Opinion
No. 31709.
May 20, 1935. Suggestion of Error Overruled September 16, 1935.
1. COURTS.
In the construction of federal statutes, state courts are bound by federal decisions.
2. ADMIRALTY.
Where, after making of contract of employment in Louisiana between citizens of that state for work on dredge, operations were subsequently carried on in Mississippi where employee was injured while at work on dredge without own motive power and engaged in making channel through point to shorten Mississippi river, employee's remedy held not that afforded by Federal Seamen's Act, but by Louisiana Compensation Act, if employer had complied with it, otherwise that afforded by Mississippi law (46 U.S.C.A., secs. 688, 713; Const. U.S., art. 3, sec. 2).
3. MASTER AND SERVANT.
In absence of proof to contrary, presumption is that foreign employer, carrying on business within the state, has complied with foreign compensation act.
4. MASTER AND SERVANT.
Any doubt as to whether remedy of employee injured within the state is under foreign compensation law or state law should be resolved in favor of compensation law under which employee's right to recover is certain.
5. COURTS.
Where Louisiana citizen was injured in Mississippi while working for Louisiana corporation pursuant to contract of employment made in Louisiana, Mississippi courts will enforce employee's remedy, whether the remedy is that afforded by Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act or that afforded by Mississippi law.
APPEAL from circuit court of Adams county.
HON. R.L. CORBAN, Judge.
Suit by Stelly Frazie against the Orleans Dredging Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Brandon Brandon, of Natchez, for appellant.
It was the contention of the appellant (defendant in the court below) that under the state of facts in this case, section 688 of Title 46 of United States Code Annotated had no application to the case at bar, and, therefore, that the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, section 51, et seq., of Title 45, of United States Code Annotated, were not applicable; that if the plaintiff had any right of action at all, his rights were governed and controlled by the Employers' Liability Act of the state of Louisiana, being Act No. 20 of 1914 of the state of Louisiana as amended by subsequent acts of said state in force at the occurrence of the injury complained of, or, that if that act were not applicable, then that the plaintiff's action was governed by the statutes and common law of the state of Mississippi.
This court has held that in applicable cases arising under the Employers' Liability Act of the state of Louisiana the courts of this state, to-wit, the chancery courts, can and shall administer the provisions of the Louisiana act.
Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Inman, 128 So. 877.
The rights and remedies of the parties to a contract of employment governed by the provisions of the Employers' Liabilitity Act of Louisiana are exclusively those provided in that act and are exclusive of any other rights or remedies.
Phillips v. Guy Drilling Co., 143 La. 951, 79 So. 549; LaBourdette v. Doullut Williams Shipbuilding Co., Inc., 156 La. 412, 100 So. 547; Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 9 La. App. 108, 118 So. 88; Kern v. Southport Mill, Ltd., 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19; Liner v. Riverside Gravel Co., 127 So. 146.
The Louisiana act applies to contracts of employment made in the state, whether to be performed within or without the state whether performed within or without the state, and whether the injuries sustained in the course of that employment be sustained within or without the state.
Hargis v. McWilliams Co., Inc., 9 La. App. 108, 119 So. 88; United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, C.C.A., 1927, 18 F.2d 453; Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, 637; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491, 495, Ann. Cas., 1917E 390, 12 A.L.R. 1207; Selser et al. v. Bragman's Bluff Lbr. Co., Inc., 146 So. 690, 700; Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410, 59 A.L.R. 728; Bradford Elec. Light Co., Inc., v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 S.Ct. 571, 76 L.Ed. 1026; Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lbr. Co. et al., 19 La. App. 494-504, 136 So. 112, 140 So. 867; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 255 U.S. 445, 65 L.Ed. 723, 41 S.Ct. 373, 184 Cal. 26, 12 A.L.R. 1190, 192 P. 1021; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 79 S.Ct. 554.
