Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-245 Edgar.
September 9, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Currently pending before the Court is the motion of Defendants, the Church of God, William A. Davis, R. Lamar Vest, John K. Vining, Bill F. Sheeks, Rich Hocker, Ray Phillips, Walter D. Watkins, Roger Daniel, H. Lynn Stone, Mark L. Williams, William M. Gaskin, Donnie W. Smith, Darrell W. Waller, Timothy Nuckles, John Briggs, and Orville Hagan, ("Defendants") to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). [Court File No. 40].
Plaintiffs have filed a response to Defendants' motion to dismiss [Court File No. 54]; and Defendants have also filed a reply to Plaintiffs' response to their motion to dismiss [Court File No. 55]. Consequently, Defendants' motion to dismiss [Court File No. 40] is now ripe for review. II. Background
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action on November 15, 2002 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan [Court File No. 1]. In their nine count complaint, Plaintiffs asserted claims alleging breach of implied contract, tortious interference with business relationships, invasion of privacy, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and loss of consortium.
On July 1, 2003, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted Defendants Motion for a transfer of venue to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). [Court File No. 25].
Plaintiff Troy D. Ogle ("Mr. Ogle") has spent more than twenty-two years in the ministry as an ordained bishop under the authority of the Church of God. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 22]. Mr. Ogle asserts that his entire financial resources are derived from his ministry. Id., ¶ 24. Mr. Ogle was "licensed" by the defendant Church of God to act as an ordained bishop; namely, he derived his authority to minister through the Church of God based upon his "license"/status as an ordained minister. Id., ¶ 25. Mr. Ogle alleges that he "is the victim of a partisan and political conspiracy within the Church [of God] to destroy his reputation and eviscerate his ministry." [Court File No. 16, p. 1].
On July 27, 2001, Mr. Ogle began a ten-day ministry trip to Belgium with defendant Rick Hocker, another Church of God minister. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 26]. According to Mr. Ogle, after their arrival in Brussels, defendant Hocker abruptly left Belgium because a "divine urgency" necessitated that Hocker return home to Virginia. Id. Upon returning home, defendant Hocker wrote a letter/memorandum to defendant William A. Davis, Administrative Bishop of the Virginia Church of God, which accused Mr. Ogle of "engaging in unbecoming and homosexual conduct." Id.; Court File No. 42, Exhibit A.
Defendant Davis convened a Fact Finding Committee to investigate the allegations in defendant Hocker's letter/memorandum. Id., ¶ 27. On August 15, 2001, the Fact Finding Committee met with Mr. Ogle and defendant Hocker. Id. After completing its investigation, the Fact Finding Committee issued a report which set forth the following recommendations:
(1) That [Mr. Ogle] be placed under the supervision of a Christian counselor to explore the issues of sexuality, modesty, humanity, and faith;
(2) That [Mr. Ogle] travel with his wife and never stay in the same room alone with any man;
(3) That [defendant] Hocker be given specific instructions about how he handles this issue . . .; and,
(4) That Evangelist Paul Edgerton be interviewed by [defendant] Davis regarding his travels abroad with [Mr.] Ogle.Id.
Subsequent to the publication of the Fact Finding Committee Report, defendant Davis received further correspondence setting forth additional charges against Mr. Ogle. Id., ¶ 28. These written statements/correspondence are alleged to have included:
1. An October 9, 2001 statement from defendant Ray Phillips;
2. An October 8, 2001 statement from defendant Walter D. Watkins;
3. The statement from defendant Roger Daniel to defendant Dr. H. Lynn Stone, dated late September 2001;
4. An April 27, 1998 letter from defendant Dr. H. Lynn Stone; and,
5. An October 10, 2001 letter from defendant Mark L. Williams.Id. Mr. Ogle characterizes these letters as being the result of "a significant campaign to acquire false and derogatory information regarding [Mr. Ogle]" and a "conspir[acy] . . . to submit false information to [defendant Davis] so that he could proffer new charges against [Mr. Ogle]." Id., ¶ 28.
