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Ortiz v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jun 16, 2009
No. 05-08-00490-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 16, 2009)

Opinion

No. 05-08-00490-CR

Opinion Filed June 16, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F-08-00239-S.

Before Justices MOSELEY, O'NEILL, and MURPHY.


OPINION


Appellant Aaron Ortiz was charged with engaging in organized criminal activity that resulted in the shooting death of Victor Arenas. The jury found him guilty, sentenced him to life imprisonment, and assessed a $10,000 fine. In ten issues, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence regarding (1) self-defense, (2) defense of a third person, (3) whether he was a member of a criminal street gang, and (4) whether he committed murder "with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate as a member of a criminal street gang." He further asserts the trial court committed harmful error by omitting defense of a third person in the jury charge. In his remaining issue, he asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the indictment because it failed to assert an essential element of the offense. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

In this case, the State presented one version of events on the night in question while the defense presented a completely different version. Because the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in numerous issues, we provide the following detailed version of the events as presented by both parties, beginning with the State.

State's Eye-Witness Testimony

Victor Arenas, the decedent, lived with Sarah Gomez, his aunt. On the evening of March 29, 2006, Sarah Gomez heard a knock on her front door. When she unlocked the door, some men pushed their way inside in an aggressive manner. The men were looking for Victor, but he was not home at the time. One of the men then told her to tell Victor that they were looking for him, and he would know who "they" were. If he did not seek them out soon, the men threatened to return. After the men left, she saw one of them get into a car parked in the back of the alley. When the door opened and the dome light came on, she recognized Claudio Ortiz, Jr. as the driver. She then walked to her sister's house, two doors down, to call Victor. While walking to her sister's house, she saw another car at the end of the street with appellant Aaron Ortiz inside. She recognized him because the Ortiz and Arenas boys had grown up together in the neighborhood. She then called Victor and told him about the events. He arrived three to four minutes later and was angered by the men's behavior at Sarah's house. Victor left the house and that was the last time Sarah saw him alive. Eric Barrientos was a friend of both Victor and Jose Arenas. He was with Victor on March 29 and knew he was upset about someone going to Sarah's house and kicking in the door. Victor said he wanted to go to Claudio, Jr.'s house and "shoot it up." They did not call the police because "they don't deal with the police." He testified Victor then drove his black Cadillac over to the Ortiz house and shot it twice with a shotgun. They then returned home and found Jose and Tony Robles, another friend, at the house. A short time later, the men heard gunshots from the backyard. They all jumped in Tony's truck and headed down Military Parkway toward Victor's older brother Nick Guerra's house. Tony drove, Eric rode in the front passenger seat, and Victor and Jose lay in the bed of the truck. Eric testified no one took guns with them when they left in the truck; however, evidence later showed Victor had a handgun. Eric testified that as they drove down Military Parkway, Tony noticed a car behind them, and he hit the median while looking in the rearview mirror. Eric then saw flashes like someone was shooting at them, and he heard sounds like a rifle. He got hit in the back and arm. When Tony realized Eric was wounded, he drove off towards the Mesquite Community Hospital. Eric did not know anyone else was injured until they got the hospital, and he saw Victor in the bed of the truck "all shot up." Tony testified that as he was driving down Military Parkway and crossing Jim Miller, they passed a car. At first he did not recognize anyone inside, but he later recognized Aaron. He then recalled the back windshield glass shattering, and Eric yelling he had been shot. He raced to the hospital, dropped everyone off, and went home. He did not call the police because he was scared, and he figured they would find him eventually. He admitted to washing down the truck; however, when the police showed up a week later, blood stains were still present but there were no bullet casings. On cross examination, he admitted to being "really drunk" on the night in question. He also admitted there was a rumor going around the neighborhood that Victor shot at the car first as they drove by. He could not, however, confirm the rumor. From his view, when he looked in the rearview mirror, he saw someone standing in the middle of the street holding a big gun. He also testified he later identified Aaron and Claudio, Jr. in a photo lineup as being the two men in the other car. Jose Arenas, Victor's older brother, testified the Arenas and Ortiz boys were friends growing up until problems arose between Victor and Edgar Ortiz. Although there was some insinuation that perhaps a woman caused problems between the families, Jose did not believe that was the case. He was at his aunt's house on March 29 when he received a phone call from Nick saying some guys were giving Victor trouble. He then went to Sarah's house, and Victor told him Edgar Ortiz and Aaron had been passing by the house but would not fight. He did not know anything about a shooting at the Ortiz house, but he was present when a car he recognized as belonging to the Ortiz family slowly drove by, rolled down the window, and shot at them twice. Victor shot back once, and then they ran to Tony's truck and took off. He thought the situation ended with this shooting; however, he was wrong. As their truck drove down Military Parkway, Jose testified he noticed a parked car on the side of the road with its lights off. He recognized it as the Ortiz family car and said Aaron was the driver and Claudio, Jr. was the passenger. The shooting started when they passed the car. He said Aaron pulled out the "AK" or "big gun." He said Victor tried to get up and shoot back, but he got hit in the arm and head. They then drove to the hospital. The police later recovered a bullet from the tire of the Ortiz car, indicating Victor did in fact fire one shot. The Mesquite Police Department tried to gather information from Jose, but he refused to talk. The case was eventually transferred to the Dallas Police Department. Again, Jose refused to talk to the police. He eventually opened up about the events and identified both Aaron and Claudio, Jr. in a photo lineup. On cross examination, the defense attempted to discredit Jose and make him appear as a liar. The defense focused on the fact that Jose first told police in his interview that the passenger in the car was an older man in his thirties, which did not match Claudio, Jr.'s description. Jose also vacillated on some testimony by stating he could not remember who Victor said was messing with him on the night in question, and he could not say for sure whether he recognized Aaron in the car that night or simply recognized the car as belonging to the Ortiz family and assumed he was in it.