By his acceptance of hospitalization, medical care, and payment of compensation under the Louisiana act, the appellee elected to be bound by the terms of the Louisiana act and is estopped from resorting to any other right or remedy.
National Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Higginbotham, 112 So. 734; Ross et ux. v. Cochran Franklin Co., Inc., 112 So. 141.
It is the contention of this appellant that the work and employment was not governed by the provisions of section 688, Title 46, U.S.C.A., and that this action was not brought and is not maintainable under the provisions of that act and therefore that said act is not applicable to this action, and further that the provisions of the said Railway Employers' Liability Act, section 51, et seq., Title 45, U.S.C.A., has no application to the case at bar.
The jurisdiction of the United States courts in matters of admiralty is granted by the provisions of article III, section 2, clause 1, of the constitution of the United States of America. The jurisdiction of admiralty courts of the United States includes only maritime causes or such as arise out of commerce and navigation on the high seas or the navigable waters of the United States of America, and the test of such jurisdiction is the nature of the claim upon which the suit is founded and not the form of remedy resorted to.
The Mary F. Chisohm, 129 Fed. 814; United Transportation, etc., Co. v. New York, etc., Transportation Line, 180 Fed. 902, 185 Fed. 386, 107 C.C.A. 442.
All admiralty jurisdiction refers directly or indirectly to navigation.
United States v. Burlington Ferry Co., D.C. Iowa, 1884, 21 Fed. 311, 335; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovak, 234 U.S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L.Ed. 1208, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1157.
But the tort committed not on board a vessel and/or not in navigable waters is not within original and exclusive admiralty jurisdiction.
In general it may be said that only those waters are "navigable waters of the United States" which have from custom and use or dedication been or become public waterway highways of the United States and have thereby become impressed with the privilege of public use for trade and commerce.
Excanaba, etc., Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 682, 2 Sup. Ct. 185, 27 L.Ed. 442, 12 Fed. 777; Rhea v. Newport News R. Co., 50 Fed. 16, 21; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Backus, 46 Fed. 211, 214; Miller v. New York, 109 U.S. 395, 3 Sup. Ct. 228, 27 L.Ed. 971, 3 Blatchf. 469, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9585, 10 Fed. 513.
Clearly the cut or ditch in question could never have been said to have become a "navigable water of the United States," — at least prior to October 8, 1934.
State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 42 Sup. Ct. 406, 258 U.S. 574, 66 L.Ed. 771; Brewer-Elliott Oil Gas Co. v. United States, 43 Sup. Ct. 60, 260 U.S. 77, 67 L.Ed. 140.
Navigability is determined by the nature of the stream in its entirety.
Waterloo Woollen Mfg. Co. v. State. 194 N.Y. 155, 118 Misc Rep. 516; McDonald v. Apple River Power Co., 164 Wis. 450, 160 N.W. 156.
The general test of navigability is whether or not the waters in their ordinary condition are used or susceptible of being used as highways of commerce.
Economy Light Power Co. v. United States, 41 Sup. Ct. 411, 256 U.S. 113, 65 L.Ed. 847, 256 Fed. 791; Blackman v. Mauldin, 164 Ala. 337. 51 So. 23, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 670; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 528, 73 Am. Dec. 439; Bissel v. Olson, 26 N. Dak. 60, 143 N.W. 340; The old case of the Monticello, decided in 1874, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L.Ed. 391.
There is no judicial presumption of navigability of any water which is not known to be navigable geographically, historically, traditionally, and any given water not so generally known will not be presumed to be navigable.
Donnelly v. United States, 33 Sup. Ct. 1024, 228 U.S. 708, 57 L.Ed. 1035; Leheihy v. Ashland Lbr. Co., 49 Wis. 165, 5 N.W. 471; Allahay v. Mauston Elec. Service Co., 116 N.W. 4, 135 Wis. 345, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 207; Mintzer v. N. American Dredg. Co., 242 Fed. 553, 245 Fed. 297, 157 C.C.A. 489.