Mr. Ogle was advised on October 4, 2001, that a second Fact Finding Committee was being convened. Id. at ¶ 29. The second Fact Finding Committee met on October 12, 2001. Id. The Committee first met with Defendant Ray Phillips and it then met with Mr. Ogle. Id. Mr. Ogle describes his meeting with the second Fact Finding Committee as an "ambush." Id. Specifically, Mr. Ogle alleges that prior to the October 12, 2001 meeting of the second Fact Finding Committee he was not provided with copies of the additional letters which had been gathered by, or provided by, the various defendants. Id. at ¶ 30.
As a result of its October 12, 2001 meeting, the second Fact Finding Committee, in its October 15, 2001 report, recommended that Mr. Ogle proceed before a trial Board on the charge of unbecoming conduct for a minister with a member of the same sex. Id. at ¶ 31. Subsequently, on November 9, 2001, Mr. Ogle, who had previously waived the right to a state trial for a Board appointed by the International Executive Committee, was informed that the International Executive Committee had appointed a General Trial Board to hear the charge against him. Id. at ¶ 34.
The proceedings before the Trial Board commenced on November 29, 2001. Id. at ¶ 36. Defendant Davis and three members of the second Fact Finding Committee prosecuted the charges against Mr. Ogle. Id. Defendant William F. Sheeks acted as the Ministerial Advocate before the Trial Board. Id. A number of witnesses testified before the Trial Board; and the Board also received a number of "testimonials," i.e., statements, from witnesses who were not present. Id. Mr. Ogle alleges that he was prevented from cross-examining the witnesses before the Trial Board and that the transcript of the proceedings before the Trial Board is inaccurate. Id.
At the conclusion of the proceedings, Mr. Ogle was found guilty of "unbecoming ministerial conduct." Id. at 37. His "license" from the Church of God was suspended for a period of one year, although he was given credit for a three-month period; and he was ordered to undergo a restoration process that included counseling sessions with an approved psychologist, Rick Gillon. Id.
Mr. Ogle alleges that during the counseling process, defendant Dr. John K. Vining attempted to interfere with his counseling by attempting to prejudice the outcome. Id. at ¶ 38. Nevertheless, Mr. Ogle admits that upon completion of the counseling process, the counselor, Rick Gillon, indicated that, in his professional opinion, restoration should commence immediately. Id. at ¶ 40. In addition, the State Executive Office of the Michigan Church of God also approved Mr. Ogle's restoration. Id. at 41.
The issue of Mr. Ogle's restoration was presented to the Church of God's September 2002 International Executive Committee, along with a request for reinstatement. Id. at ¶ 42. As a part of this process, Mr. Ogle appeared before a five-member Reinstatement Committee. Id.
Mr. Ogle responded to the Reinstatement Committee's questions, including their concerns that Mr. Ogle had retained counsel and had indicated he was considering various options, one of which was the filing of a lawsuit. Id. at 43. In fact, in his complaint Mr. Ogle admits that he was asked if he would still sue the Church of God if he were reinstated. Id. According to Mr. Ogle he advised the Reinstatement Committee "that he would indeed sue if the International Executive Council did not rectify the gross injustice and that, in fact, he had completed all steps necessary for reinstatement." Id.
Subsequently on September 27, 2002, Mr. Ogle received a letter from Defendant Orville Hagan the Assistant General Overseer of the Church of God International Offices. Id. at ¶ 44; Court File No. 1, Exhibit G. The September 27, 2002 letter states in pertinent part:
The Executive Council delayed action until matters pertaining to the specifics of the reinstatement process are further clarified.
This, in effect, leaves Reverend Ogle's reinstatement in suspense until such time as the Executive Council decides to take up this matter in the future.
The Executive Council is the highest adjudicatory ecclesiastical tribunal in the Church of God, and no other board or committee shall take action on this matter, other than the Executive Council.