State's Physical Evidence

The State presented the testimony of several witnesses regarding the physical evidence of the case. Paul Ellzey, lead detective from the Dallas Police Department, testified that he interviewed Sarah, Jose, Tony, and Eric. Sarah provided information on what prompted the murder. Eric told him he was hit with an AK-47 fired by Aaron. Through his interviews and further investigation, Detective Ellzey determined Victor discharged his weapon in self-defense causing the front left tire to go flat. The Ortiz car was later found at Aaron's parents' house, and the bullet was removed from the tire. He also recovered a .45 caliber automatic pistol and an AK-47 rifle from the Ortiz residence; however, the AK-47 rifle was not the same weapon used to kill Victor. An inspection of Tony's car revealed the back windshield was completely shattered and the inside of the cab was shot up. There were also numerous bullet holes in the rear tailgate indicating the shots were fired from behind the truck as the truck was heading away from whoever was firing. Based on interviews and physical evidence, he determined Aaron was the shooter. On cross examination, Detective Ellzey admitted he did not find any evidence in broad daylight on March 30, 2006 at the scene of the shooting on Military Parkway. However, he went back on the evening of April 5, 2006 and recovered several shell casings. He explained that because the casings are green, it is often hard to see them in daylight in the grass. At night, however, the green colored brass reflects, and they are easier to spot. He admitted the police never recovered Victor's gun, despite looking for it for days, and determined it fell out of the truck. Dr. Lynn Salzberger, a medical examiner, testified about her findings after performing Victor's autopsy. She determined he received eight gunshot wounds, but she could not determine the range of fire. Based on the extensive injuries and bullet wounds, Dr. Salzberger concluded the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and declared it a homicide. She also testified Victor's toxicology screen revealed marijuana in his system. Vicki Hall, a trace evidence examiner, analyzed gunshot residue kits from Jose and Victor to determine whether they had fired a gun or been close to someone else discharging a firearm. She found one primer gunshot residue particle on the back of Victor's left hand, but no primer particles on the back of his right hand. She testified that this indicated he was around a discharging firearm, whether he fired the weapon himself or had his hand close to the weapon at the time someone else discharged it. She did not find any trace particles from Jose's kit. She also found traces of lead particulate on Victor's t-shirt; however, she could not calculate distance of the shots because an interpose target, the truck, blocked residue from reaching the shirt. But, she still believed none of the shots were fired from close range or within a foot of Victor. Charles Clow, a firearms tool mark examiner, conducted the mechanical evaluation and test firing of the firearms in question, which included the .45 pistol and AK-47 rifle recovered from the Ortiz residence. He studied numerous steel jackets, lead fragments, cartridge cases, and bullets. He positively identified a bullet from the autopsy and a bullet fragment from the scene as being fired from the same gun. He stated that the bullets had the same class characteristics as the ones he test-fired from the AK-47 submitted to him from the Ortiz house, but he could not say for sure that they were fired from the murder weapon because the bullets were missing certain individual characteristics and he did not have the actual weapon for comparison. He also identified cartridge cases as being fired from the same gun, and based on his experience, they were consistent with having been fired from an AK-type firearm. He further stated the bullet retrieved from the tire of the Ortiz car was consistent with a .357 handgun; however, he did not have anything to compare it to for positive identification because the police never recovered Victor's gun.