In cases similar to the ones at bar the courts have by a large majority held that the state law applies and that no question of maritime law is involved.
Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L.Ed. 1207; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Philadelphia, etc., Steam Towboat Co., 23 Howard 215, 16 L.Ed. 433; Chisohm v. Northern Transportation Co., 61 Barb. 388; United States v. Burlington, etc., Ferry Co., 21 Fed. 331, 336; The City of Selem, 37 Fed. 846, 849; Campbell v. Hackfeld, 125 Fed. 696, 700; 62 C.C.A. 274; Imbrovck v. Hamburg American Steam Packet Co., 190 Fed. 229, 193 Fed. 1019, 113 C.C.A. 398.
The Jones Act is not applicable.
Southern Surety Co. v. Crawford, 274 S.W. 280, 270 U.S. 655; Sultan Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 277 U.S. 135; United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, 18 F.2d 453, 274 U.S. 759, 71 L.Ed. 1337; Fuentes v. Gulf Coast Dredging Co., 54 F.2d 69.
Assuming for the sake of argument that this case was not exclusively governable by the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act of the state of Louisiana, we believe that we have affirmatively demonstrated that the case is not governable and controllable by the terms and provisions of section 688, Title 46, U.S.C.A., then if that be so the plaintiff's case, if any he has, is governable by the laws of the state of Mississippi applicable to actions for tort as to personal injuries sustained within the territorial limits of the state of Mississippi. That being so, the fellow servant doctrine applies, and this defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed with reference thereto.
Engle Laub and Whittington Brown, all of Natchez, for appellee.
The Mississippi river has been declared navigable.
Morgan and Harrison v. Reading, 3 S. M. 366, 11 Miss. 366; The Magnolia v. Marshall, 39 Miss. 109.
We submit to the court that if the Seamen's Act is applicable, that is to say, if at the time appellee was injured he was a seaman within the purview of that act, and, therefore, entitled to the rights and remedies provided by that act, then the question of whether or not the Louisiana Compensation Law could be applicable and the question of whether or not there was any assumption of risk by the appellee in his employment, and the question of whether or not the appellant would be liable to appellee because of the negligence of a fellow servant, are all disposed of and no longer pertinent or material principles involved in this case.
If the Seamen's Act is applicable to this case, then it is a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and is governed solely by the provisions of the statute enacted by Congress as to rights or remedies and the laws of Mississippi and the laws of the state of Louisiana would be wholly inapplicable.
This fact is recognized by the courts of Louisiana where the compensation law invoked was enacted.
A vessel while undergoing repairs in a floating dry dock is subject to admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and a contract for repairs to a vessel in dry dock is a "maritime contract."
Gray v. New Orleans Dry Dock Shipbuilding Co., 146 La. 826, 84 So. 109; Jones v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., Inc., 162 La. 151, 110 So. 182; Meyers v. Hankins Bros., 5 La. App. 190.
The record is undisputed that the injury did occur in Adams county, Mississippi, and that, therefore, under section 688, Title 46, U.S.C.A., jurisdiction in such actions was given not only to the United States district courts but to the common law courts of the state of Mississippi, of the county in which the injury occurred and in which service could be had upon the employer if engaged in business therein.
A steam dredge, without motive power, engaged in deepening navigable waters and capable of being towed from place to place is a vessel within section 3, Title 1, General Provisions.
Saylor v. Taylor, 77 Fed. 476, 23 C.C.A. 343; Ellis v. United States, 27 Sup. Ct. 600, 603, 206 U.S. 246, 51 L.Ed. 1047, 11 Ann. Cas. 589; The Hurricane, 2 F.2d 70, 9 F.2d 396; George Leery Construction Co. v. Matson, 272 Fed. 461.
Under the above authorities appellee at the time he was injured was employed upon a boat or vessel as defined by the statute.
Persons employed on a steam dredge, without motive power, engaged in deepening navigable waters, and capable of being towed from place to place, and on her scows in such work are "seamen," within this section and entitled to a maritime lien for their services.
