help with his security classification. The plaintiff claims in his complaint that Reetz refused to investigate his classification. As a result, in June, 1997, the plaintiff filed a Level I grievance, which was denied. In response to the grievance, defendant Reetz stated:
The prisoner's file indicates that the prisoner attempted escape on 6-18-96. While no misconduct report is present in the prisoner's file, there is a notation that the information was previously verified via a phone call to the Monroe Co. Sheriffs Dept.
Grievance, Pl.'s Compl. Ex. II. The grievance was appealed to Level II, and was denied.
Defendant Barbara Ranger became the plaintiffs case manager in 1998; the plaintiff claims that she also refused to investigate the truth of the escape charge.
The plaintiff's mother attempted to get defendant Birkett to change the security classification without success. She then contacted the Sheriff Crutchfield for more information on the alleged escape attempt. The sheriff subsequently wrote to defendant Birkett stating that there was absolutely no record of any escape attempt by the plaintiff Pl.'s Compl., Ex. B. The plaintiff claims that Birkett refused to act on this letter, and the plaintiff filed suit in July.
In August, 1999, Sheriff Crutchfield sent a follow-up letter with further documentation, and Birkett ordered the plaintiffs case manager to revise the plaintiffs classification screening. This was done, and the new classification form was sent to Lansing for approval. However, the change of classification request was denied. The copy of the denial form provided by the plaintiff is signed by defendant N. Ludwick on August 26, 1999. Handwritten on the form is the following rationale: "Denied. Remain Level V confinement — a[n] escape risk from secure custody. N. Ludwick, CPA." Pl.'s Compl. Ex. A. Having been overruled by higher authority, SMF officials ceased their efforts on the plaintiffs behalf See Birkett Affidavit, dkt. 16 Ex. E. the plaintiff claims that the escape attempt was used to justify his Level V classification in both his year 2000 and 2001 security classification reviews. Fri. 2001, the plaintiff would have been a Level I classification, but was placed at Level IV instead because of the escape attempt. Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 5.
The plaintiff originally filed suit in 1999, but that case was dismissed because he had only exhausted his administrative remedies though Level II. See 5/2/2000 Order of Dismissal, Case No. 99-10286-BC. The plaintiff claims to have now exhausted his remedies through Level III, and his complaint demands expungement of the erroneous information from his prison file, fifty dollars for each day spent in his improper classification, compensation for the mental anguish he has unnecessarily suffered, and punitive damages.
II.
Because the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") permits the Court to dismiss unexhausted claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court will first review the claims set forth by the plaintiff in his complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)(2).
Although a prisoner does not have a right to a particular security classification or prison, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983), he does have a right to have incorrect information expunged from his prison file. Pruett v. Levi, 622 F.2d 256, 258 (6th Cir. 1980) (recognizing constitutional right to expunge false information from file that results in deprivation of liberty). In order to state a claim in the prisoner context, the prisoner must allege (1) that specific information regarding his prior criminal record or disciplinary offenses is false; (2) that there is a probability that the information will be relied on in a constitutionally significant manner, such as a parole decision; and (3) that the requested the information be expunged and prison officials refused. Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197, 201-03 (4th Cir. 1979) cited with approval by Pruett, 622 F.2d at 258.
The plaintiff meets these threshold requirements. He has alleged that the allegations of an attempted escape are false, that the information will be used to reduce or eliminate his chances for parole, and that he has tried without success to have the allegedly false information removed from his file.
Nonetheless, the Court reluctantly agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the plaintiff has once again failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Current federal law states that before any prisoner may file a civil rights suit challenging prison conditions, he must exhaust all internal administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner's failure to demonstrate exhaustion of internal remedies is grounds for automatic dismissal. See Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). The internal administrative procedures must be followed even if they do not offer the precise relief that the prisoner seeks. See Booth v. Churner, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001). Dismissal without prejudice is required even if the time for filing the required grievance has expired. See Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 417 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1997). A prisoner cannot abandon the grievance process before completion and then claim to have exhausted administrative remedies. Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999). Similarly, the prisoner may not file suit first and exhaust his remedies later. Freeman v. Fancis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999).
