Opinion
No. C-2-00-0778
October 18, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff asserts discriminatory failure to promote under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and state law. Defendant moves for summary judgment (Doc. 21). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendant's motion.
I. Facts
Plaintiff is an African-American female. Defendant is a private institution of higher learning.
Plaintiff earned a Ph.D. in Counseling Psychology at defendant. She is a licensed psychologist, and specializes in counseling diverse students, minority adolescents and young adults. Plaintiff is a health service provider in private practice and is listed in the National Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology. Plaintiff has worked for defendant since 1988 as the Director of Minority Student Affairs, a non-faculty position.
From 1994 through 1996, defendant undertook a extensive cost-cutting plan. The program included restructuring of personnel. The plan sought to eliminate a $4.5 million deficit in defendant's annual operating budget. The plan specified $2 million in cuts in personnel costs, $700,000 of which related to non-faculty personnel. The restructuring entailed the elimination of certain positions, which were then combined so that one person would have the job responsibilities that previously had been shared by two employees. Plaintiffs position with defendant was not eliminated, nor was her pay reduced by the restructuring.
Relevant to this case, the positions of Dean of Student Services, and Associate Dean of Student Services, were eliminated, and the white male employees who had held these positions were terminated. Defendant reorganized the Student Life and Student Counseling Services division, reassigning additional tasks to most employees. Defendant also created two newly-defined positions to chair each of these two divisions, Chair, Division of Student Life and Chair, Division of Student Counseling Services.
As it had done with respect to reassignments for forty-three other positions, defendant selected two existing employees to fill the positions of Chair, Division of Student Life and Chair, Division of Student Counseling Services. Specifically, on March 16, 1996, defendant appointed Dr. David S. Cozzens, a white male, to the position of Chair, Division of Student Life and appointed Dr. Janet Rogers, a white female, to the position of Chair, Division of Student Counseling Services. Defendant did not follow the formal hiring procedure in appointing these two individuals or the other forty-three reassignments.
When she learned about the two appointments, plaintiff made a complaint to defendant's Affirmative Action Officer, as plaintiff believed that the appointments violated defendant's written Affirmative Action Plan. The Affirmative Action Officer then forwarded plaintiffs complaint to defendant's president, Dr. Thomas B. Courtice. Plaintiff maintains that she waited fourteen days without hearing any response, and then, on March 26, 1996, drafted a grievance memo, asserting that the two appointment violated the Affirmative Action Plan, and submitted the memo to President Courtice. As a result of plaintiffs grievance, defendant rescinded the appointments, reopened the hiring process for the two positions, and allowed plaintiff and others to apply. Plaintiff and Dr. Cozzens applied for the position of Chair, Division of Student Life. Plaintiff did not, however, apply for the position of Chair, Division of Student Counseling Services. Only Dr. Rogers applied for that position.
Defendant then instituted an open, broad-based and inclusive review process to determine who would be the Chair of the Division of Student Life. The positions were then advertised in the defendant's newsletter. Both positions would report to defendant's Provost, Dr. William Louthan, and President Courtice directed Dr. Louthan to head the search. Dr. Louthan named members of the Search Committee. The Search Committee was comprised of the following members: Dr. Louthan, who is a white male; Lynda K. Hall, who is a white female; Stewart W. Pechham, who is a white male; and Beverly J. Rose, who is an African American female and a representative of the Affirmative Action Council. The Committee then met, and developed a search plan, a job description, and a schedule for interviews. The Affirmative Action Council approved the process.
President Courtice interviewed the applicants, as did the Search Committee, an Enrollment Management subcommittee, and the Retention Research Group. Open question and answer sessions were held to which students and employees were invited. Written statements concerning the applicants' qualifications for the position were solicited from those who attended the open sessions, and many people submitted their written comments.