This is a matter of ecclesiastical discipline of a minister under the Holy Scriptures and the General Assembly Minutes, and Reverend Ogle has submitted himself to Church of God polity.
[Court File No. 1, Exhibit G].
Mr. Ogle claims that he has been told that no such resolution was ever passed and that Defendants are using his reinstatement as leverage in the hope that he can be dissuaded from pursuing his legal remedies in court. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 45]. Plaintiff also asserts that he was denied certain due process rights set forth in the General Assembly Minutes of the Church of God. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 47.
As noted previously, plaintiffs filed their nine-count complaint on November 15, 2002. [Court File No. 1]. Count I of plaintiffs' complaint sets forth a claim for breach of implied contract. Id., pp. 14-15. Specifically in Count I, Mr. Ogle claims that his license to act as an ordained bishop was governed by the Minutes of the International General Assembly (" General Assembly Minutes") which, in effect created an implied contract between himself and the Church of God. Id. Mr. Ogle asserts that the Church of God breached the implied contract by not according him all of the rights set forth in Section 65 of the General Assembly Minutes. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 46, 52, 53.
In Count II of his complaint, Mr. Ogle seeks a declaratory judgment "that the charging body that proffered charges against [him] did not, in fact, have the legal and proper authority to bring the charges." Id. at ¶ 55. Further, in Count III of the complaint, Mr. Ogle asserts a claim for tortious interference with business relationships. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, pp. 15-16]. More specifically, Mr. Ogle asserts that he "had a business relationship with all the constituents of the Church of God whom he ministered to, and in particular, with all those ministers who invited him to attend revivals to minister to church members." Id. at ¶ 59. He asserts that the Defendants unlawfully interfered with his business relationships by allegedly fabricating evidence and changes against him and colluding to deny him the rights set forth in the General Assembly Minutes. Id. at ¶ 61.
Count IV of the plaintiffs' complaint sets forth a claim for invasion of privacy. Id. at ¶¶ 63-68. Mr. Ogle claims that he counseled with defendant Roger Daniel, who was acting in a ministerial capacity, and that he had an expectation that any information he supplied to defendant Daniel would be kept confidential. Id. at 64. Mr. Ogle further claims that he counseled with Dr. Rick Gillon as part of the "restoration" process, see ¶ 37 of the Complaint, and that he had an expectation that information he provided to Dr. Gillon would be kept confidential. Id. at ¶ 65. Mr. Ogle asserts that Defendants conspired with defendant Roger Daniel and Dr. Rick Gillon to invade his privacy by obtaining information that he had expected would be kept confidential. Id. at ¶¶ 66-68.
In Count V of the complaint, Mr. Ogle asserts that Defendants conspired against him by (1) proffering charges against him in an unauthorized forum, (2) creating fraudulent charges against him after the first Fact Finding Committee, (3) agreeing to deny him basic rights under the General Assembly Minutes and (4) agreeing to prevent him from being restored to his ministry. Id. at ¶ 70. Court VI of the complaint, alleges that the actions of Defendants were extreme and outrageous and resulted in the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶ 72-74.
In Count VII, Mr. Ogle alleges defamation against certain of the defendants. Specifically, he alleges that the statements made by defendants Phillips, Watkins, Stone, Daniel and Williams were false and were "per se" defamatory because they accused Mr. Ogle of engaging in reprehensible acts. Id. at ¶ 77. Mr. Ogle further alleges that the aforementioned statements "have been published to individuals involved in [the] discipline process as well as the general membership of the Church of God." Id. at ¶ 79.
Finally, in Count VIII, Mr Ogle seeks exemplary, i.e., punitive, damages under Michigan law; and, in Count IX, Mrs. Ogle seeks damages for loss of consortium on the ground that the allegedly tortious actions of Defendants have negatively impacted her marital relationship with Mr. Ogle. Id. at ¶ 85.
III. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Court File No. 40].
Defendants have moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). [Court File No. 40]. They assert that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims. [Court File No. 41].