Saylor v. Taylor, 77 Fed. 476, 23 C.C.A. 343; The Hurricane, 2 F.2d 70, 9 F.2d 396; Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 51 Sup. Ct. 111, 282 U.S. 234, 75 L.Ed. 312, 170 N.E. 131, 252 N.Y. 530; Warner v. Goltra, 79 L.Ed. 8.
Not even counsel for appellant in their brief or in their argument before this court undertake to deny that the "Cartagena" was not a vessel within the meaning of this statute and that appellee was not a seaman within the meaning of this statute but conceding that the "Cartagena" was a vessel and that appellee was a seaman within the meaning and purview of section 713, Title 46, U.S.C.A., nevertheless they say that the waters on which the injury occurred were not navigable waters of the United States and that the work in which the appellant was engaged was purely of a local nature and subject to the control of the laws of the state in which it was being done.
Appellee beyond question was injured on a vessel that was floating in the Mississippi river. The Mississippi river is a navigable river of the United States. This is not only established by all the evidence in this case but this court will take judicial notice of that historical and geographical fact.
Secs. 1378, 6463, Code of 1930.
If, from the circumstances and facts in this case, it appears that the work has a direct relation to navigation and commerce, then the application of the Seamen's Act is mandatory.
Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 74 L.Ed. 819; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59, 70 L.Ed. 470, 46 Sup. Ct. 194; Grant, Smith-Porter Co. v. Rhode, 66 L.Ed. 321.
In this case the application of the Seamen's Act is mandatory and exclusive.
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 64 L.Ed. 834, 40 Sup. Ct. 438.
If our conclusion that appellee's rights are governed by the provisions of the Seamen's Act of Congress then the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction conferred by Congress and the rights and remedies given to seamen under the Seamen's Act are exclusive of all other rights and remedies provided by common law or by state compensation acts.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 61 L.Ed. 1086, 37 Sup. Ct. 524; 31 A.L.R. 524, note.
Even though, for the sake of argument, we admit that the Seamen's Act is not applicable in this case, nevertheless the Louisiana State Compensation Law is not applicable and does not control the rights and remedies of the appellee. In event the Seamen's Act is not applicable appellee's rights and remedies are under the common law and statutes of the state of Mississippi where the injury occurred.
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 64 L.Ed. 834, 40 Sup. Ct. 438; Jones v. Crescent City Ice Co., Inc., 162 La. 151, 110 So. 182; Myers v. Hankin Bros., 5 La. App. 190; Gray v. New Orleans Dry Dock Building Co., 84 So. 109, 146 La. 826; Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California et al., 79 Sup. Ct. 554.
A ship owner cannot avoid liability for the injury to a seaman by a defective appliance on the ground that the seaman knew of the defect.
Grant v. U.S. Shipping Fleet Corp., 22 F.2d 488; Tonnawanda Iron Steel Co., 234 Fed. 198; Henry Gillen's Sons Lighterage v. Fernald, 294 Fed. 520; Hoof v. Pacific American Fisheries, 284 Fed. 174, 291 Fed. 306, 44 Sup. Ct. 38, 263 U.S. 712, 68 L.Ed. 520; The Waco, 3 F.2d 476; The Navarino, 7 F.2d 743; New Zealand, 49 F.2d 781; Ives v. United States, 58 F.2d 201; The S.S. Magdapur, 3 F. Supp. 971; The S.S. Phoenix, 3 F. Supp. 1017.
The seaman does not assume a risk when acting under superior orders.
U.S. v. Boykin, 49 F.2d 762.
Argued orally by Gerard Brandon, for appellant, and by S.B. Laub, for appellee.