The Search Committee met several times during the selection process. At its final meeting, the Search Committee considered all of the information on both candidates to arrive at a decision as to which one was best suited for the position of Chair, Division of Student Life. The Committee decided unanimously to select Dr. Cozzens, rather than plaintiff, to be the Chair, Division of Student Life. In its written Hiring Report, the Search Committee identified ten reasons for its decision:
(1) [Dr. Cozzens] has a far greater familiarity with the following areas of responsibility in student life: residential life, judicial affairs, public safety, student activities, new student orientation, and retention related work;
(2) He has a substantially greater capacity to articulate and communicate student life issues to various constituencies; students, parents, the public, the press;
(3) He has far superior and demonstrated skills with management, organization, leadership, and staff management (indeed, there is a concern, based on input from staff, that Kathy Ogletree has a tendency to schedule meetings without all members being aware, to cancel meetings without notification, or to be late to meetings, and to be late in responding to phone mail and memos);
(4) He has a better track record of collaborative work with faculty;
(5) He has a better appreciation for the complexities/demands of the position;
(6) He has a far more detailed, accurate, realistic working knowledge of the current state of student affairs on campus, is better with the "nuts and bolts" of the job, has more talent for handling all aspects of the job, a more acute awareness of the broad array of responsibilities of the job;
(7) He gave far superior answers to questions regarding retention and for dealing with the challenges presented to the system by an extraordinarily large incoming freshman class;
(8) He is perceived to have a far greater capacity to serve the needs of all students;
(9) He has demonstrated more involvement in professional associations and activities, and would be better able to facilitate the professional development of members of the staff;
(10) He articulated a more holistic approach to student development and also demonstrated experience in a greater breadth of student programs.
II. Summary Judgment
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see, e.g., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Although the Court views the entire record, it disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.Id. Stated otherwise, the Court must credit evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as evidence favorable to the moving party that is uncontroverted or unimpeached, if it comes from disinterested witnesses.Id.
Reeves involved a motion judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 rather than summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Nonetheless standards applied to both kinds of motions are substantially the same. One notable difference is that in ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court, having heard the evidence at trial, views the entire record, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, whereas in ruling on a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party has the duty to point out those portions of the record upon which it relies in asserting a genuine issue of material fact, and the court need not comb the paper record for the benefit of the nonmoving party. In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Liberty Lobby,Celotex, and Matsushita have effected "a decided change in summary judgment practice," ushering in a "new era" in summary judgments. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476 (6th Cir. 1989). The court in Street identified a number of important principles applicable in new era summary judgment practice. For example, complex cases and cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. Id. at 1479.
Additionally, in responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257). The nonmoving party must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the summary judgment motion. Id. It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party to merely "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586).
Moreover, "[t]he trial court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 1479-80. That is, the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact. In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. Discussion A. Legal Standard
Plaintiff contends that defendant discriminated against her in her employment on account of her race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In an employment discrimination action the plaintiff may prove discrimination by direct evidence or by establishing a prima facie case. In this case, plaintiff does not offer direct evidence of discriminatory animus. She must therefore establish a prima facie case to prevail.
The elements of prima facie case of employment discrimination are:
1. that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class;
2. that the plaintiff was qualified for the position;
3. that the defendant subjected the plaintiff to an adverse employment action; and
4. the defendant did not subject similarly situated persons outside the protected class to such adverse actions.St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Here, plaintiff asserts that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her race when it failed to promote her to the position of Chair, Division of Student Life. The elements of a failure to promote claim have been expressed as follows:
A prima facie case of discrimination based upon a failure to promote requires the plaintiff to prove that (1) she was a member of a protected group, (2) she applied for and was qualified for the desired position, (3) she was considered for and denied the promotion, and (4) the position remained open after her rejection or went to a less-qualified applicant who was not a member of the protected group.Farmer v. Cleveland Public Power, 295 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2002).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action against the plaintiff. See Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). If the defendant comes forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's proffered reason is a mere pretext for discrimination. See Hicks, 502 U.S. at 512, n. 4;Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. "The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine 450 U.S. at 253.
