Opinion
No. CV-03-0083327
February 28, 2005
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( # 105, #106)
On April 27, 1999, Marguerite Seyse (Seyse), who was domiciled in Milford, Connecticut, died. Following Seyse's death, her daughter Elenor Olson (Olson) applied to the Probate Court in Milford, Connecticut, for probate of a will that was dated February 27, 1997 (1997 will or will) and had been executed in Milford, Connecticut. Seyse's other daughter Judith Oehler (Oehler) filed a motion to dismiss the application which was denied by the Probate Court. Oehler maintained that Seyse lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will as a matter of law because she had been adjudicated a mental incompetent in the State of New Jersey on January 26, 1994. The Probate Court rejected this claim and ordered an adjudication of testamentary capacity. This appeal followed. Each side has now moved for summary judgment.
The underlying facts are not disputed: Marguerite was born on October 15, 1910 and she married Howard A. Seyse on February 14, 1934. The Seyses had two daughters, Olson and Oehler. Seyse resided in New York until 1992 when she moved to New Jersey. In 1993, Olson instituted guardianship proceedings in New Jersey on the ground of mental incompetence. On January 26, 1994, New Jersey Superior Court Judge Reginald Stanton, sitting in the Chancery Division, Probate Part, Morris County, entered a judgment finding Seyse to be "a mental incompetent as a result of unsoundness of mind and . . . incapable of governing herself and managing her affairs, and . . . unable to consent to medical treatment." NJ. Statutes §§ 3B-12-24, 3B-12-25. Olson, Oehler and Oehler's husband, John W. Oehlor, were appointed co-guardians of Seyse's person and property. Judge Stanton also appointed an arbitrator for disputes among the co-guardians.
N.J. Statutes § 3B:12-25 provides: "The Superior Court may determine the mental incompetency of an alleged mental incompetent and appoint a guardian for his person, guardian for his estate or a guardian for his person and estate. Letters of guardianship shall be granted to the spouse, if the spouse is living with the incompetent as man and wife at the time the incompetency arose, or to his heirs, or if none of them will accept the letters or it is proven to the court that no appointment from among them will be to the best interest of the incompetent or his estate, then to any other proper person as will accept the same."
N.J. Statutes § 3B:12-24 provides: "In civil actions or proceedings for the determination of mental incompetency or for the appointment of a guardian for an alleged mental incompetent, the trial of the issue of mental incompetency may be had without a jury pursuant to Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, unless a trial by jury is demanded by the alleged mental incompetent or someone on his behalf."
In 1994, N.J. Statutes § 3B:1-2 defined a "mental incompetent" as follows: "a person who is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency to the extent that he lacks sufficient capacity to govern himself and manage his affairs" or "a person who is impaired by reason of physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic alcoholism or other cause (except minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient capacity to govern himself and manage his affairs." In January 1998, New Jersey substituted the term "incapacitated person" for "mental incompetent" in this subsection of the statute. N.J. Chapter Laws 1997, c. 379, § 3, effective January 19, 1998.
On February 28, 1997, while visiting with Olson in Connecticut, Seyse executed the 1997 will which Oehler now challenges. Seyse was transferred from a Senior Quarters residence, where she had been residing in New Jersey, to the Chilton Pshychiatric Crisis Center where she remained until Olson had her discharged and brought her to Connecticut. Subsequently, further proceedings took place in New Jersey court regarding the guardianship. By order dated November 8, 1998, Judge Kenneth MacKenzie appointed Olson guardian of Seyse's person and Oehler the guardian of Seyse's property. By implication, the court's decision approved of Seyse's change of domicile to Connecticut. Thereafter, Seyse continued to reside with Olsen in Milford, Connecticut until she died on April 27, 1999.
After Seyse died, proceedings were held in New Jersey, again in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Morris County, regarding jurisdiction of the probate of Seyse's will. In a decison dated December 13, 2000, Judge MacKenzie concluded that Seyse was domiciled in Connecticut at the time of her death and that "jurisdiction regarding the probate of Seyse's Will is properly in Connecticut." Thereafter, Oehler appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey which issued a decision on August 6, 2002 affirming Judge MacKenzie. The court held that Olsen, as Seyse's guardian, could not act to change Seyse's domicle and that the change of Seyse's domicle to Connecticut in 1998 was in her best interest. In the Matter of Seyse, 353 N.J. Super. 580, 590, 803 A.2d 694 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 175 N.J. 80, 812 A.2d 1112 (2002). Accordingly, it concluded probate jurisdiction lay in Connecticut.
By statute, New Jersey precludes an individual who has been judicially determined to be "mentally incompetent" from executing a valid will unless there is a subsequent judicial adjudication that the person has returned to competency. N.J. Statutes § 3B: 12-27. The question in this case is whether that statutory preclusion applies, as a matter of law, to invalidate a will, admitted for probate in Connecticut, of a Connecticut domiciliary who had been adjudicated a mental incompetent under New Jersey law prior to the execution of the challenged will. Oehler, the plaintiff in this case, relies on the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution and principles of collateral estoppel in arguing that Connecticut must find that Seyse lacked testamentary capacity to execute the 1997 will as a matter of law. Olson counters that the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable because New Jersey waived jurisdiction over Seyse's estate and that there is no issue preclusion because the issue of Seyse's testamentary capacity in 1997, as defined in Connecticut, was not litigated in the 1994 New Jersey guardianship proceeding.
