Summary
In Osborn the plaintiff instituted an action against his former employer for improperly discharging him in violation of § 46a-60(a)(1).
Summary of this case from Swihart v. Country Home Bakers, Inc.Opinion
(3397)
The plaintiff, following the dismissal of a complaint he had filed with the commission on human rights and opportunities (CHRO), brought an action against his defendant former employer claiming that he had been improperly discharged from employment because of a physical disability. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. Held that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him for review of the dismissal of his initial complaint by the CHRO foreclosed his access to judicial relief here.
Argued May 7, 1985
Decision released July 2, 1985
Action to recover damages for the defendant employer's alleged improper discharge of the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven where the court, L. Aaronson, J., rendered summary judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. No error.
Hugh I. Manke, with whom, on the brief, was David A. Reif for the appellant (plaintiff).
Geoffrey A. Hecht, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant for improperly discharging him from employment. From the granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has appealed.
The following facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant with the commission on human rights and opportunities (CHRO), claiming that he was fired, in violation of General Statutes 46a-60 (a)(1), because of a physical disability. The CHRO chairperson dismissed the matter for lack of sufficient evidence, and the plaintiff's rights to further recourse were elucidated. The plaintiff failed to avail himself of the opportunity to apply for reconsideration, or to take an appeal to the Superior Court, but instead commenced this action.
General Statutes 46a-60 (a) provides: "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by himself or his agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disorder, mental retardation or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness."
The trial court rendered summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes 46a-51 et seq. The plaintiff then appealed to this court.
General Statutes 46a-83 (a) provides: "After the filing of any discriminatory practice complaint, the chairman of the commission shall refer the same to a commissioner or investigator to investigate and if the commissioner or investigator determines after the investigation that there is reasonable cause for believing that a discriminatory practice has been or is being committed as alleged in the complaint, he shall endeavor to eliminate the practice complained of by conference, conciliation and persuasion."
If these informal procedures are unsuccessful, the CHRO must certify the complaint, hold a hearing and order appropriate relief. General Statutes 46a-84, 46a-86. Thereafter, any party aggrieved by a final order of the CHRO may appeal to the Superior Court. General, Statutes 46a-95 (j).
The CHRO is charged by the act "with initial responsibility for the investigation and adjudication of claims of employment discrimination. That the act does not provide an unconditional private right of action for claimants like the plaintiff is underscored by the terms of General Statutes 46a-99, which expressly provides such a direct right of action when the allegedly discriminatory employer is a state agency." Sullivan v. Board of Police Commissioners, 196 Conn. 208, 216, 491 A.2d 1096 (1985). Because the plaintiff failed to follow the administrative route prescribed by the legislature for his claim of discrimination, he lacks the statutory authority to pursue that claim in the Superior Court.
The plaintiff had available to him administrative remedies that could have afforded him meaningful relief under the statutes that govern his claim of discrimination. His failure to exhaust his appellate review procedures after bringing his complaint to the CHRO forecloses his access to judicial relief, because it deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear his complaint. Id., 217-18.