State's Street Gang Evidence

The State indicted Aaron for murder as a member of a criminal street gang. It presented several witnesses in support of its contention that Aaron was a member of the East Side Home Boys (ESHB), a criminal street gang that has existed in Dallas since the late eighties or early nineties. The gang originated in old east Dallas off the streets of the Woodrow Wilson area. They have since splintered into groups in other parts of Dallas and the suburbs of Garland, Mesquite, and Irving. ESHB have over seven hundred identified members in the Dallas police gang files. Officer Darian Loera, with the Dallas Police Department Gang Unit, explained that a gang-related offense is an offense in which the suspect and the victim are both gang members. They could be members of the same gang or different gangs. He confirmed that many times conflicts arise within the same gang, but gang members usually do not call the police. They rather handle the problems themselves. He explained to the jury that a person had to meet certain criteria to be considered a gang member for purposes of the police data base. A person must meet at least two of the following criteria: admitting gang membership, wearing known gang colors, flashing gang hand signs, associating with other gang members, or hanging out in a known area where gangs are known to frequent. ESHB's gang color is blue, and its members are known to wear it proudly. They also have a specific hand sign. Its members are known for committing crimes ranging from simple theft to murder. Between 2006 and 2007, police conducted approximately one hundred criminal investigations involving the ESHB. He testified that although many gang members have tattoos, the absence of a tattoo does not mean a person is not a gang member. If a person hangs out with other members and commits offenses with other gang members, they meet the criteria for gang membership. Officer Loera testified that Luis Sandoval, Aaron's cousin, was an admitted ESHB member. The State further offered pictures of him displaying the hand sign and wearing a blue t-shirt. He also has been involved in offenses with other members. Officer Loera further testified that Claudio, Jr. associated with well-known ESHB members (including his family) and has been involved in offenses with other members. He asserted that Jose Arenas had a prior history of gang affiliation, and Victor Arenas and Eric Barrientos were known members. As far as he knew, Tony Robles was not an ESHB member. The State admitted a picture showing Aaron posing with others in gang colors, but the picture was ten years old. Officer Loera stated he believed Aaron has an ESHB member based on his prior offenses, his admitted gang membership to Officer Smith in 2003, and his familial relationship with other known gang members, as ESHB is considered a multi-generational gang. He admitted on cross examination that although sometimes non-gang members hang out with gang members, he does not believe in "false positives" for gang membership. He also disagreed with defense counsel's insinuation that officers routinely "over-identify" gang members in an attempt to justify officer over time and larger budgets. He admitted Aaron had no ESHB tattoos and that no gang paraphernalia was recovered from his parents' house; however, this alone did not mean he was not in the gang. Aaron's card on file with the police indicated he was an ESHB member at the time of the shooting. Officer Loera testified he believed in the old adage "once a gang member always a gang member" and disagreed with defense counsel that most people "age out" of a gang between eighteen and twenty years of age. He also disagreed that the average length of gang membership was one year. However, he did acknowledge that studies show when a person joins a gang, his participation in violent offenses usually increased, and he could not cite any offenses for Aaron between July 2003 and March 2006. Despite defense counsel's attempt to paint Aaron as coming from a stable home, with involved parents, Officer Loera explained gang members often live double lives. He disagreed with the defense that the relationship of the parties involved made it a domestic issue. He believed the offense was in furtherance of gang activity because Aaron and Victor were both ESHB members, and the shooting was the result of a dispute within the gang. Officer Noah Smith, also with the Dallas Police Department Gang Unit, testified the ESHB are known to be a violent gang who handle their problems with individuals by drive-by shootings. He further noted if someone in a gang engages in this behavior, then they are engaging in gang-related activities. He explained ESHB members with internal conflicts engage in tit-for-tat behavior and go back and forth as the situation escalates. This was further corroborated by Eric Barrientos's and Jose Arenans's testimony. When asked if the gang handles things on their own instead of calling the police, Eric replied, "I guess you could say that." Jose also testified that when problems came up, they solved it themselves either with "fist fights or guns." Officer Smith had contact with Aaron on June 3, 2003 when he pulled him over for a traffic violation in a known ESHB neighborhood, and his passengers were known ESHB members. Aaron admitted to his ESHB membership and threw a gang sign. He stated Aaron did not have to admit any gang affiliation, and it is not normal to throw a gang sign unless one is a member of that gang. Based on his training and experience, Officer Smith testified he believed Aaron is a current member of the gang. Finally, during Sarah Gomez's testimony, she stated she had heard that all the men involved were gang members, but did not know for sure.