N.J. Statutes § 3B:12-27 provides: "If a mental incompetent dies intestate or without any will except one which was executed after commencement of proceedings which ultimately resulted in a judgment of incompetency, and before a judgment has been entered adjudicating a return to competency, his property shall descend and be distributed as in the case of intestacy."
The validity of a will conveying personal property, including issues of testamentary capacity, is controlled by the law of the testator's domicile at the time of death. Appeal of Murdoch, 81 Conn. 681, 72 A. 290 (1909); see Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 263, W. Richman and W. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws, § 90[a] (3d. Ed. 2002). Connecticut requires a factual determination of testamentary capacity when it is challenged. See Stanton v. Grigley, 177 Conn. 558, 564, 418 A.2d 923 (1979). In contrast, N.J. Stat. § 3B:12-27 is a "specific legislative enactment in respect of testamentary capacity," Hackensack University Med. Ctr. v. Rossi, 338 N.J.Super. 139, 149, 768 A.2d 254 (2001), which has no analog in Connecticut law. The New Jersey legislature has concluded that for a person subject to guardianship there is to be no litigation regarding testamentary capacity after that person's death. In re Estate of Bechtold, 150 N.J. Super. 550, 555, 376 A.2d 211 (1977), cert. denied, 77 N.J. 468, 391 A.2d 484 (1978); cf. Matter of Estate of Frisch, 250 N.J. Super. 438, 448, 594 A.2d 1367 (1991). Here, Oehler seeks to have the New Jersey statute, rather than Connecticut law, govern the issue of Seyse's testamentary capacity. This presents a classic choice of law question.
The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws provides as follows:
§ 263. Validity and Effect of Will of Movables
(1) Whether a will transfers an interest in movables and the nature of the interest transferred are determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the state where the testator was domiciled at the time of his death.
(2) These courts would usually apply their own local law in determining such questions.
Comment (a) to this section provides that it pertains to testamentary capacity, as well as other issues.
In a choice of law analysis, the general rule is that forum law provides the rule of decision. Thus, the proponent of the application of foreign law must persuade the court that it is proper to displace forum law by demonstrating that "applying the [foreign] law would advance a policy goal sought by the sovereign which promulgated the law." W. Richman and W. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws, § 78[a] (3d Ed. 2002). Judicial economy appears to be the only apparent policy advanced by N.J. Stat. § 3B:12-27. Since New Jersey has given up any interest in the probate of Seyse's estate, Connecticut's application of its own law permitting a factual inquiry into testamentary capacity does not impose on New Jersey's interest in judicial economy as expressed in its statute. Accordingly, under a choice of law analysis, Connecticut is justified in using its own law regarding the validity of wills and testamentary capacity.
Oehler, however, seeks to avoid that question by maintaining that the New Jersey statutory preclusion is an "effect" of the 1994 guardianship judgment to which Connecticut must give full and faith and credit, citing the general proposition that "the full faith and credit clause requires a state to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it." Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 214 Conn. 52, 56, 570 A.2d 687 (1990). Oehler is not seeking to enforce the guardianship judgment in Connecticut but rather to benefit from a statutory presumption which the judgment implicates in New Jersey by raising the New Jersey statute as a bar to the admission of the 1997 will to probate. Thus, to the extent Oehler has a viable constitutional claim under the full faith and credit clause, the issue is whether Connecticut must give extraterritorial effect to the New Jersey statute. The court must turn to federal law to decide this issue. Segal v. Segal, 86 Conn.App. 617, 639 n. 21, 863 A.2d 221 (2004).
If Oehler were seeking to enforce the 1994 New Jersey judgment, it is well established that "the full faith and credit clause does not impose procedural constraints on the . . . manner in which an out-of-state judgment is enforceable in the courts of this state. `Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law.' Baker v. General Motors Corp., [ 522 U.S. 222, 235, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998), see also Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 99, pp. 303-04 (1971)." Nastro v. D'Onofrio, 76 Conn.App. 814, 820, 822 A.2d 286 (2003).
In deciding issues of extraterritorial effects of statutes under the full faith and credit clause, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "a State need not substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." (Internal quotation marks omitted; internal citations omitted). Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 155 L.Ed.2d 702, 711 (2003). Traditionally, state legislatures have been deemed competent to enact legislation regarding the disposition of estates. It is well established that "the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same persons and events." Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493, 502, 59 S.Ct. 629, 633, 83 L.Ed. 940, 945 (1939). Nonetheless, the full faith and credit clause and the due process clause require the application of the law of the state which has a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S 302, 310-13, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981). See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 640, 519 A.2d 13 (1986); Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn.App. 372, 385, 202 A.2d 70, cert. granted, 261 Conn. 936, 806 A.2d 1066 (2002).