Cowpen Point, at Gile's Bend, above Natchez, in Adams county, Mississippi, is a narrow point of land projecting westwardly for a distance of six or eight miles and is thus formed by an extreme bend in the Mississippi river. As a part of its flood control program, the federal government in the spring of 1933 entered upon the work of cutting the two miles across this point near the base of the bluffs, so as to shorten the river by about twelve miles. The first part of this work was done by drag lines which was then followed by dredges. On August 2, 1934, the dredge boat Cartagena, owned and operated by appellant, a Louisiana corporation, was engaged in finishing this work of cutting the channel across the point, and had progressed some two thousand feet or more from the southern point of entrance. The Cartagena was not self-propelled, it carried no commerce, its sole business was dredging.
Appellee, a citizen of Louisiana, had been employed by appellant in Louisiana some months before to work for appellant on its said dredge boat Cartagena; the operations being at that time actually in Louisiana. On June 19, 1934, the Cartagena was moved to this work at Cowpen Point, and, under the same employment, appellee remained as one of the employees thereon. On the date mentioned, August 2, 1934, appellee was severely injured in the course of his employment on said dredge boat, and subsequently brought suit in the circuit court of Adams county, under the United States Seamen's Act, sections 688, 713, Title 46, U.S.C.A. The trial court held the Federal Seamen's Act applicable, the case was tried under that law, and appellee recovered a judgment.
Many efforts have been made to define in a few words the field and scope of the jurisdiction in admiralty within which Congress may legislate under the grant to it of authority by section 2, article 3, Constitution U.S. Such efforts have not been entirely successful, and we shall not venture therein further than to say that there is no difficulty in a case where the vessel is actually navigating in navigable waters carrying commerce, or where it is proceeding to a point of loading, or where it is being loaded or unloaded, or is being repaired; and this much is said as charterizing most of the authorities cited by appellee, as, for instance, where a steamship is being repaired and is tied up for that purpose, John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 50 Sup. Ct. 306, 74 L.Ed. 819; where a seagoing vessel is being loaded with ice, Jones v. Crescent, etc., Co., 162 La. 151, 110 So. 182; or where one is employed to operate a pump to keep water out of the bottom of a ferryboat, Meyers v. Hankins Bros., 5 La. App. 190; or a stevedore is unloading a seagoing vessel, Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 51 Sup. Ct. 111, 75 L.Ed. 312. We proceed, therefore, at once to examine cases in precise point, that is to say, cases concerning a dredge boat, without motive power of its own, which carries no commerce, and in which its sole relation to the maritime field is that it floats on navigable waters, and is engaged in preparing a channel upon which maritime commerce is to be carried. And we concern ourselves chiefly with the holdings of the federal courts on the subject; the inquiry being upon the scope and meaning of a federal statute, in regard to which the decisions of the federal courts are binding upon state courts, as are the decisions of state courts with respect to the meaning of state statutes controlling upon federal courts.
Precisely in point is United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg (C.C.A.), 18 F.2d 453, 454. In that case the dredge boat was cutting a navigable canal across land from the Sabine river to Lake Charles, in Louisiana. The dredge was kept afloat by water which followed the dredge boat and filled up the canal as it was cut. The court tersely said of the character of the work, "While there was deep water around the dredge, and the channel she was digging was intended to be navigated when finished, she was in fact merely eating her way over land . . . to create a navigable channel;" and the court held for a death occurring in the course of that employment the state compensation law and not the admiralty law applied. This case was reaffirmed in Fuentes v. Gulf Coast Dredging Co. (C.C.A.), 54 F.2d 69, and was accepted as controlling authority in Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 9 La. App. 108, 119 So. 88, 89. To the same effect is Southern Surety Co. v. Crawford (Tex. Civ. App.), 274 S.W. 280, wherein the court said: "Here . . . the dredge was not a seagoing vessel, nor even self-propelled, but had to be towed everywhere; nor was it at the time of this casualty mediately or immediately engaged in navigation or commerce as such of any nature, being then located up in the Texas City channel in Galveston Bay . . . and actively at work dredging the channel at that local point."