Defense Eye-Witness Testimony

The defense presented a completely different version of the events on March 29 and March 30, 2006. It contended the shooting resulted from a long-standing grudge between Nick and Claudio, Jr. over Nick's former girlfriend Marisol. It further argued Aaron shot in self-defense after Victor fired first on them. Claudio, Sr. testified the family problems began when Marisol and Nick separated, and Marisol started dating Claudio, Jr. He claimed drive-by shootings started happening at his home during this time. The first drive-by occurred on March 19, 2004 and was followed by another shooting on April 10, 2004. Two more shootings happened later; however, he could not provide specific dates. After each shooting, the family called the police and made a report. Despite their suspicions that the Arenas family was involved, the police said they needed further evidence and information to continue with the investigation. The Ortiz family eventually moved from the area for their safety. At approximately 1:20 a.m. on March 30, 2006, he said the family was asleep when they again heard gunshots outside their house. He went outside to investigate, but the shooters were already gone. He noticed someone across the road at the Blockbuster and decided to see if he had seen anything. Aaron drove, Claudio, Sr. was the front passenger, and Luis Sandoval was in the back. At the time, Claudio, Sr. was armed with a .45 caliber automatic pistol. The parking lot security guard told them he saw a white truck drive away from the area. The Ortiz men then went looking for the white truck. They first went to Nick's aunt's house, but they did not see the truck. They then went to Sarah's house, and as they drove by the front, shots fired towards them. They could not, however, see who was shooting. Claudio, Sr. testified he did not shoot back. They then drove around to the back alley, and they saw a white truck parked with the doors open. Again, shots rang out towards them, and he told Aaron they needed to leave immediately because "they could kill us here right now." Aaron then drove to his mother-in-law's house because he kept an AK-47 there, and it would insure their safety on the way home. They proceeded to Military Parkway to go home. Claudio, Sr. noticed lights coming up behind them, and a white truck passed them. The truck hit the median, got in front of them, and then started coming at them in reverse. He saw two people stand up in the bed of the truck. He identified them as Victor and Jose. He said he then opened his door and got out and asked "What is the problem? What do you have?" And then Victor started shooting at them. He testified he ducked underneath the seat, and Aaron returned fire with the AK-47. He said they were still being shot at as the truck drove away. They tried to drive away, but the front tire was flat. They made it as far as a nearby parking lot where they left the car and then proceeded to walk to his brother's house. His brother then gave them a ride back to Claudio, Jr.'s apartment. The police went to the Ortiz home the next day. Claudio, Sr. gave them his pistol and a rifle. This AK-47 rifle, however, was not the same one used the night before. He claimed the rifle used must have been left in the car because he never saw it again. He further asserted Aaron was with the family for the entire evening of March 29 and March 30 and therefore could not have been at Sarah's house earlier in the evening. He further stated the police never asked him for a statement. In fact, the first time he shared his side of the story was while on the stand during trial. Luis testified to the same facts and further stated Aaron shot back in defense. The one detail he added was that in addition to Victor shooting at them, the passenger in the cab, which was Eric Barrientos, fired three or four shots at them too. He also claimed he and Aaron were at home the entire evening of March 29. On cross examination, Luis testified he was not an ESHB member despite being listed as an associate. He admitted to Officer Ellzey they were stupid for leaving and going after people they knew were armed. He further admitted that even though he claimed Claudio, Jr. was not involved in the incident and he knew the police arrested him, he never said anything to police until much later. Rene Varela, the grandmother to Aaron's children, confirmed that Aaron stopped by her home early in the morning on March 30 to retrieve the AK-47 rifle. Stephanie Varela, the mother of Aaron's children, testified Aaron was with her that entire evening and could not have been a part of the group that went to Sarah's home. She also stated she knew problems existed with the Ortiz and Arenas families, but did not know the source of the problems. Gina Tyler, a registered nurse at Mesquite Community Hospital, testified about the contents of a hospital surveillance video from March 30. She told the jury about a man seen on the video pacing back and forth, who never offered to help as medical staff pulled Victor from the truck. However, as soon as they removed Victor, the man jumped into the truck and sped off so quickly he left tire marks. She never knew the person's name; however, the defense insinuated that it was Nick who drove the truck away, rather than Tony, in an attempt to get rid of evidence. The last witness for the defense was Aaron himself. Aaron gave the same story as his father regarding the problems between the two families involving Marisol, the gunshots outside his family's house, the men talking to the security guard, and the group eventually going to Sarah's home where they saw a white truck and were fired upon by people they could not see. He said he stopped to pick up the AK-47 rifle because he did not feel safe. They did not stay at the home because he did not want the Arenas boys to see his car out front and have a reason to shoot at Rene's home. He then gave the exact same story as Claudio, Sr. regarding their encounter with the white truck on Military Parkway. He recognized Victor when he stood up in the bed of the truck, but he said as soon as Victor started shooting, the second person in the truck got down. He admitted he grabbed the AK-47 from Luis and started firing back. He testified Victor shot three or four times, and he returned five or six shots. He then claimed Eric started shooting at them as the car drove away so he again returned approximately four shots. Similar to the other defense witnesses, he said the car tire went flat so they left the car in a parking lot and got a ride home. He said he spent the whole night in the garage "just thinking," but he never went to the police with information regarding the white truck or the shooting. When the police later talked to him, he originally claimed he was not involved in the shooting. He claimed that despite the confusion regarding whether his brother or father was in the car with him during the shooting, he told the police it was not his brother. While talking to the police, he also removed his shirt to prove he did not have any gang-related tattoos, and he also denied membership in the ESHB. He further denied going to Sarah's home earlier in the evening or that the shooting was gang-related. On cross-examination, he admitted to buying another AK-47 rifle on March 29, 2006, and this was a different rifle from the one he kept at Rene's home. He claimed the State's picture of him years ago in ESHB colors with others associated with the gang was simply a picture of friends and that none of them were in a gang. He knew Claudio, Jr. had Tango Blast tattoos but since he had never been in prison, he claimed Claudio was a "wannabe." He also claimed he was forced by Detective Smith to admit he was in ESHB, even though he was not a member.