A. Standard of Review
In this instance, because Defendants filed their Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction/Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted after they filed their Answer [Court File No. 3] to the Plaintiffs' complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), Defendants' motion must be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001); Satkowiak v. Bay County Sheriff's Dep't, 47 Fed. Appx. 376, 387 n. 1, 2002 WL 31155817, **1 n. 1 (6th Cir. Sep. 26, 2002) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c)).
Moreover, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), "[i]f, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. . . ." Cook v. Providence Hospital, 820 F.2d 176, 178 (6th Cir. 1987). In this instance, both parties have extensively briefed the issue of whether, as a matter of law, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes this Court from exercising its jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims. Furthermore, along with their briefs, the parties have submitted numerous exhibits which the Court has not excluded. Therefore, the Court will treat the Defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Id. B. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
C. Analysis
As previously noted, Defendants seek, primarily as a matter of law, a summary judgment on the claims asserted by the plaintiffs . They assert that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the plaintiffs [Court File No. 41, p. 5]. More specifically, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' complaint shows that Plaintiff Troy Ogle is seeking to have this Court review internal matters of church discipline which has been decided by the hierarchy of Defendant, the Church of God. [Court File No. 41, p. 7]. Defendants asserts that it would be impossible for this Court to address the claims set forth in Plaintiffs' complaint without probing into the religious law and usage and the allocation of power within the Church of God, which would require this Court to act in derogation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id.
In their response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs assert that dismissal of this action would shield "religious institutions, in the name of the First Amendment and under the guise of an ecclesiastical purpose . . . from otherwise cognizable tort claims caused by their agents and employees." [Court File No. 54, p. 12].
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in relevant part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . .
U.S. Const. amend. I. As the Sixth Circuit has observed:
The Supreme Court has long held that on matters of church discipline, faith practice, and religious law, the Free Exercise Clause requires civil courts to refrain from interfering with the determinations of the `highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried.'Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871)).
In this same vein, the First Circuit has also observed that "it is beyond peradventure that civil courts cannot adjudicate disputes turning on church policy and administration and practice." Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09, 96 S. Ct. 2371, 2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446-47, 89 S. Ct. 601, 604-05, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 114-16, 73 S. Ct. 143, 153-55, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16, 50 S. Ct. 5, 7-8, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929); Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 726-32, 20 L.Ed. 666). The Natal court also stated that in determining whether the plaintiffs' claims involve issues of "church policy and administration or . . . religious doctrine and practice":
We look to the substance and effect of plaintiffs' complaint, not its emblemata. Howsoever a suit may be labelled, once a court is called upon to probe into a religious body's selection and retention of clergymen, the First Amendment is implicated. We agree entirely with the Fifth Circuit that:
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.Id. at 1576-77 (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.3d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972)).
Except in the rare occasion when a compelling governmental interest in public health, safety or the general welfare can be demonstrated will the courts interfere with ecclesiastical matters. Yaggie v. Indiana-Kentucky Synod, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 64 F.3d 664, 1995 WL 499468, **4 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 1995) (unpub.) (per curiam) (citing Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corporation, 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974)). The Yaggie court further observed:
The interaction between a church and its pastor is not only an integral part of church government, but also all matters touching this relationship are of ecclesiastical concern. It makes no difference when the ecclesiastical dispute fails to touch on church or religious doctrine. "Evaluation of the gifts and graces of a minister must be left to ecclesiastical institutions." Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf., 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and there is no exception to the bar against interfering with matters of church administration. Id.Yaggie, 1995 WL 499468 at **4 (internal citations omitted).
In this instance, upon review of the record, including the pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties, it is clear that regardless of how the claims set forth in the plaintiffs' complaint may be labeled, resolving the plaintiffs' claims would required this Court to enter into areas implicating the First Amendment. Natal, 878 F.2d at 1576-77. Specifically, the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint makes it clear that Mr. Ogle seeks review of matters internal to the Church of God, particularly, matters of church discipline, faith, religious law and, most importantly, the licensing of ministers/bishops by the Church of God. Lewis, 978 F.2d at 941-42; Natal, 878 F.2d at 1575-76; Yaggie, 1995 WL 499468 at **4.
