Opinion
Civil No. 3:98-CV-2246-H
February 4, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Scott's Motion to Dismiss, filed February 8, 1999, Defendant Scott's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, filed August 20, 1999; Defendant Johnson's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay Discovery, filed November 17, 1999; and all responses and replies thereto. Having considered the motions and briefs of the parties, and for the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Scott and Johnson's Motions to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Norman Charles Oliver brings this suit alleging violations of his right to privacy, right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures, and right to equal protection under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although now incarcerated in the Rosharon Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division, Oliver formerly resided at the Jesse R. Dawson State Jail Facility from July 1997 to December 1998. Oliver asserts that this Dallas facility is currently operated by a private, for-profit corporation Management and Training Corporation, Incorporated ("MTCI"), and was operated prior to September 1, 1998 by another private, for-profit corporation, Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA").
Defendants in this lawsuit include Wayne Scott, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"); Gary Johnson, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division ("TDCJ — ID"); Janice K. Wilson, Warden of Jesse R. Dawson State Jail Facility and an employee of MTCI; Corrections Corporation of America; and Management and Training Corporation, Inc.
Oliver complains first of the policies regarding female prison employees in all-male prison units. Specifically, Oliver alleges that female prison employees conduct strip searches of male inmates, and observe male inmates shower and use the bathroom, whereas male prison employees are prohibited from doing the same with female inmates. Moreover, it is alleged that the Dawson State Jail Facility provides shower and toilet partitions that shield female prisoners from view during their use of the facilities, but does not provide the same privacy for male prisoners. Oliver claims that Defendants Johnson and Scott, as Texas Department of Criminal Justice executives, promulgated the policies, practices and standards under which these alleged constitutional violations occurred. Oliver also alleges that Defendants failed to adequately train and/or supervise their employees regarding strip search procedures. Oliver requests injunctive relief, as well as actual and punitive damages and attorneys' fees.
II. SCOTT AND JOHNSON'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Although Defendants Scott and Johnson filed separate motions to dismiss, Johnson adopts the arguments and authorities set forth in Scott's motion to dismiss; thus the Court will consider the motions together.
In response to Defendant's motions and supporting evidence, Plaintiff urges that the court exclude facts and evidence outside the pleadings submitted by Defendants. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must limit its inquiry to facts stated in the complaint, as well as matters of which it may take judicial notice. See Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996). In this case, the Court limits itself to the facts alleged in the pleadings, but takes judicial notice of the Aranda class action litigation discussed below.
A. Dismissal under Gillespie
In his Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, Scott argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief regarding the TDCJ strip search policies due to the holding stated in Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1988). In that case, the Fifth Circuit en banc, exercising its supervisory power over the courts in the circuit, held that a prisoner's individual suit for equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions may not be maintained when a district court maintains jurisdiction over a class action that challenges the same conditions. See Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988). The Circuit was concerned that individual equitable suits would "interfere with the ordinary administration of the class action and risk inconsistent adjudications." See id. at 1103. However, Gillespie allows suits by individuals for damages. See id. at 1103.
Plaintiff complains essentially of two principal violations of his constitutional rights: first, that he is subject to unconstitutional strip searches by members of the opposite sex, and second, that the Dawson State Jail facility does not provide the equivalent privacy protection to male inmates in the shower and bathroom facilities as it does for females. The Court determines that Plaintiff's equitable claims regarding the strip search procedures fall squarely within the ambit of a class action under the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Texas.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over a class action regarding the constitutionality of TDCJ's policy on strip searches of male inmates by female prison employees, Aranda v. Lynaugh, Civil Action H-89-277. In Findings of Fact issued in 1993, the Honorable Norman Black found the TDCJ procedure for strip searches by female prison employees of male inmates was constitutional as written. See Aranda Memorandum and Order, dated July 27, 1993. As part of the remedy in that case, the Court continued supervision of the training of TDCJ employees on the strip search policies by female prison employees, through the filing of yearly reports of training procedures. See Aranda Final Judgment, dated July 27, 1993. In 1998, the case was reassigned to Judge Lee Rosenthal, who shortly thereafter reminded the TDCJ that the 1993 order remains in effect. See Aranda Memorandum and Order, dated July 2, 1998.
In this suit, Plaintiff requests "an injunction against opposite-sex strip searching of state prisoners in non-exigent circumstances [and] an injunction against strip searching state prisoners in the presence or view of non-security personnel or civilians." Should the Court grant this requested equitable relief; it would be interfering with the administration and ongoing supervision of the strip search procedures and training by the Southern District of Texas. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "failed to train and/or supervise their employees regarding proper strip search procedures." The Aranda Court currently supervises the training of TDCJ employees in strip search procedures through the filing of yearly reports, and this Court sees no need to interfere with its supervision.