Defense Street Gang Expert

Bruce Jacobs testified as a defense expert regarding street gangs. The purpose of his testimony was to establish that Aaron was not an ESHB member and the shooting was not gang-related. He reviewed the police report, witness statements, gang file documentation, and conducted an "in-depth life history with Aaron himself," which was actually only a one to two hour interview. Based on his field research, he stated a person who hangs out with gang members is not necessarily a member. He also testified ninety-five percent of all at-risk youth who live in gang neighborhoods do not become gang members and further claimed that if they do, membership is fleeting. He also told the jury most usually "age out" of the gang between the ages of eighteen and twenty. When deciding whether Aaron was an ESHB member, Jacobs said he focused on two broad sets of risk factors, which included background and proximate risk. He then narrowed the two broad sets as follows:
(1) Does Aaron come from a single-parent household?
(2) Has Aaron experienced any negative life events like divorce or parental unemployment?
(3) Does Aaron perceive any barriers to success in life such as economics or otherwise?
(4) Does Aaron have significant outside interests that would insulate him from a gang?
(5) Does Aaron have legitimate employment?
(6) Does Aaron suffer from any psychological risk factors?
He determined Aaron came from a close-knit family who routinely ate dinner together and attended church on Sunday. He was required to first do his homework and chores and then he received rewards. He did not suffer from any negative life events or perceive any barriers to success. Aaron was involved in significant outside activities including football, basketball, landscaping, and working on cars. He also had legitimate employment. He did not suffer from any psychological risk factors but instead appeared to be well-adjusted and integrated. Jacobs also stated criminal activity usually skyrockets once a person joins a gang; however, nothing in Aaron's record indicated an increase in activity after June 2003. He also claimed nothing in the file indicated the shooting was gang-related because it had nothing to do with enhancing a gang's mission or goals. Rather, he believed it should be classified as a domestic dispute or family feud. On cross-examination, Jacobs admitted he never had been on a ride along with anyone in the Dallas Police Department Gang Unit, but rather formulated his opinions based on his own independent research. He could not provide the names of any ESHB members that he talked to or any information they provided regarding the gang. He also could not cite any instances of the Dallas police over-identifying gang members despite his assertion that the police tend to be over-inclusive when they label someone a gang member. He further admitted the police gang unit's participation in the investigation most likely indicated there was some gang element to the shooting. And finally, he acknowledged that Hispanic gangs have increased in recent years and problems seem to be starting in the suburbs. He would not agree with the State, however, that the suburban increase most likely included individuals from stable homes. At the conclusion of all the evidence and jury deliberation, the jury found Aaron guilty. The jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.

Motion to Quash Indictment

In his first issue, Aaron contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment because it failed to assert an essential element of the offense. Specifically, he argues the indictment did not state he committed murder with "intent to establish, maintain, or participate . . . as a member of a criminal street gang." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Instead, it states he "did then and there commit the aforesaid offense as a member of a criminal street gang." The State responds Aaron failed to preserve his complaint for review; however, if the complaint is preserved, then he failed to establish he was harmed by the omission. When reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion to quash an indictment, we apply a de novo standard of review. Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (noting when decision is based on motion to quash, indictment, and arguments of counsel, trial court is in no better position than the appellate court to decide the issue; therefore, a de novo review is appropriate). In his motion to quash, Aaron argued that despite the State charging him under section 71.02 of the penal code, the indictment was deficient in its notice as to any nexus between his alleged membership in a criminal street gang and the alleged commission of the offense. Because of the failure to include this nexus, the indictment lacked specificity and was vague, indefinite, uncertain, and overbroad. On appeal, he framed his issue as "the indictment is insufficient as a matter of law because it fails to allege an essential element of the offense; hence, the trial court erroneously denied Appellant's motion to quash the indictment." We conclude Aaron has failed to preserve this issue for review. To raise an issue on appeal, the issue must have been presented first to the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. The code of criminal procedure further states the following:
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits his right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal. . . .
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 2005). His motion to quash did not inform the trial court that the indictment failed to allege an element of the offense or that an element was in fact missing. Rather, he generally complained the lack of nexus between his alleged gang membership and the alleged crime resulted in the indictment failing to give him notice and was vague, uncertain, and overbroad. This was not sufficient to put the trial court on notice that his true complaint was about an alleged missing element of the offense. As such, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to quash. Even if we determined his issue was preserved for review, Aaron would still not prevail. The right to notice is set forth in both the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. In addition, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides guidelines relating to the sufficiency of the indictment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 21.03, 21.04, and 21.11 (Vernon 2009). Thus, the indictment must be specific enough to inform a defendant of the nature of the accusations against him so he may prepare a defense. Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601. However, the due process requirement may be satisfied by means other than the language in the charging instrument. Kellar v. State, 108 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Smith v. State, AP-75479, 2009 WL 1212500, *3 (Tex.Crim.App. May 6, 2009). When a motion to quash is overruled, a defendant suffers no harm unless he did not, in fact, receive notice of the State's theory against which he would have to defend. Smith, 2009 WL 1212500 at *3; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.19 (Vernon 2009) ("An indictment shall not be held insufficient, nor shall the trial judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of any defect of form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant."). A complaint that an indictment does not provide adequate notice alleges a defect in form. Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994); Hodge v. State, 756 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.). In his indictment, Aaron challenged notice under article one, section ten of the Texas Constitution. He specifically stated "the indictment is insufficient as a matter of law because it does not comply with Article One, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution in that it does not notify the Defendant of the nature of such a nexus." Thus, we apply the article 21.19 harm analysis as instructed by Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). The important question is whether Aaron had adequate notice to prepare his defense. Id. The first step in answering this question is to decide whether the charging instrument failed to convey some requisite item of notice. Id. If sufficient notice is given, this ends our inquiry. If not, the next step is to decide whether, in the context of the case, this had an impact on Aaron's ability to prepare a defense, and finally, how great an impact. Id. In making this determination, we consider the entire record. Hodge, 756 S.W.2d at 357. Further, to be entitled to reversal based on trial error in overruling his motion to quash, Aaron must affirmatively show harm. Id. Under the first Adams step, we conclude Aaron received sufficient notice of the offense against him. The indictment alleged he intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Victor by shooting him with a deadly weapon, and he committed the offense as a member of a criminal street gang. This sufficiently put him on notice that the State was charging him under penal code section 71.02. In his motion to quash, he admitted as much by stating "in the instant indictment the Defendant is charged with the offense of Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity" and then proceeded to quote Texas Penal Code section 71.02, which sets forth the offense. Thus, there is no question he knew exactly what charges the State brought against him. Further, even if we concluded he did not receive sufficient notice in the indictment, he has failed to bring forth any evidence showing how the lack of notice affected his ability to adequately prepare his defense. He must come forward with "some factual justification other than the meagerness of the specifications which do not appear in the indictment." Hodge, 756 S.W.2d at 357. This he failed to do. Furthermore, as part of his defense, his hired expert testified at length to the reasons he believed Aaron was not a member of a street gang and that the events on the night in question were not committed with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate as a member of a criminal street gang. Therefore, the record shows he was able to present his defense to the jury. Thus, no harm has been shown requiring reversal. He overrule Aaron's first issue.