Based on the undisputed facts, it is clear that there is significant contact with Connecticut in this case and a significant interest in applying Connecticut's law regarding testamentary capacity which make the choice of Connecticut law neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Most important is the fact that Seyse was domiciled in Connecticut at the time of her death, a fact the New Jersey court found when it concluded it lacked jurisdiction to probate Seyse's estate. In the Matter of Seyse, supra, 353 N.J.Super. 590. Moreover by acknowledging that probate jurisdiction lies in Connecticut, New Jersey has arguably waived any interest in the extraterritorial application of its statute. Indeed, under New Jersey law as interpreted by the court in the Seyse case, id., at 587, the ratification of Seyse's change of domicile to Connecticut in 1998 means that New Jersey lost jurisdiction over her at that time.
Under New Jersey law, the court lacks jurisdiction over an alleged incompetent or incapacitated person unless it determines she is a domiciliary of New Jersey. In the Matter of Jacobs, 315 N.J.Super. 189, 717 A.2d 432 (1998); In re Estate of Gillmore, 101 N.J.Super 77, 90 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 52 N.J. 175 (1968).
Another significant factor is that the challenged will was executed in Connecticut. Unlike New Jersey, Connecticut has a strong public policy that permits a person subject to conservatorship, Connecticut's equivalent to New Jersey's guardianship, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-644 et seq., to execute a valid will if she is over the age of eighteen, of sound mind, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-250, and meets the common-law test for the testamentary capacity. Connecticut's approach to this issue reflects a considered view that the an autonomy and decision-making of an incapacitated person, even one who requires a conservator, with respect to the disposition of her estate should not be subject to any per se rule and should be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. Application of the preclusive effect of § 3B:12-27 would undermine, not further, Connecticut's public policy. Accordingly, Seyse's testamentary capacity must be adjudicated and determined by the probate court by applying Connecticut law and without consideration of the New Jersey statute.
Oehler maintains in the alternative that she is entitled to summary judgment because the issue of Seyse's testamentary capacity was fully litigated and determined in the 1994 New Jersey guardianship proceeding and that Olson should be collaterally estopped from litigating the issue in the probate court. "[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata that prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim . . . An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined . . . An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Efthimiou v. Smith, 268 Conn. 499, 506-07 (2004), in order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the "issues sought to be litigated in the new proceeding must be identical to those considered in the prior proceedings . . . that is, the prior litigation must have resolved the same legal or factual issue that is presented in the second litigation . . . Simply put, collateral estoppel has no application in the absence of an identical issue." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services, 271 Conn. 679, 689-90, 859 A.2d 533 (2004).
The issue before the New Jersey court in 1994 was whether Seyse met New Jersey's statutory definition of a "mental incompetent," N.J. Statutes § 3B:1-2, see note 1, infra., to permit the appointment of a guardian of her person and estate. N.J Statutes §§ 3B:12-24, 12-25. The issue in this case is whether Seyse had testamentary capacity on February 28, 1997. That issue was not determined, either legally or factually, in the 1994 guardianship proceeding.
In Connecticut, "[a]ny person eighteen years or older, and of sound mind, may dispose of his estate by will." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-250. The test for testamentary capacity is that the "testatrix must have had mind and memory sound enough to know and understand the business upon which she was engaged, that of the execution of a will, at the very time she executed it." City National Bank Trust Co.'s Appeal, 145 Conn. 518, 521, 144 A.2d 338 (1958); see Stanton v. Grigley, supra, 177 Conn. 564. This test does not require a testatrix to have the "mental capacity sufficient for the management or transaction of business generally . . . some mental impairment could occur and still leave the testatrix with a sound mind within the definition of testamentary capacity." See Doolittle v. Upson, 138 Conn. 642, 645, 88 A.2d 334 (1952). The focus is the testatrix's state of mind as of the date of the execution of the will.
There is no record of the 1994 guardianship proceeding before this court other than Judge Stanton's unexplicated conclusion that "Marguerite Seyse is a mental incompetent as a result of unsoundness of mind" as of January 26, 1994. That conclusion does not answer the questions of testamentary capacity presented here, for example: Was Seyse mentally impaired on February 27, 1997? If so, did she still have sufficiently sound mind and memory to know that she was executing a will and understand the process she was engaged in? Moreover, Judge Stanton did not have to reach the conclusion that Seyse exhibited "unsoundness of mind" to render a valid judgment of guardianship based on New Jersey's statutory definitions of a "mental incompetent." Accordingly, neither the "actually litigated" nor "necessarily decided" prongs of issue preclusion are satisfied in the case and there is no basis to collaterally estop Olson from litigating Seyse's testamentary capacity in the probate court.
For the foregoing reasons, Oehler's motion for summary judgment (# 105) is denied; Olson's cross motion for summary judgment (# 106) is granted and the appeal is dismissed.
Linda K. Lager, Judge