Plaintiff may argue that his claim of unconstitutional strip searches is broader that the claims asserted in the Aranda litigation, as he additionally alleges that strip searches made in front of civilians are unconstitutional. However, the Fifth Circuit anticipated such an argument. The Fifth Circuit stated that "if separate suits for equitable relief are filed in other districts . . . even with respect to problems not encompassed by the relief granted in [the class action], the court's orders may hobble the effect of the [class action] court's continuing decree." See Gillespie, 858 F.2d 1101, 1102 (emphasis added). Therefore, even though the substance of Oliver's complaint regarding strip searches may be broader than the relief granted in Aranda, the Court must avoid interference with the class action.
After consideration of the Gillespie doctrine and the scope of the court supervision in Aranda, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's claim of unconstitutional strip search policies and failure to train should be dismissed. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff states a claim for injunctive relief for violations of his privacy and equal protection rights due to allegedly unconstitutional strip searches, such a claim is dismissed. Oliver may seek equitable relief through the Aranda class action representative, or by intervention in the class action. See Gillespie, 858 F.2d 1101, 1102.
B. Mootness
Having held that Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief from strip searches is barred, the Court must now determine whether Oliver's remaining injunctive claim for privacy partitions is viable. Defendants argue that since Oliver has been transferred from the Dawson State Jail, his equitable claims are moot. Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional wrong is "capable of repetition yet evading review," and thus falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine. The Court finds that Plaintiff does not satisfy the exception, and thus his remaining injunctive relief claim is moot.
In paragraphs 2.21 to 2.24 of his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Dawson State Jail Facility, under Scott and Johnson's policies, permits female employees to observe male inmates while they shower and use the bathroom. However, Plaintiff does not allege that the facility where he is currently incarcerated fails to provide sufficient privacy to its inmates. Since Oliver complains only of the unequal conditions at the Dawson State Jail Facility, Oliver's transfer to the Rosharon Unit renders his complaint for equitable relief from the allegedly unconstitutional conditions at Dawson State Jail moot. See Cooper v. Sheriff Lubbock County, Texas, 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff urges that his wrong is "capable of repetition yet evading review." This exception to the mootness doctrine is limited to situations where "two elements combine . . . (1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
Although Plaintiff may successfully argue that his incarceration at Dawson was so transitory as to evade review of the prison conditions, Plaintiff fails to establish that there is a reasonable likelihood he will be transferred back to Dawson State Jail, or that he will be released and later reincarcerated there. Without such a demonstrated probability, Plaintiff's wrong is not "capable of repetition." Should the Court require that Dawson State Jail provide privacy partitions, there is no expectation that Oliver would benefit.
Oliver does not purport to bring suit for all male prisoners incarcerated at Dawson State Jail Facility. Had Plaintiff sought certification of a class of inmates at Dawson before he was transferred, the claim may not have been mooted. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (holding that even though named plaintiff's claim for prison conditions became moot after certification of the class, the class was not rendered moot). Given that there is no class certified or even sought, the Court will not order injunctive relief at Dawson. Therefore, Oliver's remaining claim for injunctive relief for privacy partitions is moot.
However, the fact that appellant is no longer confined in the complained-of facility does not affect his standing to seek damages in connection with the past alleged wrongdoings. See Culp v. Martin, 471 F.2d 814, 815 (5th Cir. 1973). The Court addresses the damage claims against Scott and Johnson as follows.
C. Official and Individual Capacity Claims for Damages
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for monetary damages from Scott and Johnson in their official capacities in federal court is barred by the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the official capacity damage claims are dismissed.
Plaintiff pleads in paragraphs 1.3, 1.4, 2.5 and 2.6 of his First Amended Complaint that Scott and Johnson are sued in their individual capacities. However, there is no factual basis provided for their personal liability. Indeed, the remainder of the complaint alleges, in a conclusory manner, that Scott and Johnson are liable solely because they set the policies for TDCJ that permitted constitutional violations in Dawson State Jail. As such, Plaintiff does not allege any individual action, involvement, or wrong by Scott or Johnson, but instead states that they acted unconstitutionally as policymakers for the TDCJ.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept Plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). Even assuming that Plaintiff's conclusory assertion that Scott and Johnson set unconstitutional policy is true, at most Oliver states an official capacity claim. Therefore, the Court concludes that Oliver fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation by Scott and Johnson in their individual capacities. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
III. CONCLUSION
Oliver's injunctive claim for relief from unconstitutional strip searches is DISMISSED pursuant to Gillespie v. Crawford, because Oliver is a member of the class afforded equitable relief in the Aranda class action. Further, the Court determines that Plaintiff's claims for all other injunctive relief from privacy and equal protection violations are DISMISSED AS MOOT as Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at Jesse R. Dawson State Facility. Plaintiff's damages claim against Scott and Johnson in their official capacity is DISMISSED due to Eleventh Amendment immunity; Plaintiff's claim against Scott and Johnson in their individual capacity is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
In sum, Scott and Johnson's Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and Johnson's Motion to Stay Discovery is DISMISSED AS MOOT. Plaintiff's damages claims against Corrections Corporation of America, Management Training Corporation, Inc. and Janice K. Wilson proceed.
SO ORDERED.