Self-Defense and Defense of a Third Person

In his second and third issues, Aaron argues the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's implied rejection of his self-defense claim. The State responds the jury was faced with two different accounts of the events and was free to believe the State's version that Aaron was a "man on a mission." Further, the State argues the physical evidence shows Aaron and his friends waited to ambush the truck and shot before anyone in the truck could have fired off a shot first. Thus, the jury was free to disbelieve his self-defense claim. We agree with the State. In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence and is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). In performing a legal sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. See Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 87 (2007). Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Bates v. State, 155 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). We will set aside the verdict only if the evidence supporting the conviction is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or when the evidence supporting the conviction is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705. Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact finder's determination concerning what weight to give contradictory testimony. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704-05. "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. The standard of review is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). A person is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes that force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force, if a reasonable person would not have retreated, and when and to the degree that he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id. § 9.32(a). Once the issue of self-defense is raised, the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Importantly, the burden of persuasion is not one that requires the production of evidence; rather, it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The issue of self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, which is free to accept or reject any defensive evidence on the issue. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. In reviewing a challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's rejection of a defense to prosecution, we use the same standards used in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, looking at the sufficiency of the evidence to support both the verdict as well as the rejection of the defense. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595 (factual sufficiency standard); Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 (legal sufficiency standard). As thoroughly discussed in the background, the jury heard two different versions of events for March 29 and March 30, 2006. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury's determination of witness credibility and conflicting evidence, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the guilty verdict and the rejection of Aaron's self-defense claim. Despite the defense's claim that the testimony of Tony, Eric, and Jose was unreliable because one was intoxicated on the night in question, another was in prison for weapon and drug charges, and the other gave inconsistent testimony on the stand, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625. The testimony of one eyewitness is sufficient to prove the State's case. Davis v. State, 831 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). The jury heard different witnesses confirm they were driving along Military Parkway when they passed a car with its lights off. They recognized the people inside as members of the Ortiz family and saw Aaron pull out an AK-47 rifle and start shooting at the truck. Jose testified Victor tried to stand up and fire back; however, he was fatally wounded in the process. The evidence later revealed he was able to fire off one shot, which was recovered from the left front tire of the Ortiz car. Despite the police never locating Victor's gun, the jury could reasonable infer Victor fired the shot with his gun; however, it was an attempt to return fire, not start the shoot out. Further, Detective Ellzey testified he believed Aaron was the shooter and Victor fired in self-defense. Also, the physical evidence supported the jury's denial of Aaron's self-defense claim. Bullet casings recovered in the area belonged to an AK-47 rifle, and the jury was free to consider the fact that the only bullet recovered that was likely fired from Victor's gun was the one he fired in return and was later recovered from the tire in the Ortiz car. Had Victor opened fire first, as the defense alleged, more .357 bullet casings would have been recovered from the crime scene. In addition, the medical examiner testified some of the bullets entered Victor's body after being shot through metal. She also recovered small pieces of truck metal in his gunshot wounds. From the evidence, the jury acted within its discretion in determining Victor did not fire first but was in fact lying in the bed of the truck when Aaron repeatedly shot him. Finally, there was evidence that Jose had no trace particles of gun residue on him, and Victor only had residue on the back of his left hand indicating he was around a discharging firearm. Had Victor fired as many shots as alleged by the defense, his hands and clothing, along with Jose's clothing, likely would have contained more residue. Thus, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. As such, the jury was free to reject Aaron's self-defense claim. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. We overrule Aaron's second issue. After reviewing the evidence in a neutral light, we likewise conclude the evidence supporting the conviction is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, nor is the evidence supporting the conviction outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Again, the jury had before it two completely different versions of the events on the night in question. It was free to weigh the testimony of the defense witnesses and the defendant himself, who all testified they did not go to Sarah's house earlier in the evening, and they did not ambush and fire first on the white truck. They were also free to consider the nurse's testimony, which was brought in to create doubt in the jury's mind about whether Nick or Tony drove off in the white truck on the night in question. The jury was free to consider whether Nick drove the truck away to destroy evidence because he was the one who really had the problem with the Ortiz family or if Tony testified truthfully that he was the one who drove the truck home that night and later washed it down. And, it was free to believe the altercation had nothing to do with another woman, but rather was the result of problems between Victor and Edgar. Also, the jury heard conflicting testimony about which car participated in the drive-by shooting on the Ortiz home. Eric testified Victor drove his black Cadillac to the home while Claudio, Sr., Aaron, and Luis all claimed a security guard told them a white truck drove away from the area. The security guard did not testify. Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to question the defense testimony regarding who was involved in the drive-by shooting at the Ortiz house. The jury also heard testimony that despite allegedly being really scared, the Ortiz men stopped and picked up an AK-47 rifle rather than either staying at the home or calling the police. And of course, there is the conflicting evidence regarding whether the white truck approached the Ortiz car from behind, passed it, and then opened fire, or if the Ortiz family waited and then ambushed the white truck. The jury was free to weigh the conflicting evidence and infer Aaron was in fact a "man on a mission" rather than defending himself. Based on the conflicting evidence and after reviewing it in a neutral light, we cannot say the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt and its rejection of Aaron's self-defense claim. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. Because the record does not clearly reveal a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact finder's determination concerning what weight to give contradictory testimony. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704-05. Thus, we overrule Aaron's third issue. In his fourth and fifth issues, Aaron contends the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's implied rejection of his defense of a third person claim. The State responds the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's implied denial of his self-defense claim, and therefore, he was not entitled to rely on defense of a third person theory. Thus, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient. We again agree with the State. Defense of a third person is a justification for the use of force against another if the circumstances are such that the person would be justified in using the force to protect himself and "the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.33 (Vernon 2002); White v. State, 201 S.W.3d 233, 247 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd). As repeatedly stated, the jury's decision on the issue of self-defense and defense of a third person depended upon the jury's determination of the credibility of the State and defense witnesses. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (factual sufficiency); Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (legal sufficiency). In this case, the jury's rejection of Aaron's defense of a third person was supported by the State's witnesses and the physical evidence. Thus, we must give appropriate deference to the jury's determination of witness credibility. After reviewing all the evidence under the legal and factual sufficiency standards, we conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's rejection of defense of a third person. We overrule Aaron's fourth and fifth issue.

Jury Charge Omission of Defense of a Third Person

In his tenth issue, Aaron claims the trial court erred in omitting an instruction on the defense of a third person. Specifically, he argues that although the charge included the defense of Claudio, Sr., the trial court erred by not allowing his acquittal if he acted in defense of Luis Sandoval. The State responds error, if any, was harmless. We need not address whether the court erred in excluding Luis in the jury instruction on defense of a third person because error, if any, could not have resulted in any actual harm. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157,171 (Tex. 1984). The trial court granted Aaron's requested instruction on self-defense. The jury, however, found him guilty of murder. By finding him guilty, the jury implicitly rejected his self-defense theory. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). This negative finding by the jury on the question of self-defense precludes the possibility that Aaron was justified in using deadly force to defend Luis, the third person. See Evans v. State, 945 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.); Curtis v. State, 754 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd). Therefore, because the jury considered and rejected his self-defense claim, any error in failing to include Luis for purposes of defense of a third person was harmless. Aaron's tenth issue is overruled.