In Count I, Mr. Ogle alleges that his license as a minister/bishop was governed by the General Assembly Minutes of the Church of God, which he asserts created an implied contract between himself and the Church of God. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 50]. He alleges that the Defendants breached their obligations under this implied contract by denying him certain obligations owed to him under Section 65 of the General Assembly Minutes. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 52. Mr. Ogle states that the "governance of the Church of God is undertaken in accordance with published "Minutes" as a result of a biennial General Assembly. Id. at ¶ 46.
Section 65 of the "Minutes of the 65th General Assembly of the Church of God" state in relevant part:
The discipline of a member of the body of Christ is a painful, but necessary experience . . . all such action is to be undertaken in love with a view toward restoration and reconciliation.
A minister who is found guilty of any of the violations of ministerial covenant and trust prescribed in these Minutes shall be disciplined for the purpose of restoration and maintaining accountability and integrity within the church and the ministerial body. The discipline and restoration process shall be based upon Scriptural principles . . .
[Court File No. 42, Exhibit G, Part D](emphasis added).
It is clear from the plaintiffs' complaint that the contract which he is alleging was breached is a Church of God document created solely for the purpose of the governance of the Church of God. In asking this Court to determine whether his rights under the General Assembly Minutes were breached, Mr. Ogle is necessarily asking this Court to delve into matters of church policy, doctrine, administration and practice. Further, the plain language of the complaint shows that the alleged breach occurred within the context of internal disciplinary proceedings within the Church of God and pursuant to the Minutes, an issue which touches upon matters of the Church of God's selection and retention, i.e., licensing, of the members of its clergy.
In Count II, Mr. Ogle seeks a declaratory judgment that the charging body within the Church of God that proffered charges against him did not have the legal and/or proper authority to make such charges. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 55]. However: civil courts do not inquire whether the relevant (heirarchical) church governing body has power under religious law (to decide such disputes) . . . Such a determination . . . frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a (heirarchical) church so as to decide . . . religious law (governing church polity) . . . would violated the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-09 (quoting Md. Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369, 90 S. Ct. 499, 500, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Milivojevich Court further stated:
The law knows no heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect, the right to organize voluntary religious association to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions, could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence to these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.Id., 426 U.S. at 709-10, 96 S. Ct. at 2381 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728-29, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)).
In Count III, Mr. Ogle alleges that defendants interfered with his business relationships by conspiring to fabricate evidence and charges against him, and colluding to deny him his basic rights as set forth in the General Assembly Minutes. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 61]. Likewise in Count V, Mr. Ogle alleges that Defendants conspired and colluded with each other by: (a) proffering charges against Mr. Ogle in an unauthorized forum so that the could control the outcome of the disciplinary process; (b) creating fraudulent testimonials to support charges against Mr. Ogle subsequent to the actions of the First Fact Finding Committee, (c) agreeing to deny him his basic rights under the General Assembly Minutes; and (d) agreeing to prevent Mr. Ogle from being restored to his ministry. Id. at ¶ 70.
The allegations in Counts III and V stem from actions taken in the context of the investigation of the Church of God of the charges made against Mr. Ogle and/or the subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Further, in both counts Mr. Ogle complains about certain steps taken during the course of the disciplinary process and, essentially asks this Court to interpret and enforce the disciplinary process as set forth in the General Assembly Minutes.
Moreover, throughout his complaint, Mr. Ogle asserts that the disciplinary process against him was based upon "false and derogatory information." Id. at ¶ 28. For instance, he states that he objected to the August 15, 2001 report of the First Fact Finding Committee as "being grossly inaccurate." Id. at 27. He also complains that the October 12, 2001 report of the second Fact Finding Committee was also "grossly inaccurate." Id. at 29.