To defeat a summary judgment motion on the basis of pretext, a plaintiff must show one of the following: "(1) that the proffered reason had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reason did not actually motivate the action, or (3) that the proffered reason was insufficient to motivate the action." Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotes omitted). Under the first and third methods of showing pretext, the fact finder may infer discrimination from the circumstances. Id. Thus, [w]hen a plaintiff proves that the defendant's proffered reasons either have no basis in fact or are insufficient to motivate discharge, a permissive inference of discrimination arises. Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 346 (6th Cir. 1997). Under the second method, a plaintiff may not rely exclusively on his prima facie evidence, but instead must introduce some further evidence of discrimination. Cicero, 280 F.3d at 589; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (allowing the fact finder to consider the plaintiff's prima facie evidence when evaluating if the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext); Kline, 128 F.3d at 346 (noting that "when the reasons offered by the defendant did not actually motivate the discharge," the plaintiff must introduce "additional evidence of discrimination"). "In challenging an employer's action, an employee `must demonstrate that the employers reasons (each of them, if the reasons independently caused [the] employer to take the action it did) are not true.'" Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805-06 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1997)).
In examining whether the stated reason is pretext, the Court must determine whether the employer reasonably relied on the particularized facts before it at the time it made the employment decision. Id. at 807. The employer is not required to show that it left no stone unturned; rather, the issue is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking the adverse employment action. Id. The Court should not blindly accept the proffered reason as honest. Id. If the employee adduces evidence establishing that the employer failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision, then its decisional process is "unworthy of credence," and any reliance by the employer on such a process cannot be deemed "honestly held." Id. at 807-08.
B. Application 1. Prima Facie Case
Plaintiff is African American, and therefore a member of a group protected under Title VII. It does not appear that defendant contends that plaintiff was unqualified for the position of Chair, Division of Student Life. She was considered for and was denied the promotion to the position. Hence, plaintiff has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote.
Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot meet the fourth prima facie element, that the position "went to a less-qualified applicant who was not a member of the protected group." Farmer v. Cleveland Public Power, 295 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2002). The Court agrees. Plaintiff has failed to adduce any admissible evidence that Dr. Cozzens was less-qualified for the position of Chair, Division of Student Life. Plaintiff's Title VII claim is subject to dismissal as a result of her failure to submit evidence on this essential element of her employment discrimination claim.
2. Legitimate Reason/Pretext
Although plaintiffs failure to establish a prima facie case is determinative of her Title VII claim, the Court will nonetheless examine pretext as an alternative basis for its decision. Defendant states that it selected Dr. Cozzens for the position because he was better qualified that plaintiff. Defendant provides ten reasons for this conclusion. This satisfies defendant's burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action.
Plaintiff states in her affidavit that Dr. Cozzens had an unfair advantage over her in the hiring process because he had the benefit of experience in the position. The Court finds this assertion to be speculative, and not reflected in the ten reasons defendant provides for its decision. Plaintiff also contends that the Search Committee was rushed. She fails to establish, however, how this is evidence of racial animus. Indeed, the uncontroverted record shows that the selection process was remarkably thorough and methodical. Plaintiff further asserts that the Search Committee failed to check references. Aside from the fact that plaintiff does not provide a basis for her personal knowledge of this matter, plaintiff fails to demonstrate any link between it and pretext. Moreover, she fails to show how checking references was crucial to the process given that defendant was hiring from among existing employees. In sum, plaintiff fails to submit admissible evidence showing that defendant's articulated reason is actually a pretext for its decision not to hire plaintiff for the position of Chair, Division of Student Life.
For the above reasons, defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on plaintiffs Title VII claim of failure to promote.
Summary judgment is granted with respect to the position of Chair, Division of Student Counseling Services for the simple reason that plaintiff was given the opportunity to apply for the position but declined to do so. Furthermore, summary judgment is granted with respect to plaintiffs asserted claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because defendant, a private institution, is not a state actor.
C. State Law Claims
Having determined that plaintiffs federal claims are subject to dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.IV. Disposition
Based on the above, the Court GRANTS defendant's summary judgment motion (Doc. 21).
The Clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of defendant, and against plaintiff, dismissing plaintiffs federal claims with prejudice and her state law claims without prejudice.
The Clerk shall remove this case from the Court's pending cases and motions lists.
The Clerk shall remove Doc. 21 from the Court's pending motions list.