Street Gang Membership

In his sixth and seventh issues, Aaron asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish he was a member of a criminal street gang. The State again responds the jury was faced with contradictory testimony and was free to believe the State's evidence regarding his ESHB membership. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict shows the following. Officer Loera testified that several members of Aaron's family and people he associated with were known ESHB members. Based on his training and experience, he believed Aaron was still a gang member. Although Aaron did not have gang tattoos, Officer Loera explained a person did not need tattoos to be a gang member. If he associated with other members in a known ESHB neighborhood, he would meet the criteria for gang membership. The State also admitted a photograph of Aaron with other known ESHB members in which he was wearing blue. Although he was about ten years old in the picture, the officer testified ESHB is a multi-generational gang. Further, the State introduced evidence of other offenses in which Aaron was involved and at the time, other gang members were present. See, e.g., Chaddock v. State, 203 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (concluding evidence sufficient of gang membership when appellant associated with known gang members, he had identifying tattoos, and his behavior regarding the type of assault he carried out was typical for the gang). And finally, Officer Smith testified Aaron admitted to him in June 2003 he was an ESHB member. See, e.g., Curiel v. State, 243 S.W.3d 10, 16-17 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) (concluding evidence sufficient to support assault was committing while participating in a gang when appellant admitted to being a gang member, wore the gang color, and had a tattoo). He also stated Aaron threw the gang sign, and it was not normal to throw signs unless a person was a gang member. Thus, we conclude this evidence of association and self-proclamation is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Aaron committed the crime while a member of a criminal street gang. We overrule his sixth issue. In reviewing the evidence in a neutral light, we consider the following evidence raised by the defense. The defense's gang expert argued Aaron was not a member of ESHB because he did not fit into his specific criteria for those most likely to join a gang. In addition, Aaron did not have any identifying tattoos, and the police did not find any gang-related paraphernalia at his home during the investigation. Aaron testified he was coerced into admitting he was an ESHB by Officer Smith, but he was not a member of any gang. He further explained the picture of him in gang colors with other known gang members was simply a picture of friends and "nobody was in a gang." This evidence does no more than challenge the credibility of the State's evidence, and the jury was free to reject it. Because the record does not clearly reveal a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact finder's determination concerning what weight to give contradictory testimony. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704-05. Thus, we conclude the evidence supporting the conviction is not so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, nor is the evidence supporting the conviction outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. The evidence is factually sufficient to support the conviction, and Aaron's seventh issue is overruled.

Committing Murder With Intent to Maintain or Participate as a Gang Member

In his eighth and ninth issues, Aaron argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish he committed murder "with intent to establish, maintain, or participate as a member of a criminal street gang." The State responds it presented sufficient evidence of the ESHB's penchant for participating in drive-by shootings as retaliation, and the jury could infer that the deadly shooting was in retaliation for a previous shooting at Aaron's house. Thus, the jury could infer he committed the shooting while maintaining or participating as a member of a criminal street gang. The State was required to prove Aaron intended to establish, maintain, or participate in the underlying offense as an ESHB member. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02(a). To that end, the State presented evidence Aaron went after the Arenas's truck as a "man on a mission" in retaliation for Victor driving by and shooting at his house earlier in the evening. The jury also heard evidence that Victor retaliated against the Ortiz family for their behavior at Sarah's house. Officer Smith testified the ESHB was a known, violent gang that handles their problems with individuals by drive-by shootings. If a person commits a drive-by as an ESHB, then that person is participating in a gang-related activity. He further explained members with internal conflicts engaged in tit-for-tat and go back and forth as the situation escalates. Jose Arenas testified if problems came up, they solved it themselves with either fistfights or guns. Although most situations involve violent acts against rival gang members, Officer Loera testified a gang-related offense could involve members of the same gang. He stated it was not uncommon for conflicts to arise within the same gang, and when problems arise, they do not call the police but take care of problems themselves. He further testified the offense was in furtherance of gang activity because Aaron and Victor were both gang members, and the situation became about a gang "family" that got broken up. He did not believe it was simply a domestic issue over a woman. Eric Barrientos also admitted the ESHB sometimes have problems with each other and when asked if they handle things on their own, he answered "I guess you could say that." The defense presented testimony from numerous witnesses who said the problems between the families started when Claudio, Jr. started dating Marisol; therefore, the shooting was a domestic dispute and not gang-related. However, as with the other evidence, the jury did not have to believe these witnesses. The same is true for the testimony of the defense's gang expert. He testified the shooting was not in furtherance of maintaining or participating in a gang because Aaron did not have on gang colors that night, no gang territory was being protected, and no one testified that any gang names were called out before the shooting. However, the jury was free to believe the officers' testimony that ESHB participate in tit-for-tat justice and usually use fistfights or guns in the process. Finally, Aaron argues the police report did not indicate that the shooting was gang-related. However, the Dallas gang unit was heavily involved in the investigation, and the jury heard testimony the gang unit would not have been involved in a domestic dispute case. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and in a neutral light, we conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to establish Aaron committed the underlying offense with the intent to maintain or participate as a member of a criminal street gang. Thus, we overrule Aaron's eighth and ninth issues.

Conclusion

Having overruled all of appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.


Summaries of

Ortiz v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jun 16, 2009
No. 05-08-00490-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 16, 2009)
Case details for

Ortiz v. State

Case Details

Full title:AARON ORTIZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jun 16, 2009

Citations

No. 05-08-00490-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 16, 2009)

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