Mr. Ogle alleges that the decision to convene the second Fact Finding Committee was based upon several false and derogatory statements/charges submitted to defendant Davis after the August 15, 2001 first Fact Finding Committee report. Id. at ¶ 28. Mr. Ogle also complains that, in contravention of Church of God polity, he was not provided with copies of these statements prior to the convening of the second Fact Finding Committee. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.
Mr. Ogle also asserts that before the trial Board he "vociferously challenged the authority of the Fact Finding Committee to proffer charges against him, including the submission of a number of detailed letters over his specific objections." Id. at 33. Furthermore, Mr. Ogle admits that he was subsequently informed that a General Trial Board had been appointed to hear the charges against him; and, he admits he received copies of the statements from the second Fact Finding Committee prior to the trial. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35. Finally, Mr. Ogle complains that, after he asserts that he completed all aspects of his restoration process, during his appearance before the Reinstatement Committee:
The most important thing that the Reinstatement Committee focused upon was the fact that [Mr. Ogle] had retained legal counsel and had indicated that he was considering numerous options, including the filing of a lawsuit. In fact [Mr. Ogle] was asked at one time whether, if he was reinstated, would he still sue the Church of God. [Mr. Ogle] advised that he would indeed sue if the International Executive Council did not rectify the gross injustice . . .Id. at ¶ 44.
Although Mr. Ogle complains that the actions of the Defendants were not consistent with Church of God polity, i.e., were "arbitrary," all of the aforementioned events took place internally within the Church of God. Subsequent to the first Fact Finding Committee, defendants Phillips, Watkins, Stone/Daniel, and Mark Williams tendered other statements concerning Mr. Ogle to officials of the Church of God. This resulted in a decision by the Church of God to convene a second Fact Finding Committee and, eventually, a General Trial Board to consider the charges made against Mr. Ogle by other Church of God ministers. Moreover, the first and second Fact Finding Committees and the General Trial Board — all of which were disciplinary proceedings internal to the Church of God — heard and considered the testimony/evidence offered by Mr. Ogle as well as the evidence offered by his accusers and determined which evidence to consider and the weight/credibility to accord to such evidence.
In Milivojevich, the Supreme Court stated:
We have concluded that whether or not there is room for "marginal civil court review" under the narrow rubrics of "fraud" or "collusion" when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no "arbitrariness" exception in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organizations of heirarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law. For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church are in that sense "arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of a church tribunal as it finds them . . .Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
In Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S. Ct. 277 (1986) the Court stated:
[T]he Court has established a firm policy protecting First Amendment rights that prohibits inquiry into ecclesiastical decisions in a hierarchical church absent the most unusual circumstances. As pointed out in Ellman, Driven From the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 Cal.L.R. 1378, 1987 (1981):
[T]he only exception to strict deference apparently left open by [ Milivojevich] was "marginal review" for fraud or collusion and the possibility of such review was not endorsed, but merely left for later review.
The plaintiff in Hutchinson was an ordained Methodist minister who challenged his enforced retirement under Church disciplinary rules. Id., 792 F.2d at 392. In his complaint the plaintiff raised various claims including: (1) the defendants had improperly applied provisions of The Discipline of the United Methodist Church, which governed the appointment and placement of Ministers in the Church; (2) the defendants had misled and misguided various units of the denomination to bring about his early retirement; and (3) the defendants were guilty of "fraudulent or collusive or arbitrary" action, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. Id. at 393.
The Sixth Circuit stated that the crux of the plaintiff's complaint in Hutchinson was that he was falsely characterized as "unappointable" to the ministry based upon fraud, misrepresentation and the withholding from various bodies with the Methodist Church the true facts of his ministry. Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that the federal courts could not constitutionally intervene in such action because the plaintiff was "really seeking civil court review of subjective judgments made by religious officials and bodies that he had become `unappointable.'"
The claims raised by Mr. Ogle in this action are strikingly similar to the claims raised by the plaintiff in Hutchinson. Further, in this action Mr. Ogle is really seeking court review of the decision of officials within the Church of God not to restore him to the ministry.
