Opinion
No. FBT CV 09-5026062
January 26, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I will continue to adhere to my decision ten years ago in Torres v. Begic, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 423742 (June 13, 2000, Levin, J.) [ 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 403]. In addition to the reasons stated in that decision, I am persuaded by the argument made by Judge Blue in Sharif v. Peck, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 429034 (March 27, 2001, Blue, J.) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr 311), in which the court stated: "The question is whether Sharif is `a party to the action' within the meaning of § 52-102b(a). The legislature has not defined the term `party.' The Supreme Court has cautioned that, `[A]nalyzing the word "party" by its "commonly approved usage" is inappropriate. Ordinarily, the word "party" has a technical legal meaning, referring "to those by or against whom a legal suit is brought . . .'" Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co., 212 Conn. 661, 669, 563 A.2d 1013 (1989). The Court has construed the term quite narrowly . . . [A] functional analysis is called for here.
"This case is functionally two cases: Sharif versus Peck and Toney versus Peck." Sharif v. Peck, supra, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 311-12.
So too here. To say that Braulio is a party to Zenaida's personal injury lawsuit "would elevate form over substance." Gerlt v. South Windsor, 284 Conn. 178, 192, 931 A.2d 907 (2007). "Appellate courts of our jurisdiction have long eschewed the practice of elevating form over substance." Diamond 67, LLC v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 117 Conn.App. 72, 84, 978 A.2d 122 (2009); see also Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 34, 848 A.2d 418 (2004). Each plaintiff has a separate and distinct cause of action under the Connecticut definition of that term. See Veits v. Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 434, 58 A.2d 389 (1948) (defining cause of action). "A single tortious act resulting in personal injury to more than one person may give rise to as many causes of action as there are persons injured, so as to permit a separate action for damages against the wrongdoer by each injured person.
"The right of a person to recover for his or her own personal injuries received in an accident and for the death of another resulting from the same accident are based on separate causes of action." 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions § 116 (2005). Indeed, here, each plaintiff has stated his or her causes of action in separate counts. Each could have brought a separate lawsuit by different counsel. One plaintiff could suffer a disciplinary nonsuit but not the other.
In the absence of further clarification from an appellate court on this issue on which there is no consensus among Superior Court judges, the motion to strike is denied.