Opinion
No. 1-605 / 99-1565.
Filed January 28, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, JAMES D. SCOTT, GARY E. WENELL, and JOHN D. ACKERMAN, Judges.
Property owner appeals following the entry of an order setting a sheriff's sale on her property. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Greta Postma, Clara City, Minnesota, pro se.
Loren J. Veldhuizen, Alton, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ. HUITINK, J., takes no part.
Greta Postma appeals from a district court order authorizing the sheriff to sell certain property owned by her for remedial safety repairs made by the city of Orange City. Upon review we find this matter fits the criterion outlined in Iowa Supreme Court Rule 9, for the issuance of a memorandum opinion.
On September 15, 1997, the city of Orange City filed, under the authority of Iowa Code section 364.22 (1999), a civil citation charging Postma, as owner of Lot 10 and the East 10 feet of Lot 9, Block 15, Original Plat, Orange City, Iowa, with a violation of City Code section 6-3-3-b, providing for public safety by removal, repair, or dismantling of a dangerous building or structure. Following a hearing at which Postma did not appear, the district court authorized Orange City to either repair or demolish the property in question. The court subsequently entered judgment against Postma in the amount of $43,132.26, plus costs and interest, for the improvements Orange City made to salvage the unsafe property.
When Postma failed to voluntarily pay the judgment within thirty days, the court issued a special execution and sheriff's sale. Pursuant to that order, the sheriff later sold the property to the highest bidder, Orange City, for $54,002.73. Postma appeals from this and various other orders.
On appeal, Postma contends: (1) Judge John D. Ackerman was required to recuse himself because his former law firm previously had been involved in litigation regarding the subject property; (2) her husband, Harold Postma, should have been allowed to intervene; (3) the clerk of court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to hold a hearing regarding the sufficiency of her supersedeas bond; and (4) the district court erred in failing to grant her petition to vacate.
We believe Postma's near wholesale failure to comply with the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure precludes us from considering her arguments on appeal. Such a failure to adhere to the rules of appellate procedure can, and has in the past, led to summary disposition of an appeal. See Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 239 (Iowa 1974) (dismissing appeal based on party's failure to cite any authority). Where a party's failure to comply with the rules requires the court "to assume a partisan role and undertake the [party's] research and advocacy," we will dismiss the appeal. State v. Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Iowa 1999) (citing Inghram, 215 N.W.2d at 240).
Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(a)(5) requires that:
Each division of the argument shall begin with a discussion, citing relevant authority, concerning the scope or standard of appellate review (e.g., "on error," "abuse of discretion," "de novo") and shall state how the issue was preserved for review, with references to the places in the record where the issue was raised and decided.
Here, Postma's brief contains no discussion regarding the appropriate standard of review. Nor does it mention how any of her four contentions were preserved for our review. There are no citations to the record as to where this court can determine for itself whether the issues were raised and decided. Postma's meager appendix, in connection with the voluminous record of proceedings below, puts this court in the difficult position of having to comb through the documents to engage in research and argument required by the rules to be done by Postma. We believe this substantially hinders our review and consideration of the issues before us on appeal. Further, to engage in such analysis on our own would lean too close toward advocacy in favor of Postma. This we cannot do.
The fact that Postma is pursuing this appeal without the aid of a lawyer does not excuse these substantial departures from appellate procedure. See In re Estate of DeTar, 572 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Accordingly, we conclude this case is subject to summary disposition, and therefore dismiss the appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.