Accordingly, the Court finds that as a matter of First Amendment law, it lacks the authority to entertain the claims set forth in Counts I, II, III and V of the plaintiffs' complaint.
In Count IV, Mr. Ogle asserts that during the course of the disciplinary process, Defendants invaded his privacy by revealing information he had provided to defendant Daniel in confidence, and also by interfering, or attempting to interfere, with his relationship with Dr. Gillon. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 64-67]. In asserting that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment should not preclude this Court's entertaining of his claims for invasion of privacy, Mr. Ogle relies on the case of Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S. Ct. 546 (1985)). In that case, Alberts, a minister of the United Methodist Church, brought suit against Devine, a psychiatrist, and two of his church superiors, alleging that his clerical superiors intentionally induced Devine to disclose confidential information relating to Albert's "diagnosis, [mental] condition, behavior and treatment." Id., 479 N.E.2d at 116. Alberts further alleged that his clerical superiors divulged the confidential information learned from Devine to numerous individual members, boards, committees and subcommittees of the Southern New England Conference of the United Methodist Church with the view of convincing them that Alberts was mentally ill and should not be reappointed as minister of the Old West Church in Boston. Id.
Mr. Ogle alleges that after the conclusion of his trial before the General Trial Board he "was ordered to undergo a restoration process that included counseling sessions with an approved psychologist, Rick Gillon." [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 37]. Mr. Ogle asserts that Defendants attempted to interfere with his relationship with Dr. Gillon and to interfere in Dr. Gillon's relationship with him. Id. at ¶ 66. In particular, Mr. Ogle alleges that "[d]uring the counseling process, [d]efendant Vining attempted to interfere with the counseling in the attempt to prejudice the outcome." Id. at ¶ 39. Nonetheless, Mr. Ogle also alleges that he "completed all aspects of his restoration process. In fact, his counselor [Rick Gillon] indicated that, in his professional opinion, restoration should commence immediately." Id. at ¶ 40. Thus, based upon Mr. Ogle's own allegations, Defendants alleged invasion of privacy/interference with his relationship with Rick Gillon was unsuccessful at best.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the First Amendment would not preclude judicial inquiry into the merits of Albert's claims against his church superiors where it was alleged that his superiors wrongfully intended to induce his psychiatrist to breach physicianpatient confidentiality. Id., 479 N.E.2d at 122-23. Further, the Alberts court held that given the allegations before it; namely, wrongful inducement of a breach of the physician-patient relationship for the purpose of preventing Albert's reappointment, "the First Amendment does not bar judicial inquiry into the church's proceedings culminating in Albert's failure to gain reappointment." Id., 479 N.E.2d at 123.
However, in Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d 301 (Mass. 2004), the Supreme Judicial court of Massachusetts distinguished its holding in Alberts. In Callahan, the plaintiff brought suit challenging, inter alia, the suspension of his privilege to be a minister by the Massachusetts Conference of the United Church of Christ. Id. at 303. The plaintiff in Callahan was accused of having an "inappropriate" relationship with a seminarian as well as other "bizarre behavior." Id. at 304. Following a hearing in which the plaintiff's "standing as a minister in the Metropolitan Boston association" was indefinitely suspended, the plaintiff was told he "could apply for reinstatement on completion and report to the committee of a `complete physiological examination . . . as well as a complete psychological examination.'" Id. at 305. The committee which was to consider the plaintiff's request for reinstatement also required the plaintiff to "authorize representatives of the committee to communicate their concerns to the health care providers before the examinations, to examine fully all records of the examinations, and to discuss the results of the examinations with the health care providers." Id. at 305-06.
