Opinion
No. CV03-0520855S
November 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendant, Bristol-Burlington Health District, moves to strike plaintiff Marion Olson's one-count complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress. After oral argument, the court denied the motion from the bench. Plaintiff then requested a decision in writing.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
For purposes of a motion to strike, the court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorable to the plaintiff. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that she was employed by defendant as a public health nurse from August 31, 1987 to May 2, 2001. At some point after being hired, defendant was made aware that plaintiff was suffering from multiple sclerosis, that she had requested accommodations due to her disability, and that she found it increasingly difficult to perform her duties. During the years 2000 and 2001, plaintiff made several serious errors in nursing care, some of which, by her own admission in her complaint, ". . . could have had severe deleterious effects on the health of students." Plaintiff's complaint ¶ 7. Plaintiff was the subject of a complaint from a parent that she could not recall directions relating to her daughter's medication; appeared to have lost some medication, and appeared to be confused and disorganized . . . Plaintiff admitted to her supervisors that she was having difficulties. In paragraph 13 of her complaint, plaintiff admits that her disability ". . . made it impossible for her to function properly as a nurse."
At a predisciplinary conference held on or about April 20, 2003, plaintiff admitted to all her errors. Nevertheless, she claims she was wrongfully accused of intentionally falsifying a student's medical record, intentionally violating standard nursing practices, and attempting to conceal her errors. Her employment was terminated on May 2, 2001.
Plaintiff now claims that these false accusations give her a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the termination process.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Construction Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). "The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp, 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Id. The motion "admits all facts well-pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368, 379 (1985). (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) A motion to strike is properly granted where the allegations of the pleading, if proven, would not establish a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id., 109.
DISCUSSION
It is important to note there is no indication in her complaint that plaintiff claims intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her allegations set forth claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
We first recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337, 345, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978). We concluded, however, that in order to state such a claim, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading that" the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm." Id.; see also Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 200 Conn. 683-84; 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 313 (1965). Accordingly, negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is "based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process." Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 682. The mere termination of employment, even where it is wrongful, is therefore not, by itself, enough to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. "The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior." Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc., 312 Or. 198, 204, 818 P.2d 930 (1991).
Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 88, 700 A.2d 655 (1997).
Plaintiff admits in her pleadings that she had serious performance problems in her employment for at least two years. During those years, plaintiff repeatedly admitted her deficiencies to her employer.
During a pre-disciplinary meeting, plaintiff again admitted to her deficiencies, but alleges she was upset when additional problems were discussed which she felt were unwarranted. Plaintiff was afforded a private meeting wherein her employer set forth a series of errors — errors which plaintiff had already admitted and continues to admit in her complaint. The fact that there were other matters relating to poor performance that were raised can not be relied upon to show that her employer should have realized that the discussion of other matters relating to performance issues would create an unreasonable risk of causing plaintiff emotional distress that might result in illness or bodily harm. Parsons, Id.
Plaintiff's failure to state a claim is even more apparent when compared to other cases involving far more egregious conduct than that alleged herein.
Defendant notes some examples in its brief as follows:
Compare the plaintiff's situation to that of the employee in the Parsons case. There, the employer terminated the employee two hours after he refused a work assignment and walked him out of the building with a security escort. The Court determined that such conduct did not constitute the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. In the Muniz case, the plaintiff was terminated and told to move out of her company residence within 24 hours while she was home recovering from surgery. This conduct by the employer was not extreme and outrageous. Muniz, 59 Conn. App. at 709.
In the case of Bator v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 73 Conn. App. 576 (2002), the Connecticut Appellate Court addressed a claim similar to Olson's. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that a supervisor made a false accusation against him. However, unlike allegations made by Olson, the Bator case involved an accusation that the plaintiff had directly endangered a patient's life. The plaintiff also alleged other conduct such as being scheduled to work while he was under a physician's care, then having discipline recommended against him when he did not report to work. Another supervisor suggested that the plaintiff seek psychiatric help for anger management after the plaintiff had a confrontation with a nurse. The plaintiff was also disciplined for complaining about a schedule change and for engaging in a verbal altercation with a nurse. Considering all of these allegations as true, the Court still found that the conduct was not extreme or outrageous. Id. at 579.
Other courts have found much more egregious conduct not to qualify as extreme or outrageous. In Appleton v. Board of Educ. of Town of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205 (2000), the plaintiff claimed that her supervisor made condescending comments to her in front of her colleagues questioning her ability to see and read telephoned her daughter and said that the plaintiff was acting differently and should take some time off work, and had the police come to the school and escort the plaintiff off of the premises. The Connecticut Supreme Court found that this conduct was not extreme and outrageous. Id. at 211-12. In Campbell v. Town of Plymouth, 74 Conn. App. 67 (2002), the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated for refusing to include erroneous and fraudulent CT Page 13336-a information in a report to the Department of Economic and Community Development. His employer also made repeated inquiries into his personal beliefs and attitudes, and harassed him in an attempt to get him to submit the fraudulent information. The Appellate Court found that this conduct did not exceed the bounds of socially tolerable behavior. Id. at 78.
Defendant's Brief, pp. 8-10.
Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the standard set forth in applicable case law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to Strike was granted at oral argument, as reflected in the record.
CHRISTINA G. DUNNELL, JUDGE.