As previously discussed, the prisoner originally grieved his concerns in 1997 through Step II. However, he did not file a Step III grievance, and his case was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. After the plaintiffs first case was dismissed in May, 2000, the plaintiff drafted correspondence on plain white paper to the director of the MDOC in Lansing. The document heading reads "RE: Step III Grievance #SMF-97-07-1722-21," but the body reads like a letter. The letter states, in pertinent part:
Dear Director,
During the past Five (5) years, I have went through the chain of command three (3) time's [sic], trying to get a False Escape Charge removed from my Prison File. . . .
I have been punished long enough on the basis of this False Information, and I DEMAND that this False Information be removed, and I DEMAND that it be removed, NOW!
Sincerely Yours,
Owens #250240
Step III Grievance Attempt, Pl.'s Compl. Ex. A. The plaintiff then received a letter in September, 2000, informing him that his "letter . . . sent to Director Martin" was being "forwarded to the Correctional Facilities Administration for reply." 9/15/2000 Letter, Pl.'s Compl. Ex. A at 4. On October 2, 2000, defendant Nick Ludwick sent Plaintiff a Reply to Prisoner Correspondence fbrm which stated: "Review of your concern indicates that you are properly screened compliant with department policy and procedure." Id. at 5. The plaintiff claims this series of exchanges suffices as his Step III Grievance.
The Magistrate Judge disagreed, as does this Court. The Magistrate Judge correctly noted that while the plaintiffs ad hoc Step III Grievance may have been sufficient before the enactment of the PLRA, it cannot suffice under the strict compliance requirements that the PLRA subsequently imposed. See Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879-80 (6th Cir. 1999) (only substantial compliance with prison exhaustion procedures required before PLRA); Wolf v. Moore, 199 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1999) (strict compliance now required). MDOC regulations require that all grievances be followed using the provided forms. See MDOC PD 03.02.130(II)(U). Although the plaintiff considers this requirement to be an empty formalism, the Court does not doubt prison administrators receive a great deal of correspondence containing various titles and demands. Had the prisoner used the correct form, his grievance would have been directed to the Prisoner Affairs division and addressed there; by sending a letter to the MT)OC director instead, his "grievance" was treated as garden-variety prisoner correspondence. See Nick Ludwick Aff., dkt. 16 Ex. 12.
The plaintiffs objections all challenge whether his grievance attempt sufficiently mimicked the form provided by MDOC. All of this, however, is beside the point. Even if the plaintiff had used the correct form, the defendants would likely still have objected that the Step III grievance was over two years late, a complaint this Court would have been required to sustain. See MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 (providing ten days to appeal adverse Step II response to Step III).
The Court observes that the strict compliance requirement now applicable in this Circuit effectively deprives the plaintiff of a remedy he appears to deserve. If an exception to the requirement triggered by extraordinary circumstances existed. this Court would apply it here and deny the defendants' motion. However, the Court is bound to follow the published decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the prevailing decisional law calls for strict application of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. See Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 880; Wolff, 199 F.3d at 329. This Court urges the Court of Appeals to reexamine application of the strict compliance standard with this case in mind.
III.
To seek relief from the federal Courts, Congress has decided that prisoners must first exhaust their administrative remedies. This prisoner has once again failed to do so, and this Court therefore must dismiss the plaintiffs complaint without prejudice.
To ensure that the prisoner's next attempt is actually considered on the merits of his case, the plaintiff should resubmit his request for a change in security classification. if he receives another adverse determination, he can proceed to grieve that decision through Steps I, II, and III of the MDOC process. If he is still unsuccessful, he can then return to federal court to have the merits of his case considered. To avoid delays in the handling of another case, the plaintiff is advised to attach the responses to each level of his grievance to his complaint. See Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1.104 (6th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment [dkt# 16] is GRANTED, and that the plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.