Opinion
No. 05-07-01391-CV
Opinion Filed October 27, 2008.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CC-07-09112-A.
Before Justices WRIGHT, LANG-MIERS, and MAZZANT.
Opinion By Justice LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Old Republic Insurance Company appeals the trial court's order dismissing its case against appellee Sisaat Sisavath. In two issues, Old Republic contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Old Republic's motion for default judgment and when it dismissed the case for want of prosecution. We affirm the trial court's order.
Factual Background
On June 15, 2007, Old Republic sued Sisavath for breach of a promissory note. On June 19, 2007, the trial court sent a letter to Old Republic stating that the case was set on the trial court's November 7, 2007 dismissal docket, and would be dismissed pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a unless Old Republic moved for summary judgment, proved up a default judgment, or appeared "to obtain a reset of the dismissal date or a trial setting as appropriate."
The appellate record shows that Sisavath was served with process on August 6, 2007, but did not file an answer or otherwise appear. On September 14, 2007, Old Republic filed a motion for default judgment, which included multiple supporting affidavits and a proposed final default judgment for the trial judge's signature. On September 20, 2007, the trial court sent a letter to Old Republic stating that it was returning Old Republic's proposed default judgment unsigned because of multiple deficiencies in the motion:
Petition fails to state a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court;
Petition does not give fair notice of claim against Defendant;
Petition affirmatively establishes invalidity of claim(s);
Judgment relies on causes of action that are not adequately pleaded;
No evidence of a systematic record kept and supported by an affidavit[; and]
Other: petition affidavits establish that the [statute of limitations] has run.
On October 1, 2007, the trial court issued a dismissal order stating that the case was dismissed without prejudice for two reasons: "Failure to appear for a hearing or trial of which notice was had," and "for Want of Prosecution."
Involuntary Dismissal
Rule 165a allows a trial court to dismiss a case sua sponte: (1) when a party seeking affirmative relief fails to appear for a hearing or trial of which it had notice, or (2) when a case is not disposed of within the time standards promulgated by the supreme court. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(1), (2); Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999). "In addition, the common law vests the trial court with the inherent power to dismiss independently of the rules of procedure when a plaintiff fails to prosecute his or her case with due diligence." Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630.
Analysis
In its first issue, Old Republic argues that the trial court erred by dismissing its case for want of prosecution. Old Republic does not challenge the other reason the court's order stated for dismissal: "failure to appear for a hearing or trial of which notice was had."
Generally speaking, we must affirm a trial court's judgment if an appellant does not challenge all independent bases or grounds that fully support that judgment. See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 05-05-01431, 2007 WL 1139671, at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Apr. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); Session v. Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co., No. 05-03-01479, 2004 WL 2378364, at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Oct. 25, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.); Britton v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). This rule "is based on the premise that an appellate court normally cannot alter an erroneous judgment in favor of an appellant in a civil case who does not challenge that error on appeal." Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681.
We see no evidence in the record that demonstrates that Old Republic failed to appear at a hearing of which it had notice, and we are troubled by the fact that the case was dismissed more than one month before the November 7, 2007 dismissal docket setting reflected in the trial court's correspondence to Old Republic. Nevertheless, Old Republic does not allege that the trial court erred by dismissing the case for failure to appear at a hearing, and our rules of appellate procedure preclude us from reversing a trial court's order for a reason that was not raised on appeal. See, e.g., Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) ("We have held repeatedly that the courts of appeals may not reverse the judgment of a trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error."). Consequently, we overrule Old Republic's first issue.
In its second issue, Old Republic argues that the trial court erred "in dismissing Old Republic's Motion for Default Judgment." But the trial court did not issue an order denying Old Republic's motion for default judgment. Instead, it returned the proposed default judgment unsigned and identified several items "as necessary before Default Judgment can be signed." In order to complain on appeal that a trial court refused to rule on a "request, objection, or motion," the record must show that "the complaining party objected to the refusal." Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(B). Old Republic does not contend, and the record does not reflect, that Old Republic objected to the trial court's refusal to sign the default judgment. Consequently, this issue has not been preserved for our review. Id. We overrule appellant's second issue.
Conclusion
We overrule appellant's two issues and affirm the trial court's order.