In Saylor v. Taylor (C.C.A.), 77 Fed. 476, and in The Hurricane (D.C.), 2 F.2d 70, affirmed (C.C.A.), 9 F.2d 396, a contrary conclusion was reached, dealing with the subject of maritime liens. Appellee also relies on Gray v. New Orleans, etc., Co., 146 La. 826, 84 So. 109, 112, wherein it was held that a dredge boat being repaired in a dry dock is within the admiralty jurisdiction. In the opinion in that case it is stated that: "It is not contended . . . that the dredge boat Dixie was not a ship or vessel within the meaning of the admiralty law." That case was ruled upon some time before the decision of the federal court of appeals of this circuit in the Lindberg case, supra; and since the Louisiana courts have lately recognized and followed the Lindberg case, as has been above mentioned, and since the parties to the cause now before us are Louisiana parties, in regard to whose respective rights and liabilities we should be, and are, content to accept the latest Louisiana decisions, we must hold that the state law and not the Federal Seamen's Act applies, so far as concerns the case now under consideration.
In the Louisiana case, Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 9 La. App. 108, 119 So. 88, above referred to, the injury occurred while working on a floating steam dredge then in waters within the territorial boundaries of the state of Florida. The employee injured was a citizen of Louisiana, and the dredge boat owner was a Louisiana corporation. The contract of employment was made in Louisiana. The court held not only that the Federal Seamen's Law did not apply, citing the Lindberg case, but that the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law did apply. The court held that when a contract of employment is made in Louisiana, and particularly when made by and between Louisiana parties, the state compensation law follows and protects the workman not only in Louisiana, but wherever he might go in the employment and wherever the injury might occur, so long as in the course of the employment. This seems to be the settled rule under Louisiana jurisprudence as may be seen from the review of their decisions in Selser v. Bragmans, etc., Co. (La. App.), 146 So. 690, and we, therefore, act upon it in this case. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044.
But appellee argues that although he is a citizen of Louisiana and the appellant is a Louisiana corporation and the contract of employment was made in Louisiana, there was no agreement or understanding at the time of the employment that the work would be done in part in another state; and appellee asserts that all the Louisiana cases which hold that its compensation laws operate extraterritorially have been where the contract was expressly made for work beyond the state. Since the Louisiana compensation law, in respect to a contract made in Louisiana between Louisiana citizens, follows the employee everywhere he may go in the execution of the employment, we are unable to see the materiality of the inquiry whether the contract, when made, contemplated its execution within or without the state, or partly within and partly without.
Appellee suggests that there is no proof that appellant employer has complied with the requirements of the Louisiana compensation law. That question seems to have been raised here for the first time. There is a presumption in the absence of anything to the contrary that a party has obeyed the law. If upon the new trial it is shown that the appellant has not qualified under the Louisiana compensation law in such manner as to be entitled to avail of it as the law applicable to this case, and as to which matter we have made no investigation, then the court will apply the law of Mississippi, the state within whose boundaries the injury occurred. But appellee was severely injured. Under the Louisiana law his compensation for the injury is certain. Under the law of this state, and for two reasons not necessary now to be discussed, his right of recovery is uncertain. He is a citizen of Louisiana. Therefore, any doubts as to the applicable law should be solved in favor of the Louisiana law.
It remains only to be added that the court will not dismiss appellee and require him to go to Louisiana to propound his claim. In Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 576, 126 So. 395, it was settled that the courts of this state will recognize and enforce the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law (see, also, Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Inman, 157 Miss. 810, 819, 820, 126 So. 399, 128 So. 877); and this is now the general rule everywhere as to the enforcement of compensation laws. See authorities cited in the Lindberg case, supra. Appellee concedes this as to injuries occurring in Louisiana, but says that since the injury occurred in this state, we are not bound to apply the Louisiana law. That we must do so, under the facts of this case, we regard as settled in Bradford, etc., Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L.Ed. 1026, 82 A.L.R. 696.
Reversed and remanded.