The Callahan court found that the Massachusetts courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's claim of inducing a violation of his right to privacy as a matter of First Amendment law. Id. at 309. The Callahan court stated that the plaintiff's claims
except the defamation claim . . . arose from the "disciplinary review process" initiated, pursued, or conducted by the various defendants against Callahan. "The First Amendment states that `Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' The principle that this language precludes jurisdiction of civil courts over Church disputes touching on matters of doctrine, canon law, polity, discipline and ministerial relationships is firmly established in Massachusetts case law."Id. at 311 (citing Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820, 436 Mass. 574, 579 (2002)). The Callahan court further stated:
We decline to venture into the realm of interpreting internal guidelines and procedures that have been adopted by the [United Church of Christ] . . . a church must be free to decide for itself what its obligations to its ministers are, without being subject to court interference . . .Id. (citing Williams, 436 Mass. at 581; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713).
Finally, with regard to its earlier holding in Alberts, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated:
This case is distinguishable from Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113, cert. denied, sub. nom. Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S. Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985), on which Callahan relies. There we held that the First Amendment would not bar judicial inquiry into an invasion of privacy claim by a minister against clerical supervisors who wrongfully induced the plaintiff's psychiatrist to divulge confidential medical information. See id. at 72-73, 479 N.E.2d 113. Our holding was grounded on the fact that the case did not involve the plaintiff's qualifications to serve as a minister. Id. at 73, 479 N.E.2d 113. In the case at bar, the committee on the ministry was trying to ascertain Callahan's fitness to continue as a minister, and the court has no jurisdiction to determine what type of information a church may require in order to determine a minister's fitness. "It is clear that the assessment of an individual's qualifications to be a minister, and the appointment and retirement of ministers, are ecclesiastical matters entitled to constitutional protection against judicial or other State interference." Id. at 72-73, 479 N.E.2d 113, citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S. Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952)).Id. at 313.
This case is virtually identical to the situation present in Callahan and readily distinguishable from the situation in Alberts. In this case the allegedly confidential information which Mr. Ogle revealed to defendant Daniel was revealed to Defendants as part of the investigation and disciplinary process into the charges made against Mr. Ogle. Further, Mr. Ogle entered into counseling with Rick Gillon as part of the restoration process that was offered to him following the decision of the General Trial Board. As such, Mr. Ogle should have understood that some of the defendants would have contact with Rick Gillon to determine if Mr. Ogle were cooperating in the counseling process and they would attempt to communication to Gillon their concerns about the restoration process as well as communicating to Gillon what information they would seek from him at the conclusion of the counseling/restoration process.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Ogle's claims of invasion of privacy under First Amendment law.
In Count VII, Mr. Ogle alleges defamation; namely, that Defendants published false and defamatory statements to individuals involved in the discipline process, as well as to the general membership of the Church of God. [Court File No. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 79-80]. In Yaggie, the Sixth Circuit held that the courts had no jurisdiction where the alleged defamatory statements were made in connection with a mediation process which sought to resolve a dispute between a pastor and his congregation and the alleged defamatory statements were made "strictly within the confines of the church." Yaggie, 1995 WL 499468 at **4. The Yaggie court noted that "[t]he alleged defamation concerned the minister's current and future employment relationship with the church" which were "matters of ecclesiastical concern . . ." Id.
Based upon plaintiff's allegations, the alleged false and defamatory statements were made in connection with the investigation and disciplinary process within the Church of God and the alleged defamation took place within the confines of the church. Therefore, the Court concludes that as a matter of First Amendment law it also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Ogle's claim of invasion of privacy.
Finally, the claims made in Counts VI, intentional infliction of emotional distress; Count VIII, exemplary/punitive damages; and Count IX, loss of consortium, are derivative of the other claims made by the plaintiff and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider those claims as part of First Amendment law for the same reasons that it lacks jurisdiction over the other, primary, claims in the plaintiffs' complaint.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in great detail above, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims set forth in Plaintiffs' complaint as a matter of First Amendment law. Accordingly, the Court finds that as a matter of law, the Defendants' motion to dismiss, which under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) must be treated as a motion for a summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 [Court File No. 40] will be GRANTED.
A